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ABSTRACT 
Traditionally, only States are considered as duty-bearers under 
international human rights law.  Fundamental human rights guarantees 
have been conceived as standards of legal protection for individuals against 
the abuse of States.  However, with the emergence of various non-State 
actors, States are no longer the only entities who may interfere with the 
enjoyment of human rights.  The obligations of certain categories non-
State actors under international human rights law have been much studied, 
but the application of intHUQDWLRQDO KXPDQ ULJKWV ODZ WR ³XQUHFRJQLVHG
HQWLWLHV ´ZKR fulfil the traditional criteria of statehood and have achieved 
de facto independence but are not generally recognised as States by the 
international community, have received relatively limited scholarly 
attention.  This thesis aims to fill this gap and examine whether existing 
rules of international human rights law, especially those concerning non-
State actors, provide any basis for such application. 
Special emphasis will be placed on the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) as 
an example of an unrecognised entity.  From the birth of the United 
Nations, the ROC government participated in human rights-related work 
within the organisation.  Yet, after the adoption of General Assembly 
Resolution 2758, which recognised the representatives of the government 
RIWKH3HRSOH¶s Republic of China as the lawful representatives of China, the 
52&¶V signatures and ratifications of international treaties are no longer 
recognised, and 7DLZDQ¶V recent attempts to ratify/accede to international 
human rights treaties have been unsuccessful.  Questions arise whether 
Taiwan is bound by these treaties and non-treaty rules of international 
human rights law.  It is envisaged that an examination of theories and 
practice regarding the application of international human rights law to 
unrecognised entities will inform the case study of Taiwan and contribute to 
the development of arguments justifying the application of international 
human rights law to Taiwan. 
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-XQH81'RF
A/HRC/23/58. 
81 +XPDQ 5LJKWV &RXQFLO µ5HSRUW RI WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &RPPLVVLRQ RI
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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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
I. Background 
International human rights law, like other branches of international law, 
traditionally only regarded States as subjects to whom the law applied and 
who bore the duty to perform certain obligations. 1   This State-centred 
characteristic of international human rights law may be traced back to the 
fact that the current international human rights regime2 was developed in 
response to the atrocities of the Second World War.3  Human rights in 
international law have traditionally been conceived as ³fundamental 
guarantees standards of legal protection for individuals against the power, 
and particularly, against the abuse of power of states´.4  Even in situations 
where the interference with the enjoyment of human rights is caused by 
non-State actors, WKLV LV OLNHO\ WR EH FRQVLGHUHG DV D EUHDFK RI D 6WDWH¶V
obligation to discharge its obligation to secure the rights of individuals 
within its jurisdiction.5  
This statist approach raises certain concerns.  Firstly, determining whether 
an entity is a State is not always an easy task.  There have long been 
controversies and debates surrounding the criteria required for statehood 
                                                            
1  Robert McCorquodale µNon-State Actors and International Human Rights Law¶ LQ Sarah 
Joseph and Adam McBeth (eds), Research Handbook on International Human Rights Law 
(Edward Elgar 2010) 97, 100. 
2  7KH WHUP ³LQWHUQDWLRQDO KXPDQ ULJKWV UHJLPH´ LV meant to include the system and 
institutions established by international human rights treaties, as well as organs of 
international organisations tasked with human rights-related functions. 
3 =HKUD ) .DEDVDNDO $UDW µLooking beyond the State But Not Ignoring It: A Framework of 
Analysis for Non-State Actors and Human Rights¶ LQ *HRUJH - Andreopoulos, Zehra F 
Kabasakal Arat, and Peter H Juviler (eds), Non-State Actors in the Human Rights Universe 
(Kumarian Press 2006) 3. 
4 $XJXVW5HLQLVFK µ7KH&KDQJLQJ ,QWHUnational Legal Framework for Dealing with Non-State 
$FWRUV¶LQ3KLOLS$OVWRQHGNon-State Actors and Human Rights (OUP 2005) 37-38. 
5 Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (OUP 2006) 26.  See also 
Robert McCorquodale and Rebecca La ForgiaµTaking off the Blindfolds: Torture by Non-State 
Actors¶ (2001) 1 Human Rights L Rev 189, 198-203.  See also Robert McCorquodale and 
3HQHORSH 6LPRQV µ5HVSRQVLELOLW\ EH\RQG %RUGHUV 6WDWH 5HVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU ([WUDWHUULWRULDO
Violations by CorporaWLRQVRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO+XPDQ5LJKWV/DZ¶0RGHUQ/5HY
624. 
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and how those criteria should be interpreted.6  This creates confusion as to 
whether entities whose statehood is contested bear obligations under 
international human rights law.  Secondly, even if an entity fulfils the 
criteria of statehood, it is still possible that it will not be recognised as a 
State by other States in the international community.  This lack of 
recognition may result in a disputed legal status, and the entity may face 
difficulties in participating in international organisations and treaties, which 
further leads to doubts as to whether such an entity is bound by 
international human rights law in the same manner as States.7  Thirdly, 
the State-centred focus begs the question of international human rights 
ODZ¶V DSSOLFDELOLW\ WR QRQ-State actors, especially considering the 
emergence of non-State actors in recent decades and the increase in their 
importance in the international community and influence over rights-
holders.  It may be argued that States are no longer the sole duty-bearers 
under international human rights law, and it has even been suggested that 
³QRWKLQJ LQ KXPDQ ULJKWV WKHRU\ « SUHFOXGHV WKH LPSRVLWLRQ of legal 
REOLJDWLRQVRQDFWRUVRWKHUWKDQ6WDWHV´8  However, the issues of whether 
different categories of non-State actors have obligations under 
international human rights law and the scope of those obligations remain 
to be explored.9  
These concerns are of particular relevance in the discussion regarding the 
applicability of international human rights law to one specific category of 
entities: those who are not recognised as States but display State-like 
                                                            
6 See Chapter 2, particularly Section II.A. 
7 See Chapter 2, Section II.B. 
8 <lHO5RQHQµ+XPDQ5LJKWV2EOLJDWLRQVRI7HUULWRULDO1RQ-6WDWH$FWRUV¶&RUQHOO,ntl 
LJ 21, 21.  6HHDOVR$QWKRQ\&XOOHQDQG6WHYHQ:KHDWOH\µ7KH+XPDQ5LJKWVRI,QGLYLGXDOVLQ
De Facto 5HJLPHVXQGHUWKH(XURSHDQ&RQYHQWLRQRQ+XPDQ5LJKWV¶+XPDQ5LJKWV
L Rev 691, 727-28. 
9 Discussions regarding the applicability of international human rights law to non-State actors 
can be found throughout the thesis, particular Chapter 3, Sections II.B-II.D and Chapter 4, 
Section III. 
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attributes and exert influence over individuals in a manner similar to States.  
7KHVH³XQUHFRJQLVHGHQWLWLHV´ 10 act as de facto governing authorities over 
certain territories and perform functions traditionally assumed by States.  
It is possible for them to undertake actions which³LIFDUULHGRXWE\VWDtes, 
ZRXOG EH UHJDUGHG DV YLRODWLRQV RI KXPDQ ULJKWV ODZ´11  However, it is 
doubtful whether they bear any obligation under international human 
rights law.   
Against this background, among various unrecognised entities, the choice 
of case study for this thesis is inspired by the unsuccessful attempts of the 
Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan)12 to accede to the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 2007 
and to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) in 2009.13  After the Chinese Civil War that ended in 1949, the 
ROC lost control of the Chinese mainland, which formed the majority of the 
52&¶V WHUULWRU\.  The same year saw the establishment of WKH 3HRSOH¶V
Republic of China (PRC), and since then the ROC and the PRC governments 
have been fighting for recognition at the international level.  After two 
decades of diplomatic battle, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly 
adopted Resolution 2758 in 1971, recognising the representatives of the 
PRC government as the lawful representatives of China, and gradually, the 
ROC lost support from other States and is not recognised as a State by the 
                                                            
10 For a detailed discussion of the term and its criteria, see Chapter 2, Section III. 
11 5RQHQµ+XPDQ5LJKWV2EOLJDWLRQVRI Territorial Non-6WDWH$FWRUV¶(n 8) 47. 
12 :KLOH³7DLZDQ´LVVRPHWLPHVXVHGDVDJHRJUDSKLFWHUPWRUHIHUWRWKHLVODQGRI7DLZDQIRU
the purpose of the thesis, Taiwan and the Republic of China (ROC) are considered as 
synonymV  7KH WHUP ³WKH LVODQGRI 7DLZDQ´ LV XVHG WR UHIHU WR WKHJHRJUDSKLF DUHDRI WKH
LVODQG7KURXJKRXWWKHWKHVLV³7DLZDQ´DQG³WKH52&´DUHXVHGLQWHUFKDQJHDEO\GHSHQGLQJ
RQ WKH FRQWH[W  )RU LQVWDQFH DIWHU DW WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO OHYHO ³7DLZDQ´ LV used more 
RIWHQZKHQDGGUHVVLQJLVVXHVRIKXPDQULJKWV7KXV³7DLZDQ ´LQVWHDGRIWKH52&LVXVHGLQ
this context. 
13 See Chapter 5, Sections III.A.2 and III.B.2. 
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majority of other States in the international community. 14   Albeit not 
generally recognised as a state, the ROC (Taiwan) has been described as a 
³sui generis LQWHUQDWLRQDO SHUVRQ´15 D ³de facto entity with considerable 
HFRQRPLF SUHVHQFH´16 D ³QRQ-state territorial entity which is capable of 
DFWLQJ LQGHSHQGHQWO\ RQ WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO VFHQH´ 17  an entity that 
³REMHFWLYHO\DSSHDU>V@WRPHHWDOOFULWHULDRIVWDWHKRRG´,18 DQGD³de facto 
>SRZHU@ WKDW LQ SUDFWLFH H[HUFLVH>V@ SRZHU RU FRQWURO>V@ WHUULWRU\´19 and 
³KDVSURWR-State international OHJDO LGHQWLW\´20  With Taiwan being one of 
WKH ³RGG FDVHV´ XQGHU LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ21 its international legal status is 
disputed,22  and so is the question of whether and to what extent it is 
bound by international human rights law.   
II. Scope and Aim of the Thesis 
A. Scope 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the application of international human 
rights law to unrecognised entities, with an emphasis on the case of 
Taiwan.  ³8QUHFRJQLVHGHQWLWLHV´DWHUPWKDWZLOOEHGHILQHGDQGGLVFXVVHG
in detail in Chapter 2, are entities that display State-like features and 
functions but are not recognised as States.  They are chosen as the focus 
of the thesis for the following reasons.  Firstly, literature on non-State 
actors and international human rights law seldom examines this group of 
entities.  Other entities such as international organisations, corporations, 
                                                            
14 For a detailed discussion on the historical background that led to the current status of 
Taiwan, see Chapter 5, Section II.A. 
15 &ROLQ :DUEULFN µ6WDWHV DQG 5HFRJQLWLRQ LQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ¶ LQ 0DOFROP ' (YDQV HG 
International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 230. 
16  Lori F Damrosch and others, International Law: Cases and Materials (5th edn, West 
Academic Publishing 2009) 341. 
17 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (6th edn, CUP 2008) 234-35. 
18 Vaughan Lowe, International Law (OUP 2007) 165. See Nii Lante Wallace-%UXFH µ7DLZDQ
DQG6RPDOLD,QWHUQDWLRQDO/HJDO&XULRVLWLHV¶4XHHQ¶V/--63. 
19 -DPHV&UDZIRUGµ&KDQFH2UGHU&KDQJH7KH&RXUVHRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ*HQHUDO&RXUVH
RQ3XEOLF,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶5HFXHLOGHV&RXUV 
20 ibid 150. 
21 Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2nd edn, CUP 2007) 61.  
22 For a detaLOHGGLVFXVVLRQRQ7DLZDQ¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOOHJDOVWDWXVVHH&KDSWHU6HFWLRQ,, 
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and armed groups generally receive more attention in scholarly writings 
that consider the relationship between non-State actors and international 
human rights law. 23   While much can be found on the status of 
unrecognised entities under international law,24  little is written on whether 
they are duty-bearers under international human rights law.25  Therefore, a 
study to address this gap is necessary.  Secondly, the most significant 
obstacle for the ROC to engage with the international human rights regime 
is its lack of recognition.  Thus, using the lack of recognition as one of the 
defining criteria for locating the entities to be studied in this thesis and 
considering the effect of the lack of recognition on the application of 
international human rights law may provide an insight as to whether 
Taiwan bears obligations under international human rights law.  To answer 
these questions, it is important to first identify the sources of international 
human rights law. 
1. The Doctrine of Sources of International Law 
The doctrine of sources, which are used to identify the primary rules that 
govern conduct at the international level, 26  has been described as the 
                                                            
23  For instance, unrecognised entities are not among the categories of non-State actors 
examined in either of the two of the most important publications in this area: Andrew 
Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (OUP 2006) and Philip Alston (ed), 
Non-State Actors and Human Rights (OUP 2005). 
24  Examples of such writings include: -RFKHQ $EU )URZHLQ µDe Facto 5pJLPH¶ LQ 5XGROI
Bernhardt (ed), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, instalment 10 (North-Holland 1987); 
6HUJR 7XUPDQLG]H µ6WDWXV RI WKH De Facto State LQ 3XEOLF ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ¶ //' WKHVLV 
University of Hamburg 2010); Yaël Ronen, µEntities That Can Be States But Do not Claim to 
Be¶ LQ Duncan French (ed), Statehood and Self-Determination: Reconciling Tradition and 
Modernity in International Law (CUP 2013).  Additionally, most international law textbooks 
and texts on recognition address the issue of the legal effect of recognition/non-recognition. 
25 It is acknowledged that there have been writings on this topic.  Examples of such writings 
include: Michael Schoiswohl, Status and (Human Rights) Obligations of Non-Recognized De 
)DFWR 5HJLPHV LQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ 7KH &DVH RI µ6RPDOLODQG¶ (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
5RQHQµ+XPDQ5LJKWV2EOLJDWLRQVRI7HUULWRULDO1RQ-6WDWH$FWRUV¶n 8).  Although the 
second publication focuses on territorial non-State actors (non-6WDWH DFWRUV ZKR ³H[HUFLVH
effective territorial contURO WR WKH H[FOXVLRQ RI D JRYHUQPHQW´) instead of unrecognised 
entities, many of the entities discussed in the article fall under the definition of unrecognised 
entities provided in Chapter 2.  For a related discussion in the context of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, see Cullen and Wheatley (n 8) 691. 
26 Harlan Grant Cohen, µFinding International Law: Rethinking the Doctrine of Sources¶
93 Iowa L Rev 65, 74. 
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³VHFRQGDU\ UXOHV RI WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO OHJDO RUGHU´. 27   As international 
human rights law forms a part of international law, Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the main point of 
reference in terms of the issue of sources. 28   Even though a literal 
interpretation of Article 38 would suggest that this provision is only meant 
to indicate the sources of law that the ICJ should apply, it has been 
overwhelmingly recognised that this provision in fact demonstrates the 
³XQLYHUVDO SHUFHSWLRQ DV WR WKH HQXPeration of sources of international 
ODZ´29  According to Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, the Court shall apply: 
a) international conventions; b) international custom; c) the general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and d) judicial decisions 
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations, with the first three being primary sources of international law and 
the last being subsidiary means to determine international law.  Although 
the meaning and the criteria of each of the sources and the hierarchy 
among them have been the subject of much debate, the authority of the 
doctrine of sources itself is seldom challenged.30   
Questions have been raised as to whether the list in Article 38(1) is 
exhaustive, and additional sources have been proposed.  Among them are 
the unilateral acts of States and the practice of international organisations 
(such as declarations and resolutions adopted by international 
                                                            
27 Niels Petersen, µCustomary Law without Custom? Rules, Principles, and the Role of State 
Practice in International Norm Creation¶ (2007) 23 Am U Intl L Rev 275, 299. 
28 Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 
October 1945) 33 UNTS 993 (ICJ Statute) art 38(1). 
29 Shaw (n 17) 71.  See also James Crawford, %URZQOLH¶V3ULQFLSOHVRI3XEOLF,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ 
(8th edn, OUP 2012)  +XJK 7KLUOZD\ µ7KH 6RXUFHV RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ¶ LQ 0DOFROP '
Evans (ed), International Law (4th edn, OUP 2014) 95; Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts 
(eds), 2SSHQKHLP¶V ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ, vol 1 (Introduction and Part 1) (9th edn, Longman 
1992) 24. 
30 +DUODQ*UDQW&RKHQµ)LQGLQJ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ3DUW,,2XU)UDJPHQWLQJ/HJDO&RPPXQLW\¶
(2012) 44 NYU J Intl L & Pol 1049, 1057; &RKHQµ)LQGLQJ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ Rethinking the 
'RFWULQHRI6RXUFHV¶Q26) 74. 
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organisations).31  With regard to the former, a unilateral act of a State can 
sometimes be considered to create binding legal obligations.  The ICJ in 
the Nuclear Tests Case UXOHG WKDW³>Z@KHQ LW LV WKH LQWHQWLRQRI WKH6WDWH
making the declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, 
that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal 
undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course 
RI FRQGXFW FRQVLVWHQWZLWK WKHGHFODUDWLRQ´32  International jurisprudence 
has consistently emphasised that these criteria should be strictly 
interpreted and the decision to attribute binding force to unilateral 
declarations of a State should not be made lightly.33  Doubts have been 
expressed as to whether the ICJ acknowledged unilateral declarations as a 
new source of law,34 and criticism of the judgment even suggests that the 
Court might have acted ultra vires, since it is not mandated to decide 
cases based on sources of law not stipulated in Article 38(1) of the ICJ 
Statute.35  With regard to the other proposed new source of international 
law, practice of international organisations, it has been argued that such 
practice is not in and of itself a primary source of international law, but 
merely an interpretation of treaties or evidence of custom.36   
Although the discussions concerning the abovementioned additional 
sources present challenges to the doctrine of sources, there have not been 
generally accepted alternative theories, and the categorisation of Article 
38(1) of the ICJ Statute continues to be adopted, including in discussions 
                                                            
31 Shaw (n 17) 114-19, 121-22; Crawford, %URZQOLH¶V 3ULQFLSOHV (n 29  7KLUOZD\ µ7KH 
Sources RI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶ (n 29) 111-14; Jennings and Watts (eds) (n 29) 45-50; David 
Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 45-56; 
Damrosch and others (n 16) 265-79, 292-98. 
32 Nuclear Tests (Australia v France) [1974] ICJ Rep 253, para 43. 
33 ibid para 44; North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany v Denmark; Germany v Netherlands) 
[1969] ICJ Rep 3, paras 27-28; WTO, United States: Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 
1974±Report of the Panel (22 December 1999) WT/DS152/R, para 7.118; Case Concerning 
the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v Mali) [1985] ICJ Rep 554, para 39. 
34 Thirlwayµ7KH6RXUFHVRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶ (n 29) 112. 
35 $OIUHG35XELQµ7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/HJDO(IIHFWVRI8QLODWHUDO'HFODUDWLRQV¶71 AJIL 1, 
29. 
36 Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law (OUP 2014) 23. 
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of the sources of human rights obligations.37  Therefore, the sources of 
international law identified by Article 38(1) still serve as the basis for the 
examination of the application of international human rights law to 
unrecognised entities set out in this thesis. 
2. Categorisation of Sources Adopted in the Thesis 
To study the application of international human rights law to unrecognised 
entities, this thesis focuses on the primary sources of international law.  As 
explicitly stated in Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute ³judicial decisions 
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations´DUH ³subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law´.38  In 
other words, they do not in and of themselves create binding rules of 
international law.  Therefore, they will not be examined independently in 
this thesis.   
Although the remainder of Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute contains three 
types of sources, this thesis chooses to categorise the sources of law as: 
international human rights treaties and ³general international human rights 
law´ZKLFKLVXVHGWRUHIHUWRall non-treaty rules of international human 
rights law.  Treaty law constitutes the majority of international human 
rights law39  and merits independent examination, especially considering 
that the law of treaties and the existing human rights treaties provide 
comprehensive rules that may help ascertain their applicability to 
unrecognised entities.  Beyond treaties, the category of ³JHQHUDO
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´ is adopted for the following reasons.  Firstly, the term 
³JHQHUDO LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´ LV VRPHWLPHVHPSOR\HG WR UHIHU WRQRQ-treaty 
                                                            
37 %UXQR6LPPDDQG3KLOLS$OVWRQ µ7KH6RXUFHVRI+XPDQ5LJKWV/DZ&XVWRP-XV&RJHQV
DQG*HQHUDO3ULQFLSOHV¶$XVWUDOLDQ<%,QWO/ &KULVWLQH&KLQNLQµ6RXUFHV¶ LQ
Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah, and Sandesh Sivakumaran (eds), International Human Rights 
Law (2nd edn, OUP 2014) 77. 
38 Statute of the International Court of Justice (n 28) art 38(1)(d). 
39 Thirlway, The Sources of International Law (n 36) 175. 
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rules of international law,40 DQGWKHZRUG³JHQHUDO´GHQRWHV WKHXQLYHUVDO
application of such rules to all entities with the capacity to possess the 
relevant rights and obligations. 41   Secondly, while the treaty/custom 
dichotomy has often been adopted by international legal scholars, human 
rights obligations of States and non-States actors may arise from other 
sources of international law, such as general principles of international 
law. 42   It has also been argued that as conventional and customary 
international human rights law do not necessarily meet all the present-day 
challenges, general principles of international law serve to fill the gap.43  
Thus, instead of solely focusing on customary international human rights, 
the scope of the study includes rules of general international human rights 
law.  Lastly, to explore the application of international human rights law to 
unrecognised entities, the analysis of theories and practice concerning non-
State actors and international human rights law is essential.  Yet, when 
this issue is addressed in academic writings or in practice, the language 
employed is sometimes ambiguous and sources of obligations unspecified.  
6LPLODUO\ZKLOHSUDFWLFHKDVVHHQ UHIHUHQFHV WRKXPDQULJKWV ³YLRODWLRQV´
of non-State actors, the character of the rules that are violated is usually 
not provided. 44   Many examples given in Chapter 4 demonstrate this 
tendency.  Since the obligations often cannot be attributed to specific 
sources, this thesis chooses to analyse the existence and extent of non-
treaty obligations of non-State actors and unrecognised entities in relation 
to the entire body of general international human rights law. 
B. Research Questions 
                                                            
40  Eg Clapham, Human Rights Obligations (n 5) 87; Nigel Rodley and Matt Pollard, The 
Treatment of Prisoners under International Law (3rd edn, OUP 2009) 64-65. 
41 Clapham, Human Rights Obligations (n 5) 87. 
42 Simma and Alston (n 37); Chinkin (n 37) 84-85.  
43 0 &KHULI %DVVLRXQL µ$ )XQFWLRQDO $SSURDFK WR ³*HQHUDO 3ULQFLSOHV RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ´¶
(1989) 11 Michigan J Intl L 768, 769. 
44 Schoiswohl (n 25) 258. 
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This thesis seeks to explore if and on what basis international human rights 
law can be applied to unrecognised entities.  As explained above, this 
thesis examines two categories of sources: international human rights 
treaties and general international human rights law.  Due to the differences 
in their nature, different approaches are taken.  In terms of the former, 
under the law of treaties, for a treaty to enter into force for the parties, the 
most essential elements are that the parties possess treaty-making 
capacity and that they express consent to be bound by the treaty. 45  
Therefore, the question of whether unrecognised entities can bear 
obligations under international human rights treaties is essentially two-fold: 
whether such entities possess capacity to conclude or participate in 
international human rights treaties, and how they express consent to be 
bound by these treaties.  As for general international human rights law, 
considerations are given to the possible bases of its binding force and 
whether such bases can justify its application to unrecognised entities. 
Since Taiwan is chosen among unrecognised entities as the focus of this 
thesis, an important part of the research questions concerns the relevant 
practice by and regarding Taiwan.  On the one hand, this thesis surveys 
7DLZDQ¶Vinteractions with the international human rights regime, including 
7DLZDQ¶V SDUWLFLSDWLRQDQGDWWHPSWed participation in international human 
rights treaties and human rights related work in international bodies, 
especially those within the UN.  On the other hand, this thesis considers 
whether the practice of other States or international actors reflects their 
attitudes towards the possibility of applying international human rights law 
to Taiwan.  It is envisaged that an examination of such practice may 
                                                            
45 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969, entered into force 27 
January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, Part II; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between 
States and International Organizations or between International Organizations (adopted 21 
March 1986) UN Doc A/CONF.129/15, Part II. 
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contribute to the discussion of whether Taiwan should be considered as a 
duty-bearer under international human rights law. 
III. Methodology and Structure 
Essentially, the research questions presented above require exploration of 
what the rules of international law are in relation to the application of 
international human rights law to unrecognised entities.  Thus, the 
doctrinal approach is the method taken in this thesis.  The doctrinal 
method, or black-letter law, LV DQ DSSURDFK WKDW VHHNV WR ³V\VWHPDWLVH
rectify and clarify the law on any particular topic by a distinctive mode of 
analysis to authoritative texts that consist of primary and secondary 
VRXUFHV´46   In other words, the method views law as a self-contained 
discipline and aims to answer research questions using law itself.  It is a 
formal and rule-based approach that examines sources of law in a 
systematic fashion and employs them in legal analysis and reasoning.47   
It may be argued that answering the research questions of this thesis with 
a doctrinal approach might in fact expose the drawbacks of the approach.  
The approach has been described as limited in scope (since it only 
concerns the law itself) and even DV ³LQWHOOHFWXDOO\ ULJLG LQIOH[LEOH DQG
inward-ORRNLQJ´48  Despite the emergence of non-State entities over the 
past several decades, international law remains highly State-centred.  
Therefore, finding answers to questions of the role of entities that are not 
recognised as States or international legal persons under international law 
might be difficult.  However, as demonstrated in subsequent chapters, the 
                                                            
46 Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, µIntroduction and Overview¶ in Mike McConville and 
Wing Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh UP 2007) 4. 
47 Reza Banakar and Max Travers, µLaw, Sociology and Method¶ in Reza Banakar and Max 
Travers (eds), Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart Publishing 2005) 7. 
48 Douglas W Vick, µInterdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law¶ (2004) -/	6RF¶\
164. 
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status of non-State actors in relation to the international human rights 
regime has received increasing attention both in academic writings and in 
practice.  Theories and rules concerning the human rights obligations of 
non-State actors can be used to inform the discussions on unrecognised 
entities. 
In exploring the rules of international law concerning the application of 
international human rights law to unrecognised entities, this thesis takes a 
positivist approach, as evidenced by the above discussion concerning 
sources of international law.  When describing positivism in the context of 
international legal theory, Simma and Paulus quote the judgment of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the Lotus Case as the 
³FODVVLFH[SUHVVLRQ´RISRVLWLYLVP49 
International law governs relations between independent States. 
The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from 
their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages 
generally accepted as expressing principles of law and 
established in order to regulate the relations between these co-
existing independent communities or with a view to the 
achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the 
independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.50 
A limit to positivism might lie in the fact that it considers the law of a 
community as a set of special rules, and the set of these legal rules is 
exhaustive of the law; in other words, if a certain issue is not covered by 
such rules, the issue cannot be resolved by applying the law.51  As this 
                                                            
49 Bruno Simma and Andreas L Paulus, µThe Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights 
Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View¶ (1999) 93 AJIL 302, 304. 
50 SS Lotus (France v Turkey) [1927] PCIJ Rep Series A No 9, 18. 
51 Ronald Dworkin, µThe Model of Rules¶ in Dennis Patterson (ed), Philosophy of Law and Legal 
13 
thesis attempts to answer research questions concerning unrecognised 
entities, this concern might be plausible considering the State-centred 
nature of international law.  However, it has been argued that with the 
growing importance of actors other than States at the international level 
and their impact on the interpretation of international law, the sources of 
international law are flexible enough to accommodate new developments.52  
Additionally, even if this thesis eventually finds that, with a positivist 
understanding of international law, existing rules in fact do not provide an 
answer to the question of whether international human rights law applies 
to unrecognised entities, identifying the existence of legal vacuum in this 
regard may still be a note-worthy conclusion for this thesis. 
Following this introductory chapter, the thesis explores the application of 
international human rights law to unrecognised entities in five further 
chapters.  Chapter 2 identifies the group that is the focus of the thesis: 
unrecognised entities.  As States were traditionally considered to be the 
sole duty-bearers under international law in general, as well as under 
international human rights law, the chapter first introduces the notions of 
international legal personality and statehood.  Considering that one 
important aspect of the initial concept of unrecognised entities is their 
State-like characteristics, it is envisaged that an examination of the criteria 
of statehood will help conceptualise the notion of unrecognised entities.  
Another important aspect is the issue of recognition under international law, 
and theories and practice concerning State recognition are analysed with a 
view to contributing to the formulation of the definition of unrecognised 
entities. 
                                                                                                                                                            
Theory: An Anthology (Blackwell Publishing 2003) 48. 
52 Simma and Paulus, µ7KH5HVSRQVLELOLW\RI,QGLYLGXDOV¶Q49) 306-08, 316. 
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After the subject of study of this thesis is identified, the examination of the 
application of international human rights law to unrecognised entities 
begins in Chapter 3, with the first category of sources: treaties.  The 
chapter is structured in a manner that reflects the rules of the law of 
treaties.  For a treaty to enter into force for a party as a matter of 
international law, the parties of the treaty must possess treaty-making 
capacity and there must be an expression of consent to be bound.  
Therefore, Chapter 3 first considers the treaty-making capacity of different 
actors under international law: States, international organisations, 
insurgents, and other international entities, as well as the rationale behind 
granting each category of actors such capacity.  The findings are then used 
to formulate potential bases for granting unrecognised entities capacity to 
conclude or participate in international human rights treaties.  This chapter 
also looks at possible reasons for other States to refuse to acknowledge 
such capacity and examines their validity.  After the discussions concerning 
treaty-making capacity, the chapter moves on to explore the plausible 
means for an unrecognised entity to express its consent to be bound by 
human rights treaties.  Throughout the chapter, the nature and 
characteristics of international human rights treaties are taken into account, 
as it is not the aim of the thesis to explore the application of international 
law in general to unrecognised entities. 
Chapter 4 turns the focus to general international human rights law.  The 
chapter approaches the question of the application of this body of law to 
unrecognised entities from three angles.  Firstly, the chapter analyses the 
sources of general international human rights law and the basis of their 
authority.  Secondly, the chapter evaluates the applicability of general 
international human rights law to certain categories of non-State actors: 
international organisations, armed groups, and entities created to 
15 
administer territories.  Thirdly, the chapter introduces relevant practice at 
the international level acknowledging the applicability of general 
international human rights law to unrecognised entities.  The discussions 
from all three are then used to formulate theories that potentially justify 
the application of general international human rights law to unrecognised 
entities. 
Chapter 5 concentrates on the case of one unrecognised entity: the ROC 
(Taiwan).  Chapter 5 first introduces the controversies surrounding the 
international legal status of the ROC and the historical development 
contributing to such controversies and then examines why the ROC falls 
under the definition of unrecognised entities provided in Chapter 2.  After 
establishing that the ROC is an unrecognised entity for the purpose of the 
thesis, the chapter goes on to apply the arguments and theories developed 
in Chapters 3 and 4 to the case of the ROC.  The validity of possible 
concerns for acknowledging the applicability of international human rights 
law to the ROC is also examined. 
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2  
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY, STATEHOOD,  
AND RECOGNITION: THE NOTION OF UNRECOGNISED ENTITIES 
I. Introduction 
7KH QRWLRQ RI ³OHJDO SHUVRQV´ RU ³VXEMHFWV´ZLWKLQ D JLYHQ OHJDO V\VWHP
entails that those entities have the capacity to enjoy certain rights and the 
duty to perform certain obligations. 1   In the nineteenth century, 
international law could be GHVFULEHG DV ³WKH ERG\ RI UXOHV WKDW 6WDWHV
DSSOLHG LQ WKHLU GHDOLQJV ZLWK RQH DQRWKHU´ DQG WKH 6WDWH FRXOG EH
FRQVLGHUHG DV ³WKH RQO\ DFWRU HQWLWOHG WR DSSHDU RQ WKH VWDJH RI
LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ´2  In other words, international law only applied to States; 
individuals or other entities were not part of the international legal 
community.3  Although it remains true that only States have international 
legal personality to the fullest extent,4 modern international law has seen 
the emergence of various categories of non-State actor.5  It might even be 
argued that statehood is not an essential condition for an entity to be a 
subject of international law.6   
An inter-governmental organisation, for instance, may possess an 
international legal personality distinct from that of the States that compose 
it.7  Constituent instruments of certain international organisations, such as 
                                                            
1 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (6th edn, CUP 2008) 195. 
2 Vaughan Lowe, International Law (OUP 2007) 14-15. 
3 Roland Portmann, Legal Personality in International Law (CUP 2010) 44. 
4 Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law (CUP 2005) 16. 
5 3.0HQRQµ7KH6XEMHFWVRI0RGHUQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶+DJXH<%,QWO/6HHDOVR
3KLOLS $OVWRQ µ7KH ³1RW-a-&DW¶ 6\QGURPH &DQ WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO +XPDQ 5ights Regime 
Accommodate Non-6WDWH$FWRUV"¶ LQ3KLOLS$OVWRQ HGNon-State Actors and Human Rights 
(OUP 2005). 
6 3KLOLS&-HVVXS µ7KH6XEMHFWVRID0RGHUQ/DZRI1DWLRQV¶0LFKLJDQ/5HY 
 -DPHV &UDZIRUG µ&KDQFH 2UGHU &KDQJH 7KH &RXrse of International Law, General 
&RXUVHRQ3XEOLF,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶5HFXHLOGHV&RXUV 
7 Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (Stevens & Sons Ltd 1950) 12-19. 
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the Charter of the United Nations, 8  often stipulate the need for legal 
capacity in order to facilitate the fulfilment of their purposes. 9  This 
tendency seems to imply WKDW PHPEHU VWDWHV ³LQWHQGHG WR FRQIHU XSRQ
>WKH LQVWLWXWLRQV@ DW OHDVW D OLPLWHG GHJUHH RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO SHUVRQDOLW\´10  
The ICJ in Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United 
Nations Advisory Opinion took the view that WKH 81 LV ³FDSDEOH RI
SRVVHVVLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOULJKWVDQGGXWLHV´DQGKDV³REMHFWLYHLQWHUQDWLRQDO
SHUVRQDOLW\´11 
Insurgents and belligerents12 have also been endowed with the capacity to 
enjoy certain rights and at the same time bear obligations to conduct 
hostilities in accordance with rules of international humanitarian law13 and, 
arguably, human rights norms.14  Another contentious category of non-
traditional subjects of international law is individuals.  Those supporting 
this categorisation point to the imposition of obligations on individuals 
involved in armed conflicts and individual responsibility under international 
criminal law. 15   Modern international agreements also confer rights on 
                                                            
8 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 
UNTS XVI, art 104.  Article 104 reads: ³The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of 
its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the 
fulfilment of its purposes .´  Such legal capacity is further elaborated in Article 1(1) of the 
1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. 
9 Jessup (n 6) 391. 
10 1NDPER0XJHUZD µ6XEMHFWVRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶ LQ0ax Sørenson (ed), Manual of Public 
International Law (Macmillan 1968) 256. 
11 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) 
[1949] ICJ Rep 174, 179, 185.  
12 Cassese categorises insurgents and belligerents as the other ³traditional subjects´ of the 
international community besides States.  Antonio Cassese, International Law (2nd edn, OUP 
2005) 71. 
13  +HUVFK /DXWHUSDFKW µ7KH 6XEMHFWV RI WKH /DZ RI 1DWLRQV¶ LQ ( /DXWHUSDFKW HG 
International Law: Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht, vol 2 (CUP 1975) 494-95; Leslie C 
Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (3rd edn, Manchester UP 2008) 299-300. 
14 Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (OUP 2006) 271-73.  See 
also $QGUHZ&ODSKDP µ+XPDQ5LJhts Obligations of Non-6WDWH$FWRUV LQ&RQIOLFW6LWXDWLRQV¶
(2006) 88 Intl Rev Red Cross 491, 491-93. 
15 Eg individual criminal responsibility for war crimes. See /DXWHUSDFKW µ7KH6XEMHFWVRI WKH
/DZRI1DWLRQV¶Q13) 519-22.   
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individuals, examples of which include the many conventions concluded by 
the International Labour Organization and human rights treaties.16   
CHUWDLQ HQWLWLHV VRPHWLPHV WHUPHG ³de facto UHJLPHV´ ZKLOH QRW
recognised as States in fact effectively exercise State-like authority over 
some territory.  Examples of such entities might include Kosovo, the 
Republic of Somaliland, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), 
and the Republic of China (ROC; Taiwan).17  Unlike other non-State actors 
XQGHU LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ WKHVH HQWLWLHV JHQHUDOO\ GLVSOD\ D ³6WDWH-like 
strucWXUH´DQGLWPD\EHDUJXHGWKDWWKH\VKRXOGEHVXEMHFWWRUXOHVWKDW
are similar to those applicable to States. 18   :KLOH VXFK ³XQUHFRJQLVHG
HQWLWLHV´ DUJXDEO\ KDYH WKH ³PLQLPXP ULJKWV DQG REOLJDWLRQV UHTXLUHG WR
HQDEOH « GHDOLQJV ZLWK RWKHU HQWLWLHV´ 19   the scope of international 
obligations imposed on such entities merits further discussion, and this 
thesis seeks to clarify whether and, if so, on what basis unrecognised 
entities may acquire international human rights obligations as well as the 
extent of such obligations.  
Before examining the international legal status of unrecognised entities, 
this chapter will first revisit the law of statehood and recognition, in order 
                                                            
16 Cassese, International Law (n 12) 146-50.  One early example of international agreements 
conferring rights on individuals is the German-Polish Convention relating to Upper Silesia, 
which contains provisions protecting the rights of education of minorities.  See Rights of 
Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools) (Germany v Poland) [1928] PCIJ Rep Series A 
No 15.  
17 For discussion on the status of the ROC (Taiwan), see, eg James Crawford, The Creation of 
States in International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 198-+XQJGDK&KLXµ7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO
/HJDO6WDWXVRI7DLZDQ¶LQ-HDQ-Marie Henckaerts (ed), The International Status of Taiwan in 
the New World Order: Legal and Political Considerations (Kluwer Law Intl 1996). See also 
Chapter 5, Section II. 
18 Michael Schoiswohl, Status and (Human Rights) Obligations of Non-Recognized De Facto 
5HJLPHV LQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ 7KH &DVH RI µ6RPDOLODQG¶ (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2004) 
207.  See also CrawforG µ&KDQFH2UGHU&KDQJH¶ Q6 DUJXLQJ WKDW ³ZLWK UHVSHFW WR
international entities not accepted in an international system of States, there is still the value 
of analogy, in that those entities as they become more established usually try to act like 
6WDWHVDQGDUHWUHDWHGOLNH6WDWHV ´ 
19  ibid 2 TXRWLQJ *HUDOG )LW]PDXULFH µ7KH *HQHUDO 3ULQFLSOHV RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ 
&RQVLGHUHGIURPWKH6WDQGSRLQWRIWKH5XOHRI/DZ¶5HFXHLOGHV&RXUV1, 31).  See 
also Hermann Mosler, The International Society as a Legal Community (Sijthoff & Noordhoff 
1980) 48. 
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to locate these entities among the various actors in the international 
community.  The traditional criteria of statehood will be introduced, and 
the additional criteria that have been suggested as necessary for the 
establishment of statehood will be discussed.  Different theories regarding 
the effect of recognition in relation to statehood will also be analysed.  The 
chapter will then attempt to conceptualise the central focus of the thesis, 
QDPHO\WKHQRWLRQRI³XQUHFRJQLVHGHQWLWLHV´$GHILQLWLRQRI³XQUHFRJQLVHG
HQWLWLHV´ZLOOEHSURYLGHGLOOXVWUDWHGE\H[DPSOHVRIHQWLWLHVWKDWIDOOZithin 
this definition. 
II. Statehood and Recognition 
A. Criteria of Statehood 
Various criteria have been proposed for the determination of statehood.20  
There are traditional criteria, as reflected in the 1933 Montevideo 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, that are generally 
acknowledged as the minimum yardstick that an entity needs to fulfil in 
order to acquire statehood, but it is unclear whether other conditions are 
required.  Therefore, besides the traditional criteria of statehood, this 
Section also discusses the additional criteria most commonly reflected in 
the practice of the international community and examined by scholarly 
writings, which include independence, permanence and stability, 
willingness and ability to observe international law, legality of 
establishment, self-determination, and recognition. 
1. Traditional Criteria of Statehood 
                                                            
20 Thomas D *UDQWµ'HILQLQJ6WDWHKRRG7KH0RQWHYLGHR&RQYHQWLRQDQG,WV'LVFRQWHQWV¶
(1999) Columbia J Transnnatl L 403, 417. 
20 
The traditional criteria of statehood are set out in Article 1 of the 
Montevideo Convention. They are: (a) permanent population; (b) defined 
territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with 
other States.21  Although signatories to the Convention are limited both in 
number and geographic representation,22 these requirements have been 
commonly adopted by States23 and tribunals,24 and considered as reflecting 
customary international law by scholars.25  While these criteria have been 
widely referred to in the context of statehood, they have also been subject 
to criticisms.26  For instance, Gardiner has expressed concerns that they 
OHDG WR ³EL]DUUHDVVHUWLRQ>V@RI VWDWHKRRG´ZKHUH WKHFULWHULDDUHDSSOLHG
DVLI³DOHDSFDQEHPDGHIURPDQDWWHPSWDWWKHLUREMHFWLYHDSSOLFDWLRQWR
HVWDEOLVKLQJ WKHUHE\ WKDW DQ HQWLW\ LV D 6WDWH IRU HYHU\ OHJDO SXUSRVH´27  
Nevertheless, considering that these criteria are most often adopted when 
issues of statehood are involved and that they have been the focus of most 
scholarly literature in the field, this chapter employs them as benchmarks 
for determining the legal status of putative States.   
                                                            
21 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (adopted 26 December 1933, entered into 
force 26 December 1934) 165 LNTS 19 (Montevideo Convention) art 1.  
22 Signatories of the Montevideo Convention are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  Avalon Project: Documents 
LQ/DZ+LVWRU\DQG'LSORPDF\µ&RQYHQWLRQRQ5LJKWVDQG'XWLHVRI6WDWHVInter-American); 
'HFHPEHU  ¶ KWWSDYDlon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp> accessed 20 
August 2014. 
23  For instance, the US Department of State issued a statement on 1 November 1976, 
indicating that when judging whether or not to recognize an entity as a State, the United 
States has traditionally looked to the following facts: ³effective control over a clearly-defined 
territory and population; and organized governmental administration of that territory; and a 
capacity to act effectively to conduct foreign relations and to fulfil international obligations .´  
(OHDQRU & 0F'RZHOO µ&RQWHPSRUDU\ 3UDFWLFH RI WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV 5HODWLQJ WR ,QWHUQDWLRQDO
/DZ¶   $-,/   See also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States, § 201 (1987). 
24 Eg Badinter Arbitration Commission, Opinion 1 (1991) 92 ILR 165.  See Matthew C R 
&UDYHQ µ7KH(XURSHDQ&RPPXQLW\$UELWUDWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQRQ<XJRVODYLD¶  British 
YB Intl L 333, VWDWLQJWKDWWKHFRQGLWLRQVDGRSWHGE\WKH&RPPLVVLRQ³FORVHO\UHIOHFW the 
classical criteria fRU VWDWHKRRG´ DQG WKDW UHIHUHQFH LV FOHDUO\ PDGH WR WKH 0RQWHYLGHR
Convention). 
25 David Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 
92; Martin Dixon, Robert McCorquodale, and Sarah Williams, Cases and Materials on 
International Law (5th edn, OUP 2011) 137. 
26 Eg &UDZIRUGµ&KDQFH2UGHU&KDQJH¶Q6) 147-48. 
27 In particular, he questioned the stability of the criteria and the lack of clarity regarding the 
fourth criteria.  Richard K Gardiner, International Law (Longman 2003) 168-70. 
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While it is unclear how the four traditional criteria of statehood came 
about, 28  it has been argued that these criteria are grounded on the 
³SULQFLSOHRIHIIHFWLYHQHVVDPRQJWHUULWRULDOXQLWV´29  As there is no central 
authority in the international community to determine the grant of rights 
and the imposition of obligations, the notion of effectiveness is used to 
GHWHUPLQHDQHQWLW\¶VFDSDFLW\WRSRVVHVVULJKWVDQGIXOILOREOLJDWLRQVXQGHU
international law.30   
a. Permanent Population 
2SSHQKHLP GHVFULEHG D SHUPDQHQW SRSXODWLRQ DV ³DQ DJJUegate of 
individuals who live together as a community though they may belong to 
GLIIHUHQWUDFHVRUFUHHGVRUFXOWXUHVRUEHRIGLIIHUHQWFRORXU´31  While a 
permanent population is required for the establishment of statehood, no 
minimum number has been prescribed. 32   For instance, Nauru, with a 
population of under 10,000, is a member of the UN (whose membership is 
limited to States33), and its status as a State has generally been accepted 
by the international community.  
As for the requirement of permanence, this does not prevent people from 
migrating across borders.34   Nor do normal changes in the size of the 
SRSXODWLRQLPSHGHDQHQWLW\¶VFODLPWRVWDWHKRRG35  However, it has been 
argued that the viability of an entity as a State might be uncertain if the 
number of people of which it comprises is very small. 36   In order to 
                                                            
28 *UDQWµ'HILQLQJ6WDWHKRRG¶Q20) 416. 
29 Crawford, The Creation of States (n 17) 46. 
30 'DYLG5DLþStatehood and the Law of Self-Determination (Kluwer Law Intl 2002) 51. 
31 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds), 2SSHQKHLP¶V,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ, vol 1 (Introduction 
and Part 1) (9th edn, Longman 1992) 121. 
32  Lori F Damrosch and others, International Law: Cases and Materials (5th edn, West 
Academic Publishing 2009) 308; Crawford, The Creation of States (n 17) 52. 
33 Charter of the United Nations (n 8) arts 3, 4. 
34 Deon Geldenhuys, Contested States in World Politics (Palgrave Macmillan 2009) 8. 
35 Menon (n 5) 37. 
36 ibid. 
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ascertain the existence of a permanent population, two indicators remain 
FUXFLDOWKHSRSXODWLRQ¶V³LQWHQWLRQWRLQKDELWWKHWHUULWRU\RQDSHUPDQHQW
EDVLV´ DQG WKH KDELWDELOLW\ RI that territory.37  The latter would arguably 
prevent Antarctica from fulfilling this requirement. 38   While these two 
indicators relate to the criterion of defined territory, they should 
nevertheless be taken into consideration when determining the existence 
of a permanent population. 
b. Defined Territory 
Each State needs a territorial base on which it exerts exclusive sovereignty. 
Yet international law does not set a minimum standard for such an area.  
There seems to be a general understanding that the geographic size of a 
State is irrelevant in terms of establishing an effective government and 
accommodating a permanent population.39  Nor would the lack of territorial 
contiguity alone deprive an entity its qualification of statehood.  In other 
words, this criterion does not require that the territory be connected.  For 
instance, the territory of the United States (US) includes areas not 
connected to the 48 states and the District of Columbia, such as Alaska, 
Hawaii, Guam, etc.40  ,QDGGLWLRQWKHUHTXLUHPHQWRID³GHILQHGWHUULWRU\´
does not demand that the territorial borders of an entity be absolutely 
undisputed, and this interpretation is demonstrated in state practice41 and 
                                                            
37 5DLþ(n 30) 58-59. 
38  Damrosch and others (n 32) 308.  On the issue of sovereignty in Antarctica, see 
Christopher C Joyner, Antarctica and the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1992) 
41-67. 
39 0+0HQGHOVRQµ'LPLQXWLYH6WDWHVLQWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV¶,&/4See I 
A Shearer, StarNH¶V,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ (11th edn, Butterworths 1994) 89. 
40 Damrosch and others (n 32) 309.  See also Crawford, The Creation of States (n 17) 47; 
Shearer (n 39) 85-86.  
41 When delivering remarks on the admission of Israel to the UN, Philip Jessup, the then US 
representative to the Security Council, advocated that ³the concept of territory does not 
necessarily include precise delimitation of the boundaries of that territory .´  Instead, it 
denotes that ³there must be VRPHSRUWLRQRIWKHHDUWK¶VVXUIDFHZKLFKLWVSHRSOHLQKLELWDQG
RYHUZKLFKLWV*RYHUQPHQWH[HUFLVHVDXWKRULW\ ´816&2IILFLDO5HFRUG'HFHPEHU81
Doc S/PV.383, 11. 
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jurisprudence42 and commonly agreed by scholars.43  Although territorial 
changes (for instance, secession, accretion, etc.) may change the legal 
status of the particular part of the territory involved, it would not alter the 
legal identity of the State.44 
c. Government 
The third criterion requires an effective government or political structure.  
This is regarded E\ &UDZIRUG DV FHQWUDO WR D SXWDWLYH 6WDWH¶V FODLP WR
statehood.45  The Åland Islands Case provided one of the earliest analyses 
of this criterion.46  The International Committee of Jurists, entrusted by the 
Council of the League of Nations with the task of investigating the dispute 
over the Åland Islands, when determining the exact date of the 
establishment of the Finnish Republic, reported that it did not become a 
GHILQLWHO\ FRQVWLWXWHG VRYHUHLJQ6WDWH ³XQWLO D VWDEOH SROLWLFDO RUJDQLVDWLRQ
had been created, and until the public authorities had become strong 
enough to assert themselves throughout the territories of the State without 
WKHDVVLVWDQFHRIIRUHLJQWURRSV´47  However, recent practice suggests that 
other factors (ie significant international recognition or admission to the UN) 
could compensate for the lack of effective control over an entire territory.48  
Moreover, commentators and State practice indicate that a State, once 
established, does not cease to exist simply because the formerly effective 
                                                            
42  Eg Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschaft v Polish State (German-Polish Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal) (1929) 5 ILR 11, 14-15; North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany v Denmark; 
Germany v Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep 3, 32. 
43 Eg Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th edn, OUP 2008) 71; James 
Crawford, Brownlie¶s Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, OUP 2012) 128; Shaw (n 
1) 199; Aust, Handbook (n 4) 17. 
44 Menon (n 5) 38. 
45 Crawford, The Creation of States (n 17) 55-56. 
46 For a detailed survey of the Åland Islands question, see James Barros, The Aland Island 
Question: Its Settlement by the League of Nations (Yale UP 1968). 
47 µReport of the International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of 
Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland 
Islands Question¶ (1920) League of Nations Official Journal Spec Supp 3, 8-9. 
48 Shaw (n 1) 201. 
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government becomes defunct.49  Somalia has often been referred to as an 
example of a State whose government no longer functions effectively but 
nevertheless remains a member of the UN and continues to be recognised 
as a State on the international plane.50 
d. Capacity to Enter into Relations with other States 
7KLV FULWHULRQ UHTXLUHV DQ HQWLW\ WR SRVVHVV ³competence, within its own 
constitutional system, to conduct international relations with other states, 
as well as the political, technical, and financial capabilities to do so´.51  It 
has been argued that the capacity to enter into relations with other States 
LV ³D FRQVHTXHQFH RI VWDWHKRRG QRW D FULWHULRQ RI LW´52  However, some 
scholars maintain otherwise.53  Others find the criterion problematic since 
international actors other than States might possess such capacity, and 
thus it does not effectively distinguish States from other actors such as 
international organisations. 54   The capacity to enter into relations with 
RWKHU6WDWHVZKLFKFRXOGEHLQWHUSUHWHGDV³LQGependence in law from the 
DXWKRULW\RIDQ\RWKHU6WDWH´55 is considered essential for States to engage 
in international relations.56  Nevertheless, practice seems to suggest that a 
State may transfer control over matters of international relations to 
anotheU 6WDWH ZLWKRXW FRPSURPLVLQJ WKH IRUPHU¶V VWDWHKRRG 57  
                                                            
49 Damrosch and others (n 32) 311. 
50 Eg Harris (n 25) 93-94. 
51 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law (n 23) § 202(2), Comment e. 
52 Crawford, The Creation of States (n 17) 61.  See also Ingrid Detter, The International Legal 
Order (Dartmouth Publishing Co Ltd   0DWWKHZ &UDYHQ µ6WDWHKRRG 6HOI-
'HWHUPLQDWLRQ DQG5HFRJQLWLRQ¶ LQ0DOFROP'(YDQV HG International Law (4th edn, OUP 
2014) 2DUJXLQJWKDWWKLVFULWHULRQ³VHHPVWREHDFRQFOXVLRQUDWKHUWKDQDVWDUWLQJSRLQW´
for discussions of territorial status). 
53 &KULVWLDQ+LOOJUXEHUµ7KH$GPLVVLRQRI1HZ6WDWHVWRWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RPPXQLW\¶
9 EJIL 491, 499-502. 
54 '32¶&RQQHOOInternational Law, vol 1 (2nd edn, Stevens & Sons Ltd 1970) 285. 
55 Harris (n 25) 98; Menon (n 5) 41-42. 
56 Shaw (n 1) 202; Shearer (n 39) 86. 
57  Liechtenstein, for instance, has transferred control of its national defence and foreign 
relations to Switzerland but nevertheless retains its statehood.  Damrosch and others (n 32) 
311; Jeffrey L Dunoff, Steven R Ratner, and David Wippman, International Law: Norms, 
Actors, Process (Aspen Law & Business 2002) 110. 
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Dependence upon foreign aid does not necessarily influence the attitude of 
the international community on the issue of statehood, either.58 
2. Other Criteria of Statehood 
While the criteria discussed above have been generally accepted, it is not 
without doubt that they are wholly sufficient for determining statehood or 
whether additional criteria are necessary.59  Dugard has commented that 
while Rhodesia, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei, and the TRNC 
DSSHDUHGWRKDYHIXOILOOHGWKHVHFULWHULDLWLV³DEVXUG´WRFRQFOXGHWKDWWKH\
acquired statehood. 60   Nonetheless, when considering whether the 
additional criteria are necessary, it would be ³unwise to stress some 
µWestern¶ notions of Statehood (for instance, democracy) as if they were 
accepted universally´ 61   Additional requirements often referred to by 
commentators are introduced and analysed below. 
a. Independence 
While some regard the requirement of independence as encompassed 
ZLWKLQWKHFULWHULRQRI³FDSDFLW\WRHQWHULQWRUHODWLRQVZLWKRWKHU6WDWHV´62 
others view it as a separate criterion.63  However, this criterion may be 
problematic for two reasons.  First, the growth in authority and 
competence of international organisations could carry consequences for 
statehood.  In other words, as the conduct of a State is often guided by 
the policies of international organisations of which it is a member, and 
                                                            
58 Shaw (n 1) 203. 
59 Crawford, The Creation of States (n 17) 89-95. 
60 These entities received virtually no recognition, and ³an entity incapable of persuading 
more than one sponsor State to accept it as a State´ arguably should not have any 
entitlement to statehood.  John Dugard, Recognition and the United Nations (Grotius 
Publication Ltd 1987) 123. 
61 Dixon, McCorquodale, and Williams (n 25) 137.  See also Sean D. Murphy, µDemocratic 
Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and Governments¶,&/4 
62 Harris (n 25) 98; Brownlie, Principles (n 43) 71; Crawford, Brownlie¶s Principles (n 43) 129. 
63  Crawford, The Creation of States (n 17) 62; Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of 
International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations (OUP 1963) 25-42. 
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perhaps even confined by the binding obligations that the State bears 
under the rules of those organisations, it may be argued that States can no 
longer make decisions independent from the influence of international 
organisations.  If independence is to be considered as a criterion of 
statehood, the growth of international organisations may render the 
fulfilment of this criterion improbable.  Second, it might be argued that this 
criterion entails independence in the legal dimension (legal autonomy from 
other States), and not other dimensions such as political or military 
independence.  Yet, all dimensions are in fact interrelated.  A State has to 
evaluate a wide range of factors in its decision-making processes, making 
it difficult to differentiate various aspects of independence for the purpose 
of this criterion. 64   It has even been suggested that considering the 
LQFUHDVLQJ LQWHUGHSHQGHQFH DPRQJ 6WDWHV ³DEVROXWH LQGHSHQGHQFH LV
LPSRVVLEOH´65 
,Q WKH FRQWH[W RI VWDWHKRRG LQGHSHQGHQFH FRXOG EH ³D V\QRQ\P IRU
VRYHUHLJQW\´66 and two notions derive from this criterion: de jure (formal) 
independence and de facto (actual) independence.  The former requires 
that the governmental powers are vested in distinct authorities of the 
putative State, separate from other States, and the entity must regard 
itself as a State.67  The latter entails that the government must exercise a 
certain degree of control over its territory, and its actions and decisions 
cannot be that of a third State.68  The ROC (Taiwan) is sometimes referred 
to as an example of an entity with de facto independence, but not de jure 
                                                            
64 *UDQWµ'HILQLQJ6WDWHKRRG¶Q20) 438. 
65  RosDO\Q &RKHQ µ7KH &RQFHSW RI 6WDWHKRRG LQ 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV 3UDFWLFH¶   8
Pennsylvania L Rev 1127, 1140. 
66 5DLþ Q30) 75.  See also Island of Palmas Case (US v Netherlands) (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 
838. 
67 Crawford, The Creation of States (n 175DLþQ30) 76. 
68 Crawford, The Creation of States (n 175DLþQ30) 78. 
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independence because it has refrained from making a claim of separate 
statehood from the PRC.69 
b. Permanence or Stability 
In order for an entity to effectively fulfil its international legal obligations, a 
condition of permanence or stability appears crucial. 70   Scholars have 
provided the following factors to be used when evaluating the stability of a 
SXWDWLYH 6WDWH ³ SHDFHIXO DQG RUGHUO\ WUDQVIHU RI SRZHU IURP WKH
mother country; (2) absence of external threats; (3) freedom from 
external control; (4) internal stability; (5) popular support evidenced by a 
IUHH YRWH  DGRSWLRQ RI D FRQVWLWXWLRQ´ 71   Although in general this 
condition might not be considered as a criterion of statehood but merely a 
reflection of the Montevideo criteria, it remains especially relevant in cases 
where certain traditional criteria of statehood are not entirely fulfilled or 
when the rights of another State are involved. 72   In other words, the 
permanent and stable existence of a regime may serve as evidence that it 
possess the features required by the traditional criteria of statehood.  
However, the determination of statehood relies on the fulfilment of the 
traditional criteria, and permanence or stability does not appear to be a 
criterion of statehood in and of itself. 
c. Willingness and Ability to Observe International Law 
Willingness to observe international law has sometimes been categorised 
as a criterion for statehood.73  Yet it has often been argued that this is not 
                                                            
69 5DLþQ30) 76. See DOVR*UDQWµ'HILQLQJ6WDWHKRRG¶Q20) 439.  This issue is discussed in 
further detail in Chapter 5, Section II.B. 
70 Menon (n 5) 43. 
71 ibid FLWLQJ+0%OL[ µ&RQWHPSRUDU\$VSHFWVRI5HFRJQLWLRQ¶5HFXHLOGHV&RXUV 
587, 635-36). 
72 Crawford, The Creation of States (n 17) 90-91. 
73 ibid 91-92 (ultimately concluding that WKLVFULWHULRQLV³XQQHFHVVDU\DQGFRQIXVLQJ´. 
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a consideration of statehood.  Failure to fulfil this criterion may lead to 
sanctions allowed by LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ RU RWKHU 6WDWHV¶ UHIXVDO WR JUDQW
recognition, instead of denial of statehood.74  Brownlie pointed out that 
such a requirement cannot logically be considered as a criterion of 
statehood since an entity can only bear obligations under international law 
if it is a State. 75   This view is questionable for two reasons. Firstly, 
statehood is no longer the only condition that incurs international 
obligations.  Other entities in the international community may also be 
subject to international law, albeit not bearing the same extent of 
obligations as States.  Thus, it is plausible to assess whether an entity has 
the willingness and ability to observe international law.  Secondly, 
evaluating whether an entity fulfils this criterion is not the same as 
acknowledging that it has the legal capacity to carry out the same 
obligations as States.  The criterion of willingness and ability to observe 
international law is not an issue of legal capacity, but a factual assessment 
of whether an entity intends to act, and is capable of acting, in conformity 
with international law. 
Yet, this is not to suggest that this thesis considers the willingness and 
ability to observe international law to be a criterion of statehood.  Instead, 
relevant practice and scholarly opinion rarely agree that it is such a 
criterion,76 and it can be inferred that it may arguably be a consideration of 
recognition.  For instance, in 1877 the US Secretary of State indicated that 
if a government was unable or unwilling to observe international law, it 
ZRXOG QRW EH ³HQWLWOHG WR EH UHJDUGHG RU UHFRJQL]HG DV D VRYHUHLJQ DQG
                                                            
74 ibid 91. 
75 Brownlie, Principles (n 43) 75. See also Crawford, Brownlie¶s Principles (n 43) 134. 
76 Crawford, The Creation of States (n 17) 91; Ti-Chiang Chen, The International Law of 
Recognition: With Special Reference to Practice in Great Britain and the United States (L C 
Green ed, Federick A Praeger Inc 1951) 61. 
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LQGHSHQGHQWSRZHU´77  Another example can be observed in the guidelines 
on the recognition of new States adopted by the European Community in 
1991, in light of the dissolution of States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
8QLRQ7KHJXLGHOLQHVUHTXLUHGDPRQJRWKHUV³UHVSHFWIRUWKHSURYLVLRQV
of the Charter of the United Nations and the commitments subscribed to in 
the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris, especially with regard 
WRWKHUXOHRIODZGHPRFUDF\DQGKXPDQULJKWV´78  The Guidelines go well 
beyond the traditional criteria of statehood79 and have been regarded as 
SROLWLFDO FRQVLGHUDWLRQV UDWKHU WKDQ ³DGGLWLRQDO UHTXLUHPHQWV RI
VWDWHKRRG´80   
As far as statehood is concerned, it has been argued that even if a State 
falls into a state of anarchy where there is an absence of responsibility for 
public order, and therefore is no longer able to uphold the rules of 
international law, it would not cease to be a State.81  This argument might 
have limited effect because it only covers one scenario where the lack of 
willingness and ability to observe international law (that is, the chaos or 
the absence of governmental structure).  Also, it appears to relate to the 
issue of extinction of statehood rather than the criteria with which to judge 
the status of a putative State.  Still, the fact remains that, although 
willingness and ability to observe international law has been considered in 
the context of statehood and recognition, little support can be found to 
suggest that it is an accepted additional criterion of statehood. 
d. Legality of Establishment 
                                                            
77  Crawford, The Creation of States (n 17) 91 (citing John Bassett Moore, A Digest of 
International Law, vol 2 (Government Printing Office 1906) 6). 
78 (XURSHDQ&RPPXQLW\µ'HFODUDWLRQRQWKH³*XLGHOLQHVRQWKH5HFRJQLWLRQRI1HZ6WDWHVLQ
Eastern Europe and in WKH6RYLHW8QLRQ´¶'HFHPEHU,/0 
79 Damrosch and others (n 32) 312. 
80 Harris (n 25) 133. 
81 Crawford, The Creation of States (n 17) 91. 
30 
The circumstances surrounding the establishment of the putative State are 
often taken into consideration when determining issues of statehood.82  For 
instance, the consequence of a unilateral declaration of independence 
might be regarded as contrary to the respect of territorial integrity of a 
State and therefore illegal, and the claim of statehood of the putative State 
might be called into question. 83   In 1992, the Badinter Arbitration 
Commission was asked to consider WKH TXHVWLRQ RIZKHWKHU ³WKH )HGHUDO
Republic of Yugoslavia is a new State calling for recognition by the Member 
6WDWHV RI WKH (XURSHDQ &RPPXQLW\´ 84   The Commission noted in its 
Opinion 10 that, while recognition is a discretionary act of an existing State, 
LW UHPDLQV VXEMHFW WR UXOHV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ ³SDUWLFXODUO\ WKRVH
prohibiting the use of force in dealings with other States or guaranteeing 
the rights of ethnic, rHOLJLRXVRUOLQJXLVWLFVPLQRULWLHV´85 
It is generally agreed that a situation created by violation of the prohibition 
of the use or force or other established rules of international law should not 
be recognised as lawful.  This can be observed in, for instance, the UN 
Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions regarding the 
situations in Rhodesia 86  and the Bantustans in South Africa, 87  the UN 
International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts,88 and scholarly writings.89  However, most of 
                                                            
82 Shearer (n 39) 87. 
83 Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke [1969] 1 AC 645, 722-28 (PC).  See also Jericho Nkala, 
The United Nations, International Law, and the Rhodesian Independence Crisis (OUP 1985) 
43-52; Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law (n 23   ³$ VWDWH KDV DQ
obligation not to recognize or treat as a state an entity that has attained the qualifications for 
statehood as a result of a threat or use of armed force in violation of the United Nations 
Charter .´). 
84 Badinter Arbitration Commission, Opinion 10 (1992) 92 ILR 206. 
85 ibid. 
86 816&5HV1RYHPEHU81'RF65(6³FDOO>LQJ@XSRQDOO6WDWHVQRW WR
recognize WKLVLOOHJDOUDFLVWPLQRULW\UpJLPHLQ6RXWKHUQ5KRGHVLD´. 
87 81*$5HV$2FWREHU81'RF$5(6$³FDOO>LQJ@XSRQDOO*RYHUQPHQWV
to deny any form of recognition to the so-FDOOHGLQGHSHQGHQW7UDQVNHL´. 
88 ILC, µArticles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts¶, UNGA Res 56/83 
(12 December 2011) UN Doc A/RES/56/83, Annex, art 41(2) (ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility). 
89 Eg 0HUULH )D\H:LWNLQ µ7UDQVNHL $Q$QDO\VLV RI WKH 3UDFWLFH RI 5HFRJQLWLRQ ± Political or 
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the relevant discussions are phrased in the language of recognition, rather 
than as criteria of statehood.  In addition, the ICJ in the Namibia Advisory 
Opinion emphasised the duty of non-recognition and stated UN Member 
States were  
XQGHU>DQ@REOLJDWLRQWRUHFRJQL]HWKHLOOHJDOLW\RI6RXWK$IULFD¶V
presence in Namibia and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of or 
concerning Namibia, and to refrain from any acts and in 
particular any dealings with the Government of South Africa 
implying recognition RI WKH OHJDOLW\ RI « VXFK SUHVHQFH DQG
administration.90   
$QRWKHU H[DPSOH FDQ EH IRXQG LQ WKH 8QLWHG .LQJGRP¶V VWDWHPHQW LQ
relation to the TRNC: ³WKHRFFXSDWLRQRIWKHQRUWKHUQVHFWLRQRI&\SUXVLV
illegal and we do not recognise the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern 
&\SUXVDVDOHJLWLPDWHHQWLW\´91  Additionally, the entities involved in these 
situations often fail to fulfil other potential criteria of statehood, especially 
the notion of independence, since such violation of the prohibition of the 
use is usually controlled or supported by third States.  In short, although it 
remains true that a putative State established through unlawful means is 
generally not considered as a State, this may result from the fact that 
other States have the duty to not recognise such a State or from the fact 
that the putative State is in fact a puppet entity controlled by a third State 
and therefore lacks de facto independence.  It does not necessarily follow 
that the legality of the establishment of the entity is a criterion of 
statehood. 
                                                                                                                                                            
/HJDO"¶18 Harvard Intl LJ 605, 615. 
90  Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 16, 58 (emphasis added). 
91 Press Statement of Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (16 December 
1997) reprinted in (1997) 68 British YB Intl L 520. 
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e. Self-Determination 
While the compliance with self-determination may impact the previous 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQWKHOHJDOLW\RIDSXWDWLYH6WDWH¶VHVWDEOLVKPHQWLWPD\DOVR
be relevant for evaluating other aspects of statehood.  Over the past 
century, the principle of self-determination has transformed from a political 
concept, as recognised in the Åland Island Case, to a legal right stipulated 
in the Charter of the United Nations,92 the two 1966 UN human rights 
covenants,93 and affirmed in the jurisprudence of the ICJ.94  The right is 
generally described as having two dimensions: external and internal. 95  
The former concerns the right of a people to determine its international 
legal status and the status of the territory it lives on. The latter refers to 
the right of a people to self-government and to freely pursue its political 
and economic development.96  The development of the right has greatly 
affected the traditional criterion of government, and this criterion is no 
longer limited to issues of effectiveness and stability. 97   Rather, the 
representativeness of the government has been suggested as an aspect of 
³JRYHUQPHQW´WKDWQHHGVWREHWDNHQLQWRFRQVLGHUDWLRQZKHQHYDOXDWLQJLW
for the purpose of statehood.  Some have even suggested that it could be 
an additional criterion of statehood.98   Observance of the right to self-
determination could reinforce the effectiveness of control over certain 
                                                            
92 Charter of the United Nations (n 8) art 1(2). 
93 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 
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97 Shaw (n 1) 205. 
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Q 30) 437.  See Thomas D Grant, The Recognition of States: Law and Practice in 
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territory, while the absence of it could potentially prevent an entity from 
becoming a State.99 
f. Recognition 
Whether a newly-born State has acquired statehood pursuant to the 
criteria outlined above is a question of fact. 100   The majority of the 
literature seems to object to adopting recognition as a criterion of 
statehood.101  Among the reasons behind this objection is the principle of 
sovereign equality, which effectively prevents one or more States from 
denying the existence of a newly-born State by refusing to recognise it.102  
While according to this school of thought, the act of recognition in theory 
carries no legal consequences for the determination of the statehood of the 
entity,103 the attitude of existing States might be of help in ascertaining 
whether an entity fulfils the requisite criteria, and some even argue that an 
HQWLW\¶V participation in the international community is conditioned upon 
the recognition of other States.104  It appears difficult to separate the act 
and effect of recognition from the issue of statehood and the ability of the 
putative State to engage in international affairs.105  Thus the section below 
will further analyse the theories and practice of recognition. 
B. Recognition: Theories and Effect 
1. Recognition in General 
                                                            
99 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples (n 96) 101. 
100  J L Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace 
(Humphrey Waldock ed, 6th edn, OUP 1963) 137. 
101 Eg Crawford, The Creation of States (n 17) 93; Shaw (n 1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103 Cassese, International Law (n 12) 73. 
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105 Jennings and Watts (eds) (n 31) 129.  See also &UDYHQ µ6WDWHKRRG6HOI-Determination, 
DQG5HFRJQLWLRQ¶Q52) 2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IDFWRIUHFRJQLWLRQIURPWKHLGHDRISROLWLFDODSSURYDO´. 
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At the outset, it is important to point out that there are two categories of 
recognition: recognition of States and of governments.  Recognition of a 
community as a State indicates that it fulfils the criteria of statehood106  
and that the recognising State declares that it regards the community as a 
6WDWH WKDW KDV ³WKH ULJKWV DQG GXWLHV ZKLFK IORZ IURP VWDWHKRRG´ 107  
Recognition of governments, on the other hand, does not entail the 
creation of new subjects of international law.108  Instead, it implies that the 
recognising State acknowledges the new government lawfully represents 
its State, 109  especially in situations where the new government is not 
formed in accordance with the constitution of the State in question. 110  
Such recognition also indicates a willingness to enter into official relations 
with the new government.111  As the focus of this research lies on entities 
not recognised as States, the following discussion will focus on the first 
category of recognition. 
A distinction should also be made between the act of recognition and the 
establishment of diplomatic relations.  While the existence of diplomatic 
relations between two States implies mutual recognition of both parties, 
the two concepts should not be considered as identical, and the severance 
of diplomatic relations should not be deemed as withdrawal of State 
recognition.112  Furthermore, while on most occasions recognition is made 
through formal diplomatic statements or the establishment of diplomatic 
relations, practice seems to suggest the possibility of implied 
recognition.113  However, the implication can only be made in exceptional 
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107 Mugerwa (n 10) 267. 
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111  Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular 
Reference to Governments in Exile (OUP 1998) 23. 
112 Mugerwa (n 10) 267. 
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circumstances, sXFK DV D 6WDWH¶V LVVXDQFH RI D FRQVXODU exequatur 
(admitting in its territory a consul of a previously unrecognised State).114  
Recognition, explicit or implied, is often an act motivated by political 
considerations, and the delay, refusal, or grant of recognition has often 
been for reasons not of a legal nature.115 
2. Theories of Recognition 
As noted previously, the issue of recognition is closely related to the 
determination of statehood.  In terms of the nature of recognition, two 
theories have traditionally been the focus of the literature: the constitutive 
theory and the declaratory theory.116  The constitutive theory contends 
that the personality of a putative State is ascertained, not through the 
examination of the criteria of statehood outlined above, but through the 
recognition of existing States.117  ,QRWKHUZRUGVWKLVWKHRU\³GHGXFHVWKH
OHJDOH[LVWHQFHRIQHZ6WDWHVIURPWKHZLOORIWKRVHDOUHDG\HVWDEOLVKHG´118  
The latter, the declaratory theory, in contrast, argues that the act of 
recognition is independent from the consideration of statehood.119  That is, 
a new State is created when the factual conditions are in conformity with 
the requirements of statehood, and the recognition of other States serves 
merely as acknowledgement of the fact. 
The majority of literature and State practice seems to support the 
declaratory, rather than the constitutive, view. 120   It has even been 
                                                            
114 Shearer (n 39) 123. 
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suggested that assuming recognition has a constitutive function deprives 
the right to self-determination of its legal substance; since the exercise of 
such a right is based on objective criteria, it should not be prevented due 
WRRWKHU6WDWHV¶DWWLWXGHV121  Still some argue that the practice concerning 
recognition in fact is usually ambiguous,122 and that while the declaratory 
theory might be the logical choice, the fourth criterion of statehood - 
capacity to enter into relations with other States - necessitates the 
willingness of other States to engage in relations with the new State, and 
thus recognition is essentially constitutive.123  The debate between the two 
theories adds to the complexity of the issue of recognition, and the case of 
Taiwan is often cited when testing the relationship between statehood and 
recognition.124  The status of Taiwan will be analysed in detail in Chapter 5. 
3. Legal Effect of Recognition  
The act of recognition is followed by effects under both municipal law and 
international law.125  At the national level of the recognising State, the 
grant of State recognition might lead to the conferment of privileges and 
immunities, the capacity to bring claims in its courts, and the acceptance 
RI WKH YDOLGLW\ RI WKH QHZ 6WDWH¶V OHJLVODWLYH DFWV126  At the international 
OHYHOUHFRJQLWLRQRIDQHZ6WDWHUHSUHVHQWV³DOHJDODFNQRZOHGJHPHQWRID
IDFWXDO VWDWH RI DIIDLUV´ DQG WKDW LW HQMR\V rights and bears duties under 
international law.127 
According to the prevalent declaratory theory of recognition, the factual 
existence of a State is not determined by the recognition of other States.  
                                                                                                                                                            
Determination and Secession in International Law (OUP 2014) 48. 
121 Schoiswohl (n 18) 35-36. 
122 2¶&RQQHOOInternational Law (n 54) 130-31. 
123 Gardiner (n 27) 190. 
124 Eg &UDYHQµ6WDWHKRRG6HOI-'HWHUPLQDWLRQDQG5HFRJQLWLRQ¶Q52) 241. 
125 Shaw (n 1) 444.  
126 Dixon, McCorquodale, and Williams (n 25) 164; Shearer (n 39) 134-35. 
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It has thus been asserted that even if a putative State is not recognised as 
D6WDWH³LWV WHUULWRU\FDQQRWEHFRQVLGHUHG WREHQR-PDQ¶V-land; there is 
no right to overfly without permission; ships flying its flag cannot be 
FRQVLGHUHG VWDWHOHVV´ 128  DQG WKDW ³QRQ-recognition is not identical to 
denying any statuV XQGHU LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´129  Unrecognised entities do 
not exist in legal vacuum,130 and some even suggest that unrecognised 
entities should nevertheless abide by universally recognised rules of 
international law.131  The following Section attempts to conceptualise the 
QRWLRQRI³XQUHFRJQLVHGHQWLWLHV´IRUWKHSXUSRVHRIWKLVWKHVLVWRIDFLOLWDWH
the examination of the application of international human rights law in 
subsequent chapters. 
III. 'HILQLQJ³8QUHFRJQLVHG(QWLWLHV´ 
A. &RQFHSWXDOLVLQJ³8QUHFRJQLVHG(QWLWLHV´ 
Although different reasons contribute to the lack of general recognition of 
entities that display State-like characteristics, certain common features can 
be observed.  On the one hand, due to the lack of international recognition, 
WKHVH HQWLWLHV¶ LQWHUDFWLRns with other States and international 
organisations are limited, and its capacity to enjoy rights and bear 
obligations under international law questioned.  On the other hand, 
however, these entities carry out State-like functions, and they and their 
territories are generally beyond the control of the States who possess de 
jure VRYHUHLJQW\ RYHU WKRVH WHUULWRULHV WKH ³SDUHQW 6WDWH´  7KH
relationship between the ROC (Taiwan) and the PRC is one such example, 
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ZLWK WKH ODWWHU EHLQJ WKH ³SDUHQW 6WDWH´  While the lack of international 
UHFRJQLWLRQ LV FOHDUO\ RQH HVVHQWLDO DVSHFW RI WKHQRWLRQRI ³XQUHFRJQLVHG
entities´, the question of which State-like characteristics and functions are 
relevant in conceptualising the notion and eventually providing a detailed 
definition merits further consideration.  In this connection, it is important 
to take into account the aim of the thesis.   
This thesis does not set out to analyse the legal status of unrecognised 
entities under international law in general.  Instead, it aims to explore the 
application of international human rights law to these entities. 132   An 
LQWHJUDOSDUWRIFRQFHSWXDOLVLQJWKHQRWLRQRI³XQUHFRJQLVHGHQWLWLHV´LVWKH
consideration of the nature of international human rights law since it 
highlights the need to study the research questions presented in this thesis.  
In theory, the parent State bears obligations under international human 
rights law in relation to the territory of unrecognised entity. However, such 
an imposition of international human rights obligations does not translate 
into implementation in reality since the territory in question and the 
governing entity are factually beyond the control of and independent from 
the parent State.  This situation appears to have created a gap between 
the theoretical and factual implementation of international human rights 
law in those territories.  Therefore, this thesis seeks to ascertain whether 
such a gap exists, and if it does, whether it should and can be remedied by 
imposing obligations on unrecognised entities.  
To approach these questions, the relationship between rights-holders and 
an entity is an important ground in determining the definition of an 
unrecognised entity.  Modern international law has seen the emergence of 
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various categories of non-State actors,133 and among the wide array of 
actors, many are likely to undertake actions that influence the enjoyment 
of human rights by individuals.  It has been argued that such actors might 
DFTXLUH ULJKWV DQG GXWLHV XQGHU LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ WKURXJK ³FDSDFLW\´
inVWHDGRI³VXEMHFWLYLW\´DQG³SHUVRQDOLW\´134  While only States possess all 
types of capacity to act at the international level, different categories of 
non-State actors have different capacities to act and are thus subject to 
different rules of international law that impose rights and obligations on 
those actors.  In some cases, international law has explicitly prescribed the 
imposition of international legal obligations.  Such is the instance of the 
rules governing armed conflicts, which directly regulate the conduct of 
parties to the conflict. 135   In other cases, such as the applicability of 
international human rights law to unrecognised entities, the rules are not 
yet clarified.  The similarities between the characteristics of unrecognised 
entities and those of States and between their relationships vis-à-vis the 
population living in their territories would suggest that unrecognised 
entities should be subject to international human rights law or similar rules.  
Traditionally, human rights have been perceived as fundamental 
guarantees against abuse of sovereign power by States136 and a set of 
UXOHV ³UHJXODW>LQJ@ WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ WKH JRYHUQPHQW DQG
JRYHUQHG´137  It has also been argued that human rights norms can be 
DSSOLHG WR ³DQ HQWLW\ H[HUFLVLQJ SRZHUV analogous to those of 
JRYHUQPHQWV´ LQ LWV UHODWLRQV ZLWK WKRVH VXEMHFW WR LWV SRZHUV138  Some 
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human rights instruments even expressly expand the scope of duty 
EHDUHUV WR ³HQWLWLHV H[HUFLVLQJ HIIHFWLYH SRZHU´139  Nevertheless, in the 
absence of an explicit prescription, it remains difficult to ascertain whether 
unrecognised entities are bound by international human rights 
obligations.140 
The above describes the underlying considerations for conceptualising the 
QRWLRQRI³XQUHFRJQLVHGHQWLWLHV´  The traditional and additional criteria of 
statehood provide a starting point for this exercise since unrecognised 
entities are State-like, but not all criteria of statehood are required for an 
entity to be considered as an unrecognised entity.  In this thesis, 
³XQUHFRJQLVHG HQWLWLHV´ DUH HQWLWLHV WKDW IXOILO WKH WUDGLWLRQDO FULWHULD RI
VWDWHKRRGRUWKH³0RQWHYLGHRFULWHULD´DQGDFKLHYHde facto independence 
but are not generally recognised as States by the international community.  
Essentially, besides the criterion concerning (the lack of) recognition, only 
the criteria pertaining to the structure, functions, and factual control of an 
entity are considered relevant since those criteria help locate entities 
whose relationships with the population within their control mirror that 
between a State and its population.  Other criteria accordingly do not form 
a part of the definition of unrecognised entities, so the present research 
does not take into account most of the additional criteria of statehood 
discussed in Section II.A.2 (except for the notions of de facto 
independence and recognition, which are elaborated respectively in 
Sections III.B.2 and III.B.3 below).  The reasons behind the exclusion of 
those criteria will be discussed in Section III.C. 
B. &ULWHULDRI³8QUHFRJQLVHG(QWLWLHV´ 
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Based on the definition provided above WKH FULWHULD RI ³XQUHFRJQLVHG
HQWLWLHV´FDQEHEURNHQGRZQLQWRWKUHHDVSHFWVDWKH0RQWHYLGHRFULWHULD
of statehood; b) de facto independence; and c) the lack of general State 
recognition. Each of the criteria of ³unrecognised entities´ are further 
elaborated below. 
1. Traditional Criteria of Statehood 
Firstly, the entity in question must objectively possess the 
qualifications/criteria of a State as defined in Article 1 of the 1933 
Montevideo Convention: a) permanent population; (b) defined territory; (c) 
government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other States.141  
It follows that international organisations, many of which have strong 
influence over the policies of their members and perform functions that 
JUHDWO\DIIHFWWKHOLYHVRILQGLYLGXDOVDUHQRWFRQVLGHUHGDV³XQUHFRJQLVHG
HQWLWLHV´LQWKLVUHVHDUFK 
$VQRWHGHDUOLHU³XQUHFRJQLVHGHQWLWLHV´DUHWKRVHHQWLWLHVZKRVHUHODWLRQV
with the people subject to their governance are similar to the relations 
between a State and those within its jurisdiction, and they display State-
like characteristics.  Thus, in applying the criteria of statehood to 
GHWHUPLQH LI D JLYHQ HQWLW\ VKRXOG EH FRQVLGHUHG DV DQ ³XQUHFRJQLVHG
HQWLW\´WKLVWKHVLVDGRSWVWKe same interpretation of those criteria as in the 
context of statehood.   
Regarding the first qualification, permanent population, as explained 
earlier, there is no minimum number that the population must reach.  
While in theory, the status of an entity as a State might be disputed if the 
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number of people is very small,142 so far there is no practice suggesting 
that the putative statehood of an entity has been challenged for such a 
reason.  Further, observing the practice in the UN, Franck and Hoffman 
have coQFOXGHG WKDW ³LQILQLWHVLPDO VPDOOQHVV KDV QHYHU EHHQ VHHQ DV D
reason to deny self-GHWHUPLQDWLRQWRDSRSXODWLRQ´143 and the exercise of 
the right to self-determination might lead to political independence and the 
establishment of a new State.   
The second TXDOLILFDWLRQ ³GHILQHG WHUULWRU\´ GLVWLQJXLVKHV ³XQUHFRJQLVHG
HQWLWLHV´ IURP UHEHO JURXSV WKDW XQGHUWDNH VSRUDGLF YLROHQFH DQG GR QRW
exercise control over a certain territorial area in a State.  However, certain 
armed groups that engage in conflicts governed by Additional Protocol II of 
WKH  *HQHYD &RQYHQWLRQV PLJKW EH FRQVLGHUHG DV ³XQUHFRJQLVHG
HQWLWLHV´144 provided that they fulfil the other criteria introduced below, 
since Article 1(1) of the Additional Protocol requires that the dissident 
armed groups exercise control over a part of the territory of a High 
&RQWUDFWLQJ 3DUW\  7KH UHTXLUHPHQW RI D ³GHILQHG WHUULWRU\´ GRHV QRW
demand that the territorial borders of an entity be absolutely undisputed, 
and this interpretation is commonly agreed by scholars 145  and 
demonstrated in state practice 146  and jurisprudence. 147   For instance, 
within the territory over which the Republic of Abkhazia claims to exercise 
sovereignty, Georgia in fact retains control over the upper Kodori Gorge, 
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which is geographically located in the region of Abkhazia;148 however, this 
fact alone would not exclude Abkhazia from the scope of this research.   
:LWK UHJDUG WR WKH WKLUG TXDOLILFDWLRQ WKH ³JRYHUQPHQW´ PXVW H[HUFLVH
effective control over the territory in question.  In other words, it must 
³H[HUFLV>H@DOOWKHIXQFWLRQVRIDVRYHUHLJQJRYHUQPHQWLQPDLQWDLQLQJODZ
and order, instituting and maintaining courts of justice, adopting or 
imposing laws regulating the relations of the inhabitants of the territory to 
one another and to the gRYHUQPHQW´ 149  For instance, since the late 1990s, 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) began to gradually control 
some areas of Sri Lanka.  Although the LTTE was eventually defeated in 
2009, for a period of time it had exercised effective control over the North 
and East of Sri Lanka.  It developed extensive governmental apparatus to 
conduct border control (with the border between the LTTE-controlled areas 
and those controlled by the Sri Lankan government resembling the border 
between two States) and revenue collection, and provided police and public 
services, as well as a judiciary.150  These are examples of functions usually 
performed by a sovereign government, and the LTTE should be considered 
as fulfilling this qualification.   
Lastly, concerning the fourth qualification, the capacity to enter into 
relations with other States, it is conceivable that unrecognised entities 
would encounter certain difficulties in establishing relations with other 
States.  Yet, it should be highlighted that this qualification calls for the 
³FDSDFLW\´WRHQWHULQWRVXFKUHODWLRQVUDWKHUWKDQWKHDFWXDOHVWDEOLVKPHQW
of such relations.  As discussed earlier in the context of statehood, an 
                                                            
148 µReport of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia¶ 
Vol II, 130 <http://www.ceiig.ch/pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_II.pdf> accessed 20 August 2014.  
Geldenhuys (n 34) 75. 
149 Government of Republic of Spain v SS Arantzazu Mendi and others [1939] AC 256 (HL) 
264-65. 
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LPSRUWDQWDVSHFWRIWKLVFDSDFLW\LVWKHHQWLW\¶VDELOLW\WRDFWLQGHSHQGHQWO\
from other States.  How such independence must be manifested in the 
context of unrecognised entities will be explored below. 
2. De Facto Independence 
Secondly, the entity in question must achieve de facto independence, and 
it entails that the government must exercise a certain degree of control 
over its territory, and its actions and decisions cannot be that of another 
State.151  ,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHSXWDWLYH6WDWHFDQQRWEHVXEMHFWWR³IRUHLJQ
control overbearing the decision-making of the entity concerned on a wide 
range of matters of high policy and doing so systematically and on a 
SHUPDQHQWEDVLV´152  In the context of statehood, in addition to de facto 
independence, the putative State must also have formal independence, 
which requires that the entity must regard itself as a State.153  However, 
as this research focuses on entities that objectively function as 
governments and exercise effective control over the territory, whether the 
entity in question claims to be an independent State or considers itself as a 
State does not influence the relationship between it and the people under 
its governance. 
7KHHQWLW\LQTXHVWLRQPXVWQRWEHD³SXSSHW6WDWH´154 which is described 
E\ &UDZIRUG DV ³QRPLQDO VRYHUHLJQV XQGHU HIIHFWLYH IRUHLJQ FRQWURO
especially in cases where the establishment of the puppet State is intended 
DV D FORDN IRU LOOHJDOLW\´155  Manchukuo, established by Japan in 1932 in 
the Chinese province of Manchuria, has often been cited as an example of 
                                                            
151 Crawford, The Creation of States (n 175DLþQ30) 78. 
152 Brownlie, Principles (n 43) 72.  See also Crawford, Brownlie¶s Principles (n 43) 130. 
153 Crawford, The Creation of States (n 175DLþ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a puppet State. 156   Since such entities are often created for the very 
purpose of circumventing applicable rules of international law,157 imposing 
international legal obligations on the puppet States and thus holding it 
internationally responsible for acts controlled by another State cannot be 
justified.  As the purpose of this thesis is to explore whether and to what 
extent unrecognised entities bear international human rights obligations, 
an entity without de facto control within the territory it claims to occupy is 
excluded from the scope of the present research, since it is the State 
controlling the puppet State that should be held internationally responsible 
for the actions taken in the name of latter.158 
The fact that an entity receives foreign support does not necessarily lead 
to the conclusion that it is not independent, unless the control by the State 
providing support is so substantial that it deprives the entity in question of 
space and discretion in decision-making processes.  In relation to the 
notion of control, different standards have been adopted in international 
juULVSUXGHQFH PRVW QRWDEO\ WKH ³HIIHFWLYH FRQWURO´ WHVW DGRSWHG E\ WKH
Nicaragua Case EHIRUHWKH,&-DQGWKH³RYHUDOOFRQWURO´WHVWDGRSWHGE\WKH
7DGLü &DVH before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY).  Admittedly, these two tests are not devised for the 
purpose of determining statehood or independence.  However, both tests 
deal with the influence of a State over a non-State entity (such as an 
armed group) and aim to assess the degree of autonomy of the non-State 
entity in question.  In essence, the tests are used to determine what level 
of control is sufficient to render a non-State entity a de facto organ of the 
                                                            
156  LELG 5DLþ Q 30) 81; Krystyna Marek, Identity and Continuity of States in Public 
International Law (Librairie Droz 1968) 173. See Lauterpacht, Recognition (n 113) 46-47. 
157 Marek (n 156) 169. 
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Q30) 78. 
46 
controlling State, which is closely related to the criterion of de facto 
independence discussed here. 
In the Nicaragua Case WKH ,&- DGRSWHG WKH ³HIIHFWLYH FRQWURO´ WHVW WR
determine whether the conduct of the contra guerrillas was attributable to 
the US.  The &RXUWKHOGWKDWIRUWKHXQODZIXOFRQGXFWWR³JLYHULVHWROHJDO
responsibility of the US, it would in principle have to be proved that that 
State had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the 
course of which the alleged violationVZHUHFRPPLWWHG´159  Based on this 
test, the ³ILQDQFLQJ RUJDQL]LQJ WUDLQLQJ VXSSO\LQJ DQG HTXLSSLQJ RI WKH
contras, the selection of its military or paramilitary targets, and the 
SODQQLQJ RI WKH ZKROH RI LWV RSHUDWLRQ´ by the US was insufficient to 
attribute the acts of the contra to it, and evidence of specific direction and 
HQIRUFHPHQWRISHUSHWUDWLRQLVQHHGHGWRHVWDEOLVK³HIIHFWLYHFRQWURO´160 A 
GLIIHUHQWVWDQGDUGRIFRQWUROZDVSURSRVHGE\WKH,&7<¶V$SSHDOV&KDPEHU
in the 7DGLü&DVH, where it was hHOGWKDW³RYHUDOOFRQWURO´E\D6WDWHRYHU
³VXERUGLQDWH DUPHG IRUFHV RU PLOLWLDV RU SDUDPLOLWDU\ XQLWV´ PXVW HQWDLO
³PRUHWKDQWKHPHUHSURYLVLRQRIILQDQFLDODVVLVWDQFHRUPLOLWDU\HTXLSPHQW
RUWUDLQLQJ´EXWLWLVQRWQHFHVVDU\WKDW³WKHFRQWUROOLQJDXWKorities should 
plan all the operations of the units dependent on them, choose their 
targets, or give specific instructions concerning the conduct of military 
RSHUDWLRQV´161  This test was employed to determine whether the control 
of a foreign State is sufficient to categorise an otherwise non-international 
conflict as an international one.162 
                                                            
159 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 
US) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 65. 
160 ibid 64. 
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)RUWKHSXUSRVHRIWKLVWKHVLVWKH³HIIHFWLYHFRQWURO´WHVWZLOOEHDGRSWHGWR
determine whether an entity has achieved de facto independence.  In other 
words, if an entLW\LVVXEMHFWWR³HIIHFWLYHFRQWURO´RIDQRWKHU6WDWHWKHQLW
will not be considered as de facto LQGHSHQGHQW  7KHQRWLRQ RI ³HIIHFWLYH
FRQWURO´KDVEHHQDGRSWHGLQWKH81ILC Articles on Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts. ArticlHVWLSXODWHVWKDW³7KHFRQGXFWRI
a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under 
international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the 
instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying 
RXWWKHFRQGXFW´163  7KXVLIWKHFRQGXFWRIDQHQWLW\VXEMHFWWR³HIIHFWLYH
FRQWURO´ RI DQRWKHU 6WDWH YLRODWHV LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ WKH FRQWUROOLQJ 6WDWH
may potentially be held responsible for the violation in question.  Turning 
to the focus of this thesis, the applicability of international human rights 
law, if another State can be held liable for the acts, including those 
amounting to human rights violations, of an entity, it would not be 
necessary to study the possibility for that entity to be a duty-bearer under 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO KXPDQ ULJKWV ODZ  7KHUHIRUH WKH ³HIIHFWLYH FRQWURO´ WHVW LV
chosen to determine the level of foreign control over an entity and 
ascertain whether de facto independence has been achieved for the 
purpose of the definition of unrecognised entities.  
For instance, when the LTTE controlled the North and East of Sri Lanka, it 
received support from India in the form of arms, money and training.  
However, such support was not provided on a permanent basis, and India 
was not able to LQIOXHQFHRWKHUDVSHFWVRIWKH/77(¶VDGPLQLVWUDWLRQRIWKH
region, and the LTTE did not act under the instruction of India.164  Thus, 
,QGLD¶V VXSSRUW GLG QRW DPRXQW WR HIIHFWLYH FRQWURO DQG FRQVHTXHQWO\ WKH
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LTTE-controlled Tamil Eelam is not excluded from the scope of this 
research.  Another case in point is the influence exerted by Russia over 
two entities: South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  Both entities receive financial 
support from Russia, and Russia has issued passports to a large number of 
individuals living in the regions.  However, certain characteristics 
differentiate the two entities.  Firstly, a greater extent of Russian control 
can be observed in South Ossetia than in Abkhazia.  In South Ossetia, 
many of the senior positions in its institutions are in fact staffed by 
³5XVVLDQ UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRU6RXWK2VVHWLDQVZLWK5XVVLDQFLWL]HQVKLS WKDW
have worked in previously equivalent positions in Central Russia or in 
1RUWK 2VVHWLD´ DQG 5XVVLD KDV H[HUWHG systematic and permanent 
influence over a wide range of internal and external matters.165  In addition, 
Russia has provided arms, equipment, and training to personnel of South 
2VVHWLD LQ WKH ODWWHU¶V FRQIOLFW ZLWK *HRUJLD166  All the abovementioned 
arrangements seem to suggest that South Ossetia in fact remains under 
the control of Russia and has not obtained de facto independence.  As for 
Abkhazia, the support it has received from Russia remains mainly financial, 
and 5XVVLD¶V FRQWURO GRHV QRW DSSHDU VXIILFLHQW WR FRQVWLWXWH HIIHFWLYH
control.  Thus, Abkhazia remains de facto independent from Russia.  The 
question of whether Russia has exercised effective control over South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia was put to the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) in Georgia v Russia (II).  Although the Court noted the issue of 
effective control in its decision declaring the admissibility of the case, it did 
not rule on it and deferred the consideration of relevant matters to the 
                                                            
165 µ5HSRUWRIWKH,QGHSHQGHQW,QWHUQDWLRQDO)DFW-)LQGLQJ0LVVLRQRQWKH&RQIOLFWLQ*HRUJLD¶Q
148) 132-33; Geldenhuys (n 34) 82. 
166 µ5HSRUWRIWKH,QGHSHQGHQW,QWHUQDWLRQDO)DFW-)LQGLQJ0LVVLRQRQWKH&RQIOLFWLQ*HRUJLD¶Q
148) 131. 
49 
merit stage of the proceedings.167  As of July 2014, the case is still pending 
before the ECtHR. 
3. Lack of General Recognition 
Lastly, from the perspective of the international community, the statehood 
of the entity in question must be disputed and not generally recognised.  
Adopting non-recognition as a criterion does not imply that this research 
considers recognition as a requirement of statehood, thus taking a 
constitutive approach168 towards the character of recognition.  Rather, this 
research acknowledges that, despite the debate between the constitutive 
and declaratory theories, in reality, entities without general international 
recognition often encounter difficulties when attempting to engage in 
international relations or to participate in the international legal regime.  
Such entities are usually denied membership in inter-governmental 
organisations and are barred from becoming parties to multilateral treaties.  
,Q PRVW FDVHV FRQVLGHULQJ WKDW WKH ³SDUHQW 6WDWH´ FRQWLQXHV WR FODLP
VRYHUHLJQW\RYHUWKHHQWLUHW\RILWVUHVSHFWLYHWHUULWRULHVDQGWRDVVHUW³VROH
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ SRZHU´ SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ PXOWLODWHral treaties is difficult for 
those entities.169   
Turning to the nature of this criterion, the fact that the entity in question is 
recognised by some States does not exclude it from the scope of the 
research.  It has been proposed that if an entity possesses the majority of 
the following five features, it may be regarded as obtaining general 
recognition:170 a) the entity is recognised by some of the major powers in 
the international community, such as permanent members of the UN 
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2011) paras 66-67. 
168 See Section II.B of the present chapter. 
169 B R Bot, Nonrecognition and Treaty Relations (A W Sijthoff 1968) 15. 
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Security Council; b) the entity LV UHFRJQLVHGE\WKH³SDUHQW6WDWH´ WKDW LW
seeks to declare independence from; c) the entity is recognised by 
neighbouring countries; d) the entity is recognised by a majority of UN 
Member States; and e) the entity is allowed to participate in international 
and regional organisations.  These elements are not cumulative, and 
therefore it is not necessary for an entity to fulfil all five conditions in order 
to be considered as having obtained general recognition.  In this regard, 
the four contested entities that emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, and Nagorno-Karabakh only 
receive mutual recognition and recognition from the Russian Federation. 
Although the Russian Federation is a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council, its special status as their patron State should be taken 
into consideration, and since the four entities are not recognised by other 
States, there is insufficient evidence of general recognition.  The elements 
of general recognition mentioned above are further examined in the 
context of various entities below to illustrate their interpretation in this 
thesis. 
7KHOHYHORIUHFRJQLWLRQUHFHLYHGE\³XQUHFRJQLVHGHQWLWLHV´DVGHILQHGE\
this thesis, varies.  On the one end of the spectrum is the Republic of 
Somaliland, which is said to have fulfilled the Montevideo criteria of 
statehood.171  Compared to the rest of Somalia, Somaliland is relatively 
stable, and violence and conflicts are rare. 172   6WLOO 6RPDOLODQG¶V
declaration of independence has been considered a secessionist claim,173 
and it remains devoid of international recognition.  Although the 
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Somaliland government has been long campaigning for its recognition,174 
GXH WR ³DQ RYHUZKHOPLQJ ODFN RI LQWHUHVW´ RI WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO
community,175 substantive recognition remains unlikely to be achieved.176  
On the other end of the spectrum is the Republic of Kosovo, which has to 
date received recognition from over 90 States, 177  presenting a more 
ambiguous case.  However, the present research still deems it to be an 
³XQUHFRJQLVHGHQWLW\´VLQFHLWKDVQRWEHHQUHFRJQLVHGE\LWV³SDUHQW6WDWH´
Serbia, and approximately half of the States of the international 
community, and since its participation in international organisations 
remains limited.  The ROC (Taiwan) presents a case in between.  Although 
it maintains formal diplomatic relations with 22 States 178  and holds 
membership or observership in over 50 inter-governmental 
organisations,179  LW LV VWLOO UHJDUGHG DV KDYLQJ QRW DWWDLQHG ³VXEVWDQWLYH
UHFRJQLWLRQ´180 as it holds at most the last feature identified above (in that 
it is allowed to participate in some inter-governmental organisations).  
7KXVLWTXDOLILHVDVDQ³XQUHFRJQLVHGHQWLW\´IRUWKHSXUSRVHRIWKHWKHVLV 
On the other hand, some entities, despite their disputed statehood, are not 
categorised as unrecognised entities due to the recognition they have 
received from other States and/or international organisations.  For instance, 
although the Holy See is not a Member of the UN, and its statehood is not 
without question, 181  it nevertheless has established diplomatic relations 
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with over 170 States and the European Union, and participates, either as a 
member or an observer, in various organisations, such as the UN, the Food 
and Agriculture Organization, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the 
UN World Tourism Organization.182  Furthermore, it is also a party to two of 
the core international human rights treaties: the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and the 
International Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).  The Holy See 
thus falls outside the scope of the present research.  In addition, in relation 
to treaties deposited with the Secretary-General of the UN, past practice 
has shown that entities that have acquired full membership in certain UN 
specialised agencies, albeit not admitted as members of the UN, have been 
allowed to become members of treaties that are open to participation by 
³DOO6WDWHV´183  Thus, entities such as the Cook Islands are also excluded 
from the scope of the study.   
Another entity excluded for the same reason is Palestine.  On 31 October 
2011, the General Conference of the UNESCO voted to admit Palestine as 
its 195th Member,184 and it officially became a Member on 23 November of 
the same year.185  Such a development suggests that Palestine would be 
allowed to participate in treaties deposited with the UN Secretary-General, 
including international human rights treaties.  In April 2014, the UN 
confirmed that its Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process 
received letters of accession to 15 international treaties from the 
                                                                                                                                                            
law, but has an international legal personality of its own which permits it to take international 
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Palestinian Authority,186 including 7 of the core international human rights 
treaties and one optional protocol.187  Five of the instruments (Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, ICERD, CEDAW, Convention on the Rights of People with 
Disabilities (CRPD), and CRC) entered into force for Palestine on 2 May 
2014, one (Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the Involvement of Children in armed conflict) on 7 May, and the two 
Covenants on 2 July.188  Palestine, with its status as a UNESCO Member as 
well as members to the abovementioned international human rights 
treaties, would thus be excluded from the study. 
C. Criteria Excluded IURPWKH'HILQLWLRQRI³8QUHFRJQLVHG(QWLWLHV´ 
Most of the non-Montevideo criteria of statehood are not included in this 
WKHVLV¶ GHILQLWLRQ RI ³XQUHFRJQLVHG HQWLWLHV´.  As discussed in Section II, 
disagreements exist as to whether those factors (permanence or stability, 
willingness and ability to observe international law, legality of 
establishment, and self-determination) should be considered additional 
criteria of statehood, and they are not helpful in locating the entities that 
this thesis seeks to analyse.  In relation to the criterion of permanence, 
ZKLOH SHUPDQHQFH PD\ VHUYH DV HYLGHQFH RI DQ HQWLW\¶V IXOILOPHQW RI
traditional criteria of statehood, it is nevertheless not an independent 
criterion.  Crawford provides a number of examples of short-lived States, 
including Zanzibar (a part of Tanzania), which from December 1963 to 
April 1964 was a State and a Member of the UN, and argues that their brief 
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existence did not automatically bar them from obtaining statehood.189  The 
same may be said about unrecognised entities.  Whether an entity is short-
lived is irrelevant as long as the criteria of unrecognised entities set out 
above are indeed fulfilled during a limited period, meaning that the entity 
exercises control and affect the enjoyment of human rights of the 
population within its territory during that period, just as a State does in 
relation to its territory.   
Turning to the other three criteria: (YHQLQFDVHVZKHUHDQHQWLW\¶VFRQWURO
and power derive from acts in violation of international law, such as 
through unlawful use of force by a third State, or in a manner inconsistent 
with the principle of self-determination, the relationship between the entity 
in question and the population under its control still mirrors that between a 
State and its population.  The TRNC, for instance, was established in the 
aftermath of the deployment of military forces by Turkey, and the use of 
force and the declaration of independence were condemned by the 
Republic of Cyprus as well as the UN. 190   In addition, it is generally 
perceived that the Chechen Republic cannot invoke the right to self-
determination and secede from the Russian Federation.191  The declaration 
of independence by the Republic of Somaliland has also been considered a 
secessionist claim192 that cannot be justified by self-determination since 
the Somalilanders are not sufficiently distinct, ethnically or culturally, from 
the rest of the clans in Somalia.193  Entities such as these would still be 
FRQVLGHUHGDV³XQUHFRJQLVHGHQWLWLHV´VLQFHWKHREMHFWRIWKLVUHVHDUFKLVWR
explore whether and how international human rights law can be applicable 
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to entities with disputed status.  No matter whether such entities are 
created in  lawful manner or not, the human rights obligations assumed by 
their parent States or other States in the international community likely do 
not guarantee the rights of the individuals living their territories and 
subject to their control.  AOVR DV WKH LOOHJDOLW\ VXUURXQGLQJ WKH HQWLWLHV¶
claims to statehood generally neither influences their capabilities to 
administer the respective territories nor alters the nature of the 
relationship between the entities in question and the population subject to 
their governance, this research does not exclude entities from its scope 
solely because they are established through unlawful means.  The same 
rationale explains the exclusion of the criterion of willingness and ability to 
observe international law.  Yet, it is important to note that, the inability to 
observe international law may stem from the lack of governmental 
structure or functions.  In such cases, the entity would not be considered 
DQ³XQUHFRJQLVHGHQWLW\´EHFDXVHRILWVIDLOXUHWRIXOILORQHof the traditional 
criteria of statehood, government, rather than because of the lack of the 
additional criterion of ability to observe international law. 
To sum up, the criteria of permanence or stability, willingness and ability 
to observe international law, legality of establishment, and self-
determination, although potentially forming part of the criteria of 
VWDWHKRRGDUHQRWXVHGWRGHILQH³XQUHFRJQLVHGHQWLWLHV´VLQFHWKH\GRQRW
help locate the entities that this thesis wishes to study. 
IV. Conclusion 
As the aim of the thesis is to explore the application of international human 
rights law to unrecognised entities, this chapter has provided an overview 
of the theories pertaining to international legal personality, statehood, and 
recognition.  After all, despite the evolution of international law, States 
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remain the sole entity with full international legal personality and subject 
to the complete set of rules governing rights and obligations under 
international law, including international human rights law.  As discussed in 
Section II of this chapter, various criteria have been proposed for the 
purpose of determining statehood, but many of them have not garnered 
the widespread support held by the Montevideo criteria.  The issue of 
recognition is perhaps the most controversial one.  Although the majority 
of international practice and scholarly opinion agree that recognition does 
not carry constitutive effect in terms of statehood, without recognition it is 
in fact difficult for an entity to interact with other States as an equal 
member of the international community and to enjoy rights and assume 
obligations in the same manner as other States.  In order to further 
examine the status and international human rights obligations of 
³XQUHFRJQLVHGHQWLWLHV´VXFKHQWLties are defined as entities that fulfil the 
WUDGLWLRQDOFULWHULDRIVWDWHKRRGRU WKH³0RQWHYLGHRFULWHULD´DQGDFKLHYH
de facto independence but are not generally recognised as States by the 
international community.  By adopting this definition, this thesis attempts 
to explore the status of these entities with State-like characteristics and 
whether the international legal order acknowledges the possibility of 
applying international human rights to these entities.  Thus, the following 
chapters seek to examine the relationship between such entities and 
international human rights law, for the purpose of ultimately ascertaining 
its applicability to unrecognised entities, with a focus on the case of the 
ROC (Taiwan).  Based on the approach laid down in Chapter 1, the next 
two chapters respectively explore the application of international human 
rights law arising from two primary sources of international law: treaties 
and general international law, with the next chapter focusing on treaty law.
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CHAPTER 3 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES  
AND UNRECOGNISED ENTITIES 
I. Introduction 
While unrecognised entities are generally considered as not possessing the 
same rights and obligations as States do, this does not mean that these 
entities can freely act contrary to international law,1 and the possibility for 
unrecognised entities, as defined in this thesis, to bear obligations under 
international human rights law has been raised.2  ,Q WKHRU\ WKH ³SDUHQW
6WDWHV´ 3  bear the obligation under international human rights law to 
respect, protect and fulfil the rights of individuals within the territories 
currently governed by unrecognised entities.  However, in practice, since 
WKH³SDUHQW6WDWHV´GRQRWH[HUFLVHIDFWXDOFRQWURORYHUWKRVHWHUULWRULHVLW
is crucial to ascertain whether and to what extent the unrecognised entities 
are bound by rules of international human rights law.  The present chapter 
will focus on the applicability of international human rights treaties, while 
the possibility of applying general international human rights law to 
unrecognised entities4 will be discussed in the next chapter.   
                                                            
1 See Scott Pegg, International Society and the De Facto State (Ashgate 1998) 187-92. 
2 For instance, in 2005, the UN Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur on the right 
of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health 
and the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate 
standarG RI OLYLQJ LVVXHG D VWDWHPHQW XUJLQJ WKH DXWKRULWLHV LQ 7DLZDQ WR ³HQVXUH WKDW WKH
KXPDQ ULJKWV RI SHRSOH DIIHFWHG E\ OHSURV\ DUH IXOO\ UHVSHFWHG´ DQG ³UHPLQG>LQJ@ WKH
DXWKRULWLHV RI WKHLU REOLJDWLRQV XQGHU LQWHUQDWLRQDO KXPDQ ULJKWV ODZ ´  UN OHCHR, µUN 
Experts Express Concern over Imminent Eviction of Taiwanese Residents in Lo-Sheng 
Sanatorium¶ (20 July 2005) <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx? 
NewsID=3329&LangID=E> accessed 20 August 2014. 
3 7KHWHUP³parent 6WDWH´LVXVHGKHUHWo refer to the State to which the territory of a given 
unrecognised entity de jure belongs.  For instance, in the case of Somaliland, Somalia is the 
³parent 6WDWH ´  This term is first used in Chapter 2, Section III. 
4 See eg .DGLü Y .DUDGåLü  F3d 232, 245 (2d Cir 1995).  The Court stated that: ³The 
customary international law of human rights, such as the proscription of official torture, 
applies to States without distinction between recognized and unrecognized States.´  
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7KH WHUP ³WUHDW\´ LV PRVW RIWHQ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK DJUHHPHQWV FRQFOXGHG
between States.5  However, it has long been recognised that treaties may 
be concluded by subjects of international law other than States, a fact 
reflected in international practice particularly since the Second World War.6  
$ ZLGHU GHILQLWLRQ IRU WKH WHUP ³WUHDW\´ ZDV SURSRVHG LQ  E\
Fitzmaurice, the then Special Rapporteur of the UN ILC on the topic of the 
law of treaties:  
DWUHDW\LVDQLQWHUQDWLRQDODJUHHPHQW«PDGHEHWZHHQHQWLWLHV
both or all of which are subjects of international law possessed 
of international personality and treaty-making capacity, and 
intended to create rights and obligations, or to establish 
relationships governed by international law.7 
Similar definitions can also be found in the literature.8 
While these definitions exclude agreements that are not governed by 
international law, Lauterpacht, FLW]PDXULFH¶V SUHGHFHVVRU DV WKH ,/&¶s 
6SHFLDO5DSSRUWHXUZDVRIWKHRSLQLRQWKDW³,WLVQRWWKHVXEMHFWLRQRIDQ
agreement to international law which makes of it a treaty.  It is its quality 
DV D WUHDW\ ZKLFK FDXVHV LW WR EH UHJXODWHG E\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´ 9  
According to this opinion, as long as an instrument fulfils other elements 
UHTXLUHG E\ WKH GHILQLWLRQ RI ³WUHDW\´ IRU LQVWDQFH FRQFOXGHG EHWZHHQ
                                                            
5 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969, entered into force 27 
January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, arts 1-2. 
6 See Section II of the present Chapter.  See also Yves Le Bouthillier and Jean-François Bonin, 
µ$UWLFOH  &RQYHQWLRQ RI ¶ LQ 2OLvier Corten and Pierre Klein (eds), The Vienna 
Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (OUP 2011) 66. 
7  Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1956, vol II (1956) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1, 107. 
8 (J³DFRQVHQVXDODJUHHPHQWEHWZHHQWZR or more subjects of international law intended to 
be and considered by the parties as binding and containing rules of conduct under 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ IRU DW OHDVW RQH RI WKH SDUWLHV ´  5XGROI %HUQKDUGW µ7UHDWLHV¶ in Rudolf 
Bernhardt (ed), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, instalment 7 (North-Holland 1987) 
460. 
9  Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1953, vol II (1953) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1953/Add.1, 100. 
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States and in written form), even if parties to an agreement specify that it 
shall be governed by the domestic law of one of them, such an instrument 
VKRXOG VWLOO EH FRQVLGHUHG DV D ³WUHDW\´  7KH ,/& XOWLPDWHO\ WRRN WKH
SRVLWLRQ WKDW ³WKH HOHPHQW RI VXEMHFWLRQ WR LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ ZDV VR
HVVHQWLDODQDVSHFWRIDWUHDW\«WKDWWKLVVKRXOGEHH[SUHVVO\PHQWLRQHG
LQ DQ\ GHILQLWLRQ´ 10   Yet it is important to point out that when an 
agreement is concluded between subjects of international law, even when 
such an agreement makes reference to municipal law, there is a 
presumption that the relationship between the parties is also governed by 
international law.11  Such a presumption may be negated if the parties 
expressly stipulate that the agreement is entirely subject to municipal law.   
In the field of human rights, most international and regional human rights 
treaties are only open to participation by States.  Yet a trend of expanding 
their participation to other actors can be observed in recent years.  For 
instance, the CRPD SURYLGHVIRUWKHSRVVLELOLW\RISDUWLFLSDWLRQE\³UHJLRQDO
LQWHJUDWLRQ RUJDQL]DWLRQV´12 and the European Union (EU) indeed ratified 
the Convention on 5 January 2010. 13   In addition, the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), through the adoption of Protocol 14, 
also stipulates the possibility for the EU to accede to the Convention,14 and 
QHJRWLDWLRQV UHJDUGLQJ WKH (8¶V DFFHVVLRQ are currently under way.15  In 
                                                            
10  Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1959, vol II (1959) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1959/Add.1, 95. 
11 3KLOLSSH*DXWLHU µ$UWLFOH&RQYHQWLRQRI¶ in Corten and Klein (eds) (n 6) 43; Robert 
-HQQLQJV µ*HQHUDO&RXUVHRQ3ULQFLSOHV RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ¶ (1967) 121 Recueil des Cours 
335, 531. 
12 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted 13 December 2006, entered 
into force 3 May 2008) 2515 UNTS 3, art 42.  
13 United Nations Treaty Collection (UNTC), µ&KDSWHU,9+XPDQ5LJKWV. Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities¶ <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src= 
TREATY&mtdsg_no=iv-15&chapter=4&lang=en> accessed 20 August 2014; European 
&RPPLVVLRQµ(85DWLILHV81&RQYHQWLRQRQ'LVDELOLW\5LJKWV¶-DQXDU\3UHVV5HOHDVH
IP/11/4 <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/4> accessed 20 
August 2014. 
14  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European 
Convention on Human Rights) Protocol 14, art 17. 
15  Recent progress of the negotiation is documented RQ WKH &RXQFLO RI (XURSH¶V ZHEVLWH  
&RXQFLO RI (XURSH µEU Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights¶ 
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HYDOXDWLQJ WKH (8¶V DFFHVVLRQ WR WKH (&+5 LW KDV EHHQ DUJXHG WKDW WKH
urgency of accession has increased in recent years considering that the EU 
takes on many functions and powers that used to be performed by 
States.16 
Under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter the 
1969 Vienna Convention) and the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties between States and International Organizations or between 
International Organizations (hereinafter the 1986 Vienna Convention), 
parties to a treaty must perform the obligations contained therein in good 
faith after the entry into force of said treaty.17  For a treaty to enter into 
force for the parties, the most essential elements are that the parties 
possess treaty-making capacity and that they express consent to be bound 
by the treaty. 18   Therefore, this chapter will first examine whether 
unrecognised entities possess treaty-making capacity, taking into 
consideration the special characteristics of human rights treaties.  This 
chapter will then explore the possible means for unrecognised entities to 
express consent to be bound by international human rights treaties. 
For the purpose of this research, a treaty is defined as: a consensual 
agreement concluded between two or more subjects of international law in 
written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a 
single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its 
particular designation.  The only difference between this definition and 
                                                                                                                                                            
<http://hub.coe.int/what-we-do/human-rights/eu-accession-to-the-convention> accessed 20 
August 2014.  
16 European Commission for Democracy thURXJK/DZ9HQLFH&RPPLVVLRQµ&RPPHQWVRQWKH
Accession of the European Union/European Community to the European Convention on 
+XPDQ5LJKWVE\0U3LHWHUYDQ',-.¶2FWREHU&'/SDUD 
17 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (n 5) art 26; Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International 
Organizations (adopted 21 March 1986) UN Doc A/CONF.129/15, art 26. 
18 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (n 5) Part II; Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International 
Organizations (n 17) Part II. 
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those in the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions is the category of actors 
who conclude such agreements.  Based on this definition of a treaty, in this 
thesis, human rights treaties are the agreements that fit the definition 
above and whose object and purpose is to safeguard the human rights of 
individuals or groups, 19  DQG ³WUHDW\-PDNLQJ FDSDFLW\´ UHIHUV WR WKH
³FDSDFLW\ RI VXEMHFWV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ WR FRQFOXGH WUHDWLHV RU WR
participate in treaties as parties, including subsequently modifying and 
terminatLQJ VXFK OHJDO UHODWLRQVKLSV´20  The following section introduces 
discussions regarding the treaty-making capacities of entities that are 
considered subjects of international law and whether, and if so to what 
extent, unrecognised entities possess such capacity. 
II. Treaty-Making Capacity under International Law 
While Article 1 of the 1969 Vienna Convention explicitly restricts the 
&RQYHQWLRQ¶VVFRSHRIDSSOLFDWLRQWRWUHDWLHVFRQFOXGHGEHWZHHQ6WDWHVWKH
text, commentaries, and the drafting history of the Convention all 
demonstrate the intention to avoid this restriction being interpreted as 
refuting the legal effect of other categories of international agreements.  In 
particular, Article 3 of the 1969 Vienna Convention recognises the 
possibility of the ConvenWLRQ¶V DSSOLFDWLRQ WR ³LQWHUQDWLRQDO DJUHHPHQWV
concluded between states and other subjects of international law or 
EHWZHHQ VXFK RWKHU VXEMHFWV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´  7KH SRWHQWLDO
³DQDORJRXV DSSOLFDWLRQ´ RI VRPH RI WKH SURYLVLRQV RI WKH  9LHQQD
ConveQWLRQWRRWKHUDJUHHPHQWV³ZKLFKDUHJRYHUQHGE\LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ´
                                                            
19  For similar definitions/descriptions of human rights treaties, see Marko Milanovic, 
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy (OUP 2011) 
3; 0DWWKHZ &UDYHQ µ/HJDO 'LIIHUHQWLDWLRQ DQG WKH &RQFHSW RI the Human Rights Treaty in 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ¶   (-,/   The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into 
Force of the American Convention on Human Rights (Arts 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC-
2/82, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series A No 2 (24 September 1984) para 30.   
20  See Hungdah Chiu, The Capacity of International Organizations to Conclude Treaties 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1966) 5. 
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has also been acknowledged in jurisprudence. 21   For instance, in 
Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and 
Egypt Advisory Opinion, the ICJ referred to certain provisions of the 1969 
Vienna Convention, 22  even though the agreement in question was 
concluded between a State and an international organisation and thus falls 
outside the scope of that Convention.  
$FFRUGLQJ WR WKH ,/& WKH SKUDVH ³RWKHU VXEMHFWV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´ LQ
$UWLFOHRIWKH9LHQQD&RQYHQWLRQ³LVGHVLJQHGWRSURYLGHIRUWUHDWLHV
concluded by: (a) international organisations, (b) the Holy See, which 
enters into treaties on the same basis as States, and (c) other international 
entities, such as insurgents, which may in some circumstances enter into 
WUHDWLHV´23  The drafting history of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions 
also saw discussions on the treaty-making capacity of members of a 
federal union24 and the International Committee of the Red Cross.25  Yet, 
the ILC explicitly proclaimed that individuals and corporations created 
XQGHU QDWLRQDO ODZ GR QRW SRVVHVV WKH ³FDSDFLW\ WR HQWHU WUHDWLHV´ DQG
³DJUHHPHQWV JRYHUQHG E\ SXEOLF LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´ 26   Whilst whether 
entities other than those mentioned above have treaty-making capacity 
remains subject to clarification, debate concerning the capacity of national 
                                                            
21  BP Exploration Company (Libya) Limited v Government of the Libyan Arab Republic 
(BP/Libya Concession Tribunal) (1973) 53 ILR 296, 332.  See also Shabtai Rosenne, 
Developments in the Law of Treaties 1945-1986 (CUP 1989) 27. 
22 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt (Advisory 
Opinion) [1980] ICJ Rep 73, 94-96. 
23 ILC, µ5HSRUWRI WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ&RPPLVVLRQ&RYHULQJ WKH:RUNRI ,WVWKSHVVLRQ¶
(24 April-29 June 1962) UN Doc A/5209, 162.  The treaty-making capacity of international 
organisations was later recognised in the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations.   
24  Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, vol II (1966) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add. 1, 192. 
25 µ'RFXPHQWVRIWKH&RQIHUHQFH¶81&RQIHUHQFHRQWKH/DZ of Treaties between States and 
International Organizations or between International Organizations (18 February-21 March 
1986) UN Doc A/CONF.129/4, 9.  See also Mark E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Martinus Nijhiff Publishers 2009) 103; Le Bouthillier and 
Bonin (n 6) 75. 
26 ,/&µ5HSRUWRIWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ&RPPLVVLRQ&RYHULQJWKH:RUNRI,WVWKSHVVLRQ¶ (n 
23) 5.  See also Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (UK v Iran) (Preliminary Objections) [1952] ICJ 
Rep 112. 
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liberation movements (NLMs) 27  and entities created to administer 
territories28 has received particular attention in the literature. 
Notably, in terms of treaty-making capacity, neither the 1969 nor the 1986 
Vienna Conventions distinguishes between different categories of treaties, 
for instance, bilateral and multilateral, or normative and contractual.  In 
fact, writers have commented that the process of codification of the law of 
treaties neglected the nature and development of multilateral treaties,29 
and the ILC has acknowledged that applying the same rules to bilateral 
DQG PXOWLODWHUDO WUHDWLHV VHHPV ³XQVDWLVIDFWRU\´ 30   Although Waldock 
includeGDSURYLVLRQGHILQLQJD³PXOWLODWHUDOWUHDW\´LQKLVILUVWUHSRUWWRWKH
ILC on the law of treaties,31 the provision was eventually removed.  It has 
been suggested that the failure to take into consideration the 
characteristics of multilateral treaties leads to difficulties in reconciling 
some provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention with human rights treaties, 
which are largely multilateral in nature.32  For instance, many multilateral 
treaties, including human rights treaties, establish independent bodies for 
monitoring treaty implementation and carrying out functions involving 
interpreting treaty provisions, but such activity might not necessarily be 
considered as one of the factors to be taken into account for the purpose of 
treaty interpretation as stipulated in Articles 31 and 32 of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention.33  ,WKDVDOVREHHQVXJJHVWHGWKDW³WKHRYHUULGLQJµFRQWUDFWXDO¶
                                                            
27  Le Bouthillier and Bonin (n 6) 62; James Crawford, %URZQOLH¶V 3ULQFLSOHV RI 3XEOLF
International Law (8th edn, OUP 2012) 123; Chris N. Okeke, Controversial Subjects of 
Contemporary International Law (Rotterdam UP 1974) 109-27. 
28 Villiger, Commentary (n 25) 103; Le Bouthillier and Bonin (n 6) 74. 
29 Theodor Meron, The Humanization of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006) 
187-91; Rosenne (n 21) 73, 83. 
30 ,/& µ)UDJPHQWDWLRQ RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ 'LIILFXOWLHV $ULVLQJ IURP WKH 'LYHUVLILFDWLRQ and 
Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶$SULO81'RFA/CN.4/L.682, 250. 
31  Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1962, vol II (1962) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1962/Add.1, 31. 
32 Menno T .DPPLQJD µ)LQDO 5HSRUW RQ WKH ,PSDFW RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO +XPDQ 5LJKWV /DZ RQ
GeneraO ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶ LQ0HQQR7 Kamminga and Martin Scheinin (eds), The Impact of 
Human Rights Law on General International Law (OUP 2009) 9. 
33 ibid.  Yet, it has been argued that the interpretation adopted by treaty monitoring bodies 
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paradigm [seems] largely (if not wholly) inappropriate in the case of 
KXPDQULJKWVWUHDWLHV´34  How the special characteristics of human rights 
treaties influence the notion of treaty-making capacity will be discussed in 
the next section.  
The discussion below addresses the treaty-making capacity of three 
categories of subjects of international law that the ILC expressly referred 
to: States, international organisations, and insurgents.  The first two 
categories are chosen since their treaty-making capacity is acknowledged 
in the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions.  The treaty-making capacity of 
insurgents is considered since, according to the ,/&¶VFRPPHQWDU\TXRWHG
above, it may be possible for agreements concluded by them to be bound 
by the same rules as those concluded by States.  Additionally, the treaty-
making capacity of two other types of international entities, NLMs and 
entities created to administer territories, will also be discussed, as their 
capacity to act at the international level has been much discussed and 
practice has seen numerous examples of agreements concluded between 
these entities and States. Whether or not these agreements can be 
FODVVLILHGDV³WUHDWLHV´ZLOOEHH[SORUHGDVZHOO 
A. Treaty-Making Capacity of States 
In the discussion below, in addition to the treaty-making capacity of States, 
the capacity of the Holy See, members of a federal union, and dependant 
States is also analysed. The Holy See, according to the ILC, enters into 
WUHDWLHV³RQWKHVDPHEDVLVDV6WDWHV´DQGLVVXHVUHJDUGLQJWKHODWWHUWZR
                                                                                                                                                            
can be considered as ³VXEVHTXHQWSUDFWLFH LQWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI WKHWUHDW\ZKLFKHVWDEOLVKHV
the agreement of the parties UHJDUGLQJ LWV LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ´ RU ³VXSSOHPHQWDU\ PHDQV RI
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ ´ International Law Association, Committee on International Human Rights Law 
DQG 3UDFWLFH µ)LQDO 5HSRUW RQ WKH ,PSDFW RI )LQGLQJV RI WKH 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV +XPDQ 5LJKWV
7UHDW\%RGLHV¶ SDUDKWWSZZZLOD-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/3B0BF58A-C096-
4113-830E8E1B5BC6DEC5> accessed 20 August 2014. 
34 &UDYHQµ/HJDO'LIIHUHQWLDWLRQDQGWKH&RQFHSWRIWKH+XPDQ5LJKWV7UHDW\¶n 19) 497.   
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FDWHJRULHV RI HQWLWLHV ZHUH GHEDWHG GXULQJ WKH ,/&¶V GUDIWLQJ RI WKH
provisions on the treaty-making capacity of States and the scope of 
application of the 1969 Vienna Convention. 
1. Recognition of the Treaty-Making Capacity of States 
Treaty-making capacity has long been considered one of the fundamental 
characteristics of sovereign States,35 and the PCIJ in the Case of the SS 
³:LPEOHGRQ´ H[SUHVVO\ UHFRJQLVHG WKDW ³WKH ULJKW RI HQWHULQJ LQWR
LQWHUQDWLRQDO HQJDJHPHQWV LV DQ DWWULEXWH RI 6WDWH VRYHUHLJQW\´ 36   The 
capacity of States to conclude treaties, as codified in Article 6 of the 1969 
Vienna Convention, has been overwhelmingly recognised as a rule of 
customary international law.37  The exercise of such capacity is only limited 
by rules of international law governing the validity of treaties.38   
In early versions of the draft articles on the law of treaties, the provision 
on treaty-making capacity sought to also cover the treaty-making capacity 
of subjects of international law other than States, such as members of a 
federal union and international organisations.39  During the UN Conference 
on the Law of Treaties at Vienna that took place from 1968 to 1969, the 
                                                            
35 Arnold D McNair, The Law of Treaties (2nd edn, OUP 1961) 35; Robert Jennings and Arthur 
Watts (eds), 2SSHQKHLP¶V ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ, vol 1 (Introduction and Part 1) (9th edn, 
Longman 1992) 1217. 
36 Case of the S6³:LPEOHGRQ´ (UK, France, Italy & Japan v Germany) [1923] PCIJ Rep Series 
A No 1, 25. 
37 Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2nd edn, Manchester UP 1984) 
21; Villiger, Commentary (n 25) 131; 'DQLHO7XUSDQG)UDQoRLV5RFKµ$UWLFOH&RQYHQWLRQRI 
¶ in Corten and Klein (eds) (n 6) 111. 
38 McNair (n 35) 35.  For instance, States are not permitted to conclude treaties that conflict 
with a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens). 
39 Eg Article 3 of the 1962 draft articles on the law of treaties reads: 
Article 3 Capacity to conclude treaties 
1. Capacity to conclude treaties under international law is possessed by States 
and by other subjects of international law. 
2. In a federal State, the capacity of the member states of a federal union to 
conclude treaties depends on the federal constitution. 
3. In the case of international organizations, capacity to conclude treaties 
depends on the constitution of the organization concerned. 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1962, vol II (n 31) 164. 
66 
following provision (then draft Article 5) was put forward for the 
consideration of the Conference and was subject to much debate:40 
Article 5. Capacity of States to conclude treaties 
1. Every State possesses capacity to conclude treaties. 
2. States members of a federal union may possess a capacity to 
conclude treaties if such capacity is admitted by the federal 
constitution and within the limits there laid down.41 
The necessity of such a provision was raised during the discussions within 
the ILC.42  Some members argued that since the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations did not deal with the issue of capacity to enter into 
diplomatic relations, by analogy, there was no need to include a provision 
on treaty-making capacity in the law of treaties.  Others disagreed, 
emphasising that the issue of capacity was of more significance in the law 
of treaties than in the law of diplomatic relations.  When the draft provision 
quoted above was put forward for consideration at the UN Conference, the 
issue of necessity and appropriateness of including a provision on the 
treaty-making capacity of States received relatively little attention, and 
most discussions surrounded paragraph 2 of the draft Article, which was 
eventually deleted. 43   In the end, draft Article 5, containing only one 
                                                            
40 See eg discussions during the 11th and 28th meetings of the Committee of the Whole 
GXULQJWKHILUVWVHVVLRQRIWKH81&RQIHUHQFHRQWKH/DZRI7UHDWLHVµ6XPPDU\5HFRUGVRIWKH
Plenary MeHWLQJVDQGRIWKH0HHWLQJVDQGRIWKH0HHWLQJVRIWKH&RPPLWWHHRIWKH:KROH¶81
Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session (Vienna 26 March-24 May 1968) UN Doc 
A/CONF.39/11, 59-68 (Summary Records of the First Session of the UN Conference on the 
Law of Treaties) 148-50. DQG WKH WK SOHQDU\ PHHWLQJ RI WKH VHFRQG VHVVLRQ µ6XPPDU\
Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings and of the Meetings of the Committee of 
WKH :KROH¶ 81 &RQIHUHQFH RQ WKH /DZ RI 7UHDWLHV 6HFRQG6HVVLRQ (Vienna 9 April-22 May 
1969) UN Doc A/CONF.39/11/Add.1 (Summary Records of the Second Session of the UN 
Conference on the Law of Treaties) 6-16). 
41 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, vol II (n 24) 178. 
42 ibid 191. 
43 Summary Records of the Second Session of the UN Conference on the Law of Treaties (n 
40) 15, para 50 (7th plenary meeting).  The treaty-making capacity of members of a federal 
union will be discussed under Section II.A.5. 
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paragraph on the treaty-making capacity of States, was adopted by 88 
votes to 5, with 10 abstentions.44 
2. Rationale behind Recognising the Treaty-Making Capacity of States 
As draft Article 5 of the 1969 Vienna Convention in its original form quoted 
above referred to the treaty-making capacity of members of federal unions 
and of international organisations, much discussion was devoted to 
whether it was appropriate to include such references and how to best 
formulate the provision, rather than the capacity of States in this regard.  
Although the drafting history of the 1969 Vienna Convention provides little 
explanation regarding the rationale behind granting treaty-making capacity 
to States, its Preamble does offer certain clues. 
While most of the preambular language relates to the need to codify a 
convention on the law of treaties, the first two preamblular paragraphs are 
useful in inferring the rationale behind recognising the capacity of States to 
enter into tUHDWLHV7KHVHWZRSDUDJUDSKVKLJKOLJKW³WKHIXQGDPHQWDOUROH
RIWUHDWLHVLQWKHKLVWRU\RILQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQV´DQG³WKHHYHU-increasing 
importance of treaties as a source of international law and as a means of 
developing peaceful co-operation among QDWLRQV´ 45   In this regard, 
treaties, as a form of interaction between States, have become 
indispensable in international relations and even exerted gradually 
increasing influence on the lives of individuals.  With the vast development 
in technology and coPPXQLFDWLRQV PRUH LVVXHV KDYH FDOOHG IRU ³LQWHU-
6WDWH UHJXODWLRQ´DQG WUHDWLHVDVDVRXUFHRI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZDUHYLWDO
tools in promoting peaceful coexistence and amicable cooperation in the 
                                                            
44 ibid 15, para 51. 
45 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (n 5) preamble, paras 1-2. 
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international community. 46   States, as the principal actors at the 
international level, must possess the capacity to establish bilateral or 
multilateral relationships with other States and other subjects of 
international law, creating rights and obligations that facilitate cooperation 
and serve the common aims of the contracting parties. 
3. The Notion of a ³6WDWH´ 
The 1969 Vienna Convention, while affirming the treaty-making capacity of 
6WDWHV GRHV QRW SURYLGH D GHILQLWLRQ IRU WKH WHUP ³6WDWH´  7KH ,/&¶V
commentaries to draft Article 5, quoted above, indicate that the term is 
XVHGWRH[SUHVV³WKHVDPHPHDQLQJDVLQWKH&KDUWHURIWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV
the Statute of the Court [ICJ], the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the 
6HD DQG WKH 9LHQQD &RQYHQWLRQ RQ 'LSORPDWLF 5HODWLRQV´ DQG WKDW ³LW
means a State for the purposHVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ´47  In addition, Article 
77(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention outlines the functions of depositories, 
LQFOXGLQJLQWHUDFWLRQVZLWK³6WDWHVHQWLWOHGWREHFRPHSDUWLHVWRWKHWUHDW\´
but neither the Convention nor the ILC commentaries give further guidance 
on  how such eligibility should be determined.  In practice, depositories of 
treaties, such as the UN Secretary-General 48  and Switzerland (as 
depository of the 1874 Treaty of Bern establishing the Universal Postal 
Union and of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, for instance 49 ), often 
undertake the task of determining eligibility when an entity seeks to 
become a party to a treaty deposited with them.   
                                                            
46 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (6th edn, CUP 2008) 94. 
47 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, vol II (n 24) 192. 
48 81 7UHDW\ 6HFWLRQ RI WKH 2IILFH RI /HJDO $IIDLUV µ6XPPDU\ RI 3UDFWLFH RI WKH 6HFUHWDU\-
*HQHUDODV'HSRVLWDU\RI0XOWLODWHUDO7UHDWLHV¶81'RF67/(*5HYpara 73. 
49  Relevant practice is introduced in Fatsah Ouguergouz, Santiago Villalpando, and Jason 
Morgan-)RVWHUµ$UWLFOH&RQYHQWLRQRI¶in Corten and Klein (eds) (n 6) 1738. 
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,Q WHUPVRI WUHDWLHVDGRSWLQJ WKH³9LHQQD IRUPXOD´ WKDW LVXQHTXLYRFDOO\
providing for the participation of member States of the UN, specialised 
agencies, and the International Atomic Energy Agency and parties to the 
ICJ Statute, the depositories would have little difficulty in ascertaining 
whether an entity would be eligible to become a party.50  However, treaties 
DGRSWLQJ WKH ³DOO 6WDWHV IRUPXOD´ RSHQLQJSDUWLFLSDWLRQ WRall States, are 
more problematic because when an entity not covered by the Vienna 
IRUPXODVHHNVWRSDUWLFLSDWHLQDWUHDW\WKH³DOO6WDWHVIRUPXOD´OHDYHVLWWR
the depository to determine whether the entity is a State.  Past practice 
suggests that when the UN Secretary-General encounters difficulties in 
deciding the eligibility of an entity he often seeks guidance from the 
practice of the General Assembly.51  An example of such practice can be 
found in General Assembly Resolution 3067, which explicitly refers  to the 
³5HSXEOLFRI*XLQHD-%LVVDX´DQGWKH³'HPRFUDWLF5HSXEOLFRI9LHW1DP´DV
³6WDWHV´ WKDWZHUH LQYLWHG WR WKH7KLUG8QLWHG1DWLRQV&RQIHUHQFHRQ WKH
Law of the Sea, evHQWKRXJKDWWKHWLPHWKHWZR³6WDWHV´GLGQRWFRPSO\
ZLWKWKH³9LHQQDIRUPXOD´52  If the Secretary-General cannot rely on past 
practice of the General Assembly, a request will be issued to seek an 
opinion from the General Assembly.53  To date, such a request has not 
taken place. 
More recently, however, a controversy emerged when the Government of 
Palestine lodged a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC).  While Article 12 of the Rome Statute of the 
                                                            
50 Eg Article 81 of the 1969 Vienna Convention:  
The present Convention shall be open for signature by all States Members of 
the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies or of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency or parties to the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, and by any other State invited by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations to become a party to the Convention«. 
51 UN Treaty Section of the Office of Legal Affairs (n 48) para 81. 
52 UNGA Res 3067 (XXVIII) (16 November 1973) UN Doc A/RES/3067(XXVIII), para 7. 
53 UN Treaty Section of the Office of Legal Affairs (n 48) para 82. 
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International CriPLQDO &RXUW VWLSXODWHV WKDW D ³6WDWH´ FDQ DFFHSW WKH
MXULVGLFWLRQRI WKH&RXUW DQG$UWLFOHDGRSWV WKH ³DOO6WDWHV IRUPXOD´
the Statute does not define the term.  The Office of the Prosecutor of the 
ICC observed that, though Palestine has been recognised as a State by 
more than 130 States and certain international organisations, it is still 
GHVLJQDWHGE\ WKH81*HQHUDO $VVHPEO\ DV DQ ³REVHUYHU´ UDWKHU WKDQ D
³1RQ-PHPEHU 6WDWH´54  Acknowledging that it is not authorised by the 
Rome Statute to determine ZKHWKHU3DOHVWLQHLVD³6WDWH´WKH2IILFHRIWKH
Prosecutor came to the conclusion that it would only consider the situation 
in Palestine if competent UN organs (namely the Security Council or the 
General Assembly) or the Assembly of States Parties of the Rome Statute 
HYHQWXDOO\³UHVROYHWKHOHJDOLVVXHUHOHYDQWWRDQDVVHVVPHQWRIDUWLFOH´
or if the Security Council refers the situation in Palestine to the Prosecutor 
according to Article 13(b) of the Rome Statutes.55 
4. The Special Case of the Holy See 
AlWKRXJK DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH ,/& WKH +RO\ 6HH HQWHUV LQWR WUHDWLHV ³RQ WKH
VDPHEDVLVDV6WDWHV´LWLQIDFWIDOOVXQGHUWKHFDWHJRU\RI³RWKHUVXEMHFWV
RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´ IRU WKH SXUSRVH RI $UWLFOH  RI WKH  9LHQQD
Convention.56  Different hypotheses have been put forward to support the 
+RO\6HH¶VWUHDW\-making capacity.  For instance, some have justified the 
FDSDFLW\ RQ WKH EDVLV RI WKH +RO\ 6HH¶V WHUULWRULDO VRYHUHLJQW\ RYHU WKH
Vatican City.57  However, this thesis has been rejected by the ILC, stating 
                                                            
54  Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, µSituation in Palestine¶ 
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C6162BBF-FEB9-4FAF-AFA9-836106D2694A/284387/ 
SituationinPalestine030412ENG.pdf> accessed 20 August 2014. 
55 ibid.  For a compilation of critiques of the approach taken by the Office of the Prosecutor, 
see Global Legal Monitor, µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDO &RXUW 3URVHFXWRU 'HFODUHV ,W /DFNV
-XULVGLFWLRQWR'HWHUPLQH:KHWKHU3DOHVWLQH,VD6WDWH¶$SULOKWWSZZZORFJRY 
lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205403091_text> accessed 20 August 2014. 
56 ,/&µ5HSRUWRIWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ&RPPLVVLRQ&RYHULQJWKH:RUNRI,WVWK6HVVLRQ¶Q
23) 162. 
57  Le Bouthillier and Bonin (n 6  FLWLQJ )UDQFHVFR &DSRWRUWL µ&RXUV JpQpUDO GH GURLW 
intHUQDWLRQDOSXEOLF¶5HFXHLOGHV&RXUV 
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WKDW³WUHDWLHVHQWHUHGLQWRE\WKH3DSDF\DUHQRUPDOO\HQWHUHGLQWRQRWLQ
virtue of its territorial sovereignty over the Vatican State, but on behalf of 
WKH +RO\ 6HH ZKLFK H[LVWV VHSDUDWHO\ IURP WKDW VWDWH´ 58   During the 
drafting of the 1969 Vienna Convention, some members of the ILC 
regarded it unnecessary to consider such controversies since no matter 
whether the entity is considered as the Holy See or as the Vatican City 
WKHUH KDV EHHQ D JHQHUDO FRQVHQVXV WKDW LW SRVVHVVHV ³LQWHUQDWLRQDO
juridical persRQDOLW\DQGWKHFDSDFLW\ WRFRQFOXGH LQWHUQDWLRQDO WUHDWLHV´59  
While the status of the Holy See and its relationship with the Vatican City 
has been the subject of much discussion, the ILC nevertheless recognised 
the capacity of the Holy See to enter into WUHDWLHV³RQWKHVDPHEDVLVDV
6WDWHV´ 60   In practice, the Holy See has ratified or acceded to many 
multilateral treaties, such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the CRC, and 
the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and concluded bilateral treaties, or 
³FRQFRUGDWV´ZLWKYDULRXV6WDWHV61 
5. Members of a Federal Union  
As noted earlier, the treaty-making capacity of members of a federal union 
was originally acknowledged in draft Article 5 (current Article 6) of the 
1969 Vienna Convention, with draft Article 5(2) provLGLQJ WKDW ³6WDWHV
members of a federal union may possess a capacity to conclude treaties if 
such capacity is admitted by the federal constitution and within the limits 
WKHUH ODLG GRZQ´  7KH GHOHWLRQ RI WKH SDUDJUDSK ZDV QRW QHFHVVDULO\
motivated by the denial of such a capacity, but by the fear that such a 
                                                            
58 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1959, vol II (n 10) 96. 
59  Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1962, vol I (1962) UN Doc 
A/C.N.4/SER.A/1962, 267 (6WDWHPHQWVRI0U7XQNLQDQGRI0U%DUWRãDWWKHWK0HHWLQJ
27 June 1962). 
60 ,/&µ5HSRUWRIWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ&RPPLVVLRQ&RYHULQJWKH:RUNRI,WVWK6HVVLRQ¶Q
23) 162. 
61 For discussLRQRQ WKHFRQFOXVLRQRIFRQFRUGDWVVHH&HGULF5\QJDHUW µ7KH/HJDO6WDWXVRI
WKH+RO\6HH¶ 3 Goettingen J Intl L 829, 844-49. 
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provision might be dangerous and too intrusive in the domestic affairs of 
federal States.62  For instance, during the UN Conference on the Law of 
Treaties, the Canadian delegation pointed out that the provision posed a 
UHDO DQG VHULRXV GDQJHU ³LQ VLWXDWLRQV OLNH WKDW RI &DQDGD ZKHUH WKH
constitution was largely unwritten and where constitutional practice was as 
LPSRUWDQW DV WKHZULWWHQGRFXPHQWV´ 63  7KHGHOHJDWLRQ¶V FRQFHUQPDLQO\
stemmed from the proviVLRQ¶V IDLOXUH WR VSHFLI\ ZKR ZDV FRPSHWHQW WR
interpret the federal constitution, which might lead to other States 
presuming to interpret the constitution of federal State in question.64  Also, 
WKHGHOHJDWLRQRI9LHW1DPVWDWHGWKDWWKHSURYLVLRQ³PLJKWEH regarded as 
DQDWWHPSWWRLQWHUIHUHLQHVVHQWLDOO\GRPHVWLFPDWWHUV´65 
The ILC commentary to this draft provision stipulates that in certain 
circumstances, the constitution of a federal State allows its members to 
possess treaty-making capacity.  While acknowledging the possibility for 
two federal members of one federal State to conclude agreements, the ILC 
is clear in stating that this paragraph only concerned treaties between a 
federal member and an outside State.66  However, it is evident from the 
discussions in the ILC, as well as the position of State delegations in the 
1968-1969 Vienna Conference, that in cases where members of a federal 
union possessed the capacity to conclude treaties, such capacity in fact 
stems from the treaty-making capacity vested exclusively in the federal 
JRYHUQPHQWDVWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKH6WDWHDQGWKHIRUPHU¶VFDSDFLW\
                                                            
62 See Turp and Roch (n 37) 109-3%UD]LOµ6RPH5HIOHFWLRQVRQWKH9LHQQa Convention on 
WKH/DZRI7UHDWLHV¶)HGHUDO/ Rev 223, 229. 
63 Summary Records of the Second Session of the UN Conference on the Law of Treaties (n 
40) 7 (7th plenary meeting). 
64 ibid 6-7. 
65 Summary Records of the First Session of the UN Conference on the Law of Treaties (n 40) 
60-68 (11th meeting of the Committee of the Whole). 
66 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, vol II (n 24) 192. 
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would always be confined by the constitution and relevant practice of that 
federal State.67 
6. The Issue of Dependent States 
An earlier version of the draft articles on the law of treaties also dealt with 
the treaty-PDNLQJ FDSDFLW\ RI GHSHQGHQW 6WDWHV ³WKH FRQGXFW RI ZKRVH
LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQV KDV EHHQ HQWUXVWHG WR DQRWKHU 6WDWH´ 68   In 
:DOGRFN¶VUHSRUWWRWKH,/&GUDIW$UWLFOHDFNQRZOHGJHGWKHSRVVLELOLWy for 
a dependent State to possess treaty-making capacity if such capacity is 
provided for in the arrangement between it and the State entrusted to 
conduct its foreign relations, and that other parties to the treaty in 
question agreed to the participation of the dependent State in its own 
name. 69   However, some members of the Commission considered that 
HQWLWLHV VXFK DV SURWHFWRUDWHV DQG FRORQLHV ³ZHUH LQ WKH SURFHVV RI
GLVDSSHDULQJ´ DQG WKHLU H[LVWHQFH ³PLJKW EH LQFRPSDWLEOH ZLWK WKH
principles of modern intHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´ DQG WKXV WKH ,/& VKRXOG QRW
consider issues regarding these entities. 70   Thus, the ILC eventually 
deleted the reference to dependant States. 
B. Treaty-Making Capacity of International Organisations 
1. Recognition of the Treaty-Making Capacity of International 
Organisations 
As reflected in the discussions prior to the adoption of the two Vienna 
Conventions on the Law of Treaties, as well as the definition ultimately 
                                                            
67 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, vol II (n 24) 192. 
68 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1962, vol II (n 31) µ)LUVW5HSRUWRQWKH 
Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock¶26 March 1962) UN Doc A/CN.4/144). 
69 ibid. 
70 ibid 57-71, 193-94, 240-2OLYHU-/LVVLW]\Qµ7HUULWRULDO(QWLWLHVRWKHUWKDQ,QGHSHQGHQW 
6WDWHVLQWKH/DZRI7UHDWLHV¶68) 125 Recueil des Cours 1, 19. 
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DJUHHGXSRQIRUWKH9LHQQD&RQYHQWLRQ³LQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQLVDWLRQ´
means an inter-governmental organisation. 71  7KH WHUP LQFOXGHV ³DQ
organisation composed mainly of States, and in some cases having 
associate members which are not yet States or which may even be other 
LQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQL]DWLRQV´72 
The practice of international organisations concluding treaties with States 
or other international organisation dates back to the 19th Century, with 
the headquarters agreement between the International Committee of 
Weight and Measures and France often cited as the earliest example.73  
Since the end of the Second World War, the numbers of international 
organisations and international agreements to which they are parties have 
increased.  During the preliminary discussions of the ILC on the topic of 
the law of treaties in 1950, it appeared that the majority of the 
Commission supported including in the ILC study agreements to which 
international organisations were parties.74  However, considering that the 
number of such agreements at the time remained limited, the ILC took the 
decision that the ComPLVVLRQ VKRXOG OHDYH DVLGH ³WKH TXHVWLRQ RI WKH
capacity of international organizations to make treaties, and that it should 
GUDIWWKHDUWLFOHVZLWKUHIHUHQFHWR6WDWHV´DQGUHYLVLWWKHLVVXHRIZKHWKHU
the rules could be applied to international organisations later.75  When the 
ILC reconsidered this issue in 1962, DOWKRXJK LW DJDLQ GHFLGHG WR ³defer 
examination of the treaties entered into by international organizations´ LW
ZDV DOVR DFNQRZOHGJHG WKDW ³international agreements to which 
                                                            
71 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations 
or between International Organizations, 21 March 1986, UN Doc A/CONF.129/15 (not yet in 
force), art 2(1)(i). 
72  Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1974, vol II(1) (1974) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1974/Add.1 (Part 1), 295-96. 
73 See eg Chiu, The Capacity of International Organizations (n 20) 6. 
74  Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1950, vol II (1950) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1, 381. 
75  Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1951, vol I (1951) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1951, 136. 
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organizations are parties to fall within the scope of the law of treaties´.76  
In the draft articles adopted by the ILC in 1966, the scope of the articles 
was confined to agreements concluded between States.77  It was expected 
that attempting to include rules governing treaties concluded by 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO RUJDQLVDWLRQV ZRXOG ³XQGXO\ FRPSOLFDWH DQG GHOD\ WKH
dUDIWLQJ´ RI WKH ODZ RI WUHDWLHV78  and the 1966 draft articles were the 
version eventually submitted for consideration at the Vienna Conference on 
the Law of Treaties. 
The number of international agreements with international organisations as 
parties grew over time.  By 1969, according to the Sixth Committee of the 
UN General Assembly, the number of such agreements amounted to 
approximately 20 per cent of all the multilateral treaties in force.79  The 
increase in number and importance of such agreements may have led to 
some relevant discussions in the 1968 Vienna Conference.  During the 
conference many delegations questioned the exclusion of agreements 
concluded between States and international organisations and even 
SURSRVHG DPHQGPHQWV WR UHLQVWDWH WKH UHIHUHQFH WR ³RWKHU VXEMHFWV RI
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´80  Waldock, serving as Expert Consultant of the Vienna 
&RQIHUHQFH UHLWHUDWHG WKH ,/&¶V FRQFHUQ WKDW ³WKH WDVN RI IUDPLQJ WKH
fundamental law governing treaties was so heavy in itself that in the 
interests of clarity it would be preferable to restrict the articles to treaties 
EHWZHHQ 6WDWHV´81  Per the suggestion of the Swedish delegation,82 the 
issue was eventually resolved in the form of a resolution recommending 
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79 UN GAOR 24th Session (1969) UN Doc A/7746 (1969) Annexes, Agenda Item 86, para 110. 
80 Eg Summary Records of the First Session of the UN Conference on the Law of Treaties (n 
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the General Assembly request the ILC study the question of treaties 
concluded between States and international organisations and between 
international organisations. 83   Subsequently, the General Assembly 
adopted Resolution 2501, recommending the ILC study this question in 
consultation with the principal international organisations.84  The final set 
of draft articles adopted by the ILC85 were submitted for the consideration 
of the UN Conference on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organizations or between International Organizations, held in 
Vienna in 1986, 86  and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
between States and International Organizations or between International 
Organizations was adopted on 20 March 1986 and opened for signature the 
next day.87 
The treaty-making capacity of international organisations was formally 
recognised in the 1986 Vienna Convention. The Preamble notes that 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO RUJDQLVDWLRQV ³SRVVHVV WKH FDSDFLW\ WR FRQFOXGH WUHDWLHV 
which is necessary for the exercise of their functions and the fulfilment of 
WKHLU SXUSRVHV´ ZKLOVW $UWLFOH  SURYLGHV WKDW ³WKH FDSDFLW\ RI DQ
international organization to conclude treaties is governed by the rules of 
WKDWRUJDQL]DWLRQ´3ULRUWRWKH codification of the 1986 Vienna Convention, 
international practice, 88  jurisprudence, 89  and scholarly writings 90  also 
provided evidence of such capacity.91  One of the earliest analyses of the 
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international status of international organisations can be found in WKH,&-¶V
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations 
Advisory Opinion.92  When faced with the question of whether the UN had 
³WKHFDSDFLW\WREULQJDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOFODLPDJDLQVWWKHUHVSRQVLEOHde jure 
or de facto JRYHUQPHQW¶ WR obtain reparation for damages due to injuries 
VXIIHUHG E\ LWV DJHQWV ³LQ FLUFXPVWDQFHV LQYROYLQJ WKH UHVSRQVLELOLW\ RI D
6WDWH´93 the ICJ considered the characteristics of the UN and enquired 
whether the UN possessed international personality.  The Court 
approached these issues by examining the provisions of the UN Charter in 
order to ascertain if Member States of the UN had intended the 
organisation to possess international rights and duties.  The Court found 
WKDW ³WKH DWWULEXWLRQ RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO SHUVRQDOLW\ LV LQGLVSHQVDEOH´ IRU WKH
UN to achieve the purposes and functions set out in the Charter. 94  
Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the UN possessed the capacity to 
operate upon an international plane and was endowed with the 
competence necessary to discharge its functions, including through the 
conclusion of agreements.95   
In addition to the UN, the capacity to enter into treaties of the League of 
Nations was also affirmed by the ICJ in the 1962 South West Africa Case, 
where the Court held that the Mandate for South West Africa 
is a special type of instrument ... [that] incorporates a definite 
agreement consisting in the conferment and acceptance of a 
Mandate ....  It is an instrument having the character of a 
treaty or convention and embodying international engagements 
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for the Mandatory as defined by the Council and accepted by 
the Mandatory.96 
At the regional level, jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
has also recognised that the negotiation and conclusion of agreements by 
the European Community with third States is necessary for the full 
discharge of its functions (regarding international transport) and that it 
possessed treaty-making capacity.97  Thus, an agreement concluded by the 
European Commission created binding legal obligations for the European 
Community under international law. 98   Therefore, under modern 
international law, the capacity of international organisations to conclude 
treaties is beyond doubt.99 
2. Rationale behind Granting Treaty-Making Capacity to International 
Organisations 
Various theses have been developed to explain the rationale behind 
granting international organisations treaty-making capacity.  In the ILC 
debates, there were essentially two schools of thought: the first viewing 
such capacity as inherent to any international organisation; and the second 
deriving such capacity from the delegation of authority by member States, 
either through the constitutive instruments or through later practice.100  
This debate continued among the delegations participating in the 1986 UN 
Conference on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
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Organizations or between International Organizations.101  The first school 
argued that international organisations could not exist without the capacity 
to conclude treaties.  For instance, some members of the ILC argued that 
international organisations must be attached to the territory of States and 
therefore must possess the capacity to conclude headquarters agreements 
with the respective States.102  Such capacity derived from international law, 
and it should not be based on internal rules of the organisations, which 
reflected the will of member States.103  The second school, on the contrary, 
FRQVLGHUHG WKDW DQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO RUJDQLVDWLRQ ³DOPRVW DOZD\V KDG WR EH
limited by the purposes for which iWKDGEHHQVHWXS´DQGDQRUJDQLVDWLRQ
³SRVVHVVHGRQO\ZKDWKDGEHHQJLYHQ WR LW´E\ LWVPHPEHU6WDWHV104  By 
way of compromise, the wording of Article 6 of the 1986 Vienna 
Convention was phrased to encompass both perspectives: the capacity is 
³JRYHUQHG E\´ WKH UXOHV RI WKDW LQWHUQDWLRQDO RUJDQLVDWLRQ UDWKHU WKDQ
³EDVHGRQ´105  As explained by certain members of the ILC, the purpose of 
a provision on the capacity to conclude treaties was to define the extent of 
the capacity, rather than the source of that capacity.106 
When determining the extent of treaty-making capacity of an international 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ WKH ILUVW SRLQW RI UHIHUHQFH VKRXOG EH WKH ³UXOHV RI WKDW
RUJDQL]DWLRQ´ 107  LQ SDUWLFXODU LWV ³FRQVWLWXWLRQ´ 108   As argued by one 
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member of the ILC in 1974,109 international organisations are established 
by States to pursue common objectives that cannot be achieved by States 
themselves, and capacities, including treaty-making capacity, are granted 
to international organisations to carry out the functions necessary to 
enable achievement of those objectives. 110   In this regard, an 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V FRQVWLWXHQW LQVWUXPHQW GHFLVLRQV RI LWV FRPSHWHQW RUJDQV
and other rules within the organisation determine the limit of the 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V FDSDFLW\ WR FRQFOXGH WUHDWLHV111  This corresponds to the 
,&-¶VRSLQLRQ LQWKHReparation Advisory Opinion that the capacities of an 
international organisation depend on its implied powers.  Although the ICJ 
only set out to answer questions concerning the capacities of the UN in a 
particular FRQWH[W LW KDV EHHQ DUJXHG WKDW FRQVLGHULQJ WKH &RXUW¶V
approach, the arguments are potentially applicable to other international 
organisations.112   
In addition to the constitution of each international organisation, some 
UHIHU WR WKHQRWLRQRI ³LQWHUQDWLRQDOSHUVRQDOLW\´DVDEDVLVRI WKH WUHDW\-
making capacity of international organisations.113  It has been argued that 
international practice demonstrates that international organisations, as 
subjects of international law, possess inherent powers, and their capacity 
is not confined by their constitutions.114  Proponents of this view point to 
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the examples of acts of international organisations that are not specifically 
authorised by their constituent instruments but are nevertheless 
considered legitimate.  Such examples include the capacity to conclude 
treaties, the sending and receiving of diplomatic representatives, 
convening conferences of plenipotentiary representatives of States, 
bringing international claims, and other acts that are generally not 
regulated in the constitution of international organisations. 115   In other 
words, international organisations acquire international personality and 
necessary capacities not by the consent of their member States but by the 
mere fact of their existence, which is contingent upon its ability to 
function.116 
When evaluating the validity of the two theories forming the bases of the 
treaty-making capacity of international organisations, constitution and 
international personality, the former seems to have garnered prevailing 
support. 117   As pointed out by Waldock in his first Special Rapporteur 
UHSRUW WR WKH ,/& ZKLOH ³DOO HQWLWLHV KDYLQJ WUHDW\-making capacity 
necessarily have international personality, it does not follow that all 
international persons have treaty-PDNLQJ FDSDFLW\´. 118   This is further 
affirmed by scholarly opinion, which regards that there is no necessary 
nexus between international personality and treaty-making capacity. 119  
While conflicting views remain with regard to the issue of the basis of the 
treaty-making capacity of international organisations, a consensus can be 
observed from the discussions within the ILC and the 1986 Vienna 
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Conference, as well as scholarly writings, that such capacity has been 
generally recognised.  As for the extent of treaty-making capacity of an 
LQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQLVDWLRQLQDGGLWLRQWRWKHOLPLWVSRVHGE\³UXOHVRIWKDW
RUJDQL]DWLRQ´ LW PLJKW EH XVHIXO WR UHFDOO WKH RSLQLRQ RI WKH ,&- LQ WKH
Reparation Advisory Opinion that the nature and capacities of a subject of 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ ³[depend] XSRQ WKH QHHGV RI WKH FRPPXQLW\´ DQG WKH
³UHTXLUHPHQWVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOOLIH´120 
C. Treaty-Making Capacity of Insurgents 
1. Recognition of Treaty-Making Capacity of Insurgents 
AFFRUGLQJ WR WKH ,/& WKH SKUDVH ³RWKHU VXEMHFWV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´ LQ
ArticOH  RI WKH  9LHQQD &RQYHQWLRQ LQFOXGHV ³LQVXUJHQWV´ 121   Sir 
Gerald Fitzmaurice, the third Special Rapporteur of the ILC on the topic of 
WKHODZRIWUHDWLHVSRLQWHGRXWLQKLVUHSRUWWRWKH,/&WKDW³LQVXUJHQWVWR
whom belligerent rights ha[d] been accRUGHG´ KDG D FHUWDLQ GHJUHH RI
international personality and possessed treaty-making capacity within the 
limits outlined by the scope of their personality.122  This view was later 
affirmed by his successor,123 yet some members of the ILC took a more 
cautious approach and emphasised that not all insurgents had treaty-
making capacity. 124   Although recognition of belligerency is rarely 
granted,125 the ILC seemed to regard it as a prerequisite for insurgents to 
possess treaty-making capacity.  Yet, it has been argued that prior 
recognition of belligerency is not necessary since such recognition can be 
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implied by the very act of concluding an agreement. 126   In addition, 
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which encourages 
SDUWLHVWRWKHFRQIOLFWWR³IXUWKHUHQdeavour to bring into force, by means 
RI VSHFLDO DJUHHPHQWV DOO RU SDUW RI WKHRWKHUSURYLVLRQV´ RI WKH*HQHYD
Conventions,127 has also been invoked as evidence of the treaty-making 
capacity of insurgents.128 
Questions have been raised regarding the legal status of agreements 
concluded with insurgents and whether they form a part of the 
international legal order.  For instance, the Constitutional Court of 
Colombia, while reviewing the constitutionality of Additional Protocol II of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Colombian law approving it, ruled 
WKDWWKH³VSHFLDODJUHHPHQWV´UHIHUUHGWR LQ&RPPRQ$UWLFOHVKRXOGQRW
EH FRQVLGHUHG ³WUHDWLHV´ LQ WKH VWULFW VHQVH EHFDXVH WKH\ ZHUH QRW
FRQFOXGHG EHWZHHQ ³HQWLWLHV VXEMHFW WR SXEOLF LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´129  This 
thesis takes the position that the status of any agreement concluded with 
insurgents is in fact contingent upon the conditions surrounding the 
conclusion of the agreement and its content.  Even if the agreement 
explicitly refers to international standards and involves international actors, 
it might not be categorised as a treaty.130   Neither does it necessarily 
reflect the will of the parties that the agreement concluded should be 
governed by international law.  The determination of whether parties to an 
agreement intended to create an international legal obligation depends on 
the terms of the agreement concerned and on the way it is implemented 
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after its conclusion.131   In addition, the attitude of other actors at the 
international level can also be observed to ascertain the perceived legal 
nature of the agreements concluded with insurgents.  The involvement, or 
even signatures, of representatives of international organisations and/or 
foreign States has been suggested as an indicator that the agreement 
between a State and other parties to an internal armed conflict has been 
internationalised, thus creating binding obligations under international 
law.132  As examples, agreements concluded in the context of two different 
conflicts are analysed below.  The opinion of international institutions and 
scholars concerning these agreements reflects the different approaches 
taken to determine the legal nature of an agreement concluded between a 
State and a non-State armed group. 
The first example is the Lusaka Protocol, which was concluded between the 
government of Angola and the União Nacional para a Independência Total 
de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola; UNITA), 
one of the major rebel groups in the civil war.  A civil war broke out in 
Angola in the 1970s and continued for over two decades.  In 1991, a set of 
documents, known as the ³$FRUGRV GH 3D]´ 3HDFH $FFRUGV DLPLQJ WR
establish peace were concluded between Angola and UNITA.  In reaching 
agreement between the two parties, the process of mediation was led by 
Portugal, with the participation of the US and the Soviet Union as 
observers.133  When UNITA failed to implement the commitments in the 
1991 Peace Accords and resumed military activities, the UN Security 
Council adopted Resolution 851 demanding WKDW81,7$³DELGHIXOO\´E\WKH
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1991 agreements.134  In 1994, Angola and UNITA concluded the Lusaka 
Protocol, which embodied the 1991 Peace Accords and was signed by the 
warring parties, the mediator of the peace process, the Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Angola, with the presence 
of observers: the US, the Russian Federation, and Portugal. 135   When 
UNITA failed to comply with the Lusaka Protocol, the Security Council, 
through Resolution 1127, adopted stronger language and demanded that 
81,7$ ³LPSOHPHQW LPPHGLDWHO\ LWV REOLJDWLRQV XQGHU WKH /XVDND
3URWRFRO´136  The resolution also specified enforcement measures such as 
travel bans for UNITA senior officials and closure of UNITA offices in foreign 
territories and expressed the Security CounFLO¶V³UHDGLQHVVWRFRQVLGHUWKH
imposition of additional measures, such as trade and financial restrictions, 
if UNITA does not fully comply with its obligations under the Lusaka 
3URWRFRO´137   
Regarding the legal status of the Lusaka Protocol, some have suggested 
that the terms used in the Protocol were ambiguous and did not reflect the 
will of the parties to establish binding legal obligations.138  In particular, it 
has been noted that a 2002 memorandum of understanding concluded by 
Angola and UNITA identifiHG WKH /XVDND 3URWRFRO DV D ³SROLWLFDO-juridical 
LQVWUXPHQW´IRUWKHUHVROXWLRQRIWKHFRQIOLFWLQ$QJROD139  Yet, considering 
the involvement of other States and the UN in the process of concluding 
the Protocol and the actions taken by the UN Security Council in response 
WR 81,7$¶V IDLOXUH WR LPSOHPHQW WKH 3URWRFRO .RRLMPDQV KROGV WKH YLHZ
that the Lusaka Protocol has indeed created international legal 
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obligations. 140   He further argues that non-State entities involved in a 
conflict that results in the conclXVLRQ RI ³LQWHUQDWLRQDOL]HG SHDFH
DJUHHPHQWV´ DQG DWWUDFWV WKH 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO¶V FRQFHUQ VKRXOG EH
considered capable of entering into binding agreements under international 
law.141   
However, the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court of Sierra Leone held a 
different view when it considered the nature of the Lomé Agreement 
between the government of Sierra Leone and a rebel group, the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF).  The armed conflict between the Sierra 
Leone forces and the RUF began in 1991.  Although in 1996 a peace 
agreement was reached between the two parties to the conflict, 142  the 
initiative eventually failed and the Lomé Agreement was concluded in 1999.  
Notably, the Lomé Agreement designated a number of international actors, 
including the government of Togo, the UN, the Organisation of African 
Unity, the Economic Community of West African States, and the 
&RPPRQZHDOWKRI1DWLRQVDV³Moral GXDUDQWRUV´RIWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI
the Agreement by both parties.143  In Prosecutor v Kallon and Kamara, the 
Appeals &KDPEHU RI WKH 6SHFLDO &RXUW RI 6LHUUD /HRQH QRWHG .RRLMPDQ¶V
view outlined above.  Yet, it ruled that the involvement of foreign States or 
international organisations as mediators, facilitators of peace processes, or 
³PRUDOJXDUDQWRUV´GLGQRWDOWHU WKHnature of the agreements concluded 
with non-State armed groups, and these agreements remained governed 
by domestic law. 144   The Chamber went on to reason that even if an 
agreement sought to bring an end to an internal conflict that affected the 
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peace and security of the international community, an issue that would be 
of concern for the Security Council, such characteristics would not lead to 
the creation of international legal obligations.145  Regarding the issue of 
treaty-making capacity of insurgents, the Appeals Chamber explicitly 
pronounced that no evidence suggested that international law has vested 
the insurgents with treaty-making capacity, and, even though the 
JRYHUQPHQWRI6LHUUD/HRQHFRQVLGHUHGWKH58)³DVDQHQWLW\ZLWKZKLFKLW
could enter into an aJUHHPHQW´ WKH /RPp $JUHHPHQW VKRXOG QRW EH
considered a treaty.146 
Commenting on the decision of the Special Court, Cassese held a different 
opinion and argued that the Lomé Agreement is an international treaty.147  
He drew such a conclusion from both the characteristics of the RUF and 
from the text of the agreement.  On the one hand, insurgents may acquire 
treaty-PDNLQJ FDSDFLW\ XQGHU LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ LI ³WKH\ VKRZ HIIHFWLYH
control over some part of the territory and the armed conflict is large-scale 
and prRWUDFWHG´148  On the other hand, the text of the agreement reflects 
the intention of the parties to create binding international legal 
obligation.149  This thesis subscribes to the view expressed by Kooijmans 
and Cassese and considers that there is indeed evidence supporting the 
treaty-making capacity of insurgents, such as the acknowledgement in the 
,/&¶V GLVFXVVLRQVDQG ILQDO FRPPHQWDULHV WR$UWLFOHRI WKH9LHQQD
Convention previously mentioned.  Also, the abundant practice of 
concluding agreements with insurgents with the use of obligatory 
                                                            
145 ibid para 42. 
146 ibid paras 47-49. 
147 Antonio Cassese, µThe Special Court and International Law: The Decision Concerning the 
Lomé Agreement Amnesty¶4) 2 J Intl Crim Justice 1130, 1134-35. 
148 ibid 1134. 
149 ibid 1135. 
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language150 demonstrates the intention of parties, States and insurgent 
groups, to establish binding obligations under international law. 
2. Rationale behind Granting Treaty-Making Capacity to Insurgents 
The rationale for recognising the treaty-making capacity of insurgents 
might be inferred from the following two features: a) the emphasis on the 
requirement of effective control over certain territories; and b) the 
proposed limit to treaty-making capacity.  Firstly, both the ILC 151  and 
scholarly writings 152  emphasise that for insurgents to possess treaty-
making capacity, they must exercise de facto control over certain 
territories.  This requirement of territorial control corresponds to the 
principle of effectiveness. 153   In practice, entities displaying State-like 
features are sometimes granted capacity to enter into treaty relations, 
especially those representing peoples entitled to exercise the right to self-
determination.154   Secondly, it has been suggested that insurgents can 
only conclude treaties regarding the conduct of warfare.155  In order to 
regulate the situation of armed conflicts and to minimise the atrocities 
brought about by the use of force, it is crucial that there is a channel for 
creating rights and obligations for parties engaged in conflict.  This 
argument is also supported by the commentary to Common Article 3 of the 
                                                            
150  For examples of such agreements, see Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-
International Armed Conflict (OUP 2012) 124-32.  One of the examples introduced is the 
2002 Agreement on the Protection of Civilians and Civilian Facilities from Military Attack 
EHWZHHQ 6XGDQ DQG WKH 6XGDQ 3HRSOH¶V /LEHUDWLRQ 0RYHPHQW ZKLFK ³UHFRQILUP>V@ >WKH
SDUWLHV¶@REOLJDWLRQVXQGHULQWHUQDWLRQDOODZLQFOXGLQJFRPPRQ$UWLFOHRIWKH*HQHYD
Conventions, to take constant care to protect the civilian population, civilians and civilian 
REMHFWVDJDLQVWWKHGDQJHUVDULVLQJIURPPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQV ´ 
151 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1958, vol II (n 122) 32, para 22. 
152 Cassese, International Law (n 125) 127-28. 
153 Jann K .OHIIQHU µ7KH$SSOLFDELOLW\RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO+XPDQLWDULDQ/DZWR2UJDQL]HG$UPHG
*URXSV¶,QWO5HY5HG&URVV451-54. 
154 See Anthea 5REHUWVDQG6DQGHVK6LYDNXPDUDQµ/DZPDNLQJE\1RQVWDWH$FWRUV(QJDJLQJ
$UPHG*URXSVLQWKH&UHDWLRQRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO+XPDQLWDULDQ/DZ¶<DOH-,QWO/
120-21. 
155 See eg Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1958, vol II (n 122) 32, para 22; 
Cassese, International Law (n 125) 127-28. 
89 
Geneva Conventions, which states that in cases where an internal conflict 
escalates,  
[i]t becomes desirable to settle in detail the treatment [victims 
of war] are to receive, the relief which is to be brought to them, 
DQG YDULRXV RWKHU PDWWHUV « $OWKRXJK WKH RQO\ SURYLVLRQV
which each of the Parties is bound to apply unilaterally are 
those contained in Article 3, they are nevertheless under an 
obligation to try to bring about a fuller application of the 
Convention by means of a bilateral agreement.156 
Evidence also suggests that when armed groups are allowed to participate 
in the process of law creation, by the conclusion of agreements between 
armed groups and international organisations, for instance, the overall 
compliance with rules of international humanitarian law would improve.157  
Against this background, it can be argued that the limits of the treaty-
making capacity of insurgents echoes the notion of necessity in relation to 
determining the capacity of an international entity to act at the 
international level, as pronounced by the ICJ in the Reparation Advisory 
Opinion.  In other words, since the necessity of allowing insurgents to 
conclude treaties arises from the need to regulate armed conflicts and to 
alleviate the damages suffered by victims of war, it follows that their 
treaty-making capacity is restricted to matters regarding conduct of 
warfare. 
D. Treaty-Making Capacity of other International Entities 
1. National Liberation Movements 
                                                            
156 Oscar Uhler and Henri Coursier, Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, vol IV (ICRC 1958) 42. 
157 Roberts and Sivakumaran (n 154) 126-32. 
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While NLMs may sometimes have other labels, such as belligerent 
communities, they are given special status under international law because 
of their fight against colonial domination, racist regimes, or alien 
occupation in the exercise of the right to self-determination.158  In other 
words, their status derives from the motivation behind their struggle and 
WKHLU UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ RI ³SHRSOHV´ HQWLWOHG WR VHOI-determination, and such 
status provides them with a range of rights and duties under international 
law.159  In particular, the legitimacy of the fight against colonial domination 
and the exercise of the right to self-determination in this regard has been 
repeatedly recognised by the UN General Assembly.160 
The treaty-making capacity of NLMs has been acknowledged in the 
literature161 and most notably provided for explicitly in the First Additional 
Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (API).  Article 1(4) of API 
expands the notion of international armed conflict to include armed 
conflicts involving NLMs.  For the NLMs involved in such conflicts, Article 
96(3) of API provides that the authority representing a people engaged in 
a war of national liberation can express its intention to be bound by the 
1949 Geneva Conventions and API through the submission of a declaration 
to the depository of API.  The same provision also stipulates that, following 
WKHGHSRVLWRU\¶VUHFHLSWRIVXFKDGHFODUDWLRQWKH*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQVDQG
API immediately apply to the conflict involving the NLM in question, and 
the Geneva Conventions and API become equally binding upon all parties 
to the conflict.   
                                                            
158 Cassese, International Law (n 125) 140. 
159 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th edn, OUP 2008) 62-63; Crawford, 
%URZQOLH¶V3ULQFLSOHV (n 27) 123-24. 
160  UNGA Res 2105 (XX) (20 December 1965) UN Doc A/RES/2105(XX); Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning friendly Relations and Co-operation among States 
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) (24 October 
1970) UN Doc A/RES/2625. 
161  Brownlie, Principles (n 159) 62; Crawford, %URZQOLH¶V 3ULQFLSOHV (n 27) 123; Kirsten 
Schmalenbach µArticle 3. International Agreements not within the Scope of the Present 
Convention¶LQOliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties: A Commentary (Springer 2012) 68. 
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While Articles 1(4) and 96(3) of API provide for the possibility for NLMs to 
assume the same rights and obligations as those assumed by a State party 
to the Geneva Conventions and API, practice suggests that these 
provisions have had little effect.  Firstly, armed conflicts prior to the 
adoption of API already demonstrated that NLMs were willing to make 
unilateral declarations expressing an undertaking to apply provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions.162  Secondly, to date the depository has not received 
any qualified declarations, mostly because States against which NLMs are 
fighting have not ratified API.163   
The reason behind the special status of NLMs and the conferral of treaty-
making capacity in some circumstances largely stems from their 
representation of peoples exercising the right to self-determination. 164  
Since international law recognises the legitimacy of a people exercising this 
right, authorities representing such peoples have been recognised as 
capable of performing certain acts that are considered as necessary to 
their struggle. 
2. Entities Created to Administer Territories 
:KLOH WKH SUHFLVH GHILQLWLRQ RI ³LQWHUQDWLRQDO WHUULWRULDO DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ´
varies, it generally denotes the exercise of administering authority over a 
particular territory, on a temporary basis, by a formally-constituted 
international entity that performs executive, judicial and legislative 
                                                            
162  ,RDQQLV .DOSRX]RV µ7KH $SSOLFDELOLW\ RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ WR $UPHG &RQIOLFWV ,QYROYLQJ
Non-6WDWH $UPHG *URXSV %HWZHHQ 6WDWXV DQG +XPDQLWDULDQ 3URWHFWLRQ¶ 3K' WKHVLV
University of Nottingham 2010) 151-52. 
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activities for the benefit of that territory.165  The administration of the Free 
City of Danzig by the League of Nations is one of the early examples of 
international territorial administration, and the UN administration of 
Kosovo and East Timor are more contemporary examples. 
Entities established for the purpose of administering or supervising certain 
territories, often created under the auspices of international organisations, 
have sometimes been vested with treaty-making capacity.166  In order to 
be bound by treaty obligations, international territorial administrations 
have been given powers to conclude treaties, accede to existing treaties, 
or functionally succeed treaty obligations of the former regime.167  The 
second power may be problematic considering treaty amendments might 
be necessary to allow participation of international territorial 
administrations or the international organisations in charge of the 
administration, and the temporary nature of such administrations also 
renders accession to existing treaties an inappropriate technique.  The last 
method, functional succession, refers to the continuation of treaty 
obligations pertaining to the provisions relevant to the functions of the 
territorial administration.  The case of the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) provides an example in this 
context.  UNMIK reported to the Human Rights Committee, on the 
implementation of the ICCPR in 2006 and to the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, on the implementation of the ICESCR in 2008.  
When explaining the role that UNMIK was expected to play, the Human 
Rights Committee invoked the concept of continuity of obligations and 
opined that UNMIK is bound to respect and ensure the rights provided in 
                                                            
165 Carsten Stahn, The Law and Practice of International Territorial Administration: Versailles 
to Iraq and Beyond (CUP 2008) 44-45; Ralph Wilde, International Territorial Administration: 
How Trusteeship and Civilizing Mission Never Went Away (OUP 2008) 21-22. 
166 Lissitzyn (n 70) 7. 
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the ICCPR because the former regime, Serbia, was a party to the 
Covenant.168 
The rationale behind granting treaty-making capacity to international 
territorial administrations and the basis for their exercise of authority 
generally derives from the consent and delegation of authority by the 
territorial sovereign. 169   In addition, since international territorial 
administrations are often created by international organisations, 
arguments concerning international organisations have also been made to 
justify the treaty-making capacity of international territorial 
administrations.  Such arguments point out that international organisations 
are established by States, which vested certain organs within the 
organisations the power to make decisions and exercise functions for the 
aim of maintaining peace and security.  The UN Security Council is a case 
in point, and its establishment or endorsement of territorial administration 
is based on the implied consent by Member States of the UN.170  In other 
words, the legitimacy of the international territorial administration projects 
authorised by the SeFXULW\ &RXQFLO PD\ UHVW RQ WKH 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO¶V
Chapter VII mandate, which has been accepted by all UN Members as they 
joined the organisation.  Such implied acceptance differentiates the 
international territorial administrations from unlawful intervention and 
³LOOHJDOFRORQLDOLVP´171 
III. The Capacity of Unrecognised Entities to Conclude or  
Participate in International Human Rights Treaties 
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As the aim of this thesis is to explore the application of international 
human rights law to unrecognised entities, this section does not seek to 
argue that unrecognised entities possess treaty-making capacity as a 
matter of international law in general and thus should be considered as 
capable of entering into every category of treaties under international law.  
Instead, the discussion below focuses on the treaty-making capacity of 
unrecognised entities with regards to international human rights treaties, 
drawing upon the analysis in the previous section.  Additionally, the 
arguments presented below reflect the special characteristics of 
international human rights treaties, especially with respect to the issue of 
continuity of treaty obligations and the requirement of a national system to 
respect, protect, and fulfil the rights set out in human rights treaties.   
It is argued that there are two bases for granting unrecognised entities 
treaty-making capacity with regards to international human rights treaties.  
The first basis relates to the theories concerning the effect of State 
recognition: the constitutive theory and the declaratory theory.172   The 
latter, that is the declaratory theory,173 seems to have garnered prevalent 
support from both the literature and State practice.174  The declaratory 
theory argues that the act of recognition is independent from the 
consideration of statehood.175  That is, a new State is created when the 
factual conditions are in conformity with the requirements of statehood, 
and recognition from other States serves merely as an acknowledgment of 
                                                            
172 For a more detailed discussion of the theories of recognition, see Chapter 2, Section II.B. 
173 H Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (CUP 1948) 38; John Dugard, Recognition 
and the United Nations (Grotius Publication Ltd 1987) 7.  See also Ti-Chiang Chen, The 
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174 SWHIDQ 7DOPRQ µ7KH &RQVWLWXWLYH 9HUVXV WKH 'HFODUDWRU\ 7KHRU\ RI 5HFRJQLWLRQ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the fact.  According to this declaratory theory, the lack of recognition 
received by unrecognised entities would not bar them from obtaining 
statehood. Since unrecognised entities fulfil the criteria of statehood, they 
are therefore vested with the capacity to conclude or participate in 
international human rights treaties due to their status as a State.  While 
the lack of general recognition does not necessarily prevent unrecognised 
entities from concluding international agreements,176 it might lead to the 
refusal of the depositories of treaties to receive instruments of accession in 
practice.177 
Another argument builds on the notion of necessity set out by the ICJ in 
the Reparation Advisory Opinion in determining the capacities of a subject 
of international law to act on the international plane and will now be 
considered in detail.  The discussion below will first consider why it is 
necessary, from the point of view of the international community, to grant 
unrecognised entities the capacity to conclude or participate in 
international human rights treaties.  Then the section will move on to 
introduce how the notion of necessity further relates to the principles of 
continuity of international human rights treaty obligations and of 
international legal personality and whether these principles serve to 
strengthen the necessity argument to support granting unrecognised 
entities treaty-making capacity in relation to international human rights 
treaties.  Lastly, possible concerns in this regard will be discussed to 
examine whether they are sufficient to prevent unrecognised entities from 
concluding or participating in international human rights treaties. 
                                                            
176 Randolph R Sean, µ7KH 6WDWXV RI $JUHHPHQWV EHWZHHQ WKH $PHULFDQ ,QVWLWXWH LQ 7DLZDQ
DQGWKH&RRUGLQDWLRQ&RXQFLOIRU1RUWK$PHULFDQ$IIDLUV¶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15 Intl Lawyer 249, 258-59. 
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A. Rationale behind Acknowledging the Capacity of Unrecognised Entities 
to Conclude or to Participate in International Human Rights Human 
Rights Treaties: The Needs of the International Society  
1. The Necessity to Allow Unrecognised Entities to Conclude or to 
Participate in International Human Rights Treaties 
a. 7KH1RWLRQRI1HFHVVLW\RU³WKH1HHGVRIWKH&RPPXQLW\´ 
In view of the discussions in Section II, it is arguable that the rationale 
behind granting treaty-making capacity to States, international 
organisations, and insurgents relates more closely to the notion of 
QHFHVVLW\RULQWKHZRUGVRIWKH,&-³WKHQHHGVRIWKHFRPPXQLW\´178 than 
the inherent characteristics of those subjects of international law.  While in 
the Reparation Advisory Opinion, the ICJ was asked to provide an opinion 
UHJDUGLQJWKH81¶VFDSDFLW\WREULQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOFODLPVWKH&RXUWGLGOD\
down general rules regarding how to determine whether an entity 
possesses international legal personality and to what extent that entity 
possesses capacities to operate on the international plane.  Noting that 
³WKH VXEMHFWV RI ODZ LQ DQ\ OHJDO V\VWHP DUH QRW QHFHVVDULO\ LGHQWLFDO LQ
WKHLUQDWXUHRULQWKHH[WHQWRIWKHLUULJKWV´ the ICJ opined that the precise 
QDWXUHRIDVXEMHFWRILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZLVGHWHUPLQHGE\³WKHQHHGVRIWKH
FRPPXQLW\´179  For an international organisation, since it is established by 
States to achieve certain purposes and aims, the capacities it possesses to 
DFWDWWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOOHYHODUHWKRVH³QHFHVVLWDWHGE\WKHGLVFKDUJHRILWV
IXQFWLRQV´180 
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While the ICJ DGRSWHG WKHQRWLRQRI ³FRPPXQLW\´ LQ LWVHYDOXDWLRQRI WKH
necessity to allow international organisations to possess certain capacities, 
it did not elaborate on the meaning of the term.  Although the ICJ indeed 
stated that UN Member States, 50 DW WKH WLPH ³represent[ed] the vast 
majority of the members of the international community´181 this by no 
means suggests that the ³LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\´Fonsists exclusively of 
UN Member States or States in general.   
7KH,&-KDVVXEVHTXHQWO\HPSOR\HGWKHWHUP³LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\´LQ
a number of cases.  For instance, in the Barcelona Traction Case, the ICJ 
described obligations erga omnes DV ³obligations of a State towards the 
interQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\DVDZKROH´.182  Another example can be found in 
the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, 
where the ICJ repeatedly referred to the term ³LQWHUQDWLRQDO
FRPPXQLW\´183  However, it appears that the Court has not attempted to 
define the term, and it has even been argued that the term was at times 
³GHYRLG RI DQ\ OHJDO VXEVWDQFH´ 184   Scholarly writings have provide 
insights in this regard.185  For instance, Franck characterised a community 
DV³Dsocial system of continXLQJLQWHUDFWLRQDQGWUDQVDFWLRQ´DQG ³EDVHd «
on a common, conscious system of reciprocity between its constituents´186 
DQG DFFRUGLQJ WR 6LPPD WKH WHUP ³LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\´ LV RIWHQ
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182  Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (New 
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 British YB Intl L 13, 34. 
185 (J'LQR.ULWVLRWLVµ,PDJLQLQJWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RPPXQLW\¶(-,/ 
186 Thomas M Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (OUP 1995) 10. 
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LQYRNHG WR ³denote the repository of interests that transcend individual 
States ut singuli and thus are not « comprehensible within the classic 
ELODWHUDOLVW SDUDGLJP´ 187   Additionally, many have argued that, while 
States are no doubt members of the international community, the concept 
extends beyond States and encompasses non-State entities,188 including 
individuals.189  It has also been argued that States and non-State entities 
play complementary roles in protecting general interests of the 
international community, including in the field of human rights.190  The 
participation of various actors in the international community changes 
DFFRUGLQJWR³WKHQDWXUHRI WKH LVVXH LQYROYHG«DQGWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRI
LQWHUQDWLRQDOOLIH´DQG³FDQQRWEHVROHO\GHWHUPLQHGE\6WDWHV´191 
Although there seems to be an absence of a uniform definition of 
³LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\´ WKLV does not mean that the test of necessity 
laid down in the Reparation Advisory Opinion is inoperable.  In its 
LOOXVWUDWLRQRIKRZWKH³QHHGVRIWKHFRPPXQLW\´GHWHUPLQHWKHQDWXUHDQG
capacities of subjects of international law, the ICJ stated that  
the development of international law has been influenced by the 
requirements of international life, and the progressive increase 
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(2001) 8 Indiana J Global Legal Studies 303, 314; Hermann Mosler, The International Society 
as a Legal Community (Sijthoff & Noordhoff 1980) 11-14. 
189  Robert McCorquodale, µ%H\RQG 6WDWH 6RYHUHLJQW\ 7KH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /HJDO 6\VWHP DQG
Non-6WDWH 3DUWLFLSDQWV¶ (2006) 8 Intl L: Revista Colombiana de Derecho Internacional 103, 
 *LRUJLR *DMD µ7KH 3URWHFWLRQ RI *HQHUDO ,QWHUHVWV LQ WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &RPPXQLW\
*HQHUDO &RXUVH RQ 3XEOLF ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ¶   5HFXHLO GHV &RXUV   5REHUW
McCorquodale, µ7KH,QGLYLGXDODQGWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/HJDO6\VWHP¶ LQMalcolm D Evans (ed), 
International Law (4th edn, OUP 2014) 282-84. 
190 Gaja (n 189) 32-33. 
191  Robert McCorquodale, µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &RPPXQLW\ DQG 6WDWH 6RYHUHLJQW\ $Q 8QHDV\
SyPELRWLF5HODWLRQVKLS¶LQ&ROLQ:DUEULFNDQG6WHSKHQ7LHUQH\HGVTowards an International 
Legal Community: The Sovereignty of States and the Sovereignty of International Law (British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law 2006) 256. 
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in the collective activities of States has already given rise to 
instances of action upon the international plane by certain 
entities which are not States.192 
While this was presented in the context of international organisations, 
similar arguments have been made in relation to other non-State 
entities.193  It has been argued that the personalities and capacities of such 
HQWLWLHV VKRXOG EH DFNQRZOHGJHG LI WKH\ DUH SHUFHLYHG DV ³performing 
functions which can be regarded as useful for international society itself´
DQG WKH EDVLV RI VXFK DFNQRZOHGJPHQW LV WKH ³society¶s needs for the 
development of international cooperation and the furtherance of the ends 
RIWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\´194 
4XHVWLRQVWKHQDULVHDVWRZKRGHWHUPLQHVWKH³QHHGVRIWKHFRPPXQLW\´
RUWKH³HQGVRIWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\´DQGKRZVXFKGHWHUPLQDWLRQ
should be made.  The ICJ, or its predecessor the PCIJ, has often been 
referred to as the institution with the competence to rule on issues 
concerning the common interests and values of the international 
community.195  While, as mentioned above, the ICJ has indeed referred to 
WKH QRWLRQ RI ³LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\´ LQ LWV GHFLVLRQV LW KDV QRW
discussed the needs of the international community or the notion of 
necessity in any context other than the examination of personality and 
capacities of international organisations in the Reparation Advisory Opinion.  
Considering that it is difficult for unrecognised entities to have access to 
                                                            
192 Reparation Advisory Opinion (n 89) 178. 
193  Anne Hsiu-$Q +VLDR µ7KH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /HJDO 6WDWXV RI 8QUHFRJQL]HG &ODLPDQWV WR
6WDWHKRRG$&RPSDUDWLYH$QDO\VLV RI 7DLZDQDQG WKH7XUNLVK5HSXEOLF RI1RUWKHUQ&\SUXV¶
(2011) 47(1) Issues & Studies 1, 10; Tiyanjana Maluwa, µThe Holy See and the Concept of 
International Legal Personality: Some Reflections¶ (1986) 19 Comp & Intl LJ Southern Africa 
1, 11-16. 
194 Maluwa (n 193) 12. 
195 Hernández (n 184) 13  FLWLQJ + /DXWHUSDFKW µ5qJOHV JpQpUDOHV GX GURLW GH OD SDL[¶ 
(1937) 62 Recueil des Cours 95, 308.); Georges Abi-Saab, µThe International Court as a World 
Court¶LQVaughan Lowe and Malgosia Fitzmaurice (eds), Fifty Years of the International Court 
of Justice: Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings (CUP 1996) 7. 
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the ICJ, 196  it is conceivable that the Court would hardly have the 
opportunity to rule on whether the notion of necessity justifies 
acknowledging legal capacities of these entities.  Therefore, the plausible 
DSSURDFK ZRXOG EH WR EXLOG RQ WKH &RXUW¶V UHDVRQLQJ LQ WKH Reparation 
Advisory Opinion and take into consideration of relevant practice at the 
international level to determine whether the needs of the international 
community can serve as a basis for the capacity of unrecognised entities to 
conclude or participate in international human rights treaties.197 
b. Applying the Notion of Necessity to Unrecognised Entities 
Turning to unrecognised entities, in order to determine whether they 
possess treaty-making capacity and the extent of such capacity, 
consideration should be given to the necessity, from the point of view of 
the international community, of allowing unrecognised entities to hold 
rights and bear obligations under international law.  Support for such 
necessity stems from the observation that only through granting certain 
capacities to unrecognised entities can rules of international law be applied 
to the territories controlled by these entities.198  In the field of human 
rights, it has been argued that it is increasingly necessary to include 
unrecognised entities in the international legal framework,199 given that 
such entities exert effective authority over certain territories. 200   The 
                                                            
196 $FFRUGLQJWR$UWLFOHRIWKH,&-6WDWXWHWKH&RXUWLV³open to the states parties to the 
present Statute ´ :KLOH LW LVSRVVible for a non-UN Member State to become a party to the 
Statute (Article 93(2) of the UN Charter) and for the Court to be open to a State whose not a 
party to the Statute (Article 35(2) of the ICJ Statute), these conditions require the 
approval/recommendation by the General Assembly and/or Security Council, thus making it 
difficult for unrecognized entities to have access to the ICJ. 
197 See Maluwa (n 193) 12. 
198 ' 3 2¶&RQQHOO International Law, vol 1 (2nd edn, Stevens & Sons Ltd 1970) 86; Finn 
6H\HUVWHGµ,QWHUQDWLRQDO3HUVRQDOLW\RI,QWHUQDWLRQDO2UJDQLVDWLRQV'R7KHLU&DSDFLWLHV5HDOO\
'HSHQGXSRQ7KHLU&RQVWLWXWLRQV"¶,QGLDQD- Intl L 1, 42. 
199 Michael Schoiswohl, Status and (Human Rights) Obligations of Non-Recognized De Facto 
5HJLPHV LQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ 7KH &DVH RI µ6RPDOLODQG¶ (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2004) 
235. 
200 See $QWKRQ\&XOOHQDQG6WHYHQ:KHDWOH\ µ7KH+XPDQ5LJKWVRI ,QGLYLGXDOV LQDe Facto 
Regimes under the European Convention on Human 5LJKWV¶ +XPDQ5LJKWV/5HY
DUJXLQJWKDW³>R@QHRIWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\UHIOHFWHG
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existing international legal framework for the protection of human rights 
contains insufficient regulations for the conduct of non-State actors, 
including unrecognised entities,201 and by allowing unrecognised entities to 
participate in international human rights treaties some of these gaps in 
protection can be filled.   
The necessity of allowing unrecognised entities to participate in 
international human rights treaties also stems from a number of 
characteristics unique to such treaties.  As international law imposes 
obligations on States and other actors, the duty bearers usually enjoy 
discretion as to how to discharge such obligations. 202   Yet many 
international human rights treaties stipulate the manner in which 
obligations should be implemented, and human rights bodies have often 
interpreted that the rights provided in the respective instruments must be 
respected, protected, and fulfilled.203  )LUVWO\ WKH GXW\ WR ³UHVSHFW´ OLPLWV
the exercise of governmental authority.204  In other words, it is a negative 
obligation under which parties to human rights treaties must refrain from 
violations of human rights.205  6HFRQGO\ WKH GXW\ WR ³SURWHFW´ GHPDQGV
that parties exercise due diligence in order to prevent individuals from 
being subjected to human rights violations committed by private actors.  In 
addition, in cases where violations have occurred, measures must be taken 
to respond to the situation, including through investigation and punishment, 
                                                                                                                                                            
in the adoption of numerous declarations and instruments on the importance of a universal 
conception of human rights, is for tKHHIIHFWLYHJXDUDQWHHRIKXPDQULJKWVWRLQGLYLGXDOV´ 
201 Angela Hegarty and Siobhan Leonard, Human Rights: An Agenda for the 21st Century 
(Cavendish 1999) 63. 
202 )UpGpULF 0pJUHW µ1DWXUH RI 2EOLJDWLRQV¶ in Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah, and Sandesh 
Sivakumaran (eds), International Human Rights Law (2nd edn, OUP 2014) 101. 
203 Eg UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights µ*HQHUDO&RPPHQW1R. 12¶ LQ
µ&RPSLODWLRQRI*HQHUDO&RPPHQWVDQG*HQHUDO5HFRPPHQGDWLRQV$GRSWHGE\+XPDQ5LJKWV
7UHDW\%RGLHV¶(27 May 2008) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) 58, para 15. 
204 7KH :RUG ³/DZV´ LQ $UWLFOH  RI WKH $PHULFDQ &RQYHQWLRQ RQ +XPDQ 5LJKWV, Advisory 
Opinion OC-6/86, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series A No 6 (9 May 1986) para 21. 
205  UN Human Rights CommLWWHH µ*HQHUDO &RPPHQW 1R ¶ LQ µ&RPSLODWLRQ RI *HQHUDO
&RPPHQWV¶Q203) 244, para 6. 
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so that the perpetrators are not allowed to act with impunity.206  Lastly, 
the duW\WR³IXOILO´GHQRWHVWKDWSDUWLHVPXVWVWUXFWXUHWKHLUJRYHUQPHQWDO
apparatus and perform functions with an aim to contributing to the greater 
enjoyment of rights.207  Therefore, governmental institutions and bodies, 
whether traditionally belonging to the executive, judicial, or legislative 
branches or specifically created for the promotion and protection of human 
rights, must contribute to the formulation of a national system to carry out 
these different categories of duties. 208   An unrecognised entity is best 
placed to establish such a system in the territory over which it exercises 
control, as opposed to the parent State.  Even though the territory in 
question might de jure belong to an existing State party to international 
human rights instruments, without de facto territorial control and the 
requisite governmental structures, the said State party would hardly be 
able to perform the latter two categories of duties, the duties to protect 
and to fulfil.  In short, acknowledging the capacity of unrecognised entities 
to conclude or to participate in human rights agreements serves the 
purpose of securing the full protection of human rights in territories not 
controlled by other States. 
The close link between effective territorial control and obligations under 
international human rights treaties can also be observed in international 
jurisprudence concerning the extraterritorial application of such treaties.209  
This issue has been addressed by the ICJ in the Israeli Wall Advisory 
                                                            
206 Velásquez-Rodríguez v Honduras (Judgment) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series 
C No 4 (29 July 1988) paras 172, 174-77. 
207  Bertrand G. Ramcharan, The Fundamentals of International Human Rights Treaty Law 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2011) 133-34. 
208  Jean-%HUQDUG 0DULH µ1DWLRQDO 6\VWHPV IRU WKH 3URWHFWLRQ RI +XPDQ 5LJKWV¶ LQ -DQXV]
Symonides (ed), Human Rights: International Protection, Monitoring, Enforcement (Ashgate 
2004) 258. 
209 In addition to cases concerning extraterritorial application of human rights treaties, the link 
can also be observed in Azemi v Serbia before the ECtHR.  In this case, the applicant 
complained that the non-enforcement of a decision by a municipal court in Kosovo violated his 
right to a fair trial, and the Court decided that Serbia, due to its lack of control over Kosovo, 
³cannot be held responsible «IRU WKHQRQ-HQIRUFHPHQW ´ Azemi v Serbia App no 11209/09 
(ECtHR, 5 November 2013) paras 45-49. 
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Opinion, the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo Case, and the 
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination Case.210  In the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion, the 
ICJ analysed the extraterritorial applicability of the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and 
the CRC.  Based on the work of the relevant treaty bodies, the ICJ noted 
,VUDHO¶V ³H[HUFLVH RI HIIHFWLYH MXULVGLFWLRQ´ LQ WKH2FFXSLHG 7HUULWRULHV DQG
LWV ³WHUULWRULDO MXULVGLFWLRQ DV WKH RFFXS\LQJ 3RZHU´ DQG RSLQHG WKDW ERWK
Covenants were applicable to acts of Israel in the territories it occupied.211  
A similar conclusion was drawn in relation to the CRC.212  In the Armed 
Activities case, the ICJ reaffirmed the position that a State, while 
performing acts as an occupying Power, bears obligations under 
international human rights treaties beyond its territory.213  :KLOHWKH,&-¶V
provisional measures order in the third case mentioned above also 
acknowledged the extraterritorial applicability of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and 
³RWKHU SURYLVLRQV RI LQVWUXPHQWV >ZLWKRXW UHVWULFWLRQV UHODWLQJ WR WKHLU
WHUULWRULDODSSOLFDWLRQ@´WRD6WDWH¶VFRQGXFWRXWVLGHLWVWHUULWRU\WKH&RXUW
did not specify in this instance the factor of effective control over the 
territory.214  7KH ,&-¶V GHFLVLRQV LQ WKHVH WKUHH FDVHV RQO\ SURYLGHG EULHI
discussions of the rationale behind the extraterritorial application of 
international human rights treaties,215 but at least in the first two cases, it 
                                                            
210 The ICJ first discussed the issue of extraterritorial obligations under international human 
rights law in the Namibia Advisory Opinion.  However, as it is not addressing the application of 
international human rights treaties, this opinion would not be discussed here. 
211 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
(Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136, paras 108-12. 
212 ibid para 113. 
213 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of 
the Congo v Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep 168, 216-17. 
214  Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Georgia v Russian Federation) (Request for the Indication of Provisional 
Measures: Order) General List No 140 [2008] ICJ Rep 353, para 109. 
215 5DOSK:LOGH µ+XPDQ5LJKWVEH\RQG%RDUGHUVDWWKH:RUOG&RXUW7KH6LJQLILFDQFHRIWKH
,QWHUQDWLRQDO &RXUW RI -XVWLFH¶V -XULVSUXGHQFH RQ WKH ([WUDWHUULWRULDO Application of 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO+XPDQ5LJKWV7UHDWLHV¶&KLQHVH-,QWOL 639, 673. 
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may be inferred that such application rests on the control that a State 
exerts over territories it occupies.216 
The ECtHR, on the other hand, has made a clearer association between 
territorial control and the extraterritorial application of the ECHR.  In 
Loizidou v Turkey, the ECtHR held that:  
[T]he responsibility of a Contracting Party may also arise when 
as a consequence of military action - whether lawful or unlawful 
- it exercises effective control of an area outside its national 
territory. The obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights 
and freedoms set out in the Convention derives from the fact of 
such control whether it be exercised directly, through its armed 
forces, or through a subordinate local administration.217   
7KLV YLHZ KDV EHHQ XSKHOG LQ WKH (&W+5¶V VXEVHTXHQW GHFLVLons.218   In 
WKHVHFDVHVWKHWHVWRI³HIIHFWLYHFRQWURO´KDVEHHQXVHGWRGHWHUPLQHWKH
extraterritorial applicability of the ECHR.219  $V 0LODQRYLF REVHUYHV ³WKH
VWDWH¶V FDSDFLW\ HLWKHU WR YLRODWH RU WR SURWHFW KXPDQ ULJKWV LQ D JLYHQ
territory does not depend on whether it possesses title or de jure 
VRYHUHLJQW\RYHULW«,WLVRQO\WKHVWDWH¶VDFWXDOcontrol over the territory 
WKDW PDWWHUV´220  In order to ensure the enjoyment of human rights in 
territories controlled by a State that does not possess de jure sovereignty, 
it is necessary to acknowledge the extraterritorial applicability of 
international human rights treaties in those territories.  This echoes the 
                                                            
216 It is acknowledged that these cases concern the territorial control of States (rather than 
non-State entities) and their obligations under international human rights treaties. 
217 Loizidou v Turkey App no 15318/89 (Preliminary Objections) (ECtHR, 23 March 1995) para 
62. 
218 Eg Cyprus v Turkey App no 25781/94 (ECtHR, 10 May 2001) para 77; %DQNRYLü HW DO Y
Belgium et al App no 52207/99 (ECtHR, 12 December 2001) para 71. 
219 'DPLUD .DPFKLEHNRYD µ6WDWH 5HVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU ([WUDWHUULWRULDO +XPDQ 5LJKWV 9LRODWLRQV¶
(2007) 13 Buffalo Human Rights L Rev 87, 146-47. 
220 Milanovic (n 19) 106. 
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argument in relation to unrecognised entities and the territories they 
control, further demonstrating the necessity to acknowledge unrecognised 
HQWLWLHV¶FDSDFLW\WRFRQFOXGHRUWRSDUWLFLSDWHLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQULJKWV
treaties.221  
2. The Necessity for the Continuity of International Human Rights 
Treaty Obligations 
The principle of continuity of international human rights treaty obligations 
suggests that once an international human rights treaty enters into force 
for a State, the relevant rights of the individuals living in the territory of 
that State should continue to be protected, despite changes in the 
government or governing State.222  This is necessary since it is the only 
way to ensure the continued enjoyment of the rights already accorded to 
the individuals in that State after the entry into force of the international 
human rights treaty in question.  Furthermore, in order for the 
international human rights treaty obligations to continue, it is necessary 
that, in the case of State succession or changes of governing entity, the 
succeeding entity possesses the capacity to participate in international 
human rights treaties to which the former governing State is a party.  
Those supporting continuity of obligations under international human rights 
treaties rely on the special characteristics and considerations of human 
rights treaties to justify their approach,223 including issues in relation to 
denunciation of and State succession with respect to international human 
rights treaties.  The following discussion focuses on these two aspects to 
                                                            
221  See <lHO 5RQHQ µ+XPDQ 5LJKWV 2EOLJDWLRQV RI 7erritorial Non-6WDWH $FWRUV¶  
Cornell Intl LJ 21, 25-27. 
222  )RU DQ H[DPSOH RI WKH XVDJH RI WKH WHUP ³SULQFLSOH RI FRQWLQXLW\´ LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI
international human rights treaties, see Menno T .DPPLQJDµ6WDWH6XFFHVVLRQLQ5HVSHFWRI
Human Rights 7UHDWLHV¶EJIL 469.  
223  81 +XPDQ 5LJKWV &RPPLWWHH µ*HQHUDO &RPPHQW 1R ¶ LQ µ&RPSLODWLRQ RI *HQHUDO
&RPPHQWV¶Q203) 223, para 4. 
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examine if the principle of continuity of obligations applies and if it can 
justify the necessity of granting unrecognised entities treaty-making 
capacity in relation to international human rights treaties.  
a. Denunciation of International Human Rights Treaties 
Those advocating against the choice to opt out of international human 
rights treaties argue that such treaties usually do not contain withdrawal or 
termination clauses.  Moreover, human rights treaties generally do not 
allow for the possibility of denunciation.  These designs seem to suggest 
that once a State agrees to undertake the obligations under an 
international human rights treaty, it is not permitted to opt out of the 
treaty and the protection of human rights in its territory must be continued.  
However, this argument is questionable.  While the ICCPR, the ICESCR, 
the CEDAW, and the International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance do not contain denunciation clauses, 
other international human rights treaties do.224   
To understand whether those treaties without denunciation clauses in fact 
permit denunciation, an examination of the practice of the Human Rights 
Committee and States parties in relation to the ICCPR can be of value.  
The issue of denunciation with regards to the ICCPR first emerged when 
the Netherlands considered denouncing the Covenant after the Human 
Rights Committee issued its opinion on Dutch social security laws.225  In 
                                                            
224  For examples of provisions on denunciation (by written notification): International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted 7 March 1966, 
entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195, art 2; Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted 10 December 1984, 
entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85, art 31; Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3, art 52; 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of their Families (adopted 18 December 1990, entered into force 1 July 2003) 2220 UNTS 3, 
art 89(1); Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (n 12) art 48. 
225 µ+XPDQ5LJKWV1HZV¶ 1HWKHUODQGV4+XPDQ5LJKWV -95.  The opinion in 
question is S W M Broeks v Netherlands, Communications No 172/1984 (9 April 1987) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/29/D/172/1984. 
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response, a petition initiated by the Dutch section of the International 
Commission of Jurists expressed the opinion of a number of prominent 
scholars that denunciation of the ICCPR was impermissible.226  Firstly, as 
Article 56 of the 1969 Vienna Convention provides conditions allowing for 
denunciation and withdrawal, such conditions do not apply in the case of 
WKH &RYHQDQW  7KH FRQGLWLRQV DUH ³D It is established that the parties 
LQWHQGHG WR DGPLW WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI GHQXQFLDWLRQ RU ZLWKGUDZDO´ RU E D
right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the 
WUHDW\´227  Furthermore, the fact that the ICCPR includes a provision for 
denunciation regarding the inter-State communications procedure 
demonstrates that the drafters were conscious of the issue of denunciation 
but intentionally chose not to provide for a right of withdrawal from the 
substantive obligations of the ICCPR.   
In 19 WKH'HPRFUDWLF3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI.RUHD'35.DWWHPSWHG WR
denounce the ICCPR, in an action taken to protest a resolution adopted by 
the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities.228  The DPRK officially submitted a notification of withdrawal to 
the UN Secretary-General and issued a statement noting that its status as 
a State party to the ICCPR had been abused by other States with the 
adoption of the resolution.  In response to the denunciation, the UN 
Secretary-General, as the depository of the ICCPR, and the Human Rights 
Committee, the monitoring body of the ICCPR, appeared to hold different 
opinions regarding its effect.  The former applied Article 54 of the 1969 
Vienna Convention and opined that, absent a specific denunciation clause 
LQ WKH ,&&35 WKH '53.¶V ZLWKGUDZDO IURP WKH ,&&35 ZRXOG RQO\ EH
                                                            
226  µPetition Submitted to the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, in Connection with the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights¶ (1988) 6 Netherlands Q Human Rights 
128, 129-30. 
227 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (n 5) art 56(1). 
228 UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities Res 
1997/3 (21 August 1997) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/50, 18-19. 
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possible if all States parties agreed with such a withdrawal.229  The Human 
Rights Committee, however, adopted General Comment No 26, taking the 
view that denunciation of the ICCPR was impermissible.230  In addition to 
the arguments put forward by the Dutch jurists mentioned above, the 
+XPDQ5LJKWV&RPPLWWHHHPSKDVLVHGWKDWWKH,&&35³WKH&RYHQDQWGRHV
QRW KDYH D WHPSRUDU\ FKDUDFWHU´ D FRPPRQ FKDUDFWHULVWLF VKDUHG E\
treaties with a right of denunciation.231  Also, the Committee reiterated its 
position that once the ICCPR entered into force in the territory of a State 
party, the rights accorded to the people belong to them.  Eventually, the 
DPRK did submit its second periodic report on the implementation of the 
ICCPR to the Human Rights Committee, 232  an undertaking provided in 
Article 40 of the ICCPR that all States parties must oblige.  It is worth 
noting that while the DPRK is still considered as a State party to the 
ICCPR,233 in the '35.¶VQDWLRQDOUHSRUWIRUWKH8QLYHUVDO3HULRGLF5HYLHZRI
the Human Rights Council, the ICCPR was not included as one of the 
instruments to which the DPRK had acceded.234  This would suggest that 
the DPRK does not consider itself a party to the ICCPR. 
Despite the opinion voiced by the Human Rights Committee, it is in fact 
difficult to unequivocally conclude that human rights treaties have a special 
status in terms of the rules regarding denunciation.235  As a large number 
                                                            
229  UNTC, µStatus of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights¶  Q  
<http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-4.en.pdf> 
accessed 20 August 2014. 
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of international treaties contain denunciation clauses, in order to achieve 
wider participation, many human rights treaties embrace the same 
approach.  Practice of denunciation of human rights treaties can also be 
observed at the regional level, with Trinidad and Tobago denunciating the 
American Convention on Human Rights in 1998, and Venezuela in 2012.236  
In other words, States parties, especially those to treaties with 
denunciation clauses, appear to enjoy the discretion of discontinuing their 
obligations under human rights treaties.  Therefore, the argument that 
human rights treaties in general are of the nature that forbids denunciation 
seems invalid and thus cannot be used to support the principle of 
continuity of international human rights treaty obligations. 
b. State Succession in Respect of International Human Rights 
Treaties 
In situations involving State succession in respect of treaties, a ³FOHDQ
VODWH´DSSURDFKLVRIWHQproposed, 237 although it has been argued that the 
DSSURDFK VKRXOG EH VXEMHFW WR OLPLWDWLRQV LQ RUGHU WR EH ³UHFRQFLOHGZith 
WKH H[LVWHQFH RI H[WHUQDO OHJDO REOLJDWLRQ´ 238   For instance, WKH ³FOHDQ
VODWH´ DSSURDFK should not be applied to cases of treaties establishing 
boundaries and other territorial regimes.239  Some hold the view that such 
an approach should also be suspended in the case of human rights treaties, 
                                                                                                                                                            
184. 
236 Organization of American States, Department of International Law, 'Multilateral Treaties: 
American Convention on Human Rights¶ <http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American_ 
Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm> accessed 20 August 2014. 
237 The term originated from the following passage by McNair:  
[N]ewly established States which do not result from a political dismemberment 
and cannot fairly be said to involve political continuity with any predecessor, 
start with a clean slate ... except as regards the purely local or ³real´ 
obligations of the State formerly exercising sovereignty over the territory of the 
new State. 
McNair (n 35) 601. 
238 0DWWKHZ&5&UDYHQ µ7KH 3UREOHP RI State Succession and the Identity of States under 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶(-,/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239 Eg Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (adopted 23 August 
1978, entered into force 6 November 1996) 1946 UNTS 3, arts 11, 12. 
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and that successor States should automatically assume obligations under 
such treaties.240  This view is based on the considerations that changes in 
the governing State should not deprive the population living in those 
territories of the rights already conferred upon them.  In other words, 
when the predecessor State adheres to a human rights treaty, the rights of 
individuals subject to the jurisdiction of that State are then safeguarded by 
that treaty.  The individuals should continue to enjoy those rights despite 
changes in government, or in the case of State succession, in governing 
States.  Also, it has been argued that the continuity of obligations under 
international human rights treaties relates to the object and purpose of 
these treaties.  When commenting on the succession of obligations under 
the Genocide Convention, Judge Shahabuddeen wrote that the object and 
purpose of the Convention demanded that parties avoid gaps in the 
protection afforded by it.241  Furthermore, in order to give effect to the 
object and purpose of the Convention, it must be construed that parties of 
WKH&RQYHQWLRQXQGHUWDNHWR³WUHDWVXFFHVVRU6WDWHVDVFRQWLQXLQJDVIURP
independence any status which the predecessor State had as a party to the 
&RQYHQWLRQ´ 242   Commenting in the same case, Judge Weeramantry 
opined that denying automatic succession of human rights treaties would 
UHVXOW LQ DQ XQGHVLUDEOH OHJDO YDFXXP DQG WKH XQGHVLUDELOLW\ ³becomes 
more evident still if the human rights treaty under consideration is one as 
fundamental as the Genocide Convention´243  
In the aftermath of the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR), the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), and 
                                                            
240 Eg U1+XPDQ5LJKWV&RPPLWWHHµ*HQHUDO&RPPHQW1R¶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the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) in the 1990s, questions 
arose regarding whether the successor States automatically succeeded to 
the international human rights treaties to which their predecessors were 
parties.  Various European and UN human rights institutions took measures 
that reflected their opinions on this issue. At the European level, after the 
dissolution of the CSFR on 1 January 1993, the two resulting republics 
were admitted as members of the Council of Europe, a precondition for 
becoming parties to the ECHR.  Although the membership admissions took 
place six months after the republics declared independence, the Council of 
Europe decided that the two States should be considered as succeeding to 
the ECHR from the date of independence, 1 January 1993.244  Also, as 
there is no record of any notification or declaration by either the Czech 
Republic or Slovakia, it can be assumed that the succession of treaty 
obligations occurred automatically.245   
At the UN level, the Commission on Human Rights (the predecessor of the 
Human Rights Council), although not explicitly supporting the notion of 
automatic succession for international human rights treaties, repeatedly 
FDOOHGRQVXFFHVVRU6WDWHV³WRFRQILUPWRDSSURSULDWHGHSRVLWDULHVWKDWWKH\
continue to be bound by obligations under relevant international human 
ULJKWV WUHDWLHV´246   Similar language is also seen in the Committee on 
(OLPLQDWLRQ RI 5DFLDO 'LVFULPLQDWLRQ¶V *HQHUDO 5HFRPPHQGDWLRQ 1R 247  
Some take the position that these calls for action imply that the successor 
States could decide whether they wanted to adhere to the human rights 
                                                            
244 Council of Europe, Directorate of Human Rights, Information Sheet No 32 (January-June 
1993) Doc H/INF(94) 1. 
245 0HQQR7.DPPLQJDµ,PSDFWRQ6WDWH6XFFHVVLRQLQ5HVSHFWRI7UHDWLHV¶LQ.DPPLQJDDQG
Scheinin (eds) (n 32) 103. 
246 UNCHR Res 16 (1994) (n 240). 
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treaties that their predecessors committed to, 248  and the confirmation 
notes from successor States are thus considered to have a constitutive 
effect on the continuation of treaty obligations.249  Nevertheless, it can also 
EH DUJXHG WKDW WKH XVH RI WHUP ³FRQILUP´ VXJJHVWV WKH FRQWLQXDWLRQ RI
obligations under those treaties is automatic and the act of confirmation 
merely reinforces the commitment of the successor States.  Supporting 
this interpretation, Kamminga has referred to the example of the call by 
the UN General Assembly in 1977 250  to Member States to make 
declarations against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment and expressing their intention to comply with a 
relevant UN declaration.251  Kamminga argues that the declarations issued 
LQ WKLVFRQWH[WKDYHEHHQGHHPHGDV³UHLQIRUFLQJ´ WKHSURKLELWLRQDJDLQVW
torture, rather than having a constitutive effect. 252   It has also been 
pointed out that the Commission on Human Rights referred to and 
HPSKDVLVHG WKH ³VSHFLDO QDWXUH´ RI KXPDQ ULJKWV WUHDWLHV DQG WKDW LW
UHTXHVWHGUHOHYDQWWUHDW\ERGLHVWRFRQVLGHUWKH³FRQWLQXLQJDSSOLFDELOLW\RI
WKHUHVSHFWLYH LQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQULJKWV WUHDWLHVWRVXFFHVVRU6WDWHV´253  
Such language further upholds the view that the Commission of Human 
Rights believed the applicability of an international human rights treaty 
should continue despite the change in governing State.   
Furthermore, the support of the UN human rights treaty bodies for 
automatic succession has been more explicitly expressed.  In 1994, the 
chairpersons of the human rights treaty bodies took the view that 
³VXFFHVVRU 6WDWHV DUH DXWRPDWLFDOO\ ERXQG E\ REOLJDWLRQV XQGHU
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international human rights instruments from their respective date of 
independence and that the respect of their obligations should not depend 
on a declaration of confirmation made by the new Government of the 
VXFFHVVRU6WDWH´254  In General Comment No 26, adopted by the Human 
5LJKWV&RPPLWWHHLQLWLVVWDWHGWKDW³once the people are accorded 
the protection of the rights under the Covenant, such protection devolves 
with territory and continues to belong to them, notwithstanding change in 
government of the State party, including dismemberment in more than one 
State or State succession´255  ,W KDV EHHQ DUJXHG WKDW WKH &RPPLWWHH¶V
position in this regard was later followed by the ECtHR in Bijelic v 
Montenegro and Serbia, 256  ZKHUH WKH &RXUW KHOG WKDW ³JLYHQ « the 
principle that fundamental rights protected by international human rights 
treaties should indeed belong to individuals living in the territory of the 
State party concerned, notwithstanding its subsequent dissolution or 
VXFFHVVLRQ´257  In 2004, the Human Rights Committee, when preparing 
the list of ratifications of the ICCPR, noted that in the case of Kazakhstan 
(a successor State of the USSR), although it had not submitted a 
³GHFODUDWLRQRIVXFFHVVLRQ´³WKHSHRSOHZLWKLQWKHWHUULWRU\RIWKH6WDWH± 
which constituted part of a former State party to the Covenant ± continue 
WR EH HQWLWOHG WR WKHJXDUDQWHHV HQXQFLDWHG LQ WKH&RYHQDQW´258  Finally, 
for those successor States that have submitted declarations of confirmation 
some time after independence, there has been no objection to the 
&RPPLWWHH¶V SRVLWLRQ WKDW WKH &RYHQDQW WRok effect at the time of 
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independence, rather than three months after the issuance of their 
³LQVWUXPHQWVRIDFFHVVLRQ´DVUHTXLUHGE\$UWLFOHRIWKH,&&35 
However, some have pointed to the practice of the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) regarding Hong Kong and 
have suggested that it did not consider succession of treaty obligations 
under ICESCR was automatic.259  ,W KDV EHHQ QRWHG WKDW LQ WKH &(6&5¶V
FRQFOXGLQJREVHUYDWLRQVRQWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶VODVWUHSRUWRQ+RQJ.RQJ
WKH &RPPLWWHH ³KRSH>G@ WKDW WKH 3HRSOH¶V 5HSXEOLF RI &KLQD [would] 
DFFHGHWRWKH&RYHQDQW´260  In addition, the fact that the CESCR urged the 
8QLWHG .LQJGRP WR ³LQIRUP WKH &RPPLWWHH DV VRRQ DV SRVVLEOH RI WKH
PRGDOLWLHV´ DJUHHG E\ LW DQG &KLQD WR FRQWLQXH Whe reporting obligations 
under the Covenant after 1997 261  was interpreted to suggest that 
succession is not automatic. 262   This research disagrees with such an 
interpretation.  At the time when sovereignty over Hong Kong was 
transferred back to China, China was not a party to the ICESCR,263 and 
even if the theory of automatic succession is applied, the Covenant would 
QRWWDNHHIIHFWLQWKHZKROHRI&KLQD¶VWHUULWRU\7KHUHIRUHLQYLWLQJ&KLQD
to accede to the Covenant and thus making the Covenant applicable to the 
rest of China should not be equated as rejecting the notion of automatic 
VXFFHVVLRQ  /LNHZLVH WKH &(6&5¶V UHTXHVW IRU LQIRUPDWLRQ UHJDUGLQJ
agreed reporting modalities after 1997 cannot serve as evidence against 
automatic succession.  The fact that it asked for the agreed modalities did 
not mean that the Committee believed the reporting obligation itself was 
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subject to the agreement of the two States.  Since China was not a party 
to the Covenant and since the next reporting period would cover both 
British and Chinese rule of the territory, it was natural that the Committee 
urged the two States to discuss the details regarding the preparation and 
presentation of the report on the implementation of the ICESCR during this 
period. 
In sum, although some take the view that automatic succession with 
regards to international human rights treaties has not been accepted as a 
rule of customary international law and is still subject to debate,264 the 
practice of international and European institutions illustrated above provide 
strong support to the notion of automatic succession.  It can also be 
observed that successor States have not challenged or objected to the 
view expressed by these institutions.   
Applying the rationale behind automatic succession of international human 
rights treaties to cases of unrecognised entities, even though such entities 
GR QRW QHFHVVDULO\ TXDOLI\ DV ³VXFFHVVRU 6WDWHV´ WKH FRQWLQXLW\ RI
obligations under international human rights treaties should remain since 
the rationale behind automatic succession of international human rights 
treaties rests on the features of international human rights treaties, rather 
than the nature or qualifications of the succeeding entity.  This position 
finds support in the practice of the Human Rights Committee with regard 
to Kosovo.  After considering the report submitted by UNMIK on the 
implementation of the ICCPR, the Committee in its concluding observation 
H[SOLFLWO\VWLSXODWHGWKDW³810,.DVZHOODV>WKH3URYLVLRQDO,QVWLWXWLRQVRI
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JXDUGHGRUKHVLWDQWIRUP´ 
116 
Self-Government], or any future administration in Kosovo, are bound to 
respect and to ensure to all individuals within the territory of Kosovo and 
VXEMHFW WR WKHLU MXULVGLFWLRQ WKH ULJKWV UHFRJQL]HG LQ WKH &RYHQDQW´ 265  
Therefore, an unrecognised entity should assume the obligations under the 
human rights treaties undertaken by the State that formerly exercised 
effective control of the territory in question, thus guaranteeing the 
enjoyment of rights already acquired by the people living in that territory. 
3. The Necessity to Grant Treaty-Making Capacity to International 
Legal Persons 
It remains true that only States have international legal personality to the 
fullest extent,266 but under modern international law, it can be argued that 
statehood is not an essential condition for the possession of international 
legal personality. 267   Different theories of international legal personality 
have been proposed.  On the one hand, the traditionalists emphasise the 
SULPDF\ RI WKH 6WDWH DQG FRQVLGHU 6WDWHV DV ³UHSRVLWRULHV RI OHJLWLPDWHG
authority over SHRSOHV DQG WHUULWRULHV´ 268   According to this school of 
thought, the legal personality of non-State entities must derive directly or 
LQGLUHFWO\ IURP6WDWHVDQG WKH IRUPHU¶VSRVVHVVLRQRI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ULJKWV
and duties is based on a transfer of authority from States.269  Another 
school takes a realist approach and stresses the decline of the State and 
the rise of non-State entities.  It embraces the changes brought by the 
drastic growth of non-State actors, such as international and regional 
organisations, corporations, sub-national governments, etc, and considers 
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DQ\HQWLW\WKDW³IDFWXDOO\HVWDEOLVKHVDQDELOLW\WRLQIOXHQFHDQGVKDSHWKH
FRQWHQW DQG DSSOLFDWLRQ RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´ KDV LQWHUQDWLRQDO OHJDO
SHUVRQDOLW\ DOEHLW ZLWKRXW 6WDWHV¶ FRQVHQW 270   These two approaches 
represent the opposite ends of the spectrum, with the former being too 
strict to reflect the emergence of non-State actors and their increasing 
importance and the latter too accommodating to the new actors without 
sufficiently justifying why their mere factual existence and influence 
warrant the status of international legal persons. 
Neither of the two theories introduced above provides satisfactory 
justification for the criteria of determining whether an entity possess 
international legal personality.  Although a consensus has not been formed 
in this respect, one crucial characteristic common to all subjects of 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZLVWKHFRPSRVLWLRQRIRUJDQVWKDWDUH³QRWVXEMHFWWRWKH
MXULVGLFWLRQ RI DQ\ RQH RWKHU RUJDQL]HG FRPPXQLW\´ 271   This is also 
demonstrated by the existence of a separate will, 272  which can be 
presumed if an entity possesses permanency and distinct purposes, powers, 
and organs.273  While the two theories described above present opposite 
ends of the spectrum, this approach stands in between.  It differs from the 
first theory in that it no longer insists that international legal personality 
must derive from the will of States.  The element of exclusivity, that the 
entity must not be subject to the control of any other international legal 
persons, distinguishes this approach from the second theory and may 
justify why such entities deserve distinct personality. 
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Unrecognised entities, due to the fact that they exercise effective control of 
territory with established governmental structures independent of control 
from other States, arguably possess a certain degree of international legal 
personality.  According to the definition elaborated in the previous chapter, 
one essential criterion of unrecognised entities is de facto independence.  
Thus, the conduct and decisions of unrecognised entities are not that of a 
third State, and they are not subject to substantial foreign control or 
domination on a permanent basis.  These features correspond to the 
common characteristic of international legal persons mentioned above. 
However, even if the possession of international legal personality of an 
unrecognised entity can be established, it does not necessarily follow that 
it has treaty-making capacity.  The precise relationship between legal 
personality, on the one hand, and the capacity to perform certain acts and 
to possess rights and duties, on the other hand, is subject to debate.  The 
possession of legal personality has been considered by many as the 
threshold for an entity in a legal system to perform legal acts. 274   In 
contrast, a second school considers that if an entity has rights and duties, 
it has legal personality.275  In other words, the performance of legal acts by 
the entity in question could serve as evidence of its legal personality.   
With regards to treaty-making capacity, some scholarly writings even 
suggest that there is no necessary nexus between the notion of 
international personality and treaty-making capacity.276  Yet, it has also 
been argued that treaty-making capacity is among the core capacities that 
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are inherent in an international legal person.277  While views on this issue 
remain divergent, it has been generally agreed that not all international 
legal persons possess the same capacities.278  Therefore, even if the first 
school of thought, which asserts that the possession of legal personality 
leads to legal capacity, is adopted, it does not necessarily justify the 
argument that unrecognised entities have the capacity to conclude or to 
participate in international human rights treaties.   
The notion of necessity arguably provides a valid basis for granting 
unrecognised entities treaty-making capacity in relation to international 
human rights treaties.  The principle of continuity of international human 
rights treaty obligations further affirms the necessity of allowing 
participation of unrecognised entities.  However, the concept of 
international legal personality cannot be proven as sufficient to support 
according treaty-making capacity to unrecognised entities.  It is only 
through analysing the nature of the entity in question and the necessity of 
granting it capacities to act on the international plane can one determine 
WKH H[WHQW RI WKH HQWLW\¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO ULJKWV REOLJDWLRQV DQG OHJDO
capacity. 
B. Reasons behind the Reluctance of States to Acknowledge the Capacity 
of Unrecognised Entities to Conclude or Participate in International 
Human Rights Treaties 
While acknowledging the capacity of unrecognised entities to conclude or 
to participate in international human rights treaties responds to the needs 
of the international community, concerns that might discourage such 
acknowledgement are evident also.  The discussion below proposes four 
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possible arguments against acknowledging the treaty-making capacity of 
unrecognised entities in relation to international human rights treaties and 
examines whether they are valid in light of international practice. 
1. Risk of Improperly Legitimising Certain Entities 
Acknowledging the capacity of unrecognised entities to bear international 
legal obligations can be interpreted as according legitimacy to those 
entities.279  Providing non-State entities with the opportunity to participate 
LQPXOWLODWHUDOWUHDWLHVKDVEHHQLQWHUSUHWHGDVDOORZLQJWKHPWR³HQKDQFH
WKHLUVWDWXV´280  This concern is exacerbated when the entity in question is 
established through means contrary to international law.  A similar 
argument has been raised in relation to applying rules of international 
humanitarian law to regulate the conduct of non-State armed groups.281  
This concern is somehow mitigated by the inclusion of certain provisions in 
international humanitarian law instruments (for instance, Common Article 
3 of the Geneva Conventions and Article 4 of Additional Protocol I to the 
Geneva Conventions) stipulating that the application of those rules does 
not affect the legal status of parties to the conflict, including non-State 
armed group.282  In addition, it has been argued that the imposition of 
international obligations on non-State armed groups serves to limit their 
conduct of warfare and does not in any way legitimise the use of violence 
by such groups or endorse their political aims.283 
                                                            
279 This was suggested by Clapham as a possible argument against imposing international 
obligations to non-State actors, but he later refuted the argument and concluded that little 
empirical evidence reflected the concern of legitimisation.  Andrew Clapham, Human Rights 
Obligations of Non-State Actors (OUP 2006) 46-53. 
280 Summary Records of the Second Session of the UN Conference on the Law of Treaties (n 
40) 234 (Statement of Groepper (Federal Republic of Germany) at the 88th meeting of the 
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legitimisation exists, it is insufficient to bar non-State armed groups from participating in the 
law-making process of international humanitarian law.).   
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While there has been a longstanding concern that acknowledging the 
treaty-making capacity of unrecognised entities implies legitimising the 
entities established through unlawful means, international practice 
suggests that such a concern has not barred other States from concluding 
treaties and agreements with unrecognised entities.284  Modern practice 
has even seen the conclusion of agreements between unrecognised entities 
DQG WKHLU ³SDUHQW 6WDWHV´ IRU LQVWDQFH WKH (FRQRPLF &RRSHUDWLRQ
Framework Agreement between two sides of the Taiwan Strait 285  and 
agreements between Serbia and Kosovo on issues including population 
registry, freedom of movement, and acceptance of university and school 
diplomas.286  This goes to show that the need for cooperation, interaction, 
and establishment of treaty relations has outweighed the concern of 
improperly legitimising unrecognised entities. 
2. Implied Recognition 
Traditionally, conclusion of bilateral treaties represented a strong indication 
of implied recognition.287  However, while establishing treaty relations with 
an unrecognised entity unavoidably acknowledges its de facto status, 
contemporary practice suggests that establishing treaty relations with an 
unrecognised entity does not necessarily indicate a change of attitude in 
terms of recognition.288  For instance, after the Second World War, the 
German Democratic Republic entered into many short- and long-term 
                                                            
284 For instance, the Republic of China (Taiwan) concludes many official, semi-official and 
unofficial agreements with other States or entities, and the list of agreements and selected 
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Affairs. 
285  Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (29 June 2010) 
<http://www.ecfa.org.tw/EcfaAttachment/ECFADoc/ECFA.pdf> accessed 20 August 2014. 
286  Dialogue Agreement on Civil Registry Books (Serbia±Kosovo) (2 July 2011); Dialogue 
Agreement on Freedom of Movement (Serbia±Kosovo) (2 July 2011); Dialogue Agreement on 
Acceptance of University Diplomas (Serbia±Kosovo) (2 July 2011); (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ µ(8
)DFLOLWDWHG 'LDORJXH 7KUHH $JUHHPHQWV¶ 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accessed 20 August 2014. 
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treaties with States that refused to recognise it, including the United Arab 
Republic, a union between Egypt and Syria. 289   Additionally, Egypt 
maintained treaty relations with North Korea and the PRC prior to 
recognising them.290  It follows that non-recognition does not mean the 
absence of any form of interaction.  Establishing treaty relations and 
granting State recognition differ in scope and purpose.  Acknowledging the 
capacity of an unrecognised entity to act at the international level through 
the conclusion of a treaty on a particular subject matter should not be 
equated with recognising that the entity in question possesses all the 
qualifications of statehood and the rights and obligations resulting 
therefrom.291 
In terms of multilateral treaties, allowing unrecognised entities to 
participate in such treaties that are originally open to States might be 
construed as some form of recognition of statehood.  In this respect, it has 
been proposed that if the statehood of an entity is recognised by some, but 
not all, existing States parties of an international treaty, such an entity 
may still be allowed to become a party provided that the treaty remains 
inoperative between that entity and the non-recognising States. 292   In 
other words, the fact that an unrecognised entity and non-recognising 
State become parties to the same international legal instrument does not 
in and of itself lead to the conclusion that a change of attitude with regards 
to recognition can be implied. 
3. Lack of Ability to Protect and Fulfil Human Rights 
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As previously mentioned, international human rights treaties have often 
been interpreted as designating the manner in which the obligations 
contained therein should be discharged, and in order to respect, protect 
and fulfil human rights provided in those instruments, a national system of 
protection is required.  Thus, there might be doubts as to whether 
unrecognised entities have the ability to comply with obligations under 
international human rights treaties, particularly considering that such 
treaties often call for the establishment of a national system to ensure 
enjoyment of human rights.  Here, it is useful to recall that, when defining 
WKHQRWLRQRI³XQUHFRJQLVHGHQWLWLHV´WKLVWKHVLVDGRSWVFULWHULDWKDWORFDWH
the entities as, albeit not recognised as States, those that display State-
like characteristics, which imply the ability to implement human rights 
protection through their infrastructure.  In other words, by requiring that 
unrecognised entities must fulfil the Montevideo criteria and achieve de 
facto independence, it can be assumed that unrecognised entities have the 
governmental institutions in place to carry out all three categories of duties.  
,QWKLVUHJDUGWKHHOHPHQWRI³JRYHUQPHQW´LVRISDUWLFXODULPSRUWDQFHDV
LWUHTXLUHVWKHH[HUFLVHRI³DOOWKHIXQFWLRQs of a sovereign government in 
maintaining law and order, instituting and maintaining courts of justice, 
adopting or imposing laws regulating the relations of the inhabitants of the 
WHUULWRU\ WR RQH DQRWKHU DQG WR WKH JRYHUQPHQW´ 293   These functions 
contribute to restraining the abuse of governmental powers and authorities, 
preventing human rights violations by private actors, and actively 
enhancing the enjoyment of rights by the population within the territory of 
the entity. 
4. Danger of Downgrading Standards of Protection 
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In the field of international humanitarian law concerns have been raised 
that allowing armed groups to have the capacity to conclude agreements 
risks downgrading standards of protection.294  Similar concerns might arise 
in the field of human rights, especially in cases of bilateral agreements 
incorporating human rights elements.  However, such concerns do not 
seem to correspond to existing practice.  When parties to bilateral 
agreements include protection of human rights as a part of their 
obligations, references are often made to international human rights law in 
general, rather than to a selection of rights or to proposed standards 
different from those in the existing international human rights instruments.  
For instance, the 1990 San José Agreement concluded between El Salvador 
and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) 
UHTXLUHVUHVSHFWIRUDQGJXDUDQWHHRIKXPDQULJKWVUHFRJQL]HGLQ³WUHDWLHV
WRZKLFK(O6DOYDGRULVDSDUW\´DQG³GHFODUDWLRQVDQGSULQFLSOHVRQKXPDQ
rights and humanitarian law adopted by the United Nations and the 
2UJDQL]DWLRQRI$PHULFDQ6WDWHV´295  In the Comprehensive Agreement on 
Human Rights concluded by the government of Guatemala and the 
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG) in 1994, although more 
detailed provisions were agreed, references are made to international 
instruments.296  In particular, the Agreement provides that:  
For purposes of implementation of the general commitment 
regarding human rights (chapter I of the present agreement), 
the Parties understand human rights as meaning those rights 
which are recognized in the Guatemalan legal order including 
                                                            
294 Roberts and Sivakumaran (n 154) 137-38. 
295  Agreement on Human Rights between the Government of El Salvador and the Frente 
Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (26 July 1990) UN Doc A/44/971-S/21541, Annex. 
296 Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights between the Government of Guatemala and 
the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (29 March 1994) 36 ILM 276, preamble 
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international treaties, conventions and other instruments on the 
subject to which Guatemala is a party.297 
In other words, parties to bilateral human rights agreements seldom lay 
down specific standards of protection, thus minimising the concern of 
downgrading standards of human rights protection. 
To conclude, these four arguments seem insufficient to prevent 
acknowledging the treaty-making capacity of unrecognised entities in 
relation to international human rights treaties.  While these concerns 
appear plausible in theory, they find little support in practice.  Even if 
States remain cautious of the implications of allowing unrecognised entities 
to conclude or participate in international human rights treaties, such 
caution should not directly result in the denial of human rights treaty-
making capacity to unrecognised entities.  Instead, this issue may be 
addressed by adopting different means for unrecognised entities to express 
consent to be bound by human rights treaties.   
IV. Means for Unrecognised Entities to  
Express Consent to be Bound by Human Rights Treaties 
It may be possible for unrecognised entities to enter into bilateral treaties 
with States that do not share the concern of improper legitimisation and 
implied recognition mentioned above.  Yet, participation in multilateral 
human rights treaties may not be as easy since existing States parties may 
disapprove of opening participation to unrecognised entities.  The following 
discussion explores the different means for unrecognised entities to 
express consent. 
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A. Conclusion of Bilateral Human Rights Treaties or Bilateral Treaties with 
Human Rights Components  
While international human rights treaties are primarily multilateral in 
nature, certain human rights components can also be observed in bilateral 
treaties, especially in agreements concluded in the context of peace 
processes and instruments concluded for the purpose of providing 
humanitarian assistance.298  Practice of unrecognised entities in relation to 
bilateral treaties with human rights components is introduced below. 
In relation to agreements with human rights components concluded in 
peace processes, examples can be found from El Salvador and 
Guatemala.299  In El Salvador, around 1980, the FMLN engaged in a large-
scale non-international armed conflict with the government of El Salvador 
and at one point arguably fulfilled many criteria of statehood.300  The two 
sides of the conflict eventually began a peace dialogue in 1989, under the 
auspices of the UN, and the San José Agreement on Human Rights was 
signed on 26 July 1990.301 The Preamble of the Agreement notes that the 
)0/1 ³KDV WKH FDSDFLW\ DQG WKH ZLOO DQG DVVXPHV WKH FRPPLWPHQW WR
respect WKHLQKHUHQWDWWULEXWHVRIWKHKXPDQSHUVRQ´302  In Guatemala, by 
the mid-20th century, military rule rose to power and various guerrilla 
groups began actively fighting against the government, and among them 
was the URNG.303  The peace process, which began after the end of the 
Cold War, led to the conclusion of Comprehensive Human Rights Accord.304  
7KH $FFRUG H[SUHVVO\ GRFXPHQWHG WKDW WKH 851* KDG WDNHQ RQ ³D
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commitment to respect the attributes inherent to human beings and to 
contribute to the effective enjoymHQWRI+XPDQ5LJKWV´DQGDOVRREOLJHG
the government of Guatemala to reaffirm its adherence to human rights 
norms.305   
Both the FMLN and the URNG at one point fulfilled the criteria of 
unrecognised entities provided by this thesis,306 and these agreements are 
generally deemed as international instruments imposing binding legal 
obligations upon parties, and the conclusion of bilateral agreements can 
thus be considered a method for unrecognised entities to express consent 
to be bound by international human rights treaties.  While the examples 
provided here show the conclusion of bilateral human rights treaties 
between unrecognised entities and their parent States, it appears that 
there is no reason to bar unrecognised entities from concluding such 
treaties with other actors who possess treaty-making capacity. 
B. Official Participation in Multilateral Human Rights Treaties with the 
Consent of Existing State Parties 
As existing international human rights treaties are only open for 
participation by States and, in the case of some treaties by international 
organisations,307 allowing unrecognised entities to officially participate as 
parties can only be achieved through treaty amendments.  A survey of the 
provisions on amendment in UN human rights treaties reveals strict 
                                                            
305 Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights between the Government of Guatemala and 
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procedural rules as well as the requirement of approval by the UN General 
Assembly and/or at least two-thirds of the States parties of the respective 
treaties.308  Past experience of amendments to international human rights 
treaties suggests that the process would be long, and even if an 
amendment is adopted, it only binds the States that have accepted it.309  It 
is virtually inconceivable that States would have the political will to initiate 
the amendment proposals and to advocate for sufficient support for the 
amendment to take effect.   
While the adoption of Protocol No 14 of the ECHR, which provides for the 
RSSRUWXQLW\RIWKH(8¶VDFFHVVLRQVHUYHVDVDQH[DPSOHRI6WDWHVDJUHHLQJ
to expand the participation in a human rights treaty to include a non-State 
entity, its success is unlikely to be duplicated in the case of unrecognised 
HQWLWLHV )LUVWO\VRPHRI WKH LPSHUDWLYHV IXHOOLQJ WKHGHEDWHRQ WKH(8¶V
accession to the ECHR are unique to the situation in Europe.  For instance, 
one of the reasons for advocatiQJ WKH (8¶V DFFHVVLRQ LV WR DFKLHYH
coherence between ECHR and EU laws and avoid discrepancies between 
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts ± a goal that has 
been reiterated by various actors of both the Council of Europe and the 
EU. 310   AlsR WKH FDOO IRU DFFHVVLRQ WR WKH (&+5 UHODWHV WR WKH (8¶V
                                                            
308  Eg International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(adopted 7 March 1966, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195, art 
23International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3, art 29; International Covenant on Civil 
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conflicts or overlapping between the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the 
(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWV´  See also 9DXJKQH0LOOHUµ(8$FFHVVLRQWRWKH(XURSHDQ
&RQYHQWLRQRQ+XPDQ5LJKWV¶0DUFK6WDQGDUG1RWH61,$Kttp://www. 
parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05914.pdf> accessed 20 August 2014.; Hans Christian 
129 
credibility in terms of its human rights policy.  While the EU requests non-
EU States seeking to join the organisation or to obtain development aid 
from the organisation to fulfil certain human righWVFRPPLWPHQWVWKH(8¶V
own conduct is not subject to external scrutiny.311  Becoming a party to the 
ECHR to a certain extent remedies the imbalance.   
Secondly, the discussions regarding expanding accession to the ECHR have 
always focused on the EU (or previously on the European Communities).  
Although the practical arrangements of accession and technical details are 
subject to negotiation, the target entity is clear.  Attempts to include 
unrecognised entities would be more problematic given that it would be 
difficult for States to reach a consensus as to exactly how to define which 
non-State entities would be eligible to become parties to an international 
human rights treaty.  The adoption of Protocol No 14 came after years of 
debate. 312   While one cannot unequivocally proclaim that States would 
never allow unrecognised entities to formally participate as parties in 
multilateral international human rights treaties, it is safe to assume that 
such arrangements would not take place in the near future, considering 
that the protection gap resulting from the exclusion of unrecognised 
entities from multilateral human rights regimes has rarely been a subject 
of concern in international fora.  Take the Universal Periodic Review 
mechanism under the UN Human Rights Council as an example: When 
China was under review, no discussion regarding the human rights 
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situation in Taiwan was recorded.313  ,Q6RPDOLD¶VUHYLHZDOWKRXJKWKHODFN
of control of the Transitional Federal Government over Somaliland was 
noted, the recommendations raised by other States only went as far as 
HQFRXUDJLQJ³FRRSHUDWLRQ´ZLWKLQVWLWXWLRQVLQ6RPDOLODQG314  It is unlikely 
that States would demonstrate enough political will to amend the existing 
human rights treaties to allow participation by unrecognised entities. 
C. Unilateral Expression of Consent to Be Bound by Multilateral Human 
Rights Treaties 
In addition to the abovementioned methods of engaging with other States 
and the existing international human rights treaty regimes,315  ways of 
unilaterally expressing consent to be bound by multilateral human rights 
treaties have been proposed.  Examples include the adoption of unilateral 
statements or declarations and incorporation in domestic legislation of 
unrecognised entities.  For instance, prior to the independence of South 
6XGDQ WKH6XGDQ3HRSOH¶V /LEHUDWLRQ$UP\RI6RXWKHUQ6XGDQ, which at 
one point controlled what is now South Sudan and fulfilled the criteria of an 
unrecognised entity for the purpose of this thesis, declared its voluntary 
adherence to the CRC.316  Also, Taiwan attempted to adhere to the CEDAW 
in 2007 317  and the ICCPR and ICESCR in 2009, 318  but its respective 
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instruments of accession and ratification were rejected by the UN 
Secretariat. 319   Still, Taiwan has subsequently begun the process of 
incorporating provisions of these treaties into its domestic legal system 
and has prepared reports on the implementation of treaty provisions, in 
accordance with the reporting requirement of the treaties.  The President 
KDVDOVRUHSHDWHGO\HPSKDVLVHG7DLZDQ¶VGHWermination to bring domestic 
human rights protection in line with the standards set in these treaties.320  
All these measures serve as evidence that, although not accepted by the 
depository of CEDAW, ICCPR, and ICSECR, Taiwan has unilaterally 
expressed its consent to be bound by these instruments.  In order to 
explore the legal effect of unilateral declarations by unrecognised entities, 
the discussion below analyses the unilateral declarations of States and 
non-State armed groups to see whether support can be found that 
unilateral declarations of unrecognised entities create binding international 
legal obligations. 
Under international law, unilateral declarations made by States can 
sometimes be considered to create binding legal obligations.  The ICJ in 
the Nuclear Tests Case UXOHG WKDW³>Z@KHQ LW LV WKH LQWHQWLRQRI WKH6WDWH
making the declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, 
that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal 
undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course 
RIFRQGXFWFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHGHFODUDWLRQ´321  International jurisprudence 
has consistently emphasised that these criteria should be strictly 
interpreted and the decision to attribute binding force to unilateral 
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October 2010) <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=22495> 
accessed 20 August 2014.  The domestication of these treaties is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5, Section III.B.2.c. 
321 Nuclear Tests (Australia v France) [1974] ICJ Rep 253, para 43. 
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declarations of a State should not be made lightly.322  Doubts have been 
expressed as to whether the ICJ acknowledged unilateral declarations as a 
new source of law,323 and criticism of the judgment even suggests that the 
Court might have acted ultra vires, since it is not mandated to decide 
cases based on sources of law not stipulated in Article 38(1) of the ICJ 
Statute. 324   Nevertheless, international courts and legal scholars have 
generally accepted that if a State makes a public declaration manifesting 
an intention to be bound by the terms of that declaration, the declaration 
will then create legal obligations for the State in question.325   
However, the legal effect of unilateral declarations by non-State actors 
remains unclear.  Instances of unilateral expressions of consent to be 
bound by an international treaty can be observed in areas other than 
human rights law. 326   The basis of legal effect of such unilateral 
expressions often derives from a special arrangement during the 
negotiation of the respective treaties and the consent of parties to the 
treaties.  For instance, the Additional Protocol of the Railway Conventions 
of 1952 and 1961 enabled ³6WDWHVRU territorial parts of states´ to adopt 
the Conventions by incorporating the provisions in their respective 
domestic legislation. 327   In 1964, the Eastern and Western parts of 
Germany notified the depository, the Swiss Government, of the 
introduction of provisions of the Railway Conventions in their domestic laws, 
and the depository accordingly informed other member States that the 
                                                            
322 ibid para 44; North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany v Denmark; Germany v Netherlands) 
[1969] ICJ Rep 3, paras 27-28; WTO, United States: Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 
1974±Report of the Panel (22 December 1999) WT/DS152/R, para 7.118; Case Concerning 
the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v Mali) [1985] ICJ Rep 554. 
323 +XJK7KLUOZD\µ7KH6RXUFHVRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶LQ(YDQVHG (n 189) 112. 
324 Alfred P 5XELQµ7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/HJDO(IIHFWVRI8QLODWHUDO'HFODUDWLRQV¶$-,/
29. 
325 ,/&µ*XLGLQJ3ULQFLSOHV$SSOLFDEOHWR8QLODWHUDO'HFODUDWLRQVRI6WDWHV&DSDEOHRI&UHDWLQJ
Legal Obligations, with Commentaries thereto¶<HDUERRNRIWKH,QWHUQDWional Law Commission, 
2006, vol II(2) (2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/2006/Add.1 (Part 2) 370. 
326 Bot (n 288) 123-30. 
327 ibid 128-30. 
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Conventions would thus be applicable in both parts of Germany as of 1 
January 1965.328   Without the adoption of the Additional Protocol, it is 
doubtful that unilateral incorporation of treaty provisions in domestic law 
would of itself give rise to the applicability of the Railway Conventions in 
both parts of Germany. 
In addition, in the context of armed conflicts, the practice of NLMs and 
non-State armed groups issuing unilateral declarations to commit to be 
bound by legal instruments of international humanitarian and human rights 
law can be of reference here.  Many such declarations have been sent to 
the ICRC and Geneva Call. The latter collects signatures of non-State 
actors in the form of adherence to Deeds of Commitment concerning the 
ban on anti-personnel mines, protection of children from the effects of 
armed conflicts, and prohibition of sexual violence and elimination of 
gender discrimination.329  Particular references to human rights law can 
also be observed in some of these declarations.  For instance, the Ogaden 
National Liberation Front, an armed group in Ethiopia seeking the 
UHDOLVDWLRQRI2JDGHQ3HRSOH¶VULJKWWRVHOI-determination, has indicated in 
LWV 3ROLWLFDO 3URJUDPPH WKDW LW ³VKDOO DGKHUH WR DOO UHOHYDQW LQWHUQDWLRQDO
agreements on human rights including the Universal Declaration on Human 
5LJKWV´ 330  It has been argued that, although the legal effect of each 
unilateral declaration by non-State armed groups should be determined on 
a case-by-case basis, some of these declarations should be considered 
binding under international law.331  The ICJ has noted that the unilateral 
declaration by Palestine on 7 June 1982 expressing its intention to comply 
                                                            
328 ibid. 
329  Geneva Call, a non-governmental organisation, develops and receives Deeds of 
Commitment of non-State armed groups.  *HQHYD &DOO µ'HHGV RI &RPPLWPHQW¶
<http://www.genevacall.org/how-we-work/deed-of-commitment/> accessed 20 August 2014. 
330 Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) µPolitical Programme¶ <http://onlf.org/?page_ 
id=16> accessed 20 August 2014. 
331 Roberts and Sivakumaran (n 154) 141-43; Sivakumaran (n 150) 118-24. 
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ZLWK WKH )RXUWK *HQHYD &RQYHQWLRQ ZDV FRQVLGHUHG ³YDOLG´ E\ WKH
depository of the Convention.332  However, neither the depository nor the 
ICJ further explained whether such a ³YDOLG´XQLODWHUDOGHFODUDWLRQFUHDWHG
obligations for Palestine under the Convention. 
Returning to the legal effect of unilateral declarations issued by 
unrecognised entities expressing the intention to be bound by international 
human rights treaties, this thesis argues that such declarations should 
create international legal obligations upon the unrecognised entities in 
question.  Firstly, this thesis contends that the source of the binding force 
of these declarations relates to the capacity of unrecognised entities to 
conclude and participate in international human rights treaties.  Víctor 
5RGUtJXH]&HGHxRWKH,/&¶V6SHFLDO5DSSRUWHXURQWKHLVVXHRIXQLODWHUDO
acts of States, analysed a wide array of unilateral acts by States and 
concluded that, as in the law of treaties, a State is endowed with 
³LQWHUQDWLRQDOFDSDFLW\«WRFRPPLWLWVHOIRUGHYHORSOHJDOUHODWLRQVDWWKH
LQWHUQDWLRQDO OHYHO WKURXJKXQLODWHUDODFWV´DQGWKDW$UWLFOH 6 of the 1969 
Vienna Convention (on the treaty-making capacity of States) might be 
³IXOO\ WUDQVIHUDEOH WR DQ\ OHJDO UHJLPH RQ XQLODWHUDO DFWV ZKLFK PD\ EH
HVWDEOLVKHG´333  The ILC appears to have endorsed this linkage between 
the capacity of States to issue unilateral declarations creating binding legal 
obligations and their treaty-making capacity. In its commentaries to the 
Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral Declarations of States Capable of 
&UHDWLQJ /HJDO 2EOLJDWLRQV WKH ,/& VWDWHG WKDW ³MXVW DV µHYHU\ 6WDWH
SRVVHVVHV FDSDFLW\ WR FRQFOXGH WUHDWLHV¶ HYHU\ 6WDWH FDQ FRPPLW LWVHOI
WKURXJK DFWV ZKHUHE\ LW XQLODWHUDOO\ XQGHUWDNHV OHJDO REOLJDWLRQV´ 334  
                                                            
332 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (n 
211) para 91. 
333  ,/& µ(LJKWK 5HSRUW RQ 8QLODWHUDO $FWV RI 6WDWHV E\ 9tFWRU 5RGUtJXH] &HGHxR 6SHFLDO
5DSSRUWHXU¶0D\81'RF$&1SDUD. 
334 ,/&µ*XLGLQJ3ULQFLSOHV$pplicable to Unilateral Declarations of States¶ (n 325) 371. 
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Based on this rationale, if a subject of international law possesses the 
capacity to enter into treaty relations and profess its intention to be bound 
through means of bilateral or multilateral agreements, it can do so through 
unilateral declarations.  In addition, as previously demonstrated, the 
official participation by unrecognised parties as parties to multilateral 
international human rights treaties appears to be impossible at present.  
Allowing them to adhere to these instruments by way of unilateral 
declarations can remedy the legal vacuum created by excluding them from 
treaty participation.   
V. Conclusion 
:KLOH WKH WHUP ³WUHDW\´ KDV WUDGLWLRQDOO\ EHHQ UHVWULFWHG WR DJUHHPHQWV
concluded between States, the drafting histories of both 1969 and 1986 
Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties and other developments of 
international law demonstrate that increasingly non-State actors have 
taken on the role of treaty-makers.  A closer look at international 
jurisprudence, the work of the ILC, and relevant practice reveals that 
treaty-making capacity is no longer exclusive to States.  International 
organisations, insurgents, NLMs, and international territorial 
administrations also possess such capacity, even though their capacity 
might be subject to limitations, unlike that of a State.   
After analysing the treaty-making capacity of different categories of actors 
and the sources of the capacity, this thesis argues that the treaty-making 
capacity of unrecognised entities in relation to international human rights 
treaties should be acknowledged on two bases.  The first basis relies on 
the declaratory theory of recognition and reasons that since unrecognised 
entities fulfil the criteria of statehood, they should be considered as States.  
Thus, their status as States implies the possession of treaty-making 
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FDSDFLW\ DQHVVHQWLDO ³DWWULEXWHRI6WDWH VRYHUHLJQW\´ 7KH second basis 
draws upon the notion of necessity, which was proposed by the ICJ to 
determine the capacities for a subject of international law to act at the 
international level.  The notion also serves to interpret the treaty-making 
capacity of international organisations and insurgents.  The necessity of 
acknowledging the capacity of unrecognised entities to conclude or 
participate in international human rights treaties is particularly evident 
when the special characteristics of such treaties are taken into 
consideration.  The requirement of a national system to respect, protect 
and fulfil rights enumerated in international human rights treaties, 
FRPELQHG ZLWK WKH ODFN RI FRQWURO RI ³SDUHQW 6WDWHV´ LQ WKH WHUULWRU\
governed by unrecognised entities, leads to the need to acknowledge the 
treaty-making capacity in this regard.  Additionally, the principle of 
continuity of international human rights treaty obligations contributes to 
the necessity of allowing unrecognised entities to bear obligations under 
international human rights treaties to which their respective former 
governing States are parties.   
Of course granting unrecognised entities the capacity to conclude or 
participate in international human rights treaties is not without concern.  
There are four plausible reasons for refusing to grant unrecognised entities 
such a capacity: the danger of improperly legitimising the entity in 
question; the fear of implied recognition; the possibility of the entity 
lacking ability to protect and fulfil human rights; and the risk of 
downgrading standards of protection.  However, this thesis argues that 
these concerns are in fact not supported by empirical evidence, and that 
they should not impede the acknowledgement of the capacity of 
unrecognised entities to conclude or participate in international human 
rights treaties. 
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Finally, if it is accepted that unrecognised entities have treaty-making 
capacity, some consideration needs to be afforded to how these entities 
can express their consent to be bound.  Since official participation of 
unrecognised entities in multilateral human rights treaties seems 
implausible at present, the thesis proposes that an unrecognised entity can 
express its consent to be bound by international human rights norms by 
concluding bilateral human rights treaties with other actors who possess 
treaty-making capacity and issuing unilateral declarations committing itself 
to undertakings in existing human rights instruments.  Practice has seen 
the adoption of both methods, and this thesis argues, provided that the 
bilateral treaty or the unilateral declaration in question clearly 
demonstrates the intention to create binding legal obligations, the 
unrecognised entity who is a party to the agreement or the issuer of the 
unilateral declaration should find itself bound by the agreement or 
declaration under international law.  Only through allowing the 
unrecognised entities to adopt these methods can the treaty-making 
capacity in relation to human rights treaties be realised, and the necessity 
of granting such capacity be addressed. 
The numbers of international human rights treaties and their ratifications 
have multiplied since the establishment of the UN.  Still, human rights 
treaty regimes do not provide a satisfactory system of protection by 
themselves considering that many States remain outside of them. 335  
Similarly, even if the capacity of unrecognised entities to conclude or to 
participate in international human rights treaties is recognised, many of 
them have not expressed consent to be bound by such treaties, or have 
only consented to a few of them.  Besides, treaties are not the sole source 
                                                            
335 %UXQR6LPPDDQG3KLOLS$OVWRQµ7KH6RXUFHVRI+XPDQ5LJKWV/DZ&XVWRP-XV&RJHQV
DQG*HQHUDO3ULQFLSOHV¶$XVWUDOLDQ<%,QWO/ 
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of obligations under international law. 336   Therefore, in order to fully 
understand the application of international human rights law to 
unrecognised entities, there is still need to study whether and to what 
extent they are bound by general international human rights law.  This will 
be focus of the next chapter. 
  
                                                            
336 See Chapter 1, Section II.A. 
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CHAPTER 4 
GENERAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
AND UNRECOGNISED ENTITIES 
I. Introduction 
As explained in the first chapter of this WKHVLV WKH WHUP ³JHQHUDO
LQWHUQDWLRQDO KXPDQ ULJKWV ODZ´ UHIHUV WR DOO QRQ-treaty rules of 
international human rights law.  Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ reflects 
WKH³XQLYHUVDOSHUFHSWLRQDVWRWKHHQXPHUDWLRQRIVRXUFHVRILnternational 
ODZ´ 1  and lays down both primary sources (international conventions, 
international custom, and the general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations) and subsidiary means for the determination of 
international law (judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations).  Since the latter category is 
used to interpret primary sources and do not directly create binding legal 
obligations, for the purpose of the present chapter, the focus here is the 
primary sources of general international law: international custom and 
general principles of international law. 
The chapter begins, in Section II, by analysing the different sources of 
general international human rights law and providing theoretical bases for 
the binding force of general international law.  Section III explores whether 
different categories of non-State actors are bound by general international 
human rights law and discusses the potential bases of such binding force.  
Section IV then turns the focus to unrecognised entities.  Drawing from the 
principles and discussions in Sections II and III, this section of the chapter 
                                                            
1 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (6th edn, CUP 2008) 71.  See also James Crawford, 
%URZQOLH¶V3ULQFLSOHVRI3XEOLF,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ WKHGQ283+XJK7KLUOZD\µ7KH
6RXUFHV RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ¶ LQ 0DOFROP ' (vans (ed), International Law (4th edn, OUP 
2014) 95; Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds), 2SSHQKHLP¶V ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ, vol 1 
(Introduction and Part 1) (9th edn, Longman 1992) 24. 
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attempts to provide a theoretical framework that justifies the applicability 
of general international human rights law to unrecognised entities. 
II. Sources of General International Human Rights Law  
and the Bases of their Binding Force 
The focus of this chapter is the primary non-treaty sources of international 
human rights law, that is, international custom and general principles of 
international law, and the bases of their binding force.  While peremptory 
norms are not listed as a standalone source of international law by Article 
38(1) of the ICJ Statute, the following discussion considers the notion of 
peremptory norms independently for two reasons.  Firstly, the 
categorisation of peremptory norms is subject to debate, and while some 
consider them to be a special set of customary rules,2 others hold the view 
that they form a part of the general principles of international law.3  Still 
others acknowledge the higher status of peremptory norms but do not 
associate them specifically to either source of international law.4  Secondly, 
the distinct and absolute nature of the authority of peremptory norms 
requires a different theoretical basis to justify their binding force.  
Therefore, it is necessary to include a separate discussion on peremptory 
norms. 
A. International Custom 
1. Criteria 
                                                            
2 Eg David Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 
 7KLUOZD\ µ7KH 6RXUFHV RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ¶ Q 1) 115 $ODQ %UXGQHU µ7KH 'RPHVWLF 
Enforcement of International Covenants on Human Rights: A Theoretical Framework¶ 
35 U Toronto LJ 219, 249. 
3 Eg Crawford, %URZQOLH¶V(n 16HHDOVR0DU\(OOHQ2¶&RQQHOOµ7KH1DWXUDO6XSHULRULW\RI 
&RXUWV¶LQ8OULFK)DVWHQUDWKDQGRWKHUHGVFrom Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays 
in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma (OUP 2011) 1044; %UXQR 6LPPD DQG 3KLOLS $OVWRQ µ7KH
6RXUFHV RI +XPDQ 5LJKWV /DZ &XVWRP -XV &RJHQV DQG *HQHUDO 3ULQFLSOHV¶  
Australian YB Intl L 82, 102-06.  
4 Shaw (n 1) 124; Jennings and Watts (eds) (n 1) 45-50. 
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Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute provides the most-cited definition of 
customary international laZ ³HYLGHQFH RI D JHQHUDO SUDFWLFH DFFHSWHG DV
ODZ´ 5   In other words, in order for a rule to become an international 
custom, it must be proven that States in general have a continuous habit 
of conducting themselves in a particular manner with the belief that they 
are obligated under international law to act in that manner.  Two criteria 
thus derive from the notion of international custom: general State practice 
and opinio juris.   
International jurisprudence and scholarly writings provide numerous 
examples of conducts that are considered State practice: for instance, 
diplomatic correspondence and exchanges, official statements, legislation, 
judicial decisions, participation in international meetings, as well as other 
acts undertaken at the international level.6  With regard to the element of 
generality, it is important to note that complete uniformity is not necessary.  
Although the ICJ in the Asylum case pronounced that the party invoking a 
customary rule must prove that the rule in question is consistent wLWK³D
FRQVWDQW DQG XQLIRUPXVDJH´7 the Court in the Nicaragua Case specified 
WKDWLWGLGQRWFRQVLGHUWKDW³IRUDUXOHWREHHVWDEOLVKHGDVFXVWRPDU\WKH
corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the 
UXOH´8  In addition, practice of every State is not necessarily given equal 
weight.  Depending on the rule in question, the attitude of States that are 
³VSHFLDOO\ DIIHFWHG´ LV VRPHWLPHVJUDQWHG VSHFLDO FRQVLGHUDWLRQ9  While it 
often takes a long time for a rule to develop and become accepted and 
practised by States, thus acquiring customary status, the time needed for 
                                                            
5 Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 
October 1945) 33 UNTS 993 (ICJ Statute), art 38(1)(b). 
6 Crawford, %URZQOLH¶V(n 1) 24; Shaw (n 1) 82. 
7 Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru) [1950] ICJ Rep 266, 276. 
8 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 
US) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 186 (Nicaragua Case). 
9 North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany v Denmark; Germany v Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep 
3, paras 74. 
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WKH IRUPDWLRQ RI HDFK FXVWRP YDULHV ³DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH QDWXUH RI WKH
FDVH´10  Therefore, since it is possible for a customary rule to form within 
a short period of tLPH³GXUDWLRQ´LVQRWLQDQGRILWVHOIDUHTXLUHGHOHPHQW
of customary international law.  It has even been argued that given special 
FLUFXPVWDQFHV³LQVWDQW´FXVWRPDU\LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZLVSRVVLEOH11 
On the other hand, opinio juris denotes the subjective element of custom 
DQGGLVWLQJXLVKHVFXVWRPIURP³XVDJH´12  It requires that States engaged 
in certain practice actually believe that they are obligated under 
international law to do so.13  In the Nicaragua Case, the ICJ emphasised 
WKDW³HLWKHUWKH6WDWHVWaking such action or other States in a position to 
UHDFWWRLWPXVWKDYHEHKDYHGVRWKDWWKHLUFRQGXFWLVµHYLGHQFHRIDEHOLHI
that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law 
UHTXLULQJ LW¶´14  While the criterion of opinio juris appears to be abstract 
and its existence difficult to prove, the ICJ has at times turned to UN 
General Assembly resolutions, codification conventions, and the work of 
the UN ILC for evidence of opinio juris.15  For instance, in the Nicaragua 
Case, the CoXUW UHDVRQHG WKDW WKHH[LVWHQFHRI ³opinio juris may, though 
ZLWKDOOGXHFDXWLRQEHGHGXFHGIURP«WKHDWWLWXGHRIWKH3DUWLHVDQGWKH
DWWLWXGHRI6WDWHV WRZDUGV FHUWDLQ*HQHUDO$VVHPEO\ UHVROXWLRQV´ DQG LQ
that case, Resolution 2625, the Friendly Relations Declaration.16  The ICJ in 
the North Sea Continental Shelf cases took a different approach and looked 
WR ³WKH ZRUN GRQH LQ WKLV ILHOG E\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO OHJDO ERGLHV RQ 6WDWH
                                                            
10 +XPSKUH\:DOGRFN µ*HQHUDO&RXUVHRQ 3XEOLF ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ¶ 5HFXHLO GHV
Cours 1, 44. 
11 %LQ &KHQJ µ8QLWHG 1DWLRQV 5HVROXWLRQV RQ2XWHU 6SDFH ,QVWDQW ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &XVWRPDU\ 
/DZ¶,QGLDQ-,QWO/ 23. 
12  Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th edn, OUP 2008) 6; Crawford, 
%URZQOLH¶V(n 1) 23. 
13 Andrew Clapham, %ULHUO\¶V/DZRI1DWLRQV (OUP 2012) 59. 
14 Nicaragua Case (n 8SDUDTXRWLQJWKH,&-¶VMXGJPHQW LQWKHNorth Sea Continental 
Shelf cases). 
15 Shaw (n 1) 88-$ODLQ3HOOHW µ$UWLFOH¶ LQ$QGUHDV=LPPHUPDQQand others (eds), The 
Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (OUP 2012) 820-24. 
16 Eg Nicaragua Case (n 8) para 188. 
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practice and on the influence attributed to the Geneva Convention [of 1958 
on WKH&RQWLQHQWDO6KHOI@LWVHOI´WRH[DPLQHZKHWKHUWKHUHZDVFXPXODWLYH
evidence of the requisite opinio juris to determine the existence of new 
customary norms.17  7KH ,&-¶V UHIHUHQFH WR WKH ZRUN RI WKH ,/& FDQ EH
observed in the *DEþtNRYR-Nagymaros Project Case.18 
In terms of the formation of custom, it has been argued that customary 
international human rights law differs from customary international law in 
general.  According to this school of thought, in the context of customary 
international human rights law, the criterion of opinio juris should carry 
more weight than State practice, and such a method would render 
identifying human rights customary norms a simpler task.  Supporters of 
WKLVPHWKRGILQGVXSSRUWLQWKH,&-¶VRSLQLRQ in the Nicaragua Case, where 
the Court evaluated the customary status of the prohibition of the use of 
force.  The Court reasoned that:  
In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court 
deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, 
be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State 
conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have 
been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the 
recognition of a new rule.19   
According to Wouters and RyngDHUW WKH ,&-¶V DSSURDFK LQ WKLV UHJDUG
considered determining the existence of opinio juris to be the priority in 
examining whether a particular rule has obtained customary status.20  Yet, 
                                                            
17 North Sea Continental Shelf (n 9) para 37. 
18 *DEþtNRYR-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, paras 47, 50-54. 58. 
19 Nicaragua Case (n 8) para 186. 
20 -DQ:RXWHUV DQG&HGULF5\QJDHUW µ,PSDFW RI WKH 3URFHVV RI WKH )RUPDWLRQ of Customary 
IntHUQDWLRQDO /DZ¶ in Menno T Kamminga and Martin Scheinin (eds), The Impact of Human 
Rights Law on General International Law (OUP 2009) 113. 
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since the rule examined by the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case ± the prohibition 
of the use of force ± is not a human rights norm, doubts may be raised as 
WR LI DQG ZK\ WKH &RXUW¶V DSSURDFK FDQ EH H[WUDSRODWHG WR WKH ILHOG RI
human rights, and two school of thoughts were formed on this issue. 
Those advocating extrapolation point to the characteristics common to 
both fields: the existence of strong opinio juris and the apparent gap 
between what States consider lawful and what States practice.21   With 
regard to the law on the use of force, the UN Charter22 and numerous 
relevant General Assembly resolutions23 reflect the convictions of States 
that international law in principle prohibits the use of force, but 
international practice often sees flagrant violations of such a prohibition.  
As for human rights law, the opinio juris of States can be clearly deduced 
from the conclusion and participation in numerous international human 
rights instruments, while it can be observed that State practice often 
departs from the commitment of States.  Given these gaps between opinio 
juris and practice, identifying customary human rights norms in the 
traditional manner would be a difficult task.  Therefore, Schachter suggests 
that when ascertaining the customary status of a human rights norm, one 
needs to rely on evidence and considerations different from those taken 
into account by the traditional approach to custom formation.24  In other 
words, the method of determining the customary status of a rule adopted 
by the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case may be applied in cases of human rights 
norms, and sufficient evidence of opinio juris would create a strong 
                                                            
21 ibid 114. 
22 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 
1 UNTS XVI, art 2(4). 
23 Eg UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970) UN Doc A/RES/2625(XXV); UNGA Res 3314 
(XXIX) (14 December 1974) UN Doc A/RES/3314(XXIX). 
24  2VFDU 6FKDFKWHU µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ LQ 7KHRU\ DQG 3UDFWLFH, General Course in Public 
International Law¶ Recueil des Cours 9, 334-35. 
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assumption that the human rights norm in question has in fact achieved 
customary status.25   
However, Simma and Alston argue that this approach de-emphasises the 
element of State practice and is perhaps better suited to cases involving 
rules that have been gradually established with the support of State 
practice but challenged by subsequent inconsistent practice. 26  
Furthermore, there is no need to adopt a different approach when 
identifying customary human rights norms, as opposed to customary 
norms in general, since State practice in fact matches opinio juris.27  This 
view is adopted in the present thesis, especially in light of the 
contemporary developments in the field of human rights.  Although it 
remains true that violations of human rights constantly challenge the 
statement that customary human rights law does exist and is supported by 
uniform State practice, it is important to point out that nowadays, such 
violations are often met with condemnation by States and international 
actors.  At the time when Schachter wrote in support of adopting a 
GLIIHUHQWDSSURDFKLQLGHQWLI\LQJFXVWRPDU\KXPDQULJKWV³6WDWHV>GLG@QRW
XVXDOO\ « SURWHVW YLRODWLRQV WKDW >GLG@ QRW DIIHFW WKHLU QDWLRQDOV´ DQG
³>D@UELWUDO DZDUGV DQG international judicial decisions [were] also rare 
except in tribunals based on treaties such as the European and Inter-
$PHULFDQ FRXUWV RI KXPDQ ULJKWV´ 28   Nevertheless, as pointed out by 
Simma and Alston, at the international level, especially in the context of 
the UN, practice has in fact confirmed the existence of customary human 
rights law.  In addition to the adoption of resolutions by the UN General 
                                                            
25 Wouters and Ryngaert (n 20) 114; Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms 
as Customary Law (OUP 1989) 94. 
26 Simma and Alston (n 3) 96- %UXQR 6LPPD µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO +XPDQ 5LJKWV DQG *HQHUDO 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ$&RPSDUDWLYH$QDO\VLV¶&ROOHFWHG&RXUVHVRIWKH$FDGHP\RI
European Law, 153, 220. 
27  Simma and Alston (n 3) 98- 6LPPD µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO +XPDQ 5LJKWV DQG *HQHUDO
,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶Q26) 221-22. 
28 6FKDFKWHUµ*HQHUDO&RXUVHLQ3XEOLF,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶Q24) 334. 
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Assembly, the former UN Commission on Human Rights and the current UN 
Human Rights Council, consistently reiterating standards of human rights 
protection, serious violations are discussed in public debates among States 
and responded to with condemnation and even sanctions.  Even though 
Member States of the latter two organs do not represent all States of the 
international community, their practice represents the attitudes of the 
participating States.  In addition, mechanisms such as the Universal 
Periodic Review conducted by member and observer States of the Human 
Rights Council, the scope of which reaches beyond international human 
rights treaties,29 routinely scrutinise the human rights practice of all States 
and identify gaps in protection.  While considerations of human rights 
treaty obligations form an essential basis of the abovementioned practice 
of UN bodies and their Member States, it is undeniable that universal 
standards, such as those set in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
have been repeatedly referred to and confirmed, providing strong evidence 
of the formation of customary human rights law. 
2. Basis of Authority 
a. The Theory of Consent 
The theory of consent has long been put forward to explain the basis of the 
binding force of customary international law,30 and the theory builds on the 
will of States, as demonstrated in the form of expressed or inferred 
                                                            
29 According to Resolution 5/1 of the Human Rights Council, the basis of the review is a) the 
UN Charter; b) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; c) Human rights instruments to 
which a State is party, and d) Voluntary pledges and commitments made by States, including 
those undertaken when presenting their candidatures for election to the Human Rights 
Council. 
30 Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the 
Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns: From the French of Monsieur de Vattel (G G 
and J Robinson, Paternoster-Row 1797) lxvi. (These three kinds of law of nations, the 
voluntary, the conventional and the customary, together constitute the positive law of 
nations. For they all proceed from the will of nations, the voluntary from their presumed 
consent, the conventional from an express consent, and the customary from tacit consent.) 
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consent, acquiescence, or presumed acceptance.  In 1927, the PCIJ in the 
Lotus Case pronounced that:  
7KHUXOHVRIODZELQGLQJXSRQ6WDWHV«HPDQDWHIURPWKHLURZQ
IUHH ZLOO DV H[SUHVVHG « E\ XVDJHV JHQHUDOO\ DFFHSWHG DV
expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate 
the relations between those co-existing independent 
communities or with a view to the achievement of common 
aims.31  
The statement above reflects the theory of consent, which suggests that 
States are independent entities and are only bound by the rules to which 
they have agreed.  While State consent to treaties is usually provided 
explicitly, through signatures, accessions, or ratifications, consent to 
international custom is often inferred.32  The absence of objection from a 
State to a particular developing customary norm is often interpreted as 
inferred consent or acquiescence.  Wolfke, who also emphasises the 
importance of the will of States, proposes that States are bound by a given 
rule of customary international ODZGXHWRWKHLU³SUHVXPHGDFFHSWDQFHRID
SUDFWLFHDVDQH[SUHVVLRQRIODZ´33   
Critics of the theory of consent consider that it fails to provide a 
satisfactory justification of the authority of customary international law.  It 
has been argued that, according to the consent theory, if the consent of 
States were required for a rule a bind them, it would also be required that 
States consented that their consent carried such an effect.34   In other 
                                                            
31 SS Lotus (France v Turkey) [1927] PCIJ Rep Series A No 9, 18. 
32 Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules (CUP 1999) 412. 
33  Karol Wolfke, Customs in Present International Law (2nd rev edn, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1993) 161. 
34  *HUDOG )LW]PDXULFH µ7KH *HQHUDO 3ULQFLSOHV RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ &RQVLGHUHG IURP WKH
6WDQGSRLQWRIWKH5XOHRI/DZ¶5HFXHLOGHV&RXUV1, 43. 
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words, each consent that gave rise to an obligation must be supported by 
D SULRU FRQVHQW 7KLV SUHVHQWV WKH GDQJHU RI DQ ³LQILQLWH UHJUHVV´35  In 
addition, critics of the consent theory argue that it has the following 
shortcomings.  Firstly, the theory does not explain why States that come 
into being after the formation of certain customary norms and thus have 
not had the opportunity to voice consent or objection would nevertheless 
be bound by the customary norms in question.36  Secondly, when a rule is 
supported by general State practice with the conviction of legal obligation, 
the States that stay silent and do not persistently object to the formation 
of this international custom are usually deemed to have consented to the 
rule in question, or at least acquiesced.  Such consent thus binds the silent 
States to the new international custom.  However, such silence is not 
QHFHVVDULO\ LQGLFDWLYH RI D 6WDWH¶V DFFHSWDQFH RI WKH UXOH  %HVLGHV LW LV
excessive to require each State to learn about and respond to every act of 
every other State and to object to every act with which it disagrees in 
order to influence the formation of a new customary rule.37  It has even 
EHHQ DUJXHG WKDW ³FRQVHQW GUDZQ IURP VLOHQFH LV D GXELRXV IRUP RI
FRQVHQW´38  In short, using consent as the sole basis of the authority of 
customary international law might be problematic: the State consent that 
allegedly supports customary norms may be in fact fictitious.  
Nonetheless, there are counter-arguments that support maintaining the 
element of consent or presumed acceptance as the basis for the binding 
force of customary international law.  With regard to the first shortcoming 
introduced above, it has been proposed that the element of consent or 
presumed acceptance does not require that all States bound by a 
                                                            
35 ibid. 
36 Shaw (n 1) 9.  
37 ibid 90-91. 
38 6DPXHO(VWUHLFKHUµ5HWKLQNLQJWKH%LQGLQJ(IIHFWRI&XVWRPDU\,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶44 
Virginia J Intl L 5, 8. 
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customary norm must have participated in its formation.39  In the case of a 
new State, once it has taken part in international life and engaged in the 
practice already established as a customary norm without raising 
objections, the consent inferred is not fictitious.  With regard to the second 
shortcoming proposed, given the convenient flow of information and the 
increased exchanges between States, it may be argued that it is no longer 
D KHDY\ EXUGHQ IRU 6WDWHV WR OHDUQ DERXW HDFK RWKHU¶V EHKDYLRXUV DQG
positions regarding a particular international law issue.  In particular, 
various international meetings, fora within international organisations, and 
mechanisms for dispute resolution provide States the chance to both take 
note of and respond to the practice of other States.  Additionally, 
nowadays State practice regarding international law has been much better 
documented and accessible either in the form of official State publications, 
records and documents of international institutions, or even in scholarly 
writings.  According to this line of argument, now that it is easier for a 
State to learn about and react to the practice of other States and the 
formation of a new rule, if the State chooses to not object to the rule, it is 
UHDVRQDEOH WRSUHVXPH LWVDFFHSWDQFH 7KHUHIRUHD6WDWH¶VFRQVHQW WRD
given customary rule is not manifested out of thin air.  Instead, it derives 
IURPWKH6WDWH¶VNQRZOHGJHRIRWKHU6WDWHV¶SUDFWLFHDQGIURPWKHDFWLRQRU
inaction of the State in question.  Such consent serves as the basis of the 
binding force of customary rules. 
While it is true that with modern technology and increased inter-State 
interactions, it has become easier for a State to be mindful of the practice 
of other States, it is the opinion of this thesis that it remains challenging 
for a State to know every aspect of the practice of all other States.  This is 
especially true in cases of States with fewer resources devoted to foreign 
                                                            
39 Wolfke (n 33) 165. 
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relations and issues of international law.  Additionally, even if the 
arguments supporting the consent theory stand, the theory of consent is 
still challenged by the principle of persistent objector and its restrictions.  
The discussions below address these challenges and attempt to provide 
further bases for the authority of international custom. 
b. The Principle of Persistent Objector and the Prohibition of 
³6XEVHTXHQW2EMHFWRUV´ 
If State consent forms the basis of authority for customary international 
law, it naturally follows that a State may distance itself from the otherwise 
uniform practice by expressing its dissent concerning a purported 
customary rule.  While States might object to a customary rule during its 
formation or after it obtains customary status, 40  the ICJ seems to 
acknowledge the former as a ground for precluding the binding force of a 
customary rule upon the objecting State. 41   In the Anglo-Norwegian 
Fisheries case before the ICJ, the United Kingdom contended that the 10-
sea-mile rule for the closing lines of bays should be regarded as a rule of 
international law.  After finding that conflicting State practice in this regard 
suggested this rule had not yet been generally accepted, the Court went on 
WR UXOH WKDW ³>L@Q DQ\ HYHQW WKH WHQ-mile rule would appear to be 
inapplicable as against Norway inasmuch as she has always opposed any 
DWWHPSWWRDSSO\LWWRWKH1RUZHJLDQFRDVW´42  A similar statement can be 
found in the Asylum case, where the Court considered that Peru was not 
                                                            
40 Mark E Villiger, Customary International Law and Treaties (Kluwer Law Intl 1997) 33. 
41 Fitzmaurice, while analysing the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, emphasised that: 
The essence of the matter is dissent from the rule while it is in process of 
becoming one, and before it has crystallized into a definite and generally 
accepted rule of law. The Court's finding is not therefore to the effect that a 
State can at any time exempt itself from an established rule by opposing the 
application to itself of that rule.  
*HUDOG )LW]PDXULFH µ7KH/DZDQG3URFHGXUHRI WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RXUWRI -XVWLFH -54: 
*HQHUDO3ULQFLSOHVDQG6RXUFHVRI/DZ¶%ULWish YB Intl L 1, 26 (emphasis original).  
42 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (UK v Norway) [1951] ICJ Rep 116, 131. 
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bound by the rule invoked by Colombia concerning diplomatic asylum 
because a) Peru did not ratify the conventions codifying such a rule; and b) 
even if the rule had acquired customary status, considering that Peru 
repudiated the rule by not ratifying the relevant conventions, such a 
custom could not be asserted against Peru.43  The Court did not specifically 
elaborate on why either Peru or Norway qualified as a persistent objector.  
Nor did it justify why this principle can be legitimately invoked to exclude 
the applicability of customary norms to the objectors.  Still, it can 
nevertheless be observed that the ICJ recognises the effect of persistent 
objection.  Since then, the principle of persistent objector has received 
much support.44   
Nevertheless, practice has seldom seen States invoke this principle as a 
ground for exemption of customary obligations;45 a fact that has prompted 
some commentators to question the existence of such a principle.46  One 
possible explanation for the lack of practice is that the State acting 
contrary to a customary norm tends to argue that the norm in question 
does not exist (or has not obtained customary status), rather than it has 
SHUVLVWHQWO\ REMHFWHG WR WKH QRUP¶V IRUPDWLRQ 47   Those denying the 
                                                            
43 Asylum Case (n 7) 277-78. 
44 Eg Waldock (n 10) 49-50; Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States, § 102 (1987) Comment d; I M Lobo GH 6RX]D µ7KH 5ROH RI 6WDWH &RQVHQW LQ WKH
&XVWRPDU\3URFHVV¶,&/43; Crawford, %URZQOLH¶V(n 1) 28. 
45 Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law (OUP 2014) 87; Lori F Damrosch and 
others, International Law: Cases and Materials (5th edn, West Academic Publishing 2009) 
102; 3DWULFN 'XPEHUU\ µ,QFRKHUHQW DQG ,QHIIHFWLYH 7KH &RQFHSW RI 3HUVLVWHQW 2EMHFWRU
5HYLVLWHG¶ 59 ICLQ 779, 791-94. 
46 -RQDWKDQ,&KDUQH\µ8QLYHUVDO,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶87 AJIL 529, 538-40 (arguing that 
FRQVLGHULQJWKHSULQFLSOHKDVUDUHO\EHHQLQYRNHGWKHSULQFLSOHLV³RSHQWRVHULRXVGRXEW ´DQG
WKDW³VWDWHSUDFWLFHDQGRWKHUHYLGHQFHGRQRWVXSSRUWWKHH[LVWHQFHRIWKHSHUVLVWHQWobjector 
UXOH ´Antonio Cassese, International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 163 (also arguing that such 
ODFNRISUDFWLFHVXJJHVWV³QRILUPVXSSRUW´DQGWKDW³D6WDWHLVQRWHQWLWOHGWRFODLPWKDWLWLV
not bound by a new customary rule because it consistently opposed it before it ripened into a 
FXVWRPDU\ UXOH ´  6HH DOVR - 3DWULFN .HOO\ µ7KH 7ZLOLJKW RI &XVWRPDU\ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ¶
(2000) 40 Virginia J Intl L 449, 512. 
47  International Law Association, Committee on Formation of Customary (General) 
International Law, µ6WDWHPHQWRI3ULQFLSOHV$SSOLFDEOHWRWKH)RUPDWLRQRI*HQHUDO&XVWRPDU\
,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ¶   <http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/A709CDEB-92D6-
4CFA-A61C4CA30217F376> accessed 20 August 2014; CL Lim and Olufemi Elias, 
µ:LWKGUDZLQJIURP&XVWRm and the Paradox of Consensualism in ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶
Duke J Comp & Intl L 143, 151. 
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existence of the persistent objector principle also point to its 
ineffectiveness and logical inconsistencies, which are most evidently 
reflected in the exceptions to the principle.  One example provided to 
support such an argument is the exception of peremptory norms, which 
renders the application of the principle of persistent objector incoherent.48  
With regard to the exception of peremptory norms, an analogy may be 
drawn to the regime of treaty law.  According to Article 53 of the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, treaties in conflict with 
peremptory norms are void.  In general, States possess the capacity and 
the right to enter into treaty relations on matters of their choice and with 
terms mutually agreed upon with other States.  The fact that this capacity 
and right are subject to norms of a higher hierarchy does not negate the 
fact that States possess them.  Applying the same rationale to the principle 
of persistent objector, the fact that a State cannot invoke the principle 
against a peremptory norm should not be used as ground for denying the 
existence of such a principle. 
Provided that the principle of persistent objector may be invoked to 
preclude the binding force of a customary rule upon the objecting State, 
the fact that States cannot object to a rule once it has obtained customary 
status and that new States cannot opt out of any existing obligations 
arising from a customary norm suggests the principle does not allow 
³VXEVHTXHQWREMHFWRUV´  ,WPD\EHDUJXHGWKDWE\DJUHHLQJWREHFRPHD
part of the community of States, the new State in question has in fact 
consented to be bound by existing customary norms. 49   While it is 
generally agreed that a State cannot withdraw from existing custom, 50 
                                                            
48 Dumberry (n 45) 797-99; Charney (n 46) 541. 
49 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument 
(CUP 2005) 313, n 23 (ultimately concluding that such an argument does not justify the 
continuing binding force of custom on existing States). 
50 See eg Michael P. Scharf, Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change: 
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little justification has been given as to how such a restriction can be 
reconciled with the theory of consent.51  The requirement of timeliness of a 
6WDWH¶VH[SUHVVLRQRIREMHFWLRQ WRDFHUWDLQ UXOHKLQWV WKDW FRQVHQW LVQRW
the sole basis of authority of international custom.   
c. An Alternative Theory: Social Necessity 
As demonstrated above, many writers have indeed questioned the role of 
consent as the basis of authority for international custom, and one 
alternative theory proposed to justify the binding force of custom on 
VXEVHTXHQW REMHFWLQJ 6WDWHV LV WKH QRWLRQ RI ³VRFLDO QHFHVVLW\´ 52   The 
consent of States may recognise a rule after the establishment of such a 
rule, but it does not create it.53  ,WKDVEHHQDUJXHGWKDW³WKH6WDWHVZKLFK 
initiate the practice which is to grow into a rule of customary international 
law act under the influence of an opinio necessitates «DQRSLQLRQWKDWWKH
practice in question is necessary as law, not merely as a matter of 
FRQYHQLHQFH´54  According to this theory, the customary rules are binding 
³EHFDXVH QR VRFLDO OLIH FDQ H[LVWZLWKRXW >WKHP@´55  In other words, if a 
rule is a necessary condition of the international society, such a rule must 
be binding in order to serve its function, irrespective of the consent of 
States. 56   Even new States, which have not played any role in the 
formation of existing customary international law, are automatically bound 
by it.  Thus, these rules exist on the basis of justice and common interest 
and because members of the intHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\FRQVLGHU³RUGHUDQG
                                                                                                                                                            
Recognizing Grotian Moments (CUP 2013) 30. 
51 &XUWLV$%UDGOH\DQG0LWX*XODWL µ:LWKGUDZLQJ IURP,QWHUQDWLRQDO&XVWRP¶ <DOH/-
202, 205. 
52 )LW]PDXULFHµ7KH*HQHUDO3ULQFLSOHV¶Q34) 98. 
53 ibid 98. 
54  H W A Thirlway, International Customary Law and Codification: An Examination of the 
Continuing Role of Custom in the Present Period of Codification of International Law (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 1972) 55. 
55 Koskenniemi (n 49) 169. 
56 )LW]PDXULFHµ7KH*HQHUDO3ULQFLSOHV¶Q34) 39. 
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QRWFKDRVLVWKHJRYHUQLQJSULQFLSOHRIWKHZRUOGLQZKLFKWKH\KDYHWROLYH´
rather than solely on the basis of the will of the States.57   
B. General Principles of Law  
1. Criteria 
Many opinions have been expressed regarding the meaning, characteristics 
DQG IXQFWLRQV RI ³WKH JHQHUDO SULQFLSOHV RI ODZ UHFRJQLVHG E\ FLYLOL]HG
QDWLRQV´UHIHUUHGWRLQ$UWLFOHFRIWKH,&-6WDWXWH7KHUHIHUHQFHWR
³FLYLOL]HG QDWLRQV´ ZDV RULJLQDOO\ WKRXJKW WR EH QHFHVVDU\ LQ RUGHU WR 
exclude certain primitive communities, but it is now generally considered 
redundant, and all States of the international community are deemed 
³FLYLOL]HG´IRUWKHSXUSRVHRIWKLVSURYLVLRQ58  Beyond this, the meaning of 
the term remains disputed, and the ICJ has yet to specifically apply Article 
38(1)(c) in its judgments. 59   Some consider that the term can be 
LQWHUSUHWHGWRLQFOXGH³general principles applicable directly to international 
legal relations, and general principles applicable to legal relations 
gHQHUDOO\´60  Others consider the Article 38(1)(c) principles to be those 
that are common across various domestic legal systems,61 and this can be 
observed in the drafting history of Article 38(3) of the PCIJ Statute, which 
is later repeated in Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute.  As pointed out by 
Lord Phillimore, who co-authored the proposal for Article 38(3) of the PCIJ 
6WDWXWH³WKHJHQHUDOSULQFLSOHVZHUHWKHVHZKLFKZHUHDFFHSWHGE\DOO
                                                            
57 Clapham, %ULHUO\¶V/DZRI1DWLRQV(n 13) 53. 
58  Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals 
(Stevens & Sons Ltd 1953) 25. 
59 0DXULFH 0HQGHOVRQ µ7KH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &RXUW RI -XVWLFH DQG WKH 6RXUFHV RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO
/DZ¶LQ9DXJKDQ/RZHDQG0DOJRVLD)LW]PDXULFH (eds), Fifty Years of the International Court 
of Justice: Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings (CUP 1996) 79; Pellet (n 15) 832 
(observing that of all of the four instances where the Court referred to Article 38(1)(c), its 
application was dismissed by the ICJ); Crawford, %URZQOLH¶V (n 1) 36 (commenting that 
³¶>J@HQHUDOSULQFLSOHV¶QRUPDOO\HQWHUMXGLFLDOUHDVRQLQJZLWKRXWIRUPDOUHIHUHQFHRUODEHO ´ 
60 7KLUOZD\µ7KH6RXUFHVRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶Q1) 105. 
61 Eg Jennings and Watts (eds) (n 1/LQGD-0DNL µ*HQHUDO3ULQFLSOHVRI+XPDQ5LJKWV 
Law Recognized by All Nations: Freedom from $UELWUDU\ $UUHVW DQG 'HWHQWLRQ¶ 
California Western Intl LJ 272, 274-77. 
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nations in foro domestico, such as certain principles of procedure, the 
principle of good faith, and the principle of res judicata HWF´ 62   This 
interpretation was echoed by a number of other drafters of the PCIJ 
Statute.63  It goes without saying that the principles derived from domestic 
legal systems are not imported in toto, but only to the extent applicable to 
inter-State relations.64  Schachter has provided a comprehensive list of 
categories of general principles of law, which seems to encompass the 
different interpretations mentioned above.  These are: 
(1) The principOHV RI PXQLFLSDO ODZ ³UHFRJQL]HG E\ FLYLOL]HG
QDWLRQV´ 
(2) *HQHUDOSULQFLSOHVRIODZ³GHULYHGIURPWKHVSHFLILFQDWXUHRI
WKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\´ 
(3) 3ULQFLSOHV³LQWULQVLF WRWKH LGHDRI ODZDQGEDVLF WRDOO OHJDO
V\VWHPV´ 
(4) 3ULQFLSOHV³YDOLGWKURXJKDOONLQds of societies in relationships 
of hierarchy and co-RUGLQDWLRQ´DQG 
(5) 3ULQFLSOHVRIMXVWLFHIRXQGHGRQWKH³YHU\QDWXUHRIPDQDVD
rational and social being´.65 
As the meaning and characteristics of general principles of international 
law remain disputed, the identification of such principles is a difficult task.   
Although neither the PCIJ nor the ICJ has directly applied this source of 
international law as the basis of their reasoning, some guidance on 
                                                            
62 League of Nations, Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the 
Advisory Committee of Jurists, 16-24 July 1920 (Van Langenhuysen Brothers 1920) 335. 
63 For instance, Mr Albert de Lapradelle ³admitted that the principles which formed the bases 
of national law, were also sources of international law ´LELG.  
64  International Status of South-West Africa (Advisory Opinion) [1950] ICJ Rep 128, 148 
(Separate Opinion by Judge Sir Arnold McNair). 
65  Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
1991) 50; 6FKDFKWHU µ*HQHUDO &RXUVH LQ 3XEOLF ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ¶ Q 24) 75 (footnotes 
omitted). 
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identification of these principles can be found from their jurisprudence.  In 
the Lotus CaseWKH3&,-LQWHUSUHWHGWKHSULQFLSOHVDV³LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZDV
it is applied between all QDWLRQVEHORQJLQJWRWKHFRPPXQLW\RI6WDWHV´66 
and such an interpretation has been suggested to imply that the Court 
adopted the test of universal acceptance in determining whether the 
proposed principles of criminal jurisdiction were in fact principles of 
international law.67  This approach was rejected by Judge Tanaka in the 
,&-¶VSouth West Africa CasesZKHUHKHVWDWHGWKDW³WKe recognition of a 
SULQFLSOHE\ FLYLOL]HGQDWLRQV«GRHVQRWPHDQ UHFRJQLWLRQE\all civilized 
QDWLRQV´68  In order to identify such principles, the Courts have turned to 
evidence in the domestic legal systems of representative States,69 State 
conduct at the regional and international level,70 and previous PCIJ and ICJ 
decisions.71 
2. Basis of Authority 
While general principles of international law encompass rules of a different 
nature, the basis of their authority is associated with the notion of 
³QHFHVVLW\´7he notion is relevant in two aspects. Firstly, when there is an 
absence of regulation under conventional and customary international law 
with regards to a specific issue, it becomes necessary to draw on principles 
common to various municipal legal systems or principles intrinsic to all 
legal systems.  The inclusion of general principles as a source of law is a 
³UHVSRQVH WR WKH QHHG IRU FRPSOHWHQHVV RI WKH ODZ´72 and it has been 
                                                            
66 SS Lotus (n 31) para 37 (emphasis added). 
67 0 &KHULI %DVVLRXQL µ$ )XQFWLRQDO $SSURDFK WR ³*HQHUDO 3ULQFLSOHV RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ´¶
(1989) 11 Michigan J Intl L 768, 788 (concluding that the CouUWDGRSWHGWKHWHVWRI³XQLYHUVDO 
DFFHSWDQFH´LQWKLVLQVWDQFHEXWGLGQRWLQWHQGWRHVWDEOLVKLWDVWKHWHVWIRUDOOFDVHV 
68 South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) [1966] ICJ Rep 6, 299 
(Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka) (emphasis added). 
69 Eg ibid 148-49 (Separate Opinion of Judge McNair). 
70 Eg Asylum Case (n 7) 369 (Dissenting Opinion of M Caicedo Castilla). 
71 Eg SS Lotus (n 31). 
72 Pellet (n 15) 832. 
157 
WHUPHGDV³DQXOWLPDWHVDIHJXDUGDJDLQVWWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIDnon liquet´73 
The ³necessity´ rationale was also acknowledged by some drafters of the 
PCIJ Statute. 74   In the field of human rights, Judge Tanaka, in his 
Dissenting Opinion in the South West Africa FDVHRSLQHGWKDW³WKHFRQFHSW
of human rights and of their protection is included in the general principles 
PHQWLRQHG LQ >$UWLFOH F RI WKH ,&- 6WDWXWH@´ 75   6WUHVVLQJ ³WKHUH
VKRXOG EH QR OHJDO YDFXXP LQ WKH SURWHFWLRQ RI KXPDQ ULJKWV´ -XGJH
Tanaka considered that general principles of international law have a 
natural law character and fill the gaps in the protection offered by positive 
sources of law.76  Also commenting on the gap-filling function of general 
principles of international law, Bassiouni has identified human rights as one 
of the four fields where general principles of international law play a 
particularly important role in response to the increased interdependence of 
the world and the need to adjudicate disputes involving human rights 
issues.77 
Secondly, among the five categories proposed by Schachter, certain 
categories of general principles of international law have been deemed as 
principles necessary for a) the co-existence of States and the operation of 
legal systems;78 DQG E WKH UHVSHFW IRU ³QDWXUDO MXVWLFH´79  The former 
category, principles necessary for the coexistence of States, mostly 
governs the rights and obligations of States.  Examples of such principles 
include pacta sunt servanda and the equality of States.  The latter category 
                                                            
73 Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (CUP 
1982) 166.  See also Akiho Shibata, µThe Court¶s Decision in Silentium on the Sources of 
International Law: Its Enduring Significance¶, in Karine Bannelier, Theodore Christakis, and 
Sarah Heathcote (eds), The ICJ and the Evolution of International Law: The Enduring Impact 
of the Corfu Channel Case (Routledge 2012) 20³WKH µODVW UHVRUW¶ for the Court to avoid a 
non-liquit´ 
74 League of Nations, Advisory Committee of Jurists (n 62) 336. 
75 South West Africa (n 68) 298. 
76 ibid 298-99. 
77 Bassiouni (n 67) 769. 
78 Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (n 65) 53-54. 
79 ibid. 
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relates more to the protection of human rights and includes principles 
necHVVDU\ WRSUHVHUYHWKH³PLQLPDOVWDQGDUGVRIGHFHQF\DQGUHVSHFW IRU
WKH LQGLYLGXDO KXPDQ EHLQJ´ 80   Such principles reflect requirements 
imposed by natural law and apply to all States irrespective of their 
individual will or consent.81 
C. Peremptory Norms 
1. Criteria 
Under general international law, there is a set of rules that represent 
overriding principles and cannot be set aside by treaties: peremptory 
norms, which are also known as jus cogens.82  Although much controversy 
arose within the UN ILC and among States during the drafting process,83 
Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is often 
resorted to for a definition of the term:84  
[A] peremptory norm of general international law is a norm 
accepted and recognized by the international community of 
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent 
norm of general international law having the same character.85 
In its early cases, the ICJ avoided ruling on the identification and the effect 
of peremptory norms.  For instance, in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
                                                            
80 ibid 55. 
81 *HUDOG)LW]PDXULFH µ7KH)XWXUHRI3XEOLF ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZDQGRI WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/HJDO
SystHPLQWKH&LUFXPVWDQFHVRI7RGD\¶,QWO5HODWLRQV-83. 
82 Brownlie, Principles (n 12) 510. 
83 'LQDK6KHOWRQµ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZDQG³5HODWLYH1RUPDWLYLW\´¶LQ(YDQVHGQ1) 144. 
84  Eg Lauri Hennikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law: Historical 
Development, Criteria, Present 6WDWXV)LQQLVK/DZ\HUV¶3XEOLVKLQJ&RPSDQ\-15; 
6WHIDQ.DGHOEDFKµJus Cogens Obligations Erga Omnes and other Rules ± The Identification of 
)XQGDPHQWDO1RUP¶LQ&KULVWLDQ7RPXVFKDWDQG-HDQ-Marc Thouvenin (eds), The Fundamental 
Rules of the International Legal Order: Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2006) 28-29. 
85 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (n 5) art 53. 
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Opinion, the ICJ described certain rules of international humanitarian law 
DVUXOHV³WREHREVHUYHGE\DOO6WDWHVZKHWKHURUQRWWKH\KDYHUDWLILHGWKH
conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible 
SULQFLSOHV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO FXVWRPDU\ ODZ´86 which leaves the question of 
whether these rules are in fact peremptory norms unanswered.  Eventually 
in the 2006 Armed Activities case, the Court explicitly referred to the 
concept of peremptory norms and pronounced that the prohibition against 
genocide was one such norm.87 
The identification of peremptory norms is not an easy task, but it has been 
proposed that the defining feature of such norms is their legal 
consequences.  In other words, peremptory norms are the rules 
categorised by treaties and State practice as absolute in nature.88  The 
absolute character of peremptory norms is reflected in their unconditional 
application, regardless of any external factors, such as reciprocity, 
circumstances precluding wrongfulness under the law of State 
responsibility, or the attitude and motivation of the State in violation.89  
The ILC, when drafting the provision on peremptory norms in the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, decided to not provide examples 
of such norms in order to avoid confusion regarding the status of norms 
not included in the list and to avoid prolonging the study of the law of 
treaties whilst preparing a proper list of examples.90  Nevertheless, in its 
commentary to the draft provision on peremptory norms the ILC stipulated 
                                                            
86 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 
para 79. 
87 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v Rwanda) [2006] ICJ Rep 6, 32. 
88 Kadelbach (n 84) 40. 
89 Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (OUP 2006) 68-69. 
90 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, vol II (n 24) 248. 
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that the following examples had been suggested by its members: the 
prohibitions of the use of force, genocide, slave trading, and piracy.91   
In the field of human rights, guarantees of non-derogable rights, such as 
those provided in Article 4(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 92  have been referred to as examples of peremptory 
norms.93  The fact that the obligations pertaining to such rights cannot be 
suspended even during a state of emergency demonstrates their 
unconditional application.  The relationship between non-derogable rights 
and peremptory norms is also discussed by the Human Rights Committee 
in its General Comment No 29.  According to the Committee, some rights, 
such as those under Articles 11 and 18, are included in Article 4(2) simply 
EHFDXVH ³LW FDQ QHYHU EHFRPH QHFHVVDU\ WR GHURJDWH IURP WKHVH ULJKWV
GXULQJ D VWDWH RI HPHUJHQF\´94 while the inclusion of a number of other 
rights, such as those under Articles 6 and 7, can be considered as 
recognition of their peremptory nature.95 
2. Basis of Authority 
The authority of peremptory norms, which bind all States unconditionally 
irrespective of the will of the States and their attitudes towards it, cannot 
be explained by the theory of consent.  For instance, Article 53 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties demonstrates that despite the 
consent of two or more States to be bound by a treaty, if such a treaty is 
                                                            
91 ibid. 
92 $UWLFOH  SURYLGHV WKH OLVW RI ULJKWV WKDW FDQQRW EH VXVSHQGHG HYHQ ³LQ WLPH RI SXEOLF
emergency which threatens the life of the nDWLRQ .´  The rights include those protected under 
Articles 6, 7, 8(1)(2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 of the ICCPR. 
93  Kadelbach (n 84) 30; Kate Parlett, The Individual in the International Legal System: 
Continuity and Change in International Law (CUP 2011) 326; Erika de Wet, µThe Role of 
Human Rights in Limiting the Enforcement Power of the Security Council: A Principled View¶ in 
Erika de Wet, André Nollkaemper, and Petra Dijkstra (eds), Review of the Security Council by 
Member States (Intersentia 2003) 22-23. 
94  81 +XPDQ 5LJKWV &RPPLWWHH µ*HQHUDO &RPPHQW 1R ¶ LQ µ&RPSLODWLRQ RI *HQHUDO
&RPPHQWVDQG*HQHUDO5HFRPPHQGDWLRQV$GRSWHGE\+XPDQ5LJKWV7UHDW\%RGLHV¶0D\
2008) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) 237, para 11. 
95 ibid. 
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in conflict with peremptory norms, tKH ODWWHU SUHYDLOV GHVSLWH WKH6WDWHV¶
consent.  Rather, the absolute character of peremptory norms stems from 
the prevalence of the interests of the international community as a whole 
over that of individual States.96  These norms are superior and retain the 
highest hierarchy due to the necessity of maintaining international public 
order.  Such an argument finds support in scholarly writings, jurist opinion, 
and the work of the ILC on the law of treaties and the subsequent Vienna 
Conference on the Law of Treaties.   
Firstly, in relation to the limits to freedom of States to enter into treaties, 
NcNair commented WKDW ³,Q HYHU\ FLYLOLVHG FRPPXQLW\ WKHUH DUH VRPH
rules of law and some principles of morality which individuals are not 
permitted by law to ignore RU WR PRGLI\ E\ WKHLU DJUHHPHQWV´97  At the 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOOHYHOWKH³LPSHUDWLYHSURYLVLRQVRIWKHODZRURISXEOLFSROLF\´
are indispensable for an international legal order.98  Such a view is also 
shared by other authors commenting on the basis of the binding force of 
peremptory norms.99  Secondly, Judge Moreno-4XLQWDQD¶VVHSDUDWHRSLQLRQ
LQ WKH ,&-¶V Guardianship of Infants case emphasises the existence of 
FHUWDLQ³JHQHUDOSULQFLSOHVRIWKHODZRIQDWLRQVDQGWKHIXQGDPHQWDOULJKWV
of States, respect for which is indispensable to the legal coexistence of the 
SROLWLFDO XQLWV ZKLFK PDNH XS WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\´ DQG WKHVH
principles are usually peremptory in nature and universal in scope. 100  
Lastly, the reports produced by two ILC Special Rapporteurs on the law of 
treaties, Lauterpacht and Waldock, suggest that Article 53 of the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties originated from the close 
                                                            
96 Orakhelashvili (n 89) 67. 
97 Arnold D McNair, The Law of Treaties (2nd edn, OUP 1961) 213-14. 
98 Orakhelashvili (n 89) 28. 
99 Eg GJH van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of International Law (Kluwer Law and Taxation 
1983) 153-54. 
100 Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of Infants (Netherlands 
v Sweden) [1958] ICJ Rep 55, 106-07. 
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association between peremptory norms and the international legal order, 
as well as from the need to outlaw treaties with illegal objects.101  During 
the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, various statements by State 
representatives echoed the same approach, suggesting that peremptory 
QRUPVDUHGHULYHG IURPSULQFLSOHV³DEVROXWHO\HVVHQWLDO WRFR-existence in 
WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\´102 DQGDUH UXOHV ³HVVHQWLDO WR WKH OLIHRI WKH
LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\´103 
It can be argued that the authority and absolute nature of peremptory 
norms derives from the necessity in preserving the international legal 
order and the common interests of the international community.  Although 
peremptory norms are not the only tool to maintain international public 
order, they embody rules and values that are so fundamental that any 
departure from them must not be admitted.104  Therefore, from the point 
of view of the international community, there is a need to ensure such 
norms are upheld and no derogation is permitted.   
Such a statement is also true when it comes to peremptory norms of 
human rights.  For instance, in Victims of the TuJERDW ¶ GH 0DU]R¶ Y
Cuba, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights stressed the 
peremptory nature of the right to life.  When explaining the nature of 
peremptory norms, the Commission opined that these norms are rules 
DFFHSWHG DV ³QHFHVVDU\ WR SURWHct the public interest of the society of 
                                                            
101  Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1953, vol II (1953) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1953/Add.1, 154-55 (Report by Lauterpacht); Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission, 1963, vol II (1963) UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1963/Add.1, 52 (Report by 
Waldock). 
102 µ6XPPDU\5HFRUGVRIWKH3OHQDU\0HHWLQJVDQGRIWKH0HHWLQgs and of the Meetings of the 
&RPPLWWHH RI WKH :KROH¶ 81 &RQIHUHQFH RQ WKH /DZ RI 7UHDWLHV )LUVW 6HVVLRQ 9LHQQD 
March-24 May 1968) UN Doc A/CONF.39/11, 294 (Statement of Mr Suárez (Mexico) at the 
52nd meeting of the Committee of the Whole). 
103 ibid 296 (Statement of Mr Yasseen (Iraq) at the 52nd meeting of the Committee of the 
Whole). 
104 Orakhelashvili (n 89) 28. 
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QDWLRQVRUWRPDLQWDLQOHYHOVRISXEOLFPRUDOLW\UHFRJQL]HGE\WKHP´105  In 
addition, writers such as Verdross and Brudner also emphasise that 
peremptory norms are considered absolute due to the common interest of 
the international community.106  Furthermore, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the )XUXQGåLMD Case discussed 
the peremptory nature of the prohibition against torture.  The Trial 
Chamber held that the peremptory norm prohibiting torture has an effect 
at both individual and international levels.  At the individual level, torture 
involves criminal liability, and the peremptory characteristic of the 
SURKLELWLRQ OHDGV WR HYHU\ 6WDWH¶V HQWLWOHPHQW WR LQYHVWLJDWH SURVHFXWH
and punish those responsible.107  At the international level, the peremptory 
QDWXUH RI WKH SURKLELWLRQ ³VHUYHV WR LQWHUQDWLRQDOO\ GH-legitimise any 
OHJLVODWLYH DGPLQLVWUDWLYH RU MXGLFLDO DFW DXWKRULVLQJ WRUWXUH´108  Further, 
WKH ³GHWHUUHQW HIIHFW´109 created by such a prohibition also contributes to 
the common interest of the international community in the preservation of 
public morality recognised by all and the maintenance of a system where 
States and other actors peacefully co-exist.  In sum, preserving 
international public order and the common good of the international 
community is crucial in maintaining a functioning international system 
where States and other actors peacefully coexist.  In order to achieve this 
goal, according fundamental human rights norms with a special status that 
is not subject to derogation is necessary for safeguarding the interests of 
the international community as a whole. 
                                                            
105  9LFWLPV RI WKH 7XJERDW ¶ GH 0DU]R¶ Y &XED, Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, Report No 47/96 (16 October 1996) para 79. 
106 Brudner (n 2$OIUHG9HUGURVVµJus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens LQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶ 
(1996) 60 Am J Intl L 55, 58-60.  See also David F. Klein, µA Theory for the Application of the 
Customary International Law of Human Rights by Domestic Courts¶ (1988) 13 Yale J Intl L 
332, 350-53. 
107 3URVHFXWRUY)XUXQGåLMD(Judgment) ICTY-95-17/1-T (10 December 1998) para 156. 
108 ibid para 155. 
109 ibid para 154. 
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III. The Applicability of General International Human Rights Law  
to Non-State Actors 
In this Section, the categorisation of non-State actors follows that of 
Chapter 3.  Yet, whilst NLMs are indeed of a special status in terms of the 
conclusion of international agreements, and therefore merit a distinct 
discussion on their treaty-making capacity, for the purposes of general 
international human rights law, they are often studied under the 
framework of insurgents and armed groups.  Therefore, the present 
section will not address issues concerning NLMs independently. 
Under general international human rights law, the roles of two other 
categories of non-State actors have also been the focus of scholarly 
writings: non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and transnational 
corporations.  In terms of international law in general, NGOs undoubtedly 
play an increasingly important role in the law-making process,110 especially 
through participation in meetings of international institutions111 and even 
through influence over the drafting of international legal instruments.112  In 
the field of human rights law, the role played by NGOs in the law-making 
process has also been highlighted by various authors.113  Nevertheless, 
NGOs are usually not considered to be bearers of human rights obligations 
                                                            
110 Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin, The Making of International Law (OUP 2007) 52-81. 
111 For example, NGOs with UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) consultative status 
may sit as observers at public meetings of the ECOSOC and its subsidiary bodies and, upon 
LQYLWDWLRQ DWWHQG LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRQIHUHQFH FRQYHQHG E\ WKH 81  81 (&262& µ&RQVXOWDWLYH
Relationship between the United Nations and Non-GRYHUQPHQWDO2UJDQL]DWLRQV¶5HV
(25 July 1996) Principles 29 and 42. 
112 Kamminga provides a number of examples of instances where human rights NGOs have 
employed strategies to convince State representatives of the need to adopt treaties on certain 
particular topics.  For instance, the International Commission of Jurists was instrumental 
EHKLQGWKHDGRSWLRQRIWKH$IULFDQ&KDUWHURQ+XPDQDQG3HRSOH¶V5LJKWVDQGWKH(XURSHDQ
&RQYHQWLRQIRUWKH3UHYHQWLRQRI7RUWXUH0HQQR7.DPPLQJDµ7KH(YROYLQJ6WDtus of NGOs 
under International Law: A Threat to the Inter-6WDWH6\VWHP¶LQ Philip Alston (ed), Non-State 
Actors and Human Rights (OUP 2005) 101-05. 
113  Eg ibid 93- ,VDEHOOH 5 *XQQLQJ µ0RGHUQL]LQJ &XVWRPDU\ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ 7KH
Challenge of Human RigKWV¶   9LUJLQLD - ,QWO /  -34; Andrea Bianchi, 
µ*OREDOL]DWLRQRI+XPDQ5LJKWV7KH5ROHRI1RQ-6WDWH$FWRUV¶LQ*XQWKHU7HXEQHUHGGlobal 
Law without a State (Dartmouth 1997) 185-92. 
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or violators of human rights and thus they are not included in the 
discussions in this Section.   
Regarding transnational corporations, while there have been soft law 
instruments dealing with their human rights responsibilities,114 questions 
have been raised as to whether those instruments reflect the formation of 
customary international law, thus becoming ³hard law´. 115   Although it 
might be desirable to impose human rights obligations upon transnational 
corporations, the existing international legal framework does not seem to 
contain such binding obligations.116  Even in the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights, which were endorsed by the Human Rights 
&RXQFLO LQ WKHUHVSRQVLELOLW\RIFRUSRUDWLRQV LVGHHPHGDV³DJOREDO
VWDQGDUGRIH[SHFWHGFRQGXFWIRUDOOEXVLQHVVHQWHUSULVHV´117 rather than as 
³REOLJDWLRQV´118  In his report to the Human Rights Council, the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises clearly stated 
WKDW UHVSHFW IRU KXPDQ ULJKWV LV ³QRW DQ REOLJDWLRQ WKDW FXUUHQW
international human rights law generally imposes directly on 
FRPSDQLHV´119   This position has been since reiterated by the Working 
Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
                                                            
114 (J 81 +XPDQ 5LJKWV &RXQFLO µGuiding Principles on Business and Human Rights¶ LQ UN 
Human Rights Council, µ5HSRUWRIWKH6SHFLDO5HSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKH6HFUHWDU\-General on the 
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises¶ (21 
March 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/31, Annex. 
115  DavLG .LQOH\ DQG -XQNR 7DGDNL µ)URP 7DON WR :DON 7KH (PHUJHQFH RI +XPDQ 5LJKWV
5HVSRQVLELOLWLHVIRU&RUSRUDWLRQVDW,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶44 Virginia J Intl L 931, 952. 
116 *UHJRU\ 7 (XWHQHLHU µ7RZDUGV D &RUSRUDWH ³/DZ RI 1DWLRQV´ 0XOWLQDWLRQDO (QWHUSULVHV¶
&RQWULEXWLRQV WR&XVWRPDU\ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ¶ 7XODQH/5HY.  See also 
Kinley and Tadaki (n 115) 1021. 
117 81 +XPDQ 5LJKWV &RXQFLO µ*XLGLQJ 3ULQFLSOHV RQ %XVLQHVV DQG +XPDQ 5LJKWV¶ Q 114) 
Commentary to Principle 11; UN Human Rights Council Res 17/4 (6 July 2011) UN Doc 
A/HRC/RES/17/4, para 1. 
118 Rae Lindsay and others, µ+XPDQ5LJKWV5HVSRQVLELOLWLHVLQWKH2LODQG*DV6HFWRU$SSO\LQJ
WKH81*XLGLQJ3ULQFLSOHV¶ (2013) 6 J World Energy L & Business 2, 11. 
119 UN Human Rights Council, µ5HSRUWRIWKH6SHFLDO5HSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKH6HFUHWDU\-General 
on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises¶
(9 April 2010) UN Doc A/HRC/14/27, para 55. 
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other business enterprises.120  As the aim of this Section is to explore the 
applicability of general international human rights law to non-State actors, 
transnational corporations are not one of the actors considered in this 
Section. 
Although there have been concerns regarding acknowledging the 
applicability of general international human rights law to non-State actors 
(mostly due to the fear of legitimising such actors), practice and writings 
introduced below demonstrate the tendency to acknowledge their 
obligations under general international human rights law.121 
A. International Organisations 
Considering that international organisations are established by States, the 
binding force of general international human rights law upon the former 
might stem from the basis that States cannot evade their obligations by 
acting in the name of an international organisation.122  While this may be 
the logical inference from the perspective of the formation of international 
organisations, in view of the diverse purposes, natures, functions, and 
structures of international organisations, every act of an international 
organisation cannot be considered as an act of all member States 
collectively and therefore governed by rules of general international human 
rights law binding upon States.123  For instance, it has been argued that 
given the power and mandate provided by Chapter VII of the Charter of 
the UN to the Security Council, when the Security Council acts under this 
&KDSWHU LWZRXOG QRW EH ERXQG E\ ³REOLJDWLRQV DULVLQJ IURP WUHDWLHV DQG
                                                            
120 µ5HSRUWRIWKHWorking Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and other Business Enterprises¶$XJXVW UN Doc A/68/279, para 19. 
121 Discussions of similar concerns in the context of international human rights treaties can be 
found in Chapter 3, Section B. 
122 Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (OUP 2006) 109. 
123 6HH (ULF 'H %UDEDQGHUH µ+XPDQ 5LJKWV $FFRXQWDELOLW\ RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO $GPLQLVWUDWLRQV
7KHRU\DQG3UDFWLFHLQ(DVW7LPRU¶LQJan Wouters and others (eds), Accountability for Human 
Rights Violations by International Organisations (Intersentia 2010) 338. 
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RWKHUVRXUFHVRI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´124  Further, it is generally agreed that 
the precise scope of international rights and obligations varies from one 
organisation to another.125  Therefore, other bases need to be provided in 
order to determine whether and to what extent an international 
organisation is bound by general international human rights law. 
With regard to the UN, Mégret and Hoffmann propose three possible 
foundations for the applicability of human rights standards;126 two of which 
may be relevant to general international human rights law.127  Firstly, they 
argue that the UN may be bound by such norms due to its status as a 
subject of international law. 128   7KLV DSSURDFK WHUPHG ³H[WHUQDO
FRQFHSWLRQ´VHHPVWR ILQGVXSSRUW LQ WKHRSLQLRQRI-XGJH)LW]PDXULFH LQ
the Namibia Advisory Opinion of the ICJ, which suggests that the Security 
Council is subject to well-HVWDEOLVKHGSULQFLSOHVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZDV³WKH
8QLWHG 1DWLRQV LV LWVHOI D VXEMHFW RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´ 129   7KH ,&-¶V
Interpretation of the Agreement of March 25, 1951 between the WHO and 
Egypt Advisory Opinion provides a simiODU DUJXPHQW ³,QWHUQDWLRQDO
organizations are subjects of international law and, as such, are bound by 
any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international 
ODZ´130  Both opinions suggest that the UN is bound by rules generally 
                                                            
124  Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental 
Problems, with Supplement (London Institute of World Affairs 1964) 295. 
125 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) 
[1949] ICJ Rep 174, 178 (Reparation Advisory Opinion).  See also Jan Wouters and others, 
µ$FFRXQWDELOLW\ IRU +XPDQ 5LJKWV 9LRODWLRQV E\ International Organisations: Introductory 
5HPDUNV¶LQ:RXWHUVDQGRWKHUVHGV (n 123) 7. 
126  )UpGpULF 0pJUHW DQG )ORULDQ +RIIPDQQ µ7KH 81 DV D +XPDQ 5LJKWV 9LRODWRU" 6RPH
Reflections on the United Nations ChangLQJ+XPDQ5LJKWV5HVSRQVLELOLWLHV¶+XPDQ
Rights Q 314, 316-18. 
127  7KH WKLUG IRXQGDWLRQ LV WKH ³K\EULG´ FRQFHSWLRQ DFFRUGLQJ WR ZKLFK WKH KXPDQ ULJKWV
REOLJDWLRQV RI WKH 81 PD\ UHVXOW IURP ³IXQFWLRQDO WUHDW\ VXFFHVVLRQ E\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO
organisatioQV WR WKH SRVLWLRQ RI WKHLU PHPEHU 6WDWHV´ TXRWLQJ $XJXVW 5HLQLVFK µ7KH
$FFRXQWDELOLW\RI,QWHUQDWLRQDO2UJDQL]DWLRQV¶*OREDO*RYHUQDQFH$VWKLV
approach specifically refers to treaty obligations, it is beyond the scope of discussion in the 
present section. 
128 6HHDOVR:RXWHUVDQGRWKHUVµ,QWURGXFWRU\5HPDUNV¶Q125) 6-7. 
129  Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 16, 294 (Dissenting Opinion of Judges Fitzmaurice). 
130 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt (Advisory 
Opinion) [1980] ICJ Rep 73, 89-90. 
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applicable to all subjects of international law.  However, some writers 
consider that status as an international legal person is the consequence, 
not the basis, of the possession of rights and obligations.131  The notion of 
³OHJDOSHUVRQV´RU³VXEMHFWV´ZLWKLQDJLven legal system often entails that 
those entities have the capacity to enjoy rights and bear duties.132  The 
possession of legal personality has been considered by some as the 
threshold for an entity in a legal system to perform legal acts. 133   In 
contrast, a second school considers that if an entity has rights and duties, 
it has legal personality.134  Moreover, it has been generally agreed that not 
all international legal persons possess the same capacities, rights, and 
obligations. 135   Thus, the first proposed bDVLV ³H[WHUQDO FRQFHSWLRQ´
cannot satisfactorily explain why the international legal personality of 
international organisations automatically entails obligations under general 
international human rights law. 
0pJUHW DQG +RIIPDQQ¶V VHFRQG SURSRVLWLRQ LV WKH ³LQWHUQDO FRQFHSWLRQ´
which emphasises that since the UN Charter includes the promotion of 
KXPDQULJKWVDVRQHRIWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VSXUSRVHVWKH81LV³REOLJDWHGWR
SXUVXHDQGWU\WRUHDOL]HLWVRZQSXUSRVH´136  A similar argument has been 
applied to the European Union (EU).  As Article 6(3) of the Treaty on 
(XURSHDQ 8QLRQ VWLSXODWHV WKDW ³[f]undamental rights, as guaranteed by 
the [European Convention on Human Rights] and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, constitute general 
                                                            
131  016 6HOOHUV µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /HJDO 3HUVRQDOLW\¶   ,XV *HQWLXP   &Oaudia 
Kissling, µThe Legal Status of NGOs in International Governance and Its Relevance for the 
Legitimacy of International Organizations¶ 2006) University of Bremen TranState Working 
Paper No 38, 7-8 <http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/24951/1/514650192.PDF> accessed 
20 August 2014. 
132 Shaw (n 1) 195. 
133 -DQ.ODEEHUVµ7KH&RQFHSWRI/HJDO3HUVRQDOLW\¶,XV*HQWLXP49-56. 
134 Sellers (n 131) 74; Kissling (n 131) 7-8. 
135 '32¶&RQQHOOInternational Law, vol 1 (2nd edn, Stevens & Sons Ltd 1970) 82. 
136 =HQRQ6WDYULQLGHVµ+XPDQ5LJKWV2EOLJDWLRQVXQGHUWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV&KDUWHU¶
Intl J Human Rights 38, 40. 
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SULQFLSOHVRI WKH8QLRQ¶V ODZ´137 some have argued that such a provision 
creates binding obligations for EU organs.138  However, it is unclear why 
such a pronouncement in the constituent instrument of an international 
organisation is sufficient to create binding obligations for the organisation 
DVDPDWWHURIJHQHUDO LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ :KLOH WKH ³LQWHUQDO FRQFHSWLRQ´
does not fully justify the applicability of general international human rights 
ODZWRWKH81WKH³D[LRPDWLFDSSURDFK´SURSRVHG by Clapham might serve 
WRVXSSOHPHQWWKLVDUJXPHQW&ODSKDP¶VDSSURDFKSODFHVHPSKDVLVRQWKH
repeated practice at various levels within the UN affirming that UN 
personnel should protect and respect human rights.139  In other words, it is 
not only the constituent instrument, but also the subsequent practice 
carried out within the framework of the instrument that serve as evidence 
RI WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V XQLODWHUDO GHFODUDWLRQ WR EH ERXQG E\ KXPDQ ULJKWV
standards and thus create binding international legal obligations.140  Also, 
as the UN consistently calls for the respect of human rights norms by 
States and other actors, it should acknowledge the applicability of such 
norms to its own activities. 141   This of course does not lead to the 
conclusion that all international organisations are bound by general 
international human rights law.  The use of the UN as an example here 
demonstrates the theories concerning international organisations in this 
                                                            
137  Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) art 6(3).  See also Nold v Commission 
[1974] ECR 491, 507. 
138 Lars Bondo Krogsgaard, µFundamental Rights in the European Community After Maastricht¶
(1993) 1 Legal Issues of European Integration 99, 108. 
139 Clapham, Human Rights Obligations (n 122) 127. 
140  Under international law, unilateral declarations made by States can sometimes be 
considered to create binding legal obligations.  (Nuclear Tests (Australia v France) [1974] ICJ 
Rep 253, para 43.)  While the legal effect of unilateral declarations by non-State actors 
remains unclear, the ILC appears to have endorsed the linkage between the capacity of States 
to issue unilateral declarations creating binding legal obligations and their treaty-making 
FDSDFLW\  %DVHG RQ WKH ,/&¶V UDWLRQDOH ,/& µ*XLGLQJ 3ULQFLSOHV $SSOLFDEOH WR 8QLODWHUDO
Declarations of States Capable of Creating Legal Obligations, with Commentaries thereto¶
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2006, vol II(2) (2006) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/SER.A/2006/Add.1 (Part 2) 371), if a subject of international law, such as an 
international organization, possesses the capacity to enter into treaty relations and profess its 
intention to be bound through means of bilateral or multilateral agreements, it can do so 
through unilateral declarations.  
141 Reinisch (n 127) 137. 
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regard and, just as the case of the UN, the nature, purposes and functions 
RIDQLQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQLVDWLRQGHWHUPLQHWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VSRVVHVVLRQRI
obligations under general international human rights law and the extent of 
such obligations.   
B. Armed Groups142 
Traditionally, in terms of armed groups recognised as insurgents or 
belligerents, the possession and extent of rights and obligations of such 
groups was determined in accordance with the recognition they received 
from the relevant States.143  Yet, under modern rules of international law, 
once the situation warrants the application of humanitarian law, non-State 
armed groups who are parties to the conflict are bound, as a matter of 
international law, by relevant rules of human rights and humanitarian 
norms, irrespective of their international legal status and whether the 
parties acknowledge the existence of an armed conflict.144  Tomuschat has 
suggested that, the grounds for applying international humanitarian law to 
non-State parties to an armed conflict can be adduced to support the 
applicability of international human rights law.145  Individuals, instead of 
abstract warring parties, are the ones most adversely affected by the 
armed conflicts.  Therefore, the paramount humanitarian consideration 
requires obedience to international human rights and humanitarian law by 
all parties.  Moreover, in situations of non-international armed conflicts, 
governments and the opposition armed groups may in fact share many 
                                                            
142  7KH WHUPV ³DUPHG JURXSV ´ ³QRQ-6WDWH DUPHG JURXSV ´ DQG ³QRQ-State parties [to an 
DUPHGFRQIOLFW@´DUHXVHGLQWHUFKDQJHDEO\KHUH. 
143 Clapham, Human Rights Obligations (n 122) 271. 
144  6HH HJ ,QVWLWXWH RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ µ5HVROXWLRQ ³7KH $SSOLFDWLRQ RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO
Humanitarian Law and Fundamental Human Rights, in Armed Conflicts in Which Non-State 
(QWLWLHVDUH3DUWLHV´¶$XJXVW para II <http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1999_ 
ber_03_en.PDF> accessed 20 August 2014. 
145 &KULVWLDQ7RPXVFKDW µ7KH$SSOLFDELOLW\RI+XPDQ5LJKWV/DZ WR ,QVXUJHQW0RYHPHQWV¶ LQ
Horst Fischer and others (eds), Crisis Management and Humanitarian Protection (BWV - 
Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag 2004) 576. 
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similar characteristics and should thus be subject to similar standards.  For 
instance, the Guatemalan Commission on Historical Clarification applied 
principles common to international human rights and humanitarian law to 
ERWKWKHJXHUULOODIRUFHVDQGWKH*XDWHPDODQJRYHUQPHQW³ZLWKDYLHZWR
JLYLQJHTXDOWUHDWPHQWWRWKH3DUWLHV´146 
In terms of the responses of various UN organs to conflict situations 
involving non-State armed groups, practice has seen condemnation of 
violations of both human rights and humanitarian law by States and non-
State warring parties, as well as calls for respect for or compliance with 
both bodies of norms.  For instance, in its first resolution on the topic of 
SURWHFWLRQRIFLYLOLDQVLQDUPHGFRQIOLFWWKH6HFXULW\&RXQFLO³>X@UJH>G@DOO
parties concerned to comply strictly with their obligations under 
international humanitarian, human rights and refugee ODZ´ 147   Similar 
statements regarding human rights and humanitarian law can also be seen 
in Security Council resolutions 1564 (Sudan),148  1814 (Somalia),149  and 
1894 (protection of civilians).150  Various resolutions adopted by the former 
UN Commission on Human Rights and the current Human Rights Council 
also adopt similar approaches.151  The fact that many of these resolutions 
DGRSWWHUPLQRORJ\VXFKDV³FDOOVXSRQ´RU³XUJHV´PLJKWEHLQWHUSUHWHGDV
political statements rather than legal pronouncements.  Yet Tomuschat 
points out that although decisions taken by the Security Council under 
                                                            
146 ibid (citing Informe de la Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, Guatemala Memoria 
del Silencio, vol I, Guatemala (1999) 46).  A similar reference to the Guatemalan 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶V UHSRUW FDQ EH IRXQG LQ Tomás Lares Cipreano v Guatemala (Merits) Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, Report No 69/106 (21 October 2006) n 19. 
147 UNSC Res 1265 (17 September 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1265, para 4. 
148  Security Council Resolution 1564, UN Doc S/RES/1564 (1999).  (The Security Council 
³>V@WUHVV>HG@WKDWthe Sudanese rebel groups, particularly the Justice and Equality Movement 
and the Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement, must also take all necessary steps to respect 
international humanitarian and human rights law ´) 
149 UNSC Res 1814 (15 May 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1814, para 16.  (The Security Council 
³>F@ondemn[ed] all and any violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, 
calls upon all parties in Somalia to respectfully their obligations in this regard « ´ 
150 UNSC Res 1894 (11 November 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1894, para 1. (The Security Council 
³>G@emand[ed] that parties to armed conflict comply strictly with the obligations applicable to 
them under international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law ´ 
151 Eg UNCHR Res S-3/1 (25 May 1994) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/S-3/1, para 1. 
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Article 39 of the UN Charter usually adopt mandatory terminology, for 
LQVWDQFH ³GHFLGHV´ VLQFH WKH DERYHPHQWLRQHG UHVROXWLRQV DUH PHDQW WR
draw attention to the existing international legal order, not to create new 
obligations, it is unnecessary to adopt mandatory language.152  
The applicability of human rights norms to non-State armed groups is 
further explored by UN special procedure mandate holders.  When 
introducing the international legal framework governing the use of lethal 
force by the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, the Special Rapporteur 
RQH[WUDMXGLFLDO VXPPDU\RUDUELWUDU\H[HFXWLRQVZURWH³$VDQRQ-State 
DFWRU WKH /77( « UHPDLQV VXEMHFW WR WKH GHPDQG RI WKH LQWHUnational 
community, first expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
WKDW HYHU\ RUJDQ RI VRFLHW\ UHVSHFW DQG SURPRWH KXPDQ ULJKWV´153  The 
same Special Rapporteur in an earlier report identified activities of armed 
JURXSVWKDW³H[HUFLVHVLJQLILcant control over territory and population and 
KDYHDQLGHQWLILDEOHSROLWLFDOVWUXFWXUH´DVGHVLUDEOHWDUJHWVWREHDGGUHVVHG
³ZLWKLQVRPHSDUWRIWKHKXPDQULJKWVHTXDWLRQ´154  The abovementioned 
arguments were later applied in the report by four mandate holders 
following their joint mission to Lebanon and Israel in 2006.  They called on 
Hezbollah, a non-State armed group, to respect human rights norms.155  In 
a relatively recent publication by the UN Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, the element of control over territory and population was 
                                                            
152 Tomuschat (n 145) 585-86. 
153  81&+5 µ5HSRUW RI WKH 6SHFLDO 5DSSRUWHXU RQ ([WUDMXGLFLDO 6XPPary or Arbitrary 
([HFXWLRQV0LVVLRQWR6UL/DQND¶0DUFK81'RF(&1$GGSDUD. 
154  81&+5 µ5HSRUW RI WKH 6SHFLDO 5DSSRUWHXU RQ ([WUDMXGLFLDO 6XPPDU\ RU $UELWUDU\
([HFXWLRQV¶'HFHPEHU81'RF(&1SDUD. 
155 UN HuPDQ5LJKWV&RXQFLOµ5HSRUWRIWKH6SHFLDO5DSSRUWHXURQ([WUDMXGLFLDO6XPPDU\RU
Arbitrary Executions, the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the 
Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, the Representative of the 
Secretary-General on Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, and the Special 
Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of 
/LYLQJ0LVVLRQWR/HEDQRQDQG,VUDHO¶2FWREHU81'RF$+5&SDUD. 
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again emphasised as a relevant factor in determining the application of 
human rights norms to non-State actors involving in armed conflicts.156   
Lastly in the context of the UN, commissions of inquiry and fact-finding 
missions established to investigate and report on serious violations of 
human rights and humanitarian law also contribute to affirming the human 
rights obligations of non-State armed groups.  Such findings can be 
observed in the reports of the commissions of inquiry on, for instance, 
Sudan, Libya,157 and Syria.158  In particular, in the report submitted by the 
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, the Commission established 
that the two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and the 
-XVWLFH DQG (TXDOLW\ 0RYHPHQW ³KDYH UHDFKHG D FHUWDLQ WKUHVKROG RI
organization, stability and effective control of territory, possess 
international legal personality and are therefore bound by the relevant 
rules of customary international law on internal armed confliFWV´159 and 
WKHVH UXOHV LQFOXGH ³fundamental human rights principles with regard to 
LQWHUQDODUPHGFRQIOLFWV´160  Also, the International Commission of Inquiry 
established to investigate the alleged human rights violations in Libya 
reported that ³LW LV LQFUHDVLQJO\ DFFHSWHG WKDW ZKHUH QRQ-state groups 
exercise de facto control over territory, they must respect fundamental 
KXPDQULJKWVRISHUVRQVLQWKDWWHUULWRU\´161  In this connection it has been 
argued that if a rebel group seeks to become the legitimate government of 
                                                            
156 812+&+5µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/HJDO3URWHFWLRQRI+XPDQ5LJKWVLQ$UPHG&RQIOLFW¶81
Sales No E.11.XIV.3, 25. 
157  81 +XPDQ 5LJKWV &RXQFLO µ5HSRUW RI WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &RPPLVVLRQ RI ,QTXLU\ WR
Investigate All Alleged Violations of International Human Rights Law in the Libyan Arab 
-DPDKLUL\D¶-XQH81'RF$+5&SDUD 
158 81+XPDQ5LJKWV&RXQFLOµ5HSRUWRIWKH,QGHSHQGHQW,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RPPLVVLRQRI,QTXLU\
RQ WKH 6\ULDQ $UDE 5HSXEOLF¶  )HEUXDU\  81 'RF $+5& SDUDV   UN 
+XPDQ5LJKWV&RXQFLOµ5HSRUWRIWKH,QGHSHQGHQW,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RPPLVVLRQRI,QTXLU\RQWKH
6\ULDQ$UDE5HSXEOLF¶-XQH81'RF$+5&SDUDV 
159 µ5HSRUWRIWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RPPLVVLRQRI,QTXLU\RQ'DUIXU3XUVXDQWWR6HFXULW\&ouncil 
5HVROXWLRQ  RI  6HSWHPEHU ¶ (25 January 2005) para 172 <http://www.un.org/ 
news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf> accessed 20 August 2014. 
160 ibid para 165. 
161 81+XPDQ5LJKWV&RXQFLOµ5HSRUWRIWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RPPLVVLRQRI,QTXLU\RQ/LE\D¶(n 
157) para 72. 
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the territory concerned, there is a requirement of the international 
community that such groups respect the rules and obligations applicable to 
DOO6WDWHV³LQWKHLQWHUHVWRIDFLYLOL]HGVWDWHRIDIIDLUVDPRQJQDWLRQV´162 
As demonstrated above, the discussions regarding the human rights 
obligations of non-State armed groups often relate to situations of armed 
conflicts.  While there is no doubt that the rules governing armed conflicts 
overlap with certain fundamental human rights norms, whether non-State 
armed groups are bound by general international human rights norms, 
independently from the application of international humanitarian norms, 
remains to be explored.  In this regard, the two following opinions are of 
relevance.   
The ICTY in the ýHOHELüLcase specified the relevance of human rights law in 
the context of an armed conflict by elaborating on the nature of the rules 
codified in Common Article 3.  The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY reaffirmed 
the customary status of rules in Common Article 3, reiterated their 
applicability to both international and non-international armed conflicts, 
DQGRSLQHG WKDWERWKKXPDQ ULJKWVDQGKXPDQLWDULDQ ODZVKDUH ³FRQFHUQ
for human dignity, which forms the basis of a list of fundamental minimum 
standDUGV RI KXPDQLW\´163  It held that in relation to human rights law, 
non-derogable rights are of particular significance when determining the 
VFRSH RI IXQGDPHQWDO VWDQGDUGV ³DSSOLFDEOH DW DOO WLPHV LQ DOO
FLUFXPVWDQFHVDQGWRDOOSDUWLHV´164  This reasoning suggests that rules of 
general international human rights law forming minimum standards of 
humanity are binding upon non-State parties to an armed conflict. 
                                                            
162 Tomuschat (n 145) 587. 
163 ProsecXWRUY0XFLüHWDO(Judgment) ICTY-96-21-A (20 February 2001) paras 143, 147-49. 
164 ibid para 149. 
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Also, the Institute of International Law, in its resolution on the application 
of international humanitarian law and fundamental human rights in armed 
conflicts in which non-State entities are parties, has stated that the law 
DSSOLFDEOH WR VXFK FRQIOLFWV LQFOXGH ³WKH SULQFLSOHV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ
µGHULYHG IURP HVWDEOLVKHG FXVWRP IURP WKH SULQFLSOHV Rf humanity and 
IURPGLFWDWHVRISXEOLFFRQVFLHQFH¶´165  Even in situations not amounting to 
an armed conflict, such as internal disturbances, the Institute has adopted 
WKH SRVLWLRQ WKDW ³>D@OO SDUWLHV DUH ERXQG WR UHVSHFW IXQGDPHQWDO KXPDQ
rights under the VFUXWLQ\ RI WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\´ 166   Such a 
position suggests that fundamental human rights norms apply to non-State 
armed groups outside the framework of international humanitarian norms.  
It has even been argueGWKDW³a customary rule has emerged that extends 
human rights obligations to [armed opposition groups] in control of 
territory´167 
C. Entities Created to Administer Territories 
Entities established for the purpose of administering or supervising certain 
territories are often created under the auspices of international 
organisations, 168  whose obligations under general international human 
rights law need to be ascertained in light of their nature, purpose and 
activities.169  It has been argued that where an international organisation 
creates entities that undertake functions originally performed by the 
government of a State, the exercise of public authority and administrative 
                                                            
165 Institute of International Law (n 144) para IV. 
166 Eg ibid para X. 
167  Aristotle Constantinides, µHuman Rights Obligations and Accountability of Armed 
Opposition Groups: The Practice of the UN Security Council¶  4 Human Rights & Intl 
Legal Discourse 89, 102-03. 
168 Lissitzyn (n 70) 7. 
169 Carla Bongiorno, µA Culture of Impunity: Applying International Human Rights Law to the 
United Nations in East Timor¶ (2002) 33 Columbia Human Rights L Rev 623, 643-44. 
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activities under such circumstances should be bound by general 
international human rights law.170   
With regards to the actual practice, Regulation 1999/01 of the UN 
7UDQVLWLRQDO $XWKRULW\ LQ (DVW 7LPRU VWDWHV WKDW ³>L@Q H[HUFLVLQJ WKHLU
functions, all persons undertaking public duties or holding public office in 
East Timor shall observe internationally recognized human rights 
standarGV´ HVSHFLDOO\ WKRVH UHIOHFWHG LQ WKH 8QLYHUVDO 'HFODUDWLRQ RQ
Human Rights and core international human rights treaties. 171  While the 
practice of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK), on the other hand, suggests that treaty obligations binding upon 
Serbia were not considered by UNMIK as automatically applicable to it,172 it 
has been argued that such a view does not deny the applicability of 
customary human rights law.173  Alternatively, it has been proposed that 
since officials working for an entity created to administer a territory are 
DFWLQJ DV ³DJHQWV´ RI WKH 6WDWH WR ZKRP WKH WHUULWRU\ EHORQJV WR UXOHV
applicable to States must therefore be complied with by that entity.174 
IV. The Applicability of General International Human Rights Law  
to Unrecognised Entities 
As demonstrated in the discussion in the previous sections, the application 
of general international human rights law is no longer limited to States.  
Practice acknowledging the applicability of general international human 
rights law to unrecognised entities can also be found.  This Section 
                                                            
170 De Brabandere (n 123) 338. 
171 Regulation 1999/1 on the Authority of the Transitional Administration in East Timor, UN 
Doc UNTAET/REG/1991/1 (27 November 1999) Section 2. 
172 Report Submitted by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo to the 
Human Rights Committee on the Human Rights Situation in Kosovo Since June 1999, UN Doc 
CCOR/C/UNK/1 (13 March 2006) paras 123-24. 
173 De Brabandere (n 123) 339. 
174 5DOSK :LOGH µ7KH &RPSOH[ 5ROH RI WKH /HJDO $GYLVHU :KHQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 2UJDQL]DWLRQV
$GPLQLVWHU7HUULWRU\¶$P6RF¶\,QWO/3URFHHGLQJV 
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introduces some further examples of such practice and then seeks to 
provide a theoretical basis to justify why unrecognised entities should be 
bound by general international human rights law.   
A. Practice Acknowledging the Applicability of General International 
Human Rights Law to Unrecognised Entities 
Practice at the national and international levels has seen acknowledgement 
of general human rights obligations in the case of certain unrecognised 
entities.  In 1995, two citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina alleged to be victims 
of human rights violations by the military forces of the self-proclaimed 
5HSXEOLFRI6USVNDOHGE\.DUDGåLüEURXJKWWKHLUFODLPVEHIRUH86FRXUWV
As the case was brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act, the issue of 
whether the Republic of Srpska was a State emerged.  The District Court 
considered that since the military faction that carried out the human rights 
DWURFLWLHV LQ TXHVWLRQ ³>GLG@ QRW FRQVWLWXWH D UHFRJQLVHG 6WDWH´ DQG WKH
acts committed by non-6WDWHDFWRUV³>GLG@QRWYLRODWHWKHODZRIQDWLRQV´
WKH\ ³>FRXOG QRW@ EH UHPHGLHG WKURXJK >WKH $OLHQ 7RUW &ODLPV $FW@ 175  
However, the US Court of Appeals Second Circuit took a different view.  It 
was argued that, despite the lack of recognition, the Republic of Srpska in 
fact fulfilled the definition of State, with control over defined territory and 
populations within its power and conclusions of agreements with other 
governments.  The Court considered that it would be anomalous if non-
UHFRJQLWLRQ ³KDG WKH SHUYHUVH HIIHFW RI VKLHOGLQJ RIILFLDOV RI WKH
unrecognized regime from liability for those violations of international law 
QRUPV WKDW DSSO\ RQO\ WR VWDWH DFWRUV´ DQG IRXQG WKDW ³>W@KH FXVWRPDU\
international law of human ULJKWV « DSSOLHV WR VWDWHV ZLWKRXW GLVWLQFWLRQ
                                                            
175 'RHY.DUDGåLü, 866 F Supp. 734, 739-41 (SDNY 1994). 
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EHWZHHQ UHFRJQL]HG DQG XQUHFRJQL]HG VWDWHV´ 176   Such a conclusion 
supports the argument that, the Republic of Srpska, although not 
recognised as a State, was in fact bound by customary international 
human rights law. 
At the international level, a number of reports or statements issued by 
various human rights mandate holders of the UN touch upon the issue of 
the applicability of general international human rights law to certain 
unrecognised entities.  While some merely adopt the language of human 
rights in their reports, others explicitly adopt terminology suggesting 
binding obligations.  In terms of the former, the view taken by the Special 
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions regarding the 
LTTE in Sri Lanka can serve as an example.  In addition to being an armed 
group, the LTTE also at one point fulfilled the criteria of unrecognised 
entities provided in Chapter 2,177 and the Special Rapporteur opined that 
the LTTE ³UHPDLQ>HG@ VXEMHFW WR WKe demand of the international 
FRPPXQLW\ « WKDW HYHU\ RUJDQ RI VRFLHW\ UHVSHFW DQG SURPRWH KXPDQ
ULJKWV´178 DQGDUH GHVLUDEOH WDUJHWV WR EH DGGUHVVHG ³ZLWKLQ VRPHSDUW RI
WKHKXPDQULJKWVHTXDWLRQ´179   
Other reports have chosen to employ strong language implying obligations.  
For instance, in 2005, the Special Rapporteurs on the right to health and 
on the right to adequate housing received information concerning the 
imminent eviction of residents in a sanatorium for leprosy patients in 
Taiwan.  In their statement urging respect for human rights of individuals 
DIIHFWHG E\ OHSURV\ WKH\ ³UHPLQG>HG@ WKH DXWKRULWLHV RI WKHLU REOLJDWLRQV
                                                            
176 .DGLüY.DUDGåLü, 70 F3d 232, 245 (2d Cir 1995).  
177 For a discussion on the criteria of unrecognised entities in the context of the LTTE, see 
Chapter 2, Section III.B. 
178  81&+5 µ5HSRUW RI WKH 6SHFLDO 5DSSRUWHXU RQ ([WUDMXGLFLDO 6XPPDU\ RU $UELWUDU\
([HFXWLRQV0LVVLRQWR6UL/DQND¶Q153) para 25. 
179  81&+5 µ5HSRUW RI WKH 6SHFLDO 5DSSRUWHXU RQ ([WUDMXGLFLDO 6XPPDU\ Rr Arbitrary 
([HFXWLRQV¶Q154) para 76. 
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XQGHU LQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQULJKWV ODZ´180  In a more recent report on the 
LTTE, the UN Secretary-*HQHUDO¶V3DQHORI([SHUWVRQ$FFRXntability in Sri 
Lanka commented that 
although non-state actors cannot formally become party to a 
human rights treaty, it is now increasingly accepted that non-
state groups exercising de facto control over a party of a 
6WDWH¶V WHUULWRU\ PXVW UHVSHFW IXQGDPental human rights of 
persons in that territory.  Various organs of the United Nations, 
including the Security Council, have repeatedly demanded that 
such actors respect human rights law.  Although the Panel 
recognizes that there remains some difference of views on the 
subject among international actors, it proceeds on the 
assumption that, at a minimum, the LTTE was bound to respect 
the most basic human rights of the person, and freedom from 
torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and 
punishment.181 
More recently in 2012, the Senior Expert on Human Rights in Transnistria 
undertook three missions to the region.  Transnistria is a region in the 
Republic of Moldova that is controlled by de facto authorities but not 
considered by the international community to be an independent State.  In 
his report after his missions, the UN expert wrote that the de facto 
authorities governing the Transnistrian Region, although not recognised as 
                                                            
180 812+&+5 µ81([SHUWV([SUHVV&RQFHUQRYHU,PPLQHQW(YLFWLRQRI7DLZDQHVH5HVLGHQWV
in Lo-6KHQJ 6DQDWRULXP¶ (20 July 2005) <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/ 
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=3329&LangID=E> accessed 20 August 2014. 
181 µReport of the Secretary-*HQHUDO¶V 3DQHO RI ([SHUWV RQ $FFRXQWDELOLW\ LQ 6UL /DQND¶ (31 
March 2011) para 188 <http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full. 
pdf> accessed 20 August 2014. 
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D6WDWHVKRXOGEHERXQGE\³FXVWRPDU\LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZREOLJDWLQJ>WKHP@
tRXSKROGWKHPRVWIXQGDPHQWDOKXPDQULJKWVQRUPV´182   
As the abovementioned practice suggests that unrecognised entities may 
be bound by general international human rights law, the discussion below 
aims to provide a theoretical basis for this practice by drawing upon the 
discussions in previous sections on the nature and authority of general 
international human rights law and on the applicability of general 
international human rights law to non-State actors. 
B. Basis of the Applicability of General International Human Rights Law to 
Unrecognised Entities: Necessity 
As introduced in the previous chapter, the notion of necessity, or the 
³QHHGV RI WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\´183 was invoked by the ICJ in its 
1949 Reparation Advisory Opinion to determine the nature, capacities, 
rights, and obligations of a subject of international law.184  The discussion 
below goes on to invoke the notion of necessity to explain why 
unrecognised entities should be bound by general international human 
rights law, while making reference to the bases of obligations of various 
non-State actors introduced in the previous section. 
The necessity of holding unrecognised entities bound by general 
international human rights law can be established on two grounds: a) the 
bases of authority of different sources of general international law; b) the 
common characteristics shared by unrecognised entities and States, taking 
into consideration the nature of obligations under general international 
                                                            
182 µReport on Human Rights in the Transnistrian Region of the Republic of Moldova by Thomas 
Hammarberg, Senior Expert¶ (14 February 2013) 4 <http://www.un.md/publicdocget/41/> 
accessed 20 August 2014. 
183 For discussions concerning the notion of the ³LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\´DQGWKHTXHVWLRQRI
ZKRGHWHUPLQHVWKH³QHHGVRIWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\ ´VHH&KDSWHU6HFWLRQ,,,$D. 
184 Reparation Advisory Opinion (n 125) 176. 
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human rights law.  Section II introduced theories explaining the bases of 
binding force of international custom, general principles of international 
law and peremptory norms.  Although the will of States appears to play a 
role in the formation of these rules, with the element of acceptance or 
recognition by States being a part of their definitions, the theory of State 
consent does not seem to provide a satisfactory justification for their 
binding force.  Instead, the authority of general international law might 
derive from the necessity to uphold the basic standards of justice and 
decency, pursue common interests, and maintain a peaceful international 
community.  While the traditional State-centred approach considers the will 
of States as the basis of international obligation, the necessity approach 
focuses on the needs of the international community and opens the 
possibility of expanding the application of general international law to non-
State actors.  Of course not all non-State actors would accordingly be 
bound by general international law, but as demonstrated below, it is 
indeed necessary, from the point of view of the international society, to 
impose general international human rights obligations on unrecognised 
entities. 
Recalling the discussions in Section III, as international human rights 
obligations were traditionally associated with States, their application to 
non-6WDWHDFWRUVRIWHQLVEDVHGRQWKHDFWRUV¶UHVHPEODQFHWR6WDWHV7KH
influence of the statist tradition can be observed particularly in the 
discussions concerning non-State armed groups and entities created to 
administer territories.  The fact that a non-State armed group displays 
State-like characteristics (exercising territorial control and possessing 
political organisation) is often invoked as the basis for the imposition of 
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obligations under general international human rights law.185  In the case of 
entities created to administer territories, the applicability of general 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO KXPDQ ULJKWV ODZ UHVWV RQ WKH HQWLWLHV¶ SHUIRUPDQFH RI
functions traditionally carried out by States or on the argument that these 
entities are in fact acting as agents of the State to which the territory in 
question belongs.186  Turning to unrecognised entities, as the fulfilment of 
traditional criteria of statehood is proposed by this thesis as one of the 
required characteristics of unrecognised entities, such entities by definition 
share common traits with States.  A similar thesis was put forward by 
Groth in relation to private military security firms, arguing that the firms 
SHUIRUPLQJ DFWLYLWLHV WKDW DUH ³LQKHUHQWO\ JRYHUQPHQWDO´ VKRXOG EHDU
obligations under international human rights law.187  In short, in situations 
where the State is no longer the entity in control of the territory or 
exercising governmental functions, the obligations originally assumed by 
States should be transferred to the entity that is best placed to offer 
human rights protection.  Such transferral is necessary to avoid gaps of 
protection merely due to changes in political circumstances or governing 
authorities.  From the point of view of individuals, their rights should be 
protected no matter whether the entity governing the territory and 
population is a State, a non-State armed group, an international territorial 
administration, or an unrecognised entity.   
Further, it is necessary to impose general international human rights 
obligations to unrecognised entities in view of the nature of such 
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186 See Section III.C of the present chapter. 
187  /DXUHQ *URWK µ7UDQVIRUPLQJ $FFRXQWDELOLW\ $ 3URSRVDO IRU 5HFRQVLGHULQJ +RZ +XPDQ
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obligations.  Similar to conventional human rights obligations, 188 
obligations under general international human rights law share the same 
typology: respect, protect, and fulfil.189  Firstly, the duty to respect obliges 
States to refrain from violations of human rights.  Secondly, the duty to 
protect demands that States exercise due diligence in order to prevent 
individuals from being subjected to human rights violations committed by 
private actors, and take appropriate measures to respond to violations, 
including through investigation and punishment.  Lastly, the duty to fulfil 
requires States to structure their governmental apparatus and perform 
functions with an aim to contributing to the greater enjoyment of rights.  
Therefore, governmental institutions and bodies must formulate a national 
system in order to carry out these different categories of duties. 190  
Although discussions surrounding the tripartite typology often take place in 
the context of human rights treaties,191 this does not mean that such a 
typology only applies to treaty obligations.  When the typology was first 
proposed by Shue192 and later developed by Eide,193 distinctions were not 
made between conveQWLRQDO DQG JHQHUDO REOLJDWLRQV  1RWDEO\ LQ (LGH¶V
analysis, although references were made to the two human rights 
Covenants, he also acknowledged that the rights embedded in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights were recognised by some as 
                                                            
188 See Chapter 3, Section III.A.1. 
189 Writers discussing this typology often refer to international human rights law in general, 
rather than international human rights treaties specifically. Eg Ida Elisabeth Koch, 
µ'LFKRWRPLHV7ULFKRWRPLHVRU:DYHVRI'XWLHV¶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190  Jean-%HUQDUG 0DULH µ1DWLRQDO 6\VWHPV IRU WKH 3URWHFWLRQ RI +XPDQ 5LJKWV¶ LQ -DQXV]
Symonides (ed), Human Rights: International Protection, Monitoring, Enforcement (Ashgate 
2004) 258. 
191 Eg UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rightsµ*HQHUDO&RPPHQW1R12¶LQLQ 
µ&RPSLODWLRQ RI *HQHUDO &RPPHQWV¶ Q 94) para 15; Velásquez-Rodríguez v Honduras 
(Judgment) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 4 (29 July 1988) paras 172, 
174-77. 
192  Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy (2nd edn, 
Princeton UP 1996) 52.  He termed the three categories of duties as: duties to avoid 
depriving, to protect from deprivation and to aid the deprived. 
193 Asbjørn Eide, µThe International Human Rights System¶ in Asbjørn Eide and others (eds), 
Food as a Human Rights (UN Univ 1984) 154; UNCHR, µReport on the Right to Adequate Food 
as a Human Right: Final Report Submitted by Asbjørn Eide, Special Rapporteur¶ (7 July 1987) 
UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23, paras 66-69. 
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forming a part of customary international law and thus as rights under 
international law. 194  This suggests that the typology may be applicable 
equally to customary human rights obligations.   
The necessity of imposing upon unrecognised entities the duties to respect, 
protect and fulfil under general international human rights law is evident 
especially in light of the exclusive control exercised by unrecognised 
entities over territory and population.  Since it is the unrecognised entity 
that exercises control and possesses the governmental structures and 
institutions to administer the territory, it is the most, if not the only, 
appropriate entity to carry out all three categories of duties.   
Also, by definition, unrecognised entities must possess de facto 
independence.  In other words, an unrecognised entity is not subjected to 
foreign control in its decisions and actions, and thus generally, no other 
State can be held directly or indirectly responsible for the conduct of an 
unrecognised entity.  Therefore, in order to ensure individuals living in the 
territory of an unrecognised entity enjoy rights under general international 
human rights law, it is necessary to impose corresponding obligations to 
such an entity.  
Lastly, even though the previous chapter argues that unrecognised entities 
should be granted the capacity to conclude or participate in international 
human rights treaties, that does not eliminate the necessity of allowing 
such entities to bear obligations under general international human rights 
law.  On the one hand, many unrecognised entities have not expressed 
consent to be bound by international human rights treaties or have only 
consented to be bound by a number of them.  The application of general 
                                                            
194 UNCHR, µReport on the Right to Adequate Food as a Human RighW¶ (n 193) para 62. 
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international human rights law to these entities is therefore essential in 
ensuring human rights protection in the territories controlled by 
unrecognised entities.  On the other hand, even if an unrecognised entity 
expresses its consent to be bound by all existing international human 
rights treaties, general international human rights law serves to fill the 
JDSV RI WKH WUHDW\ V\VWHP  $V 6LQFODLU ZURWH ³FXVWRPDU\ ODZ LWVHOI
operating alongside the codifying convention, has its role to play in filling 
the gaps which any exercise in codification and progressive development 
LQHYLWDEO\ OHDYHV´ 195   A similar function of general principles of 
international law (in situations where there is an absence of rules under 
conventional and customary law) was pointed out earlier.  In short, it 
remains necessary that general international human rights law is applicable 
to unrecognised entities to ensure its universal application to even 
territories not subject to de facto control by any State. 
C. Potential Concerns for Acknowledging the Applicability of General 
International Human Rights Law to Unrecognised Entities 
As discussed in the previous chapter, States might be reluctant to 
acknowledge the treaty-making capacity of unrecognised entities due to a 
number of concerns, 196   and some of those concerns might also be 
asserted in the context of the applicability of general international human 
rights law to unrecognised entities.  Firstly, there is the concern of 
improperly legitimising unrecognised entities. 197   Such a concern stems 
from the fear that, the acknowledgment of the capacity to bear 
international obligations implies the acknowledgment of certain legitimacy 
or status under international law.  Although such a concern theoretically 
                                                            
195 Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2nd edn, Manchester UP 1984) 
258. 
196 See Chapter 3, Section III.B. 
197 This was introduced by Clapham as a possible argument against imposing international 
obligations to non-State actors, but he later dismissed the argument.  Clapham, Human 
Rights Obligations (n 122) 46-53. 
186 
stands, as demonstrated by the examples in practice to be discussed 
above, it appears that the fear of legitimisation is outweighed by the need 
to safeguard human rights by imposing human rights obligations on 
unrecognised entities.   
Another concern emerges if unrecognised entities are not only considered 
bound by general international human rights law but also are able to 
engage in the law-making process.  It might be argued that allowing 
unrecognised entities to play a role in the law-making process would risk 
downgrading standards of human rights protection.198  Though such a risk 
might theoretically exist, there is little evidence to suggest that 
unrecognised entities necessarily lack the capacity or willingness to provide 
human rights protection and would therefore support the downgrading of 
standards.  On the contrary, it can be argued that unrecognised entities, 
especially those seeking recognition or approval from the international 
community, might have stronger incentives to align themselves with 
existing international human rights standards.  Although the role that 
unrecognised entities can play in the law-making process remains unclear, 
the examples introduced above suggest that the risk of downgrading 
standards of protection, if any, has not barred the acknowledgement of the 
applicability of general international human rights law to unrecognised 
entities. 
V. Conclusion 
                                                            
198 This concern has been raised in the context of involving armed groups in the law-making 
process of international humanitarian law.  Anthea Roberts and Sandesh Sivakumaran, 
µ/DZPDNLQJ E\ 1RQVWDWH $FWRUV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disadvantages of incorporating armed groups in the law-making process can be countered by 
adjusting the manner of their participation, instead of excluding them altogether). 
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In order to examine the applicability of general international human rights 
law to unrecognised entities, this chapter first looked at the various 
sources of general international human rights law and the basis of their 
authority.  While the will and consent of States has traditionally been 
considered as an important basis of obligations of States under 
international law, especially considering that almost all sources of general 
international law include the element of acceptance by States in their 
criteria, it is undeniable that certain rules are binding irrespective of State 
consent or withdrawal of consent.  This is particularly evident in the 
continuing binding force of international custom on States who object to 
those rules after the rules have obtained customary status and in the 
absolute and unconditional applicability of peremptory norms.  Such 
characteristics indicate that, in addition to States consent, there are other 
considerations justifying the authority of general international human 
rights law.  This thesis proposes that the notion of necessity is in fact the 
underlying consideration.  For the peaceful co-existence of States and the 
maintenance of order in the international community, certain rules need to 
remain applicable.   
The relation of the notion of necessity to the binding force of general 
international human rights law becomes all the more evident when the 
human rights obligations of non-State actors are examined.  Taking the 
examples of international organisations, non-State armed groups, and 
entities created to administer territories, it has been demonstrated that the 
tradition of holding States to be the sole duty bearers under general 
international human rights law is no longer sustainable.  Rather, the 
applicability of general international human rights law has been expanded 
to actors taking on functions of States and/or exercising effective control 
over territories and populations, because such expansion of scope of 
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application is necessary to ensure the protection of human rights in areas 
where States cannot control.   
Turning to unrecognised entities, considering that they have fulfilled the 
traditional criteria of statehood and achieved de facto independence, it 
naturally follows that no other State is in the position to carry out 
obligations under general international human rights law in the territories 
of these entities.  In order to guarantee that the rights of individuals in 
those territories are respected, ensured and protected and to uphold the 
principle of universality of human rights, it is necessary to impose 
obligations of general international human rights law on the unrecognised 
entities.  The arguments presented in this chapter and those developed in 
relation to international human rights treaties in Chapter 3 will be 
considered in the context of the ROC (Taiwan) in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5  
THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW TO 
THE ROC (TAIWAN) 
I. Introduction 
The preceding chapters explored the nature and characteristics of 
unrecognised entities and the applicability of international human rights 
law to those entities.  This chapter in turn applies the theories and 
arguments put forward in the preceding chapters to the ROC (Taiwan). The 
ROC was established in 1912, but as a result of a civil war between the 
ROC and the Chinese Communist Party that began in 1927 and continued 
intermittently until 1949, the ROC lost control of the Chinese mainland, 
which formed the majority of the territory of the ROC.  The Chinese 
Communist Party established the PRC in 1949, and since then the ROC and 
the PRC governments have been battling for recognition at the 
international level.  As a founding member of the UN, the ROC participated 
in various aspects of the operation of the organisation, including its human 
rights-related work.  However, after the adoption of UN General Assembly 
Resolution 2758 in 1971, which recognised the representatives of the PRC 
government as the lawful representatives of China at the UN, the ROC was 
barred from participating in the UN and its specialised agencies, and 
gradually lost support from other States, who were under pressure from 
the PRC to de-recognise the ROC government.   
After the de-recognition of the ROC government, its previous signatures 
and ratifications of human rights treaties were no longer recognised.  
Moreover, its attempts to participate in international human rights treaties, 
including the CEDAW, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR, in recent years have 
been denied.  As will be demonstrated in subsequent sections of this 
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chapter, the enjoyment of human rights in Taiwan receives little attention 
from UN bodies tasked with functions related to human rights.  Outside the 
UN, among the international actors who most often comment on issues of 
human rights in Taiwan is the European Union (EU).  Even though the EU 
DSSHDUV WR VXSSRUW WKH ³DGRSWLRQ RI WKH SURYLVLRQV RI WKH ,&&35 DQG
,&(6&5 LQ 7DLZDQ¶V GRPHVWLF ODZ´ LW KDV QRW H[SUHVVHG LWV SRVLWLRQ
VSHFLILFDOO\RQ7DLZDQ¶VDWWHPSWWRSDUWLFLSDWHLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQULJKWV
treaties. 1   Overall, the human rights situation in the ROC is rarely 
addressed in any international forum.  Essentially, academic writings2 and 
reports produced by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 3  have 
become the only forms of human rights monitoring.4 
7DLZDQ¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOOHJDOVWDWXVDQGLWVLQWHUDFWLRQZLWKWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO
human rights regime trigger many questions in relation to the application 
of international human rights law to Taiwan: whether the ROC 
government¶V VLJQDWXUHV DQG UDWLILFDWLRQV of international human rights 
treaties prior to its de-recognition remain valid; whether the ROC is now 
eligible to be a party to international human rights treaties; whether the 
ROC bears obligations under general international human rights law, etc.  
To answer these questions, this chapter first explores the historical 
background contributing to the special status of the ROC and applies the 
                                                            
1 European Union - European External Action Service, µThe European Union and Death Penalty 
in Taiwan¶ <http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/taiwan/eu_taiwan/human_rights/abolition_ 
death_penalty/index_en.htm> accessed 20 August 2014. 
2 For examples of such academic writings in English, see Jyh-SLQ )D µ7KH 'HYHORSPHQW RI
Human Rights in the Republic of China: 1971-¶(1981) 1 Chinese YB Intl L & Affairs 125; 
Jyh-SLQ)Dµ/HJLVODWLRQDQG&RQVWLWXWLRQDO,QWHUSUHWDWLRQVRn Human Rights in the Republic of 
China, 1982-$Q2YHUYLHZ¶(1983) 3 Chinese YB Intl L & Affairs 87; Fort Fu-7H/LDRµThe 
Abolition of the Death Penalty in Taiwan: Why a De Facto Moratorium Was Established and 
/RVW¶Asia-Pacific J Human Rights & L 1. 
3 Amnesty International, for instance, includes a section on Taiwan (separate from the section 
on China) in its annual reports on human rights in the world.  For the most recent report, see 
Amnesty International, µAnnual Report 2013: The State of WKH:RUOG¶V+XPDQ5LJKWV7DLZDQ¶ 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/taiwan/report-2013> accessed 20 August 2014. 
4 Additionally, the Department of State of the United States also include a section on Taiwan in 
its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.  For its latest report on Taiwan, see US 
Department of State, µ7DLZDQ+XPDQ5LJKWV5HSRUW¶KWWSZZZVWDWHJRYGRFXPHQWV 
organization/220444.pdf> accessed 20 August 2014. 
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definition of an unrecognised entity to Taiwan (Section II).  Section III 
introduces the participation of, and attempts to participate by, the ROC 
government in international human rights treaties before and after its de-
recognition, and then discusses whether such treaties should be applicable 
to Taiwan, based on the arguments put forward in Chapter 3 of the thesis.  
Section IV moves on to examine the practice of and concerning Taiwan in 
relation to general international human rights law, and then discuss the 
applicability of such law to Taiwan in light of the arguments set out in 
Chapter 4. 
II. The International Legal Status of the ROC (Taiwan) 
Discussions on the legal status of Taiwan often involve two sets of 
questions: a) the legal status of the islands of Taiwan and Penghu, which 
are currently under the control of the ROC government; and b) whether 
the ROC is a State or should be recognised as one.  In keeping with the 
focus of the research, the following discussion will focus on the latter.5  
Firstly, tKH KLVWRULFDO EDFNJURXQG WKDW FRQWULEXWHV WR 7DLZDQ¶V FXUUHQW
disputed status will be introduced DQG7DLZDQ¶V LQWHUQDWional legal status 
will be examined in light of the theories provided in Chapter 2. 
A. Historical Background 
The ROC, established in 1912, emerged in the aftermath of a revolution 
that overthrew the Qing Dynasty the year before.  At the time of its 
establishment, the islands of Formosa (Taiwan) and Pescadores (Penghu) 
were ceded to Japan under the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki. Japanese rule 
                                                            
5  For discussions on the legal status of the islands currently controlled by the ROC 
government, see eg ' 3 2¶&RQQHOO µ7KH 6WDWXV RI )RUPRVD DQG WKH &KLQHVH 5HFRJQLWLRQ
3UREOHP¶$-,/-3-DLQµLegal Status of Formosa: A Study of British, Chinese 
DQG ,QGLDQ9LHZV¶ $-,/ +DQV.XLMSHU µ,V7DLZDQ D3DUWRI&KLQD"¶ LQ in Jean-
Marie Henckaerts (ed), The International Status of Taiwan in the New World Order: Legal and 
Political Considerations (Kluwer Law Intl 1996) 9. 
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over the islands continued until the end of the Second World War.6  In the 
1943 Cairo Declaration, the Allies declared that ³DOO WKH WHUULWRULHV -DSDQ
has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the 
3HVFDGRUHV VKDOO EH UHVWRUHG WR WKH 5HSXEOLF RI &KLQD´ 7   The 1945 
Potsdam Proclamation later affirmed the terms of the Cairo Declaration.8  
Yet the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan only stated that Japan 
³UHQRXQFHV DOO ULJKW WLWOH DQG FODLP WR )RUPRVD >7DLZDQ@ DQG WKH
3HVFDGRUHV >3HQJKX@´9 without specifying to whom the islands should be 
returned.  Thus some have argued that such a provision created ambiguity 
DQGOHIWWKHOHJDOVWDWXVRIWKHVHLVODQGV³XQGHWHUPLQHG´DQGWKDW³7DLZDQ
was legally detached from Japan but was not attached to China or any 
RWKHUFRXQWU\´10  However, in the Instrument of Surrender of 1945, Japan 
indeed undertook to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation 
and eventually surrendered to the Commander-in-Chief of the ROC.11  On 
the Chinese mainland, not long after the establishment of the ROC, a civil 
war broke out between the forces of the Nationalist government of the 
ROC and the Communist Party in 1927.  Though interrupted by the Sino-
Japanese War that started in 1937, the civil war resumed soon after the 
end of the Second World War.  In 1949, the defeated ROC forces retreated 
to the island of Taiwan, and the Communist Party of China, led by Mao Tse 
Tung, established the PRC.   
                                                            
6 For a brief account of history of Taiwan since the seventieth century, see Yu-ming Shaw, 
µ0RGHUQ+LVWRU\RI7DLZDQ$Q,QWHUSUHWDWLYH$FFRXQW¶ LQ+XQJGDK&KLX HGChina and the 
Taiwan Issue (Praeger 1979). 
7 Cairo Declaration (1 December 1943) in Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic 
Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 (US Government Printing Office 1961) 
448. 
8 Potsdam Proclamation (Proclamation Calling for the Surrender of Japan, Approved by the 
Heads of Governments of the United States, China, and the United Kingdom) (26 July, 1945) 
in Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin, 1945 
(The Potsdam Conference), vol II (US Government Printing Office 1960) 1475, para 8. 
9 Treaty of Peace with Japan (adopted 8 September 1951, entered into forced 28 April 1952) 
136 UNTS 45 art 2(b). 
10 Lung-FKX&KHQµ7DLZDQ¶V&XUUHQW,QWHUQDWLRQDO/HJDO6WDWXV¶1HZ(QJODQG/5HY
675, 677. 
11 James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 198. 
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The ROC was one of the founding members of the UN, and the UN Charter 
LQ IDFW FRQWDLQV H[SOLFLW UHIHUHQFHV WR WKH ³5HSXEOLF RI &KLQD´ $UWLFOH 
SURYLGHVWKDW³>W@KH6HFXULW\&RXQFLOVKDOOFRQVist of eleven Members of the 
United Nations, The Republic of China, ... shall be permanent members of 
WKH 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO´ 12  DQG $UWLFOH  VWDWHV WKDW ³>W@KH SUHVHQW
Charter shall come into force upon the deposit of ratifications by the 
Republic of CKLQD DQGE\DPDMRULW\RIRWKHUVLJQDWRU\6WDWHV´13  Yet, 
after the establishment of the PRC, governments of both the ROC and the 
PRC claimed to be the sole representative of China and have since engaged 
in a diplomatic battle, fighting for recognition from other States as well as 
the representation in international organisations, including the UN.14  While 
during the first two decades after the establishment of the PRC, the ROC 
was recognised by most States and represented China in the UN and other 
international organisations, by the mid-1970s, the PRC had garnered 
recognition from a majority of States.15  The crucial turning point came in 
1971, when the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758, 
³UHFRJQL]LQJ WKDW WKH UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV RI WKH *RYHUQPHQW RI WKH 3HRSOH¶V
Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United 
1DWLRQV DQG WKDW WKH 3HRSOH¶V 5HSXEOLF RI &KLQD LV RQH RI WKH ILYH
SHUPDQHQW PHPEHUV RI WKH 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO´16  The Resolution further 
GHFLGHGWR³UHVWRUHDOOLWVULJKWVWRWKH3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI&KLQD«DQGWR
expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-Shek [then-President of 
the ROC] from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United 
                                                            
12 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 
1 UNTS XVI, art 23. 
13 ibid art 110(3). 
14 Many have written on the developments since the Second World War and the relations 
between the ROC and PRC. Eg -RQDWKDQ,&KDUQH\DQG-593UHVFRWWµ5HVROYLQJ&URVV-Strait 
RelatiRQVEHWZHHQ&KLQDDQG7DLZDQ¶$-,/&KL&KXQJµ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZDQG
the Extra-2UGLQDU\ ,QWHUDFWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH 3HRSOH¶V 5HSXEOLF RI &KLQD DQG WKH 5HSXEOLF RI
&KLQDRQ7DLZDQ¶,QGLDQD,QWO	&RPS/5HY 
15 Crawford, The Creation of States (n 11) 199. 
16 UNGA Res 2758 (XXVI) (25 October 1971) UN Doc A/RES/2758(XXVI). 
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1DWLRQVDQGLQDOOWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQVUHODWHGWRLW´17  Following the adoption 
of this resolution, the ROC not only was barred from participating in the UN 
and its specialised agencies, but also gradually lost support from other 
6WDWHVZKRZHUHXQGHUSUHVVXUHIURPWKH35&WR³GH-UHFRJQLVH´WKH52& 
government.18  Despite such pressure, as a matter of fact, Taiwan has not 
been governed by the PRC, and the status of the ROC needs to be 
ascertained in light of the relevant theories introduced in Chapter 2. 
B. The International Legal Status of the ROC (Taiwan) 
Applying the traditional criteria of statehood, there is little doubt that the 
ROC (Taiwan) objectively meets all the criteria.19  Firstly, concerning the 
requirement of a permanent population, as of June 2014, it is estimated 
that a population of 23.392 million is under the 52&¶V HIIHFWLYH
governance.20  Secondly, regarding the criteria of a defined territory, the 
52&¶VUXOHH[WHQGVWRWKHLVODQGVRI7DLZDQ3HQJKX.LQPHQ0DWVXDQG
other surrounding small islands, covering an area of more than 36,000 
square kilometres.21  Although the sovereignty over certain surrounding 
islands remains disputed,22 this does not defeat the claim that the ROC has 
fulfilled the requirement of defined territory.  The competing claim by the 
PRC also does not change the fact that the ROC indeed exercises effective 
control 23  over the area. 24   Thirdly, with regard to the requirement of 
                                                            
17 ibid. 
18  &KHUL $WWL[ µ%HWZHHQ WKH 'HYLO DQG WKH 'HHS %OXH 6HD $UH 7DLZDQ¶V 7UDGLQJ 3DUWQHUV
Implying Recognition of TaLZDQHVH6WDWHKRRG"¶&alifornia Western Intl LJ 357, 363-
64. 
19 Vaughan Lowe, International Law (OUP 2007) 165; Richard K Gardiner, International Law 
(Longman 2003) 199. 
20  1DWLRQDO 6WDWLVWLFV 52& µ0RQWKO\ 6WDWLVWLFV -01 General Condition of PRSXODWLRQ¶
<http://eng.stat.gov.tw/public/data/dgbas03/bs7/bulletin_eng/B-1.xls> accessed 20 August 
2014. 
21 Executive Yuan 52& µ52& <HDUERRN*HRJUDSK\	 'HPRJUDSKLFV¶KWWSZZZH\JRY 
tw/en/cp.aspx?n=5776024635D354A6> accessed 4 July 214. 
22 See eg Han-\L6KDZ µ5HYLVLWLQJ WKH'LDR\XWDL6HQNDNX ,VODQGV'LVSXWH([DPLQLQJ /HJDO
Claims and New Historical Evidence under International Law and the Traditional East Asian 
:RUOG2UGHU3ULQFLSOH¶&KLQHVH (Taiwan) YB Intl L & Affairs 95. 
23 The discussion concerning the notion of effective control can be found in Chapter 2, Section 
III.   
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JRYHUQPHQWDIWHU-DSDQ¶VFRORQLVDWLRQHQGHGLQWKH52&KDVVLQFH
assumed exclusive control over the abovementioned territory and 
established an effective government with an executive, legislative and 
judicial branch.25  Lastly, pertaining to the criteria of capacity to enter into 
relations with other States, as of July 2014, the ROC maintains formal 
diplomatic relations with 22 States 26  and holds membership or 
observership in approximately 50 inter-governmental organisations.27  In 
addition, the ROC has concluded numerous agreements with other 
States.28  Yet in many cases, such agreements do not refer to either the 
ROC or Taiwan as a party.  A number of agreements on economic 
FRRSHUDWLRQDUHFRQFOXGHGE\WKH³6HSDUDWH&XVWRPV7HUULWRU\RI7DLZDQ
3HQJKX.LQPHQDQG0DWVX´WKH52&¶VQDPHDVDPHPEHURIWKH:RUOG
Trade Organization), 29  while many agreements are concluded between 
governmental organs30 or representative offices (which serve as de facto 
embassies and consulates)31 of the ROC and another State.  Even though 
                                                                                                                                                            
24 'RQDOG*3DOPHU-Uµ7DLZDQDe Jure or Not De Jure? That is the Question. An Analysis of 
7DLZDQ¶V/HJDO6WDWXVZLWKLQWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RPPXQLW\¶-).8/5HY86. 
25 Huang-Chih Chiang and Jau-<XDQ+ZDQJµ2QWKH6WDWHKRRGRI7DLZDQ$/HJDO5HDSSUDLVDO¶
in Peter C Y Chow (ed), 7KH³2QH&KLQD´'LOHPPD(Palgrave Macmillan 2008) 70.  
26  0LQLVWU\ RI )RUHLJQ $IIDLUV 52& µ&RXQWU\ ZLWK :KRP :H &XUUHQWO\ +DYH 'LSORPDWLc 
5HODWLRQV¶KWWSZZZPRIDJRYWZHQ$OOLHV,QGH[DVS[!accessed 20 August 2014. 
27 0LQLVWU\RI)RUHLJQ$IIDLUV52&µ,*2VLQ:KLFK:H3DUWLFLSDWHKWWSZZZPRIDJRYWZ 
enigo/Link3enigo.aspx?n=58BD38F4400A7167> accessed 20 August 2014. 
28 Each volume of the Chinese (Taiwan) Yearbook of International Law and Affairs provides a 
chronological list RI ³WUHDWLHVDJUHHPHQWV DQG RIILFLDO VHPL-official or unofficial agreements 
FRQFOXGHGE\ WKH5HSXEOLF RI&KLQDZLWK RWKHU FRXQWULHV´ LQ WKH UHVSHFWLYH \HDU DV well as 
selected text.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ROC also maintains a database of such 
DJUHHPHQWV  0LQLVWU\ RI )RUHLJQ $IIDLUV 52& µ7UHDW\ DQG $JUHHPHQW &ROOHFWLRQ ,QTXLU\
6\VWHP¶KWWSQRPRIDJRYWZPRIDWUHDW\V,QGH[(DVS[!DFFHVVHd 20 August 2014. 
29  For instance, in 2013, the ROC concluded two such agreements with New Zealand 
(Agreement between the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu 
and New Zealand on Economic Cooperation) and Singapore (Agreement between Singapore 
and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu on Economic 
Partnership). 
30 For instance, in 2011, the ROC concluded such agreements with Italy (Memorandum of 
Understanding on Operational Cooperation between the Customs Service of Taiwan and the 
Italian Customs Agency), Mongolia (Memorandum of Understanding between  the National 
Immigration Agency of the  Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of China and the Mongolia 
Immigration Agency the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs of Mongolia concerning 
Cooperation in Immigration Affairs and Human Trafficking Prevention), and Slovakia 
(Agreement between the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the 
Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income), among others. 
31 For instance, in 2010, the ROC concluded such agreements with Australia (Memorandum of 
Understanding between the  Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Australia and the 
Australian Commerce and Industry Office in Taipei on Cooperation within the Fields of Energy 
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different names have been used, these agreements serve as evidence that 
many States retain semi-official or unofficial trade, political and cultural 
relations with the ROC.32  ,W FDQ EH REVHUYHG WKDW WKH52&¶V FDSDFLW\ WR
enter into relations with other States has seldom been called into 
question.33   
Besides the traditional criteria of statehood, the ROC has also proven itself 
to be compatible with many of the proposed additional requirements.34  For 
instance, regarding the requirement of willingness and ability to observe 
international law, the ROC, even after its expulsion in 1971, has continued 
to support the activities and resolutions of the UN.  For instance, after 
,UDT¶V LQYDVLRQ RI .XZDLW LQ  WKH 81 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO DGRSWHG
Resolution 661 imposing economic sanctions against Iraq, and the ROC 
government subsequently issued an order to implement this resolution by 
suspending the issuance of export licenses to Iraq.35  Another example can 
EHREVHUYHG LQ WKH52&JRYHUQPHQW¶V UHVSRQVH IROORZLQJ WKHDGRSWLRQRI
Security Council Resolution 1973 in 2011 regarding the no-fly zone over 
Libya, voicing its intention to respect the resolution.36  7KH52&¶VDWWHPSWV
                                                                                                                                                            
and Minerals), the United States (Agreement between the Taipei Economic and Cultural 
Representative Office in the United States and the American Institute in Taiwan for 
Cooperation in and the Promotion of Transportation Safety), and Vietnam (Agreement 
between the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Vietnam and the Vietnam Economic and 
Cultural Office in Taipei on Judicial Assistance in Civil Matters), among others. 
32 $QJHOLQH * &KHQ µ7DLZDQ¶V ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 3HUVRQDOLW\ &URVVLQJ WKH 5LYHU E\ )HHOLQJ WKH
6WRQHV¶/R\ROD/$,QWO	&RPS/-, 225.  For instance, after the United State 
severed its diplomatic relation with the ROC, the Taiwan Relations Act was enacted to 
FRQWLQXH WKH ³FRPPHUFLDO FXOWXUDO DQG RWKHU UHODWLRQV EHWZHHQ WKH SHRSOH RI WKH 8QLWHG
6WDWHVDQG WKHSHRSOHRQ7DLZDQ .´ Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Pub L No 96-8, 22 USC § 
3301 (a).  
33 %UDG55RWKµ7KH(QWLW\7hat Dare not Speak Its Name: Unrecognized Taiwan as a Right-
%HDUHU LQWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/HJDO2UGHU¶(DVW$VLD/5HY6HHDOVRHsiu-An 
Anne HsiaoµOn the Fringe of Statehood ± Para-Statal Actors in International Law¶3K'WKHVLV
London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London 2003) 128-30. 
34 See &KULVWRSKHU-&DURODQµ7KH³5HSXEOLFRI7DLZDQ´$/HJDO-Historical Justification for a 
7DLZDQHVH'HFODUDWLRQRI,QGHSHQGHQFH¶1<8/5HY-57; Parris Chang and 
Kok-XL/LPµ7DLZDQ¶V&DVHIRU8QLWHG1DWLRQV0HPEHUVKLS¶8&/$-,QWO/	)RUHLJQ
Affairs 393, 422-23. 
35 Similar actions were taken in response to Resolutions 757, 788, and 820, which imposed 
sanction against Yugoslavia.  +XQJGDK&KLX µ7KHRight of the Republic of China and Its 21 
0LOOLRQ&KLQHVH3HRSOH WR3DUWLFLSDWH LQ WKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV¶ -0DUVKDOO/5HY, 
253-54. 
36 0LQLVWU\RI)RUHLJQ$IIDLUV52&µThe Republic of China (Taiwan) to Respect UN Resolution 
on No-Fly Zone over Libya¶  0DUFK  http://www.mofa.gov.tw/En/News_Content. 
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to participate in the CEDAW,37 the ICCPR, and the ICESCR,38 as well as the 
subsequent incorporation of these instruments into domestic law, also 
GHPRQVWUDWHWKH52&¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRSURPRWHDQGSURWHFWKXPDQULJKWVLQ
its territory. 
Regarding another additional criterion, independence, it has been argued 
that since the ROC has never made a claim of separate statehood from 
China, and that no State (even including the ROC itself39) regards the ROC 
as a State independent of the PRC, it is not de jure independent, and it 
should not be recognised as a State.40  This position has also led some to 
conclude that the additional requirement of independence is not fulfilled in 
the case of Taiwan.  However, in view of recent developments, the validity 
of this argument may be questioned.  
After the establishment of the PRC, the ROC government did hold the 
position that it represented the whole of China, even though it only 
effectively controlled Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu, and other 
surrounding small islands.  Nevertheless, the ROC government since the 
1980s has gradually ceased to claim to be the sole legitimate 
representation of China, and a formal statement was made in 1994 that 
³the ROC government would no longer compete for the right to represent 
China in the international arena´.41  In 2007, the ROC government formally 
                                                                                                                                                            
aspx?n=1EADDCFD4C6EC567&sms=5B9044CF1188EE23&s=55DDF2BD12069953> accessed 
20 August 2014. 
37 0LQLVWU\RI)RUHLJQ$IIDLUV52&µ0LQLVWU\RI)RUHLJQ$IIDLUV3URDFWLYHO\3URPRWHV7DLZDQ¶V 
PartiFLSDWLRQ LQ WKH ³&RQYHQWLRQ RQ WKH (OLPLQDWLRQ RI $OO )RUPV RI 'LVFULPLQDWLRQ DJDLQVW
:RPHQ´¶ (30 April 2007) <http://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=1EADDCFD 
4C6EC567&sms=5B9044CF1188EE23&s=1BDBF9DEE247D7CE> accessed 20 August 2014. 
38  Office of the 3UHVLGHQW 52& µ3UHVLGHQW 0D 6LJQV ,QVWUXPHQWV RI 5DWLILFDWLRQ RI 7ZR 
&RYHQDQWV RQ +XPDQ 5LJKWV¶  0D\  KWWSHQJOLVKSUHVLGHQWJRYWZ'HIDXOW 
aspx?tabid=491&itemid=19415> accessed 20 August 2014. 
39 This claim might derive from the traditional position of the ROC government that it was the 
sole legitimate government of China. 
40 Crawford, The Creation of States (n 11) 219; Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (6th edn, 
CUP 2008) 234. See also Gardiner (n 19) 199-200. 
41 Chiang and Hwang (n 25) 60.  
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submitted an application for UN membership under the name of Taiwan.42  
The recent attempt to participate in international human rights treaties 
(whose membership is limited to States) can also serve as evidence that 
the ROC, at least implicitly, considers itself and claims to be a State.  This 
tendency can be observed even in situations involving the PRC.  In 
November 2012, the PRC revealed a new design of passport, which 
included photographs RI WKH52&¶V WHUritory and landscape.  In response, 
the Mainland Affairs Council released a statement stressing that:  
0DLQODQG&KLQD
V LQFOXVLRQRISKRWRJUDSKVRI7DLZDQ¶V WHUULWRU\
and landscape entirely ignores existing facts and provokes 
controversy... The ROC is a sovereign and independent country. 
8QGHUWKH52&&RQVWLWXWLRQWKH52&¶VWHUULWRU\KDVLWVH[LVWLQJ
national boundaries. The mainland Chinese authorities should 
squarely face the fact that the two sides are divided by the sea 
and governed separately«43   
AnotKHU H[DPSOH FDQ EH REVHUYHG LQ WKH 52&¶V response after the PRC 
DQQRXQFHGWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDQ³DLU-GHIHQFHLGHQWLILFDWLRQ]RQH´LQWKH
East China Sea, which covers disputed islands claimed by the ROC, the 
PRC, and Japan, in November 2013.  Following thH35&¶VDQQRXQFHPHQW, 
the ROC National Security Council issued a statement reiterating the ROC 
³VRYHUHLJQW\´RYHUWKHLVODQGV³DIDFWZKLFKLVQRWDIIHFWHGLQDQ\ZD\E\
PDLQODQG &KLQD¶V DQQRXQFHPHQW FRQFHUQLQJ DQ DLU GHIHQVH LGHQWLILFDWLRQ
                                                            
42 8QLWHG1DWLRQV µ5HTXHVW IRU WKH ,QFOXVLRQRID6XSSOHPHQWDU\ ,WHP LQ WKH$JHQGDRI WKH
Sixty- Second Session: UrginJ WKH 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO WR 3URFHVV 7DLZDQ¶V 0HPEHUVKLS
Application Pursuant to Rules 59 and 60 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security 
&RXQFLO DQG $UWLFOH  RI WKH &KDUWHU RI WKH 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV¶ (17 August 2007) UN Doc 
A/62/193.  However, it is important to note that the language of the application was smartly 
drafted to avoid being interpreted as a declaration of independence. 
43  Mainland Affairs Council 52& µMAC Issues a Stern Statement on the Mainland¶V 1HZ
Passport¶ 3 November 2014) <http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=103648&ctNode= 
6256&mp=3> accessed 20 August 2014.  
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]RQH´44  Therefore, while it remains true that the ROC has not officially 
characterised its relations with the PRC as inter-State relations, it has on a 
IHZRFFDVLRQVHPSKDVLVHGLWVVWDWXVDVD³VRYHUHLJQ6WDWH´ 
Despite the developments mentioned above, the official position of the 
ROC government still denies the seeking of independence, leaving room for 
the argument that the ROC has not achieved formal independence.  
Furthermore, since the current administration came into power after the 
Presidential Election of 2008, the government has been campaigning for 
closer ties with Mainland China, and the likelihood of formally claiming 
independence seems to have diminished.45  In summary, the ROC remains 
a peculiar case under international law, and whether the ROC should be 
recognised as a State is still open to debate.   
C. Applying the Definition of an Unrecognised Entity to the ROC (Taiwan) 
As defined in Chapter 2, an unrecognised entity is an entity that fulfils the 
WUDGLWLRQDOFULWHULDRIVWDWHKRRGRUWKH³0RQWHYLGHRFULWHULD´DQGDFKLHYHV
de facto independence but is not generally recognised as a State by the 
international community.  Applying the traditional criteria of statehood, as 
discussed above, there is little doubt that Taiwan meets all the criteria.46  
Regarding the second element of the definition, de facto independence, an 
unrecognised entity must exercise a certain degree of control over its 
territory, and its actions and decisions cannot be that of another State.47  
                                                            
44 1DWLRQDO 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO 52& µ52&6WDWHPHQW RQ %HLMLQJ¶V $QQRXQFHPHQW RI WKH (DVW
China Sea Air 'HIHQVH ,GHQWLILFDWLRQ =RQH¶ 1RYHPEHU KWWSZZZPRIDJRY.tw/ 
en/cp.aspx?n=FB12FE5EEF086E38> accessed 20 August 2014; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
52&µ52&5HVSRQGVWR%HLMLQJ¶V$QQRXQFHPHQWRI(DVW&KLQD6HD$LU'HIHQVH,GHQWLILFDWLRQ
Zone (24 November 2013) <http://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=8157691 
CA2AA32F8&sms=4F8ED5441E33EA7B&s=CFACC05ABB27BC1A> accessed 20 August 2014.  
45  Lori F Damrosch and others, International Law: Cases and Materials (5th edn, West 
Academic Publishing 2009) 343. 
46 Lowe (n 19) 165; Gardiner (n 19) 199. 
47 Crawford, The Creation of States (n 11'DYLG5DLþStatehood and the Law of Self-
Determination (Kluwer Law Intl 2002) 78. 
200 
In other words, if an entity is subject to the ³HIIHFWLYHFRQWURO´RIDQRWKHU
State, then it would not be considered as de facto independent.  Taiwan is 
often referred to as an example of an entity with de facto, but not de jure, 
independence (since it has never made the claim of independent statehood 
from the PRC).48  Although Taiwan retains official or semi-official relations 
with many States, none of them in fact exercises effective control over 
Taiwan.  As for the PRC, in recent years, interactions between the two 
sides of the Taiwan Strait have increased, especially since 2008, and 
cooperation has been negotiated regarding various issues, such as 
transportation, trade, investment, and crime-fighting.49  While the PRC is 
DGPLWWHGO\DQLQIOXHQWLDODFWRUIURP7DLZDQ¶VSRLQWRIYLHZWKH7DLZDQHVH
governmHQWQHYHUWKHOHVVGRHVQRWDFW³RQWKHLQVWUXFWLRQVRIRUXQGHUWKH
GLUHFWLRQ RU FRQWURO RI´ 50  the PRC, and thus the criterion of de facto 
independence is met.  Lastly, with regards to the element of lacking 
general recognition, despite the relations that Taiwan maintains with other 
States, the majority of the international community do not recognise 
Taiwan as a State, and instead considers Taiwan to be a part of the PRC.51  
In conclusion, Taiwan fits the definition of an unrecognised entity, and the 
subsequent discussions apply the arguments regarding the application of 
international human rights law to unrecognised entities, as developed in 
Chapters 3 and 4, to Taiwan. 
III. The Application of International Human Rights Treaties  
to the ROC (Taiwan) 
                                                            
48 5DLþQ 476HHDOVR7KRPDV'*UDQWµ'HILQLQJ6WDWHKRRG7KH0RQWHYLGHR&RQYHQWLRQ
DQG,WV'LVFRQWHQWV¶&ROXPELD-7UDQVQQDWO/ 403, 439. 
49  For information regarding the cross-strait negotiations and the agreements concluded 
WKHUHIURPVHH0DLQODQG$IIDLUV&RXQFLO52&µDialogue and Negotiation¶ <http://www.mac. 
gov.tw/np.asp?ctNode=5891&mp=3> accessed 20 August 2014. 
50 ,/&µ$UWLFOHVRQ5HVSRQVLELOLW\RI6WDWHVIRU,QWHUQDWLRQDOO\:URQJIXO$FWV¶, UNGA Res 56/83 
(12 December 2011) UN Doc A/RES/56/83, Annex (ILC Articles on State Responsibility) art 8. 
51 Attix (n 18) 363-64. 
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A. The ROC (Taiwan) and International Human Rights Treaties 
1. Before the De-Recognition of the ROC Government 
As a founding member of the UN, the ROC actively participated in the 
drafting of the UN Charter and the three instruments collectively known as 
the International Bill of Human Rights: the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights (UDHR), the ICCPR, and the ICESCR.52  Although many consider 
that part or even all of the UDHR carries binding force,53 it is nevertheless 
QRWD WUHDW\ 7KHUHIRUH WKH52&¶V UROH LQ LWVGUDIWLQJZill be included in 
the discussions below concerning general international human rights law 
(Section IV.A.1.). 
After the Second World War, as the major powers of the world gathered to 
discuss the establishment of a general international organisation, which 
would ultimately become the UN, the ROC was one of the few States that 
advocated the inclusion of principles related to human rights in the 
constituent instrument of the organisation.54  Wellington Koo, who led the 
52&¶VGHOHJDWLRQDWWKH'XPEDUWRQ2DNV&RQference, spoke about law and 
justice55 and stated that: 
The new organization aims at the maintenance of peace and 
security throughout the world. ... As a means of promoting 
this ... it will be highly desirable to consecrate the principle of 
equality of races as of states in the fundamental instrument of 
the new institution.  Reference to this principle ... in the 
                                                            
52 Ian Neary, Human Rights in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (Routledge 2002) 116. 
53 Hurst Hannum, µThe Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and 
International Law¶ (1995/96) 25 Georgia J Intl & Comp L 287, 324 (citing scholars such as 
Patrick Thornberry, Philip Alston, AH Robertson, JG Merrills, opining that the UDHR has 
become customary international law). 
54 Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen (3rd edn, U 
Pennsylvania P 2011) 160. 
55 Robert C Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search 
for Postwar Security (U North Carolina P 1990) 237.  
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preamble of the new charter will not only give moral 
satisfaction to the greater part of humanity, but will also go far 
to pave the way for the realization of the ideal of universal 
brotherhood inseparable from the ideal of permanent world 
peace.56 
Yet, this view was not shared by other participants of the Conference, and 
in the proposals adopted at the end of the Conference only one 
³SHUIXQFWRU\ UHIHUHQFH´ ZDV LQFRUSRUDWHG 57  ³WKH 2UJDQL]DWLRQ VKRXOG «
SURPRWHUHVSHFWIRUKXPDQULJKWVDQGIXQGDPHQWDOIUHHGRPV´58 
Turning to the drafting of the two Covenants, originally, it was envisaged 
that the UN Commission on Human Rights would prepare a text for a single 
Covenant on Human Rights rather than the two separate instruments that 
H[LVWWRGD\7KH52&¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRGUDIWLQJDSSHDUVWREHOLPLWHGWRWKH
period before the decision was taken to draft two instruments.  For 
instance, the ROC submitted amendments to draft texts (for instance, on 
draft Article 18, freedom of assembly 59 ) and a proposal on the 
implementation of the Covenant.  In the proposal on implementation 
jointly issued by the ROC and the US, it was suggested that complaints 
under the Covenant should be resolved in the first place by negotiation, 
and failing that, by referral to the Committee established under the 
Covenant. 60   The proposal also suggested that there was no need to 
                                                            
56 Lauren (n 54) 162. 
57 William A Schabas, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: The Travaux Préparatoires, 
vol 1 (CUP 2013) lxxv. 
58  Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, Washington 
Conversations on International Peace and Security Organization (7 October 1944) Ch IX, Sec 
A. 
59  81&+5 µ'UDIW ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &RYHQDQW RQ +XPDQ 5LJKWV $UWLFOH  &KLQD 'UDIWLQJ
$PHQGPHQW¶-XQH 1949) UN Doc E/CN.4/307. 
60 81&+5 µ&KLQD DQG WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV 3URSRVDO RQ ,PSOHPHQWDWLRQ IRU WKH &RYHQDQW RQ
+XPDQ5LJKWV¶-XQH81'RF(&1 
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establish an International Court of Human Rights or a dedicated special 
chamber in the International Court of Justice.61   
In addition to UN instruments, the ROC also participated in the drafting of 
a number of International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions dealing 
with the right to work and labour rights.  For instance, in the discussions in 
June 1957 leading to the adoption of the Abolition of Forced Labour 
Convention, representatives of both the ROC government and the workers 
in the ROC presented statements.  The ROC representative expressed the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V VXSSRrt for the adoption of such a Convention, noted the 
practice of forced labour in the PRC-controlled mainland China, and 
concluded the issue of forced labour not only related to human rights but 
also security. 62   After the ILO Convention No 105 (Abolition of Forced 
Labour Convention) was adopted on 25 June 1957, the ROC officially 
ratified the instrument in 1959. 
Aside from contributing to the process of drafting, the ROC also expressed 
its intention to participate in a number of human rights instruments.  In 
total, before 1971, the ROC signed, ratified, or acceded to over 30 treaties 
related to human rights. 63   These include: the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Convention on 
the Political Rights of Women, the ICERD, the ICCPR; the (First) Optional 
                                                            
61 ibid. 
62 International Labour Conference (40th Session) Record of Proceedings (1957) (statement 
by Mr Tsune-chi Yu (China) at the 22nd Sitting, 21 June 1957) 355-57. 
63 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ROC), Wai Jiao Bu Han: Wai Tiao Yi Zi Di 9101164450 Hao 
[Ministry of Foreign Affairs Letter, Ref. No.: Wai-Tiao-Yi-Zi-9101164450], cited in Taiwan New 
CenWXU\ )RXQGDWLRQ µ*XR -L 5HQ 4XDQ *RQJ <XH *XR 1HL )D +XD =KL )DQJ )D <X &H /XH
>0HDQV DQG 6WUDWHJLHV RI 'RPHVWLFDWLQJ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO +XPDQ 5LJKWV 7UHDWLHV@¶ 5HSRUW 1R
RDEC-RES-091-003, Commissioned by the Research, Development and Evaluation 
Commission, Executive Yuan (2002) 102-04. 
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Protocol to the ICCPR, and the ICESCR.  A full list is set out in Table 1 
below.64 
When the ROC signed or ratified these instruments, the UN at times 
received communications from certain States protesting against the 
signatures/ratifications.  For instance with respect to the ICERD, Bulgaria, 
Mongolia, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republic, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics notified the 
81WKDWWKH52&¶VVLJQDWXUHDQGRUUDtification were null and void since the 
³VLQFHWKHVR-FDOOHGµ*RYHUQPHQWRI&KLQD¶KDGQRULJKWWRVSHDNRUDVVXPH
obligations on behalf of China, there being only one Chinese State, the 
3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLF RI&KLQD DQG RQH*RYHUQPHQW HQWLWOHG WR UHSUHVHQW it, 
WKH *RYHUQPHQW RI WKH 3HRSOH¶V 5HSXEOLF RI &KLQD´ 65   Similar 
communications were sent from these States and three additional ones 
&]HFKRVORYDNLD5RPDQLDDQG<XJRVODYLDIROORZLQJWKH52&¶VVLJQDWXUHV
of the ICCPR and the ICESCR.66  In response to these communications, the 
ROC stated in letters to the Secretary-General that,  
the Republic of China, a sovereign State and Member of the 
United Nations, had attended the twentieth regular session of 
the United Nations General Assembly, contributed to the 
formulation of the Convention concerned, signed the 
Convention and duly deposited the instrument of ratification 
WKHUHRIDQG WKDW³DQ\VWDWHPHQWVDQGUHVHUYDWLRQV UHODWLQJ WR
                                                            
64 See pages 207-10. 
65 UNTC, µChapter IV Human Rights: 2. International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination¶ <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY& 
mtdsg_no=IV-2&chapter=4&lang=en> accessed 20 August 2014. 
66  UNTC, µChapter IV Human Rights: 3. International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights¶ <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
3&chapter=4&lang=en> accessed 20 August 2014; UN7& µ&KDpter IV Human Rights: 4. 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO &RYHQDQW RQ &LYLO DQG 3ROLWLFDO 5LJKWV¶ <http://treaties.un.org/pages/ 
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en> accessed 20 August 
2014. 
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the above-mentioned Convention that are incompatible with or 
derogatory to the legitimate position of the Government of the 
Republic of China shall in no way affect the rights and 
REOLJDWLRQVRIWKH5HSXEOLFRI&KLQDXQGHUWKLV&RQYHQWLRQ´67 
However, after the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, the 
validity of the signatures, ratifications, and accessions by the ROC became 
disputed.   
2. After the De-Recognition of the ROC Government 
*HQHUDO$VVHPEO\5HVROXWLRQPDUNHGWKH52&¶VH[LW IURPWKH8168 
and the ROC was subsequently excluded from participating in the UN 
specialised agencies to which the ROC held membership, such as the ILO 
and UNESCO.  This was followed by the de-recognition and breaking of 
diplomatic ties by the majority of States in the world.  The ROC became 
isolated from the international community.  Furthermore, domestically, in 
the midst of the civil war between the nationalist and communist 
governments, martial law was imposed in Taiwan in May 1949.69   The 
imposition of martial law continued even after the ROC retreated from 
mainland China and only ended on 15 July 1987.70  Although the ROC 
Constitution contains provisions on the protection of fundamental human 
rights, the martial law effectively suspended those provisions.  For instance, 
Article 11 of the Martial Law authorised the government to restrict the 
enjoyment of freedoms of assembly and association, among other rights, 
and regulations were subsequently adopted to further enforce the 
                                                            
67 817& µ&KDSWHU ,9 +XPDQ 5LJKWV  ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &RQYHQWLRn on the Elimination of All 
)RUPVRI5DFLDO'LVFULPLQDWLRQ¶Q65). 
68 See text accompanying nn 16, 17. 
69 Tai Wan Jie Yan Ling [Order of Martial Law in Taiwan] (ROC) (1949) <http://www.archives. 
gov.tw/Publish.aspx?cnid=1014&p=857> accessed 20 August 2014. 
70 Tai Wan Di Qu Jie Yan Ling [Order Terminating Martial Law] (ROC) (1987) <http://law.moj. 
gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=A0000016> accessed 20 August 2014. 
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restriction, such as by prohibiting the establishment of new political 
parties.71  These external and internal factors conWULEXWHGWRWKH52&¶VODFN
of interaction with the international human rights regime during that 
time.72 
On 29 September 1972, the PRC sent a communication to the UN 
Secretary-General stating that:   
1. With regard to the multilateral treaties signed, ratified or 
acceded to by the defunct Chinese government before the 
HVWDEOLVKPHQWRIWKH*RYHUQPHQWRIWKH3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI
China, my Government will examine their contents before 
making a decision in the light of the circumstances as to 
whether or not they should be recognized.   
2. As from October 1, 1949, the day of the founding of the 
3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLF RI&KLQD WKH&KLDQJ.DL-shek clique has 
no right at all to represent China.  Its signature and 
ratification of, or accession to, any multilateral treaties by 
uVXUSLQJWKHQDPHRIµ&KLQD¶DUHDOOLOOHJDODQGQXOODQGYRLG
My Government will study these multilateral treaties before 
making a decision in the light of the circumstances as to 
whether or not they should be acceded to.73 
Although it appears that no official UN statement was released following 
WKH 35&¶V FRPPXQLFDWLRQ WKH UHFRUG RI WUHDW\ SDUWLFLSDWLRQ WKDW WKH 81
currently holds implies acceptance of the PRC position.  The treaties that 
                                                            
71  Jie Yan Fa [Martial Law] (ROC) (1949) <http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAllIf.aspx? 
PCode=F0070002> accessed 20 August 2014. 
72  Fort Fu-Te Liao and Jau-<XDQ +ZDQJ µ7KLQN *OREDOO\ 'R /RFDOO\ ± Internationalizing 
7DLZDQ¶V +XPDQ 5LJKWV 5HJLPH¶ LQ Peter C Y Chow (ed), 7DLZDQ¶V 0RGHUQL]DWLRQ LQ *OREDO
Perspective (Praeger 2002) 79. 
73 817& µ+LVWRULFDO Information: China, Note 1¶ <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/HistoricalInfo. 
aspx?#%22China%22> accessed 20 August 2014. 
207 
the ROC adhered to did not automatically bind the PRC.  Today, with a few 
exceptions, the dates of signature, ratification or accession set out in the 
UN Treaty Collection database reflect the actions taken by the PRC, not the 
ROC.74  A complete list of human rights treaties signed and/or ratified by 
the ROC government prior to its de-recognition is set out in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Human right treaties signed and/or ratified by  
the ROC government prior to its de-recognition75 
Treaty Name 
Date of 
52&¶V 
Signature 
(s), or 
Ratification 
Date of 
35&¶V 
Signature 
(s), 
Accession 
(a), or 
Ratification 
'HSRVLWRU\¶V
Record for 
³&KLQD´ 
Notes 
Convention on 
the Prevention 
and Punishment 
of the Crime of 
Genocide 
20/07/1949 
(s) 
05/05/1951 
18/04/1983 
20/07/1949 
(s)  
18/04/1983 
The PRC declared 
ratification by the 
³7DLZDQORFDO
authoritieV´ 
as null and void. 
Convention on 
the Political 
Rights of Women 
09/06/1953 
(s)  
21/12/1953 
  
Czechoslovakia, 
Denmark, India, 
the Soviet Union, 
the United 
Kingdom and 
Yugoslavia 
objected to the 
52&¶VVLJQDWXUH
and ratification. 
                                                            
74 )RUGDWHVRIUDWLILFDWLRQRIKXPDQULJKWVWUHDWLHVE\³&KLQD ´VHH817&µ&KDSWHUIV: Human 
Rights¶ <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en> accessed 20 
August 2014. 
75 The selection of human rights treaties is based on the list SURYLGHG LQ WKH 52&¶V 
Human Rights Policy White Paper.  The original list also includes the UN Charter, the Final Act 
of the United Nations Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness, and 
the 1949 Geneva Convetions.  Sources of dates and notes include: 52&µ5en Quan Li Guo Yu 
Ren Quan Bao Zhang De Ji Chu Jian She ± 2002 Nian Guo Jia Ren Quan Zheng Ce Bai Pi Shu 
[Human Rights Infrastructure-Building for a Human Rights State ± 2002 Human Rights Policy 
White Paper of the Republic of China (Taiwan)@¶Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ROC) Letter, Wai-
Tiao-Yi-Zi No. 09101164450; UNTC, µMultilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-
General¶ <http://treaties.un.org/pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx> accessed 20 August 2014; 
International Committee of the Red Cross, µ1949 Conventions and Additional Protocols, and 
Their Commentaries¶ <http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreaties1949.xsp> accessed 
20 August 2014; UNESCO, µConventions¶ <http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID= 
12025&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=-471.html> accessed 20 August 2014.  
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Treaty Name 
Date of 
52&¶V 
Signature 
(s), or 
Ratification 
Date of 
35&¶V 
Signature 
(s), 
Accession 
(a), or 
Ratification 
'HSRVLWRU\¶V
Record for 
³&KLQD´ 
Notes 
Slavery 
Convention, 
signed at Geneva 
on 25 September 
1926 and 
amended by the 
Protocol 
07/12/1953 
(s) 
14/12/1955 
   
Protocol 
amending the 
Slavery 
Convention 
signed at Geneva 
on 25 September 
1926 
07/12/1953 
(s) 
14/12/1955 
  
The PRC declared 
signature and 
ratification by the 
³7DLZDQ 
DXWKRULWLHV´DV
null and void. 
Convention on 
the Nationality of 
Married Women 
20/02/1957 
(s)  
22/09/1958  
 
20/02/1957 
(s)  
22/09/1958  
Czechoslovakia, 
Denmark, India, 
the Soviet Union, 
the United 
Kingdom and 
Yugoslavia 
objected to the 
52&¶VVLJQDWXUH
and ratification. 
Supplementary 
Convention on 
the Abolition of 
Slavery, the 
Slave Trade, and 
Institutions and 
Practices Similar 
to Slavery 
23/5/1957 
(s)  
28/05/1959 
  
Czechoslovakia, 
Denmark, India, 
the Soviet Union, 
the United 
Kingdom and 
Yugoslavia 
objected to the 
52&¶VVLJQDWXUH
and ratification. 
ILO C100 - Equal 
Remuneration 
Convention 
01/03/1958 02/11/1990 02/11/1990  
ILO C105 - 
Abolition of 
Forced Labour 
Convention 
23/01/1959    
ILO C111 - 
Discrimination 
(Employment and 
Occupation) 
Convention 
31/08/1961 12/01/2006 12/01/2006  
ILO C081 - 
Labour Inspection 
Convention 
26/09/1961    
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Treaty Name 
Date of 
52&¶V 
Signature 
(s), or 
Ratification 
Date of 
35&¶V 
Signature 
(s), 
Accession 
(a), or 
Ratification 
'HSRVLWRU\¶V
Record for 
³&KLQD´ 
Notes 
ILO C098 - Right 
to Organise and 
Collective 
Bargaining 
Convention 
10/09/1962    
ILO C105 - 
Abolition of 
Forced Labour 
Convention 
10/09/1962    
ILO C095 - 
Protection of 
Wages 
Convention 
22/10/1962    
Convention on 
Consent to 
Marriage, 
Minimum Age for 
Marriage and 
Registration of 
Marriages 
04/04/1963 
(s) 
  
The PRC declared  
signature by the  
³7DLZDQ
DXWKRULWLHV´ 
as null and void. 
International 
Convention on 
the Elimination of 
All Forms of 
Racial 
Discrimination 
31/03/1966 
(s) 
14/11/1970 
29/12/1981 
(a) 
29/12/1981 
(a) 
The PRC declared  
signature by the  
³7DLZDQ
DXWKRULWLHV´ 
as null and void. 
International 
Covenant on Civil 
and Political 
Rights 
05/10/1967 
(s) 
05/10/1998 
(s) 
05/10/1998 
(s) 
Bulgaria, 
Byelorussian SSR, 
Czechoslovakia, 
Mongolia, 
Romania, the 
Ukrainian SSR, 
the Soviet Union 
and Yugoslavia 
objected to the 
52&¶VVLJQDWXUH. 
Optional Protocol 
to the 
International 
Covenant on Civil 
and Political 
Rights 
05/10/1967 
(s) 
  
Bulgaria, 
Byelorussian SSR, 
Czechoslovakia, 
Mongolia, 
Romania, the 
Ukrainian SSR, 
the Soviet Union 
and Yugoslavia 
objected to the 
52&¶VVLJQDWXUH. 
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Treaty Name 
Date of 
52&¶V 
Signature 
(s), or 
Ratification 
Date of 
35&¶V 
Signature 
(s), 
Accession 
(a), or 
Ratification 
'HSRVLWRU\¶V
Record for 
³&KLQD´ 
Notes 
International 
Covenant on 
Economic, Social 
and Cultural 
Rights 
05/10/1967 
(s) 
27/10/1997 
(s)  
27/03/2001 
27/10/1997 
(s)  
27/03/2001 
The PRC declared  
signature by the  
³7DLZDQ
DXWKRULWLHV´ 
as null and void. 
Convention 
against 
Discrimination in 
Education 
16/11/1964    
ILO C127 - 
Maximum Weight 
Convention 
23/12/1969    
ILO C092 - 
Accommodation 
of Crews 
Convention 
23/12/1970    
These records reveal varied practice among the treaty depositories and the 
lack of consensus regarding the validity of the ROC government¶V
signatures and ratifications prior to its de-recognition.  In terms of ILO and 
UNESCO treaties, WKH GHSRVLWRULHV¶ UHFRUGV RI ³&KLQD´ VROHO\ UHIOHFW WKH
DFWLRQV WDNHQE\ WKH35&ZKLFK VXJJHVWV WKDW WKH52&¶V VLJQDWXUHVDQG
ratifications are no longer recognised.  Yet no official statements can be 
IRXQGRQWKHYDOLGLW\RIWKH52&¶VVLJQDWXUHVDQGUDWLfications.  In terms of 
WKH81WKHUHFRUGVRI³&KLQD´DUHUDWKHULQFRQVLVWHQW,QPRVWFDVHVWKH
UHFRUGV RI WKH52&¶V DFWLRQV DUH UHSODFHG E\ WKRVH RI WKH 35&¶V DFWLRQV
However, the record for the Genocide Convention documents the date of 
signature by the ROC (and the date of ratification by the PRC), and the 
record for the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women show the 
dates of signature and ratification by the ROC.  It is unclear whether such 
discrepancies are deliberate or intended to demonVWUDWHWKH81¶VDWWLWXGH
towards the validity of the ROC government¶VVLJQDWXUHVDQGUDWLILFDWLRQV
prior to its de-recognition.  The issue of whether these treaties remain 
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binding upon Taiwan is subject to further examination and will be 
discussed in Section III.B.2.a of this chapter. 
After its de-recognition, the ROC government did not attempt to participate 
in human rights treaties until the mid-1990s.76  The first instrument to 
which the ROC considered acceding was the CRC. The government of the 
ROC sent several correspondences to the UN enquiring about the 
SRVVLELOLW\ RI 52&¶V DFFHVVLRQ WR &5&  ,Q  D UHSO\ IURP WKH 81
dismissed such possibility, citing General Assembly Resolution 2758 and 
emphasising that the PRC was the sole legitimate representative of 
China.77  According to existing records, no further action was taken by the 
ROC government to follow up on the issue. 
The 2000 Presidential Election saw the first change of political parties in 
government since the establishment of the ROC. A sign of the new 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V LQWHQWLRQ WR UH-establish engagement with the international 
KXPDQ ULJKWV UHJLPH FDQ EH REVHUYHG LQ 3UHVLGHQW &KHQ¶V LQDXJXUDO
DGGUHVVRI0D\WKDW\HDU +HVWDWHGWKDW³>W@KHQHZJRYHUQPHQWZLOO
request the Legislative Yuan [(the parliament)] to pass and ratify the 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO%LOORI5LJKWVDVDGRPHVWLFODZRI7DLZDQ«:HKRSHWRVHW
up an independent national human rights commission in Taiwan, thereby 
UHDOL]LQJ DQ DFWLRQ ORQJ DGYRFDWHG E\ WKH 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV´78  In October 
2002, pursuant to a proposal from the Executive Yuan (the cabinet), the 
Legislative Yuan began its deliberation on a bill concerning ratifying the 
ICCPR and the ICESCR.  Experts provided opinions on whether the ROC 
should ratify these two instruments, whether reservations should be 
                                                            
76 See Neary (n 52) 116. 
77 The reply from the UN was noted during a discussion concerning human rights treaties in 
the Legislative Yuan in 2007.  Legislative Yuan (ROC), µLi Fa Yuan Gong Bao [Official Gazette 
of the Legislative Yuan]¶ vol 96, issue 6 (12 January 2007) 159. 
78  Office of the President (ROC), µ3UHVLGHQW &KHQ¶V ,QDXJXUDO $GGUHVV¶ (20 May 2000) 
<http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=18907> accessed 20 
August 2014. 
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registered, and the difficulties in relation to depositing the instruments of 
ratification.79  In December of the same year, the Legislative Yuan adopted 
the proposed bill and added reservations to a number of provisions and a 
declaration.  For the ICCPR, reservations were made to Articles 6 (right to 
life) and 12 (freedom of movement), and for the ICESCR, a reservation 
was made to Article 8 (right to work).80  Additionally, a declaration was 
made concerning Article 1 of the ICCPR.  In the declaration, the Legislative 
Yuan indicated that:  
In practice, the UN only acknowledges the right of self-
determination of the people in colonies, trust territories, and 
non-self-governing territories, and the exercise of such a right 
must be predicated upon the affirmation and support by the UN 
General Assembly and other relevant institutions.  The UN 
General Assembly never listed Taiwan as a colony or non-self-
governing territory that have yet to achieve independence, and 
the people of Taiwan are not living under colonisation or other 
similar conditions.  Thus, according to existing international 
treaties and practice, since the Republic of China is already an 
independent sovereign State, the need for the exercise of the 
right to self-determination has ceased.81  
As this declaration reflected a questionable understanding of Article 1 of 
the ICCPR, a proposal to repeal this declaration was raised by one of the 
political parties.  However, the deliberation on the repeal was postponed 
                                                            
79 Legislative Yuan (ROC), µLi Fa Yuan Gong Bao [Official Gazette of the Legislative Yuan]¶ vol 
92, issue 3 (8 January 2003) 205-06. 
80 ibid 206. 
81 ibid 264. 
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and had not been continued before the issue of ratifying the two Covenants 
was again put before the Legislative Yuan in 2008.82  
In 2008, the Executive Yuan again proposed that the Legislative Yuan 
consider completing the ratification procedures for the two Covenants, but 
it was only in March 2009 that the Legislative Yuan adopted the bills 
concerning the ratification of the two Covenants, this time with neither 
reservations nor declarations. 83   On 14 May 2009, the ROC President 
formally signed the instruments of ratifications of the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR.84  7KHLQVWUXPHQWVQRWHGWKDW³WKHGXO\DXWKRULVHGUHSUHVHQWDWLYH
of the Republic of China signed the Covenant on behalf of the government 
RIWKH5HSXEOLFRI&KLQDRQ2FWREHU´DQGDFFRUGLQJO\WKH3UHVLGHQW
ratified the Covenants pursuant to the relevant provisions in the Covenants 
(Article 48 of the ICCPR and Article 26 of the ICESCR) and the 
constitutional procedure.85  A month after the instruments of ratification 
were sent to the UN Secretariat, the ROC received a letter from the Under 
Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, stating that the Secretary-General 
³ZDVLQQRSRVLWLRQWRDFFHSW7DLZDQ¶VUDWLILFDWLRQEHFDXVHRI815HVROXWLRQ
 ZKLFK UHFRJQL]HV WKH 3HRSOH¶V 5HSXEOLF RI &KLQD DV WKH VROH DQG
legitimate representativHRI&KLQD´86 
                                                            
82 Legislative Yuan (ROC), µLi Fa Yuan Gong Bao [Official Gazette of the Legislative Yuan]¶ vol 
92, issue 5 (15 January 2003) 694. 
83 Legislative Yuan (ROC), µLi Fa Yuan Gong Bao [Official Gazette of the Legislative Yuan]¶ vol 
98, issue 14 (7 April 2009) 518. 
84  2IILFH RI WKH 3UHVLGHQW 52& µ3UHVLGHQW 0D 6Lgns Instruments of Ratification of Two 
&RYHQDQWVRQ+XPDQ5LJKWV¶Q38). 
85 µGong Min Yu Zheng Zhi Quan Li Guo Ji Gong Yue Pi Zhun Shu [Instrument of Ratification to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]¶ (14 May 2009) <http://law.moj.gov. 
tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=Y0000049> accessed 20 August 2014 µJing Ji She Hui Wen 
Hua Quan Li Guo Ji Gong Yue Pi Zhun Shu [Instrument of Ratification to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights]¶ (14 May 2009) <http://law.moj.gov.tw/ 
LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=Y0000051> accessed 20 August 2014.  
86 µCore Document Forming Part of the Reports, Republic of China (Taiwan)¶ (September 2012) 
1 <http://www.humanrights.moj.gov.tw/public/Attachment/2102417215890.pdf> accessed 
20 August 2014. 
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A similar outcome can be observed in relation to the CEDAW.  In December 
2006, the Legislative Yuan began its deliberation on a bill concerning 
accession to the CEDAW.  Although doubts were expressed as to whether 
the instrument of accession could be successfully deposited with the UN,87 
the Legislative Yuan eventually completed the necessary procedure, 
without reservations or declarations. 88   The President signed the 
instrument of accession to the CEDAW on 9 February 2007, and the 
instrument was transmitted to the UN Secretary-*HQHUDO E\ WKH 52&¶V
diplomatic allies. 89   Nevertheless, the instrument of accession was 
eventually rejected by the UN Secretary-General in May 2007, and the 
attempt to officially participate in the CEDAW was unsuccessful.90   
Despite such difficulties, the ROC government continues to express its 
interest in participating in other international human rights treaties.  
Recently, in cooperation with the Presidential Office Human Rights 
Consultative Committee (an organ originally established to promote the 
domestic ratification procedure of the two Covenants),91 the Ministry of the 
Interior began studying the possibility of implementing the CRPD.  A public 
hearing on the necessity of signing the CRPD was held by the Ministry in 
July 2013, and relevant authorities, experts, and civil society groups were 
invited to contribute to the discussion.92  A similar process was initiated to 
examine the necessity of signing the Convention against Torture in August 
                                                            
87 Legislative Yuan (ROC), µLi Fa Yuan Gong Bao [Official Gazette of the Legislative Yuan]¶ vol 
96, issue 6 (12 January 2007) 161, 167. 
88 Legislative Yuan (ROC), µLi Fa Yuan Gong Bao [Official Gazette of the Legislative Yuan]¶ vol 
96, issue 10 (22 January 2007) 35. 
89 0LQLVWU\RI)RUHLJQ$IIDLUV52&µ0LQLVWU\RI)RUHLJQ$IIDLUV3URDFWLYHO\3URPRWHV7DLZDQ¶V
3DUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKH&('$:¶Q37). 
90 µ&RUH'RFXPHQW)RUPLQJ3DUWRIWKH5HSRUWV5HSXEOLFRI&KLQD7DLZDQ¶Q86) 118. 
91  2IILFH RI WKH 3UHVLGHQW 52& µ7KH 3UHVLGHQWLDO 2IILFH +XPDQ 5LJKWV &RQVXOWDWLYH
&RPPLWWHH 2ULJLQ RI WKH &RPPLWWHH¶ KWWSHQJOLVKSUHsident.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid= 
1425> accessed 20 August 2014. 
92 Ministry of Health and Welfare (ROC), µ³6hen Xin Zhang Ai Zhe Quan Li Gong Yue Shi Xing 
Fa Cao An´ 6hu Mian Bao Gao [Report on Draft Act to Implement the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities]¶ <http://www.moi.gov.tw/dsa/news_content.aspx?sn= 
7583> accessed 20 August 2014. 
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2013.93   The discussions are still on-going and as of August 2014, no 
conclusion has been reached as to whether the government would attempt 
to participate in these treaties. 
Since the UN considers Taiwan to be a part of the PRC and therefore 
ineligible to participate in international human rights treaties as a State 
party, one might expect that the human rights situation in Taiwan would 
EHDGGUHVVHG LQ WKH81 WUHDW\ERGLHV¶ UHSRUWLQJSURFHGXUHV LQ UHODWLRQ WR
the PRC.  However, that is not the case.  The human rights situation in 
Taiwan has not been discussed by any treaty body.  While the PRC is a 
State party to a number of core international human rights treaties,94 it 
has never reported on the implementation of those instruments in Taiwan.  
Available records concerning the reporting procedure also indicate that 
issues concerning Taiwan have not formed a part of the dialogue between 
the PRC and the treaty bodies. 
It might be worth noting that in the work of the UN human rights treaty 
bodies, the practice of Taiwan has been referred to in three individual 
communications before the Human Rights Committee, all involving issues 
concerning religious freedom.  Yet the references were made by parties to 
the communications not the Committee itself.  In Arenz v Germany, the 
authors of the communication listed Taiwan as one of the six countries that 
officially recognised Scientology as a religion, to support the applicability of 
Article 18 of the ICCPR to Scientology.95  As the Committee eventually 
                                                            
93 0LQLVWU\RIWKH,QWHULRU52&µ³:R*XR<RX:X4LDQJin Zhi Ku Xing Gong Yue =KL%L<DR´
Gong Ting Hui [Public Hearing on the Necessity of the Signing of the Convention against 
7RUWXUH@¶ http://www.moi.gov.tw/files/news_file/%E7%A6%81%E6%AD%A2%E9%85%B7 
%E5%88%91%E5%85%AC%E7%B4%84%E8%AD%B0%E7%A8%8B.doc> accessed 20 
August 2014. 
94 As of July 2014, the PRC is a party to the ICERD, the ICESCR, the CEDAW, the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the CRC, 
the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed conflict, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, and the CRPD. 
95 Arenz, Röder, and Röder v Germany, Communications No 1138/2002 (29 April 2004) UN 
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found the communication to be inadmissible, it did not comment on the 
merits of the case or whether the practice of Taiwan informed the 
interpretation of Article 18.  In Yeo-Bum Yoon and Myung-Jin Choi v 
Republic of Korea and Eu-min Jung et al v The Republic of Korea, 
concerning compulsory military service and conscientious objectors, 
7DLZDQ¶V DOWHUQDWLYH VHUYLFH DUUDQJHPHQW ZDV UHIHUUHG WR E\ WKH DXWKRUV
and the State party.  In both instances, the authors were convicted of 
³HYDVLRQ RI HQOLVWPHQW´ DIWHU WKH\ UHIXVHG WR EH GUDIWHG GXH WR WKHLU
religious beliefs.96  They argued that, compared to the State party, Taiwan 
faced similar external threats to national security but nevertheless 
provided alternative forms of services to conscientious objectors.97  On the 
other hand, the State party distinguished its security environment from 
that of Taiwan in order to justify its refusal to accept exceptions to 
conscription.98   Although the Committee did consider the merits of the 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQV WKHUH LV QR FOHDU LQGLFDWLRQ WKDW WKH SDUWLHV¶ GLVFXVVLRQV
concerning Taiwan ZHUH WDNHQ LQWRDFFRXQW LQ WKH&RPPLWWHH¶V ILQGLQJRI
violations by the Republic of Korea of Article 18(1) of the ICCPR. 
B. Application of International Human Rights Treaties to the ROC (Taiwan) 
1. Capacity to Participate in International Human Rights Treaties 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the capacity of unrecognised entities to 
conclude or participate in international human rights treaties stems from 
the principle of necessity, or the needs of the international community.  
                                                                                                                                                            
Doc CCPR/C/80/D/1138/2002, para 6.8, n 8. 
96  Mr Yeo-Bum Yoon and Mr Myung-Jin Choi v Republic of Korea, Communication Nos 
1321/2004 and 1322/2004 (23 January 2007) UN Doc CCPR/C/88/D/1321-1322/2004, paras 
2.1-2.6; Eu-min Jung et al v The Republic of Korea, Communications Nos 1593 to 1603/2007 
(30 April 2010) UN Doc CCPR/C/98/D/1593-1603/2007, paras 2.1-2.12. 
97 Mr Yeo-Bum Yoon and Mr Myung-Jin Choi v Republic of Korea (n 96) para 5.4; Eu-min Jung 
et al v The Republic of Korea (n 96) para 10. 
98 Mr Yeo-Bum Yoon and Mr Myung-Jin Choi v Republic of Korea (n 96) para 6.5; Eu-min Jung 
et al v The Republic of Korea (n 96) para 4.3. 
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7KH QHFHVVLW\ IRU DFNQRZOHGJLQJ 7DLZDQ¶V capacity to participate in 
international human rights treaties derives from two sources: territorial 
control exercised by Taiwan and the principle of continuity of international 
human rights obligations.   
With regard to the former, this thesis argues that only the unrecognised 
entity, rather than its ³SDUHQW6WDWH´ is able to ensure that the rights set 
out in international human rights treaties are respected, protected and 
IXOILOOHG  7KH ³SDUHQW 6WDWH´ ZKRVH VRYHUHLJQW\ de jure extends to the 
territories controlled by the respective unrecognised entities, cannot as a 
matter of fact implement the obligations under international human rights 
treaties.  Turning to the case of Taiwan, since the establishment of the PRC 
in 1949, the PRC government has never exercised control over the 
territory of Taiwan.  Such lack of control continued after the de-recognition 
of the ROC government and still exists today.  Although increased 
exchanges between the PRC and Taiwan can be observed in the political, 
economic, and social spheres, the PRC has yet to exert real influence on 
the enjoyment of human rights in Taiwan.  By contrast, the Taiwanese 
government has set up a comprehensive governmental structure whose 
operation affects the daily life of individuals living in Taiwan, and the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VFRQWURORYHUWKHWHUULWRU\RI7DLZDQLVHIIHFWLYHDQGH[FOXVLYH
5HFDOOLQJ WKH DUJXPHQW LQ &KDSWHU  WKDW WKH REOLJDWLRQV WR ³UHVSHFW
SURWHFW DQG IXOILO´ GHPDQG WKH HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI D QDWLRQDO V\VWHP WR
ensure the enjoyment of human rights, it is the Taiwanese government, 
rather than the PRC, that is capable of providing such a system.  In view of 
7DLZDQ¶VFRQWURORYHU LWVWHUULWRU\ LW LVWKXVQHFHVVDU\WRDFNQRZOHGJH LWV
capacity to bear obligations under international human rights treaties in 
order for the rights provided in such treaties to be effectively implemented 
in this area. 
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,QDGGLWLRQDFNQRZOHGJLQJ7DLZDQ¶VFDSDFLW\WRSDUWLFLSDWHLQLQWHUQDWLRQDO
human rights treaties is also necessary for the continued application of 
international human rights treaties concluded by the ROC government prior 
to its de-recognition.  Of these human rights treaties, not all have been 
subsequently ratified or acceded to by the PRC government.  As 
demonstrated in Table 1, a number of treaties, including the Convention on 
the Political Rights of Women, the Slavery Convention and the subsequent 
amending Protocol, and many ILO conventions, have not been ratified by 
WKH35&DQG³&KLQD´LVQRWFRQVLGHUHGDSDUW\WRWKHVHWUHDWLHV$FFRUGLQJ
to the principle of continued application of international human rights 
obligations,99 once these treaties entered into force in Taiwan the rights of 
individuals within Taiwan became safeguarded by these treaties.  
Individuals in Taiwan should continue to enjoy those rights despite the 
FKDQJHVLQJRYHUQLQJHQWLW\RUWKHHQWLW\¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOOHJDOVWDWXV,WLV
therefore necessary to acknowledge that Taiwan has the capacity to bear 
obligations under the human rights treaties ratified before the de-
recognition of the ROC government.   
One may argue that such necessity can be minimised by having the PRC 
succeed the obligations under those treaties.  In the case of Hong Kong 
and Macau, after the PRC regained sovereign control over these areas in 
2007, the human rights treaties previously applicable to those areas have 
continued to apply, and the PRC has assumed obligations under those 
treaties in Hong Kong and Macau.100  Yet this thesis argues that the case of 
Taiwan is different from that of Hong Kong and Macau, and that it remains 
necessary that Taiwan, rather than the PRC, takes the role of duty-bearer 
under international human rights treaties.  Firstly, in the case of Taiwan, 
                                                            
99 This principle has been discussed in Chapter 3, Section III.A.2. 
100  -RKDQQHV &KDQ µ6WDWH 6XFFHVVLRQ WR +XPDQ 5LJKWV 7UHDWLHV +RQJ .RQJ DQG WKH
,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RYHQDQWRQ&LYLODQG3ROLWLFDO5LJKWV¶,&/4. 
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the PRC takes the view that the signatures and ratifications of the former 
government, the ROC government, were illegitimate and thus null and void.  
This view is shared by some other States, and the UN has implied its 
acceptance of this position by erasing most of the signature and ratification 
records of the ROC.101   In other words, the de-recognition of the ROC 
government has been treated as an issue of government recognition rather 
than a situation triggering the application of rules concerning State 
succession (as in the case of Hong Kong and Macau).  Accordingly the PRC 
has not been considered as the successor to obligations under treaties 
ratified by the ROC government prior to its de-recognition.  The necessity 
to continue the application of those treaties thus justifies the attribution of 
obligations under those treaties to Taiwan.  Secondly, as discussed in the 
previous paragraphs, Taiwan is the entity that is in control of its territory 
and capable of implementing the obligations of respecting, protecting and 
fulfilling human rights.  The lack of territorial control of the PRC over the 
territory of Taiwan (unlike the areas of Hong Kong and Macau) makes it 
unsuitable to carry out obligations under human rights treaties.   
In short, it is necessary to acknowledge that Taiwan has the capacity to 
participate in international human rights treaties.  In order for Taiwan to 
be bound by such treaties, there needs to be an expression of consent by 
7DLZDQDQGWKHIROORZLQJGLVFXVVLRQFRYHUV7DLZDQ¶VSUDFWLFHLQUHODWLRQWR
three means of expression of consent: submission of instruments of 
ratification/accession, unilateral declaration, and incorporation of human 
rights treaties into the domestic legal system. 
2. Expression of Consent to Be Bound by International Human Rights 
Treaties  
                                                            
101 See Table 1. 
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a. Submission of Instruments of Ratification/Accession 
In relation to the human rights treaties signed and/or ratified by the ROC 
government prior to its de-recognition, there have been no formal 
decisions adopted by the depositories of those treaties concerning the 
validity of the signatures and ratifications.  In the case of the UN, although 
WKH 35& KDV LVVXHG GHFODUDWLRQV VWDWLQJ WKDW WKH 52&¶V VLJQDWXUHV DQG
ratifications were illegal and null and void, the UN has not responded to 
such declarations.  Although the attitude of the UN toward this matter has 
not been clear, in WKH ³+LVWRULFDO ,QIRUPDWLRQ´ VHFWLRQ RI WKH 81 7UHDW\
6HULHV SXEOLFDWLRQ XQGHU ³&KLQD´ D QRWH FRQFHUQLQJ WKLV LVVXH KDV EHHQ
appended, which states WKDW ³>D@OO HQWULHV UHFRUGHG WKURXJKRXW WKLV
publication in respect of China refer to actions taken by the authorities 
UHSUHVHQWLQJ&KLQD LQWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQVDW WKHWLPHRI WKRVHDFWLRQV´102  
7KLVVWDWHPHQWPLJKWEH LQWHUSUHWHG WR LPSO\ WKDW WKH52&JRYHUQPHQW¶V
signatures and/or ratifications were considered valid at the time they were 
made.  Further, the rHFRUG RI&KLQD¶V SDUWLFLSDWLRQ WKDW WKH81 FXUUHQWO\
holds indeed includes a number of signatures and one ratification by the 
52& JRYHUQPHQW  +RZHYHU LQ PRVW FDVHV WKH UHFRUG RI WKH 52&¶V
signature and/or ratification was erased and replaced with the record of 
WKH35&¶VDFWLRQ :KLOH WKHYDOLGLW\RI WKH52& government¶V VLJQDWXUHV
and ratifications prior to its de-recognition remains disputed at the 
international level, according to the principle of continued application of 
international human rights obligations discussed above and in Chapter 3,103 
the treaties acceded to by the ROC prior to 1970 should continue to apply.  
                                                            
102 817&µ+LVWRULFDO,QIRUPDWLRQ&KLQD1RWH¶Q73). 
103 This principle has been discussed in Chapter 3, Section III.A.2. 
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Furthermore, it is clear that the ROC government considers itself bound by 
the treaties signed or ratified prior to its de-recognition.104 
Turning to the human rights treaties that Taiwan has attempted to 
participate in in recent years, the CEDAW, the ICCPR and the ICESCR, as 
noted previously, the instruments of ratification/accession that Taiwan 
submitted were not accepted by the UN Secretary-*HQHUDO:KLOH7DLZDQ¶V
DWWHPSWVZHUHQRWVXFFHVVIXOWKHVHVXEPLVVLRQVZKLFKLOOXVWUDWH7DLZDQ¶V
intention to be a party to the relevant instruments, may be considered as 
XQLODWHUDOGHFODUDWLRQVWKDWH[SUHVV7DLZDQ¶VFRQVHQWWREHERXQG 
b. Unilateral Declaration 
With regard to the CEDAW, the ICCPR and the ICESCR, in addition to the 
submission of instruments of ratification/accession, Taiwan has, on many 
occasions, unilaterally declared its consent to be bound by these 
instruments.  Government officials and organs have issued statements 
H[SUHVVLQJ WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V UHVROYH WR XQGHUWDNH WKH REOLJDWLRQV
embedded in the three treaties.  For instance, the Taiwanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs issued a press release on 30 April 2007, indicating the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V LQWHQWLRQ WR ³DELG>H@ E\ WKH >&('$:@¶V VWLSXODWLRQV´ 105  
$GGLWLRQDOO\ WKH 3UHVLGHQW KDV RQ RFFDVLRQ KLJKOLJKWHG WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V
SROLWLFDO ZLOO WR ³LPSOHPHQW´ WKH ,&&35 DQG WKH ,&(6&5 106   Similar 
GHFODUDWLRQVFDQDOVREHIRXQG LQ7DLZDQ¶VUHSRUWVRQWKH Lmplementation 
of the three instruments. 107   These statements can be considered as 
                                                            
104 µ&RUH'RFXPHQW)RUPLQJ3DUWRIWKH5HSRUWV5HSXEOLFRI&KLQD7DLZDQ¶Q86) 58. 
105 0LQLVWU\RI)RUHLJQ$IIDLUV52&µ0LQLVWU\RI)RUHLJQ$IIDLUV3URDFWLYHO\3URPRWHV7DLZDQ¶V
3DUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKH&('$:¶Q37). 
106  2IILFH RI WKH 3UHVLGHQW 52& µ3UHVLGHQW 0D 6LJQV ,QVWUXPHQWV RI 5DWification of Two 
&RYHQDQWVRQ+XPDQ5LJKWV¶Q38)µ&RUH'RFXPHQW)RUPLQJ3DUWRIWKH5HSRUWV5HSXEOLFRI
&KLQD7DLZDQ¶Q86) I (foreword by the ROC President). 
107  µ,nitial Report under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women¶ <http://www.iwomenweb.org.tw/Upload/UserFiles/%E5%88%9D%E6%AC% 
A1%E5%9C%8B%E5%AE%B6%E5%A0%B1%E5%91%8A.pdf> accessed 20 August 2014. 
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7DLZDQ¶V XQLODWHUDO GHFODUDWLRQ RI LWV FRQVHQW WR EH ERXQG E\ WKH WKUHH
international human rights treaties as the statements clearly indicate the 
intention to undertake international legal obligations.  As argued in Chapter 
3, the unilateral declarations issued by unrecognised entities should be 
considered binding as a matter of international law, considering that the 
capacity to issue such declarations closely relates to the capacity to 
FRQFOXGH RU SDUWLFLSDWH LQ WUHDWLHV  7KLV SRVLWLRQ GUDZV XSRQ WKH ,/&¶V
RSLQLRQWKDW³MXVWDVµHYHU\6WDWHSRVVHVVHVFDSDFLW\WRFRQFOXGHWUHDWLHV¶
every State can commit itself through acts whereby it unilaterally 
undertakes legal obligatioQV´108  Also, acknowledging such binding force in 
the case of unrecognised entities may remedy the legal vacuum created by 
their exclusion from official participation in international human rights 
treaties.  Thus, the official statements and declarations of Taiwan 
concerning its commitment to implement the three treaties should be 
considered as creating binding obligations under international human rights 
law. 
c. Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties into the Domestic Legal 
System 
The incorporation of international human rights treaties into the domestic 
OHJDOV\VWHPVKRZVWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VLQWHQWLRQWRHQIRUFHdomestically the 
rights provided in those treaties and can be interpreted as an expression of 
                                                                                                                                                            
For initial reports on the implementation of the two Covenants and an accompanying Core 
Document, see µImplementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
Initial Report Submitted under Article 40 of the Covenant: Republic of China (Taiwan)¶ 
(September 2012) <http://www.humanrights.moj.gov.tw/public/Attachment/21041062855. 
pdf!DFFHVVHG$XJXVWµImplementation of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: Initial Report Submitted under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: 
Republic of China (Taiwan)¶ (September 2012) <http://www.humanrights.moj.gov.tw/public/ 
Attachment/21041071263.pdf> accessed 20 August 2014; µCore Document Forming Part of 
the Reports: Republic of China (Taiwan)¶ (September 2012) <http://www.humanrights.moj. 
gov.tw/public/Attachment/2104105692.pdf> accessed 20 August 2014. 
108 ,/&µ*XLGLQJ3ULQFLSOHV$SSOLFDEOHWR8QLODWHUDO'HFODUDWLRQVRI6WDWHV&DSDEOHRI&UHDWLQJ
/HJDO2EOLJDWLRQVZLWK&RPPHQWDULHVWKHUHWR¶<HDUERRNRIWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ&RPPLVVLRn, 
2006, vol II(2) (2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/2006/Add.1 (Part 2) 371. 
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consent to be bound by them.  Such incorporation can be observed in 
various practices of the government.  In relation to the human rights 
treaties that the Taiwanese government has attempted to ratify, having 
predicted that its submissions of instruments of ratification/accession 
would not be accepted by the UN Secretary-General, the government 
decided to promulgate special legislation to incorporate the CEDAW, the 
ICCPR, and the ICESCR.109   
It is disputed whether the legal system in Taiwan is a monist system (and 
thus considering domestic law and international law as belonging to one 
unitary legal order) and whether international treaties have the status of 
domestic law, and in 1993, a related question was put to the Constitutional 
Court, which is mandated to issue Judicial Yuan Interpretations on 
constitutional controversies upon petition by individuals, members of the 
Legislative Yuan, or judges.110  $FFRUGLQJ WR WKH&RXUW¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ111 
had the UN Secretary-General accepted the instruments of 
ratification/accession, these human rights treaties would have undoubtedly 
become binding upon Taiwan and thus automatically become a part of the 
GRPHVWLF OHJDOV\VWHP7KH&RXUW¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHOHJDO
system in Taiwan is a monist one.  Yet, the instruments of 
ratification/accession were rejected by the UN, leaving the binding force of 
the treaties upon Taiwan open to question, and domestic legislation is 
needed in order to ensure that these human rights treaties acquire the 
status of domestic law in Taiwan.  Therefore, the Legislative Yuan passed 
acts for the purpose of implementation of treaties.  The Act to Implement 
                                                            
109  2IILFH RI WKH 3UHVLGHQW 52& µ3UHVLGHQW 0D 6LJQV ,QVWUXPHQWV RI 5DWLILFDWLRQ RI 7ZR
&RYHQDQWVRQ+XPDQ5LJKWV¶Q38). 
110  Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act (ROC) art 5 <http://www.judicial.gov.tw/ 
constitutionalcourt/EN/p07_2.asp?lawno=73> accessed 20 August 2014. 
111  Judicial Yuan (ROC), µJudicial Yuan Interpretation No. 392¶ (24 December 1993) 
<http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=329> accessed 20 
August 2014. 
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the ICCPR and the ICESCR was adopted in 2009, and Article 2 of that Act 
SURYLGHV WKDW ³+XPDQ ULJKWV SURWHFWLRQ SURYLVLRQV LQ WKH WZR&RYHQDQWV
KDYHGRPHVWLFOHJDOVWDWXV´112  The same Act also requires:  
All levels of governmental institutions and agencies should 
review laws, regulations, directions and administrative 
measures within their functions according to the two Covenants. 
All laws, regulations, directions and administrative measures 
incompatible to the two Covenants should be amended within 
two years after the Act enters into force by new laws, law 
amendments, law abolitions and improved administrative 
measures.113   
In 2011, the Legislative Yuan adopted the Enforcement Act of Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which 
contains similar provisions to the Act to Implement the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR.114 
)ROORZLQJ WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V DWWHPSW WR SDUWLFLSDWH LQ WKH WKUHH KXPDQ
rights treaties, the Ministry of Justice has been tasked with the function of 
overseeing the review required by the enforcement acts.  By June 2014, 
more than 260 pieces of legislation and other measures had been 
nominated as potentially incompatible with the two Covenants, and a 
process of further examination and amendment is under way. 115   In 
                                                            
112  Act to Implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ROC) art 2 
<http://mojlaw.moj.gov.tw/EngLawContent.aspx?id=3> accessed 20 August 2014. 
113 ibid art 8. 
114 Enforcement Act of Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (ROC) <http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=D0050175> 
accessed 20 August 2014. 
115 Ministry of Justice (ROC), µ263 Ze Wei Fan Gong Zheng Gong Yue Ji Jing She Wen Gong 
Yue Wei Xiu Zheng Zhi ³)a Lu An ´³0ing Ling An ´-i ³;ing Zheng Cuo Shi An´-ian Tao Jin 
Du [Progress of Review of 263 Unamended Laws, Orders and Administrative Measures 
Incompatible with ICCPR and the ICESCR]¶ <http://www.humanrights.moj.gov.tw/ct.asp? 
xItem=283349&CtNode=32910&mp=200> accessed 20 August 2014. 
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addition, a Human Rights Consultative Committee was created under the 
Office of the President, with the Vice President serving as the Chairperson 
of the Committee, to study international human rights law and relevant 
mechanisms and to provide opinion on human rights policies in Taiwan.  
This Committee is also mandated with the function of preparing national 
reports in accordance with the requirements under human rights treaties. 
Since these reports cannot be submitted to the UN human rights treaty 
bodies, the Taiwanese government has devised a unique mechanism that 
mirrors the UN treaty body reporting procedure.116  International human 
rights law experts, including a number of former members of UN treaty 
bodies, are invited to form a review committee for each of the three 
human rights instruments.117  7KHFRPPLWWHHVFRQGXFWUHYLHZVRI7DLZDQ¶V
national reports, and, at the end of the review process including dialogues 
with representatives from various government organs, issue concluding 
REVHUYDWLRQV RQ 7DLZDQ¶V LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI WKH UHVSHFWLYH KXPDQ ULJKWV
treaties.  Civil society organisations are also invited to participate in this 
process, by participating in the preparation of national reports, preparing 
shadow reports, and meeting with the experts.  The review of the initial 
report on the CEDAW was concluded in 2011, and the review of the initial 
reports on the two Covenants was concluded in March 2013.118 
Turning to the jurisprudence of domestic courts, invocation of the three 
international human rights treaties has become increasingly common.  The 
&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RXUWUHIHUUHGWRKXPDQULJKWVWUHDWLHVHYHQEHIRUH7DLZDQ¶V
                                                            
116 Documents relevant to the review process and videos of the review meetings are made 
available online.  See Ministry of Justice (ROC), µ&hu Ci Quo Jia Bao Gao Zhi Guo Ji Shen Cha 
(2013) [Review of Initial State Reports (2013)]¶ <http://www.humanrights.moj.gov.tw/np. 
asp?ctNode=33565&mp=200> accessed 20 August 2014. 
117 7KH H[SHUWV LQYLWHG WR UHYLHZ 7DLZDQ¶V ILUVW UHSRUW RQ WKH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI WKH ,&&35
were Nisuke Ando, Jerome Cohen, Shanthi Dairiam, Asma Jahangir, and Manfred Nowak, and 
the experts for the review of the ICESCR report were Philip Alston, Theodoor Cornelis van 
Boven, Virginia Bonoan-Dandan, Eibe Riedel, and Heisoo Shin. 
118 For concluding observations and recommendations of the review panel, see Ministry of 
Justice (ROC), µConcluding Observations and Recommendations¶ <http://www.humanrights. 
moj.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=298633&ctNode=33698&mp=200> accessed 20 August 2014.   
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attempt to ratify the CEDAW, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR.  Yet in its earlier 
interpretations, the international human rights instruments were invoked 
as evidence of international trend or universal value, rather than binding 
sources of law.  For instance, Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 582, adopted 
in July 2004, listed Article 14(3)(e) of the ICCPR (along with provisions of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, the Constitution of the US, and 
the Codes of Criminal Procedure of Japan and Germany) as evidence that 
the right of a defendant to examine the witnesses against him/her has 
EHHQ³XQLYHUVDOO\SURYLGHG´119   
After the incorporation of the three treaties into the domestic legal system, 
the Constitutional Court has made increased use of the three treaties in 
Judicial Yuan Interpretations, and a number of general comments adopted 
by the treaty bodies have been used to determine the scope of rights.  For 
instance, Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 710, adopted in July 2013, 
examined the constitutionality of a provision in domestic legislation on the 
expulsion of PRC nationals who legally entered the territory of the ROC, 
and the Court referred to Article 12 of the ICCPR and paragraph 6 of the 
+XPDQ 5LJKWV &RPPLWWHH¶V *HQHUDO &RPPHQW 1R  DUULYLQJ DW WKH
conclusion that the constitutional protection of freedom of movement 
extends to such PRC nationals. 120   The trend of applying international 
human rights treaties can be particularly observed in the individual 
opinions of Justices.121  Justice Shin-Min Chen, in his concurring opinion for 
                                                            
119  Judicial Yuan (ROC), µJudicial Yuan Interpretation No 582¶ (23 July 2004) 
<http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=582> accessed 20 
August 2014. 
120  Judicial Yuan (ROC), µJudicial Yuan Interpretation No. 710¶ (5 July 2013) 
<http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/p03_01.asp?expno=710> accessed 20 
August 2014 (in Chinese). 
121  Eg Judicial Yuan (ROC), µJudicial Yuan Interpretation No. 708¶ (6 February 2013), 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Yeong-Chin Su <http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/ 
uploadfile/C100/708%E5%8D%94%E5%90%8C%E6%84%8F%E8%A6%8B%E6%9B%B8_%
E8%98%87%E5%A4%A7%E6%B3%95%E5%AE%98%E6%B0%B8%E6%AC%BD_.pdf> 
accessed 20 August 2014 (in Chinese) (freedom of movement); Judicial Yuan (ROC), µJudicial 
Yuan Interpretation No. 696¶ (20 January 2012), Concurring Opinion by Justice Lo-chang Fa 
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Interpretation No. 701, adopted in July 2012, specified that Article 12 of 
the ICESCR, which has now obtained domestic legal status, requires the 
³FUHDWLRQ RI FRQGLWLRQV ZKLFK ZRXOG DVVXUH WR DOO PHGLFDO VHUYLFH DQG
PHGLFDO DWWHQWLRQ LQ WKH HYHQW RI VLFNQHVV´ 122  and such a requirement 
establishes a new right in the domestic legal system.   
In addition to the Constitutional Court, courts of all levels in Taiwan have 
applied the CEDAW, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR more frequently and in 
more detail. 123   6XEVHTXHQW WR WKH UHYLHZ RI 7DLZDQ¶V UHSRUWV RQ WKH
implementation of the two Covenants, a number of judgments even refer 
to specific concluding observations adopted by the committee of experts.  
For instance, in two cases decided by the Taipei High Administrative Court 
concerning the denial of resident visa applications for foreign spouses, the 
judgments refer to paragraph 46 of the concluding observations concerning 
³PDUULDJHLPPLJUDQWV´IURP6RXWKHDVW$VLDDQGWKHGLIILFXOWLHVWKH\IDFHLQ
their enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights.124   
Although under international law, the incorporation of rules of international 
law into a domestic legal system does not automatically create binding 
international obligations, all the measures described above in fact reinforce 
the unilateral declarations which commit Taiwan to the three international 
human rights treaties. Further, they show that the government has acted 
in the belief that it is under an obligation to implement the three treaties 
and in fact has the capacity to do so, which echoes the necessity argument 
                                                                                                                                                            
<http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/uploadfile/C100/696%E5%8D%94%E5%90%
8C%E6%84%8F%E8%A6%8B%E6%9B%B8_%E7%BE%85%E6%98%8C%E7%99%BC_.pdf
> accessed 20 August 2014 (in Chinese) (the right to marry and found a family). 
122  Judicial Yuan (ROC), µJudicial Yuan Interpretation No. 701¶ (6 July 2012), Concurring 
Opinion by Justice Shin-Min Chen <http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/uploadfile/ 
C100/%E9%87%8B701%E5%8D%94%E5%90%8C%E6%84%8F%E8%A6%8B%E6%9B%B8
-E9%99%B3%E5%A4%A7%E6%B3%95%E5%AE%98%E6%96%B0%E6%B0%91.pdf> 
accessed 20 August 2014 (in Chinese) (right to health). 
123 Eg Supreme Court (ROC) Judgment, 99-Tai-Shang-1983 (31 March 2010); Supreme Court 
(ROC) Judgment, 98-Tai-Shang-5283 (17 September 2009). 
124 Eg Taipei High Administrative Court (ROC) Judgment, 102-Su-16 (23 May 2013); Taipei 
High Administrative Court (ROC) Judgment, 102-Su-259 (23 May 2013).  
228 
that Taiwan is the proper duty-bearer to respect, protect and fulfil human 
rights in the territory that it controls. 
IV. The Application of General International Human Rights Law 
to the ROC (Taiwan) 
A. The ROC (Taiwan) and General International Human Rights Law 
The discussion below provides a survey of the practice concerning the 
52&¶V LQYROYHPHQW LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO ERGLHVZKRVHZRUN UHODWHV WR JHQHUDO
international human rights law, as well as their attitudes concerning the 
human rights situations in Taiwan.  Such practice will then serve as the 
basis for the subsequent discussion regarding the applicability of general 
international human rights law to Taiwan. 
1. Before the De-Recognition of the ROC Government 
Soon after the establishment of the UN, its Economic and Social Council 
adopted a resolution establishing the Commission on Human Rights.  The 
same resolution mandated the Commission to prepare an international bill 
of rights and designated the initial seven members of the nuclear 
Commission, including an ROC representative.125  Per a recommendation 
by the nuclear Commission,126 in 1946, a full Commission was established 
to draft an international bill of rights.127  Peng-chun Chang of the ROC was 
the Vice-Chair of both the Commission and the Drafting Committee tasked 
                                                            
125 81(&262&µ&RPPLVVLRQRQ+XPDQ5LJKWVDQG6XE-&RPPLVVLRQRQWKH6WDWXVRI:RPHQ¶
(22 February 1946) UN Doc E/27, para 7.  As the Economic and Social Council decided to 
HVWDEOLVK &RPPLVVLRQ RQ +XPDQ 5LJKWV LW LQGLFDWHG WKDW ³>L@QLWLDOO\ WKH &RPPLVVLRQ VKDOO
consist of a nucleus of nine members appointed in their individual capacity for a term of office 
expiring on 31 March 1947 .´  The nuclear Commission served most of the functions 
designated to the Commission on Human Rights and was tasked to make recommendations 
regarding the composition of the Commission.  ibid para 6. 
126 81(&262&µ'UDIW5HVROXWLRQRIWKH(FRQRPLFDQd Social Council: Commission on Human 
5LJKWV¶-XQH81'RF(SDUD 
127 81(&262&µ'UDIW5HVROXWLRQ&RQFHUQLQJWKH5HSRUWRIWKH&RPPLVVLRQRQ+XPDQ5LJKWV¶
-XQH81'RFǭȉ5HY 
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to prepare a text that would later become the UDHR.  He is known for 
introducing Chinese approaches to various issues in the drafting process 
and considered to be instrumental in resolving many stalemates during 
negotiation.128  An example of the former characteristic can be observed in 
the discussion on draft Article 16 (ultimately Article 18) on freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion.  He introduced the Chinese approach to 
religious issues, emphasising the pluralistic tolerance embedded in Chinese 
philosophy. 129   When the draft declaration was put to a vote on 10 
December 1948, the ROC was among the 48 States that voted in favour.130  
The ROC also participated in the work of the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.  For instance, 
when the Sub-Commission was considering drafting a set of principles on 
freedom and non-discrimination in the matter of religious rights and 
practices, the ROC representative expressed support towards this exercise 
by referring to the provision in the ROC constitution which guarantees 
freedom of religious belief for all.131 
2. After the De-Recognition of the ROC Government 
After 1971, Taiwan lost most of its opportunities to participate in any inter-
governmental organisations or forums, including those related to human 
rights, and the human rights situation in Taiwan has received little 
attention from the UN and other international organisations.  Although 
there have been instances where the UN human rights special procedures 
mandate holders have noted issues of human rights concern in Taiwan, the 
references have been very limited, and only one actually addressed the 
                                                            
128  See John P Humphrey, Human Rights & the United Nations: A Great Adventure 
(Transnational 1984) 23. 
129 81*$µ+XQGUHGDQG7ZHQW\-SeventK0HHWLQJRIWKH7KLUG&RPPLWWHH1RYHPEHU¶
(1948) UN Doc A/C.3/SR.127, 398. 
130 UN GAOR 3rd Session, 183th Plenary Meeting (10 December 1948) UN Doc A/PV.183, 933. 
131 81&+5 µ'UDIW 3ULQFLSOHV RQ )UHHGRP DQG 1RQ-Discrimination in the Matter of Religious 
5LJKWVDQG3UDFWLFHV¶'HFHPEHU81'RF(&1 
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obligations of Taiwan under international human rights law.  In November 
1998, 3,000 tonnes of toxic waste, exported by a Taiwanese petrochemical 
firm (Formosa Plastics), was dumped in Sihanoukville, Cambodia, and this 
incident was linked to cases of deaths and illness in the local community.132  
Furthermore, the demonstration against such dumping resulted in the 
arrest of two protesters.  After receiving relevant information, the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the Adverse Effects of the Movement and Dumping 
of Toxic and Dangerous Products and Wastes on the Enjoyment of Human 
Rights sent communications to the governments of Cambodia and Taiwan 
respectively.  According to the report prepared by the Special Rapporteur, 
QR UHSO\ IURP WKH ³*RYHUQPHQW RI 7DLZDQ SURYLQFH RI &KLQD´ ZDV
received,133 and the comment of the Special Rapporteur only contained 
recommendations to the measures to be taken by the Cambodian 
government.  In the report, no reference was made in relation to the role 
that the Taiwanese government should play in this regard.   
Another incident that caught the attention of UN special procedures was 
the eviction of residents in the Lo-Sheng Sanatorium in Taipei.  The 
Sanatorium was built in 1930 as an isolation hospital for leprosy patients.  
While it no longer serves the function of an isolation hospital, 300 residents 
remain in the Sanatorium.  The eviction controversy arose when the plan 
for a new line of the Mass Rapid Transit System134 was revealed, and the 
Lo-Sheng Sanatorium was designated as one of the locations for the 
construction.  In order to facilitate such construction, the eviction of the 
Sanatorium residents was planned.  Upon receiving relevant information, 
                                                            
132 Human Rights Watch, Toxic Justice: Human Rights, Justice and Toxic Waste in Cambodia 
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/cambotox/> accessed 15 July 2013.  
133 81&+5 µ$GYHUVH (IIHFWV RI WKH ,OOicit Movement and Dumping of Toxic and Dangerous 
Products and Wastes on the Enjoyment of Human Rights: Report Submitted by Special 
5DSSRUWHXURQ7R[LF:DVWH¶0DUFK81'RF(&1 
134 The system is now known as the Taipei Metro, a transit system similar to the London 
underground. 
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the UN Special Rapporteurs on the Right to Health and on the Right to an 
Adequate Standard of Living issued a joint statement, expressing their 
concern over the imminent eviction.  In the statement, the Special 
5DSSRUWHXUV ³UHPLQG>HG@ WKH authorities of their obligations under 
international human rights law, including the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, especially with regard to the right to 
KHDOWK DQG WKH ULJKW WR DGHTXDWH KRXVLQJ´135  7KH\ IXUWKHU XUJHG ³WKe 
DXWKRULWLHV´ WR HQJDJH LQ FRQVXOWDWLRQ ZLWK WKH 6DQDWRULXP UHVLGHQWV WR
explore all possible alternatives, and in the case of eviction, to provide 
adequate remedies and procedures to those affected.136  At the time this 
statement was issued, Taiwan had not attempted to ratify the ICESCR, and 
the Special Rapporteurs did not provide further elaboration on the sources 
of law supporting their statement.  Nevertheless, this marks the only 
occasion where UN special procedures human rights mandate holders have 
remDUNHGRQWKH³REOLJDWLRQV´RI7DLZDQXQGHULQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQULJKWV
law.   
There have been reports of Taiwanese local NGOs sending other Special 
Procedures mandate holders communications of alleged human rights 
violations by the Taiwanese government, and some NGOs reportedly met 
with the relevant mandate holders to discuss their communications.  For 
instance, the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
reportedly acknowledged receipt of a communication by a Taiwanese NGO 
concerning the goveUQPHQW¶V UHIXVDO WR UHFRJQLVH WKH Pingpu, tribes of 
aborigines originally residing in lowland regions in Taiwan, as indigenous 
people. 137   Yet, these communications have not been recorded in any 
                                                            
135 812+&+5 µ81([SHUWV([SUHVV&RQFHUQRYHU,PPLQHQW(YLFWLRQRI7DLZDQHVH5HVLGHQWV 
in Lo-Sheng Sanatorium¶ (20 July 2005) <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/ 
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=3329&LangID=E> accessed 20 August 2014. 
136 ibid. 
137  µ3LQJSX 5HFRJQLWLRQ :RXOG 5HTXLUH /DZ 5HYLVLRQ &,3¶ Taipei Times (27 May 2010) 
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official reports submitted by those mandate holders, and no known action 
has been taken by the Special Rapporteur. 
Another mechanism in the UN human rights machinery is the Universal 
Periodic Review (UPR), which examines, on a periodic basis, the fulfilment 
E\HDFKRIWKH81¶V0HPEHU6WDWHVRIWKHLUKXPDQULJKWVREOLJations and 
commitments.138  $OWKRXJKWKHPHFKDQLVPDLPVWREH³XQLYHUVDO´LQQDWXUH
the human rights situation in Taiwan has not been examined in this context.  
The PRC underwent its first UPR in February 2009 and its second UPR in 
October 2013, and none of the documents forming the basis of the 
review 139  (national report, 140  compilation of UN information, 141  and 
VXPPDU\ RI VWDNHKROGHUV¶ VXEPLVVLRQV 142 ) included information on the 
human rights situation in Taiwan.  Neither was the issue raised by other 
States during the dialogues with China or addressed in the final UPR 
reports.143 
                                                                                                                                                            
<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/05/27/2003473997> accessed 20 
August 2014. 
138 UNGA Res 60/251 (15 March 2006) UN Doc A/RES/60/251, para 5(e). 
139 UN Human Rights Council Res 5/1 (18 June 2007) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/5/1, Annex, para 
15. 
140 µ1DWLRQDO5HSRUWV6XEPLWWHG LQ$FFRUGDQFHZLWK3DUDJUDSKDRI WKH$QQH[WR+XPDQ
5LJKWV &RXQFLO 5HVROXWLRQ  &KLQD¶  1RYHPEHU  81 'RF A/HRC/WG.6/4/CHN/1; 
µ1DWLRQDO 5HSRUW 6XEPLWWHG LQ $FFRUGDQFH ZLWK 3DUDJUDSK  RI WKH $QQH[ WR+XPDQ5LJKWV
&RXQFLO5HVROXWLRQ&KLQD¶$XJXVW81'RF$+5&:*&+1 
141  µ&RPSLODWLRQ 3UHSDUHG E\ WKH 2IILFH RI WKH +LJK &RPPLVVLRQHU IRU +XPDn Rights, in 
Accordance with Paragraph 15(b) of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1: China 
LQFOXGLQJ +RQJ .RQJ DQG 0DFDR 6SHFLDO $GPLQLVWUDWLYH 5HJLRQV +.6$5 DQG 06$5¶ 
'HFHPEHU  81 'RF $+5&:*&+1 µ&RPSLODWLRQ 3UHSDUHG E\ Whe Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights in Accordance with Paragraph 15 (b) of the Annex to 
Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1 and paragraph 5 of the Annex to Council Resolution 
 &KLQD ,QFOXGLQJ +RQJ .RQJ &KLQD DQG 0DFDR &KLQD¶  $Xgust 2013) UN Doc 
A/HRC/WG.6/17/CHN/2. 
142  µ6XPPDU\ 3UHSDUHG E\ WKH 2IILFH RI WKH +LJK &RPPLVVLRQHU IRU +XPDQ 5LJKWV LQ
Accordance with Paragraph 15(c) of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1: 
People's Republic of China (including Hong Kong and Macao Special Administrative Regions 
+.6$5DQG06$5¶-DQXDU\81'RF$+5&:*&+1µ6XPPDU\3UHSDUHG
by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Accordance with Paragraph 15 
(b) of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1 and Paragraph 5 of the Annex to 
&RXQFLO5HVROXWLRQ3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI&KLQD,QFOXGLQJ+RQJ.RQJDQG0DFDR6SHFLDO
$GPLQLVWUDWLYH5HJLRQV+.6$506$5¶-XO\81'RF$+5&:*&+1 
143 µ5HSRUWRI WKH:RUNLQJ*URXSRQWKH8QLYHUVDO3HULRGLF5HYLHZ&KLQD¶ 2FWREHU
81'RF$+5&µ5HSRUWRIWKH:RUNLQJ*URXSRQWKH8QLYHUVDO3HULRGLF5HYLHZ&KLQD
,QFOXGLQJ+RQJ.RQJ&KLQDDQG0DFDR&KLQD¶'HFHPEHU81'RF$+5& 
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Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the UN Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues (UNPFII), established by the UN Economic and Social 
&RXQFLO WR ³GLVFXVV LQGLJHQRXV LVVXHV « UHODWLQJ WR HFRQomic and social 
development, culture, the environment, education, health and human 
ULJKWV´144 has been attended by representatives of both the Taiwanese 
government and local NGOs since its inaugural session in 2002.  Taiwan 
even hosted the 2009 Asian preparatory meeting for the Eighth UNPFII.  
Reports written by the participants suggest that issues concerning the 
indigenous peoples in Taiwan or raised by the Taiwanese delegation were 
discussed.145   However, no relevant conclusion or recommendation was 
made in WKH813),,¶VUHSRUWVDVDUHVXOWRIVXFKGLVFXVVLRQV146 
While inter-governmental organisations have paid little attention to the 
human rights situations in Taiwan, international NGOs have more often 
addressed issues of human rights concerning Taiwan.  The reports and 
VWDWHPHQWVLVVXHGE\1*2VDUHRIWHQFULWLFDORIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSUDFWLFH
in relation to the death penalty,147 treatment of migrant workers,148 and 
rights of indigenous peoples,149 amongst others issues.  In fact, a number 
of international NGOs have included issues of human rights in Taiwan in 
their submissions to various UN organs, even though such submissions 
                                                            
144 81(&262&µ(VWDEOLVKPHQWRID3HUPDQHQW)RUXPRQ,QGLJHQRXV,VVXHV¶5HV
July 2000) para 2. 
145 Hui-wen Chinµ&DQ<X/LDQ+H*XR'L:X-LH<XDQ=KX0LQ=X<L7L&KDQJ6KH/XQ7DQ<X
:HL/DL=KDQ:DQJ>3DUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKH)LIWK813),,DQG)XWXUH3URVSHFWV@¶Xin Shi Ji Zhi Ku 
Lun Tan [New Century Think Tank Forum]  (30 December 2006) 86 <http://www.taiwanncf. 
org.tw/ttforum/36/36-14.pdf> accessed 20 August 2014; Patrick Thornberry, Indigenous 
Peoples and Human Rights (Manchester UP 2002) 13. 
146 Council of Indigenous Peoples, Executive Yuan (ROC), µCan Jia 2011 Nian Di 10 Jie Lian He 
Guo Yuan Zhu Min Zu Yi Ti Chang She Lun Tan [Report on the Participation of the 10th UN 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in 2011]¶ (30 July 2011) 18 <http://www.taiwan.gov. 
tw/public/Attachment/343011392871.pdf> accessed 20 August 2014. 
147 Human Rights Watch, µTaiwan: Reinstate Moratorium on Death Penalty: 12 Executions in 4 
Months Sets Back Rule of Law¶  $SULO  <http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/25/ 
taiwan-reinstate-moratorium-death-penalty> accessed 20 August 2014. 
148  0LJUDQW)RUXPLQ$VLDµ6XEPLVVLRQWRWKH&RPPLWWHHRQ0LJUDQW:RUNHUV'D\RI*HQHUDO
'LVFXVVLRQRQ8QGRFXPHQWHG0LJUDQW:RUNHUV¶ -5 <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ 
bodies/cmw/docs/DGD/MigrantForumAsia_DGD2011.pdf> accessed 20 August 2014. 
149   0LQRULW\ 5LJKWV *URXS ,QWHUQDWLRQDO µ6WDWH RI WKH :RUOG
V 0LQRULWLHV DQG ,QGLJHQRXV
3HRSOHV¶KWWSZZZPLQRULW\ULJKWVRUJGRZQORDGSKS"LG !accessed 
20 August 2014. 
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usually do not result in any substantive discussions in the UN.  For instance, 
in a 1993 report concerning the solution of problems involving minorities 
submitted by Asbjørn Eide, a member of the former Sub-Commission on 
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, recorded a submission by 
the International Catholic Migration Commission.  The submission 
addressed issues such as the standard of living of indigenous peoples in 
Taiwan and the exploitation of undocumented foreign workers by private 
individuals.150  Another example can be found in an oral intervention before 
the Commission on Human Rights by a representative for the Coalition 
against Trafficking in Women in March 1998.  The statement indicated 
serious concerns regarding prostitution and trafficking of women and girls 
in Asian countries, particularly in Taiwan. 151   In the statement, the 
organisation also called for the provision of access to Taiwanese NGOs to 
UN bodies and urged the Special Rapporteur on violence against women to 
thoroughly investigate the issue of trafficking in women and girls in 
countries including Taiwan.152 
In short, it can be observed that after 1971, discussions concerning Taiwan 
and general international human rights law have been limited. Particularly 
at the inter-governmental level, very few references can be found in 
relation to the obligations of the Taiwanese government under general 
international human rights law.   
B. Application of General International Human Rights Law to the ROC 
(Taiwan) 
                                                            
150   UNCHR Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 
µ3RVVLEOH:D\VDQG0HDQVRI)DFLOLWDWLQJ WKH3HDFHIXODQG&RQVWUXFWLYH6ROXWLRQRI3UREOHPV
,QYROYLQJ 0LQRULWLHV )LQDO 5HSRUW 6XEPLWWHG E\ 0U $VEM¡UQ (LGH¶  -XO\  81 'RF
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34/Add.2, 17-18. 
151  UNCHR, Fifty-)RXUWK6HVVLRQµ6XPPDU\5HFRUGRIWKHWK0HHWLQJ0DUFK¶
August 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/SR.25, paras 79-81. 
152  ibid para 82. 
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1. The Notion of Necessity and the Application of General International 
Human Rights Law to the ROC (Taiwan) 
Although Taiwan had participated in the human rights-related work of the 
UN prior to 1971, whether general international human rights law 
continues to apply to Taiwan until present day remains to be explored.  A 
few observations can be made based upon the practice introduced above.  
Firstly, after the de-recognition of the ROC government, the human rights 
situation in Taiwan has received very little attention at the international 
level. Not only is Taiwan excluded from participating in inter-governmental 
ERGLHV WKDW H[DPLQH 6WDWHV¶ LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI KXPDQ ULJKWV 7DLZDQ LV
also absent from any monitoring of implementation on the part of China.  
Secondly, even in situations where human rights issues concerning Taiwan 
are brought about in international fora, few discussions actually touch upon 
the question of whether Taiwan bears obligations under general 
international human rights law.  However, this lack of discussion should 
not be interpreted to suggest that general international human rights law 
should not apply to Taiwan.  It can be argued that such a vacuum in fact 
confirms the need for more attention and an acknowledgment that general 
international human rights law does apply and that the Taiwanese 
government bears corresponding obligations under international law. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the binding force of general international human 
rights law does not only stem from the consent of States.  The fact that 
some rules apply irrespective of opposition or withdrawal of consent of 
States demonstrates that those rules need to be binding for the peaceful 
co-existence of States and the order of the international community.  The 
notion of necessity also serves as a basis for justifying the application of 
general international human rights law to certain non-State actors.  
Chapter 4 argues that obligations of general international human rights law 
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should be imposed on entities taking on functions of States and/or 
exercising effective control over territories and populations, because such 
expansion of scope of application is necessary to ensure the protection of 
human rights in areas where States cannot exercise control.   
Turning to the case of Taiwan, as described in Section II, Taiwan indeed 
displays characteristics and exercises functions of a State, including 
exerting effective and exclusive territorial control.  Applying the arguments 
presented in Chapter 4, it is necessary to apply general international 
human rights law to Taiwan. In addition, the international human rights 
treaties in which Taiwan attempts to participate remain limited.  Even 
though discussions are ongoing regarGLQJ WKH ³UDWLILFDWLRQ´ RI RWKHU
LQVWUXPHQWVLWLVOLNHO\WKDWVXFK³UDWLILFDWLRQV´ZLOOQRWEHFRPSOHWHGLQWKH
near future.  Thus, the necessity to impose on Taiwan obligations under 
general international human rights law becomes even more evident in 
order to ensure individuals in Taiwan enjoy comprehensive human rights 
protection. 
2. The Application of General International Human Rights Law at the 
Domestic Level in the ROC (Taiwan) 
While necessity may serve as the basis for the binding force of general 
international human rights law upon Taiwan, the following discussion 
examines whether general international human rights law has been applied 
at the domestic level.   
,Q WHUPV RI 7DLZDQ¶V SUDFWLFH WKHUH LV D ODFN RI IRFXV RQ JHQHUDO
international human rights law, as opposed to treaties.  Such a tendency 
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can be observed in statements of government officials,153 human rights 
white papers, 154  and national human rights reports. 155   When these 
VWDWHPHQWV DQG GRFXPHQWV H[SUHVV WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V FRPPLWPHQW WR
implement international human rights standards or examine the human 
rights situations in Taiwan, references are usually made to international 
human rights treaties, especially the ICCPR and the ICESCR.  It may be 
argued that, having been isolated from the international human rights 
system since its de-recognition, the Taiwanese government deems 
(attempted) participation in international human rights treaties as the most 
GLUHFWZD\WRUHVXPHLQWHUDFWLRQZLWKWKHV\VWHP<HWWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V
treaty-focused approach does not imply that it does not consider itself 
bound by general international human rights law.   
As a matter of domestic law, it is unclear if general international human 
rights law is applicable law in courts in Taiwan.  The ROC Constitution does 
not specify the status of general international law in the domestic legal 
system, and to date there has not been a constitutional interpretation 
providing clarification on this topic.  Unlike human rights treaties, rules of 
general international human rights law has rarely been invoked by parties 
LQFDVHVRUVHUYHGDV WKHEDVLV IRU MXGJHV¶RSLQLRQV  ,QVLWXDWLRQVZKHUH
judgments involve discussions concerning international human rights 
standards other than treaty provisions, references are usually made to 
³LQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQULJKWVSUHFHGHQWV´MXULVSUXGHQFHRIUHJLRQDOKXPDQ
rights courts),156  ³UXOHV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO KXPDQ ULJKWV ODZ´157  or simply 
                                                            
153 2IILFHRIWKH3UHVLGHQW52&µ3UHVLGHQW&KHQ¶V,QDXJXUDO$GGUHVV¶Q78). 
154 52&µ5en Quan Li Guo Yu Ren Quan Bao Zhang De Ji Chu Jian She ± 2002 Nian Guo Jia 
Ren Quan Zheng Ce Bai Pi Shu [Human Rights Infrastructure-Building for a Human Rights 
State ± 2002 Human Rights Policy White Paper of the Republic of China (Taiwan)@¶ 
155 See ROC, µ2002 Nian Guo Jia Ren Quan Bao Gao (Shi Xing Bao Gao) [2002 National 
Human Rights Report (Trial Report)]¶ (December2003); ROC, µ2007-2008 Nian Guo Jia Ren 
Quan Bao Gao (Shi Xing Bao Gao) [2002 National Human Rights Report (Trial Report)]¶ 
(December 2009). 
156 Eg Taiwan High Court (ROC) Judgment, 96-Zhu-Shang-Geng-Yi-1 (3 January March 2008); 
Taiwan High Court (ROC) Judgment, 101-Shang-Zhong-Geng-San-Zi-4 (14 May 2013) (both 
238 
³LQWHUQDWLRQDO KXPDQ ULJKWV´ 158   While it may be argued that some of 
these notions overlap with the concept of general international law, these 
vague references were usually made by the courts when summarising the 
submissions of the parties, and there is no clear indication that these 
standards subsequently served as the basis for the judgments.  A rare 
example of the courts applying standards other than human rights treaties 
is a case decided by the Taipei High Administrative Court in 2013.159  In 
this case, the applicant, a death row inmate, attempted to send out letters 
documenting his personal life and experience, but he was later asked by 
the prison officials to amend the letters on account of potential disruption 
of discipline and order in the prison.  The applicant refused to abide by 
such a request and thus brought a case alleging violation of his freedoms 
of expression and privacy of correspondence.160  The applicant based his 
DUJXPHQWVLQSDUWRQWKHUHOHYDQW³LQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQULJKWVVWDQGDUGV´
deriving from both treaty law (Articles 7 and 10 of the ICCPR and General 
Comment No 21 of the Human Rights Committee) and non-treaty 
instruments (UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners 161 ).  While determining the extent of rights enjoyed by the 
applicant, the Court applied the various provisions of the Standard 
Minimum Rules, as well as the Body of Principles for the Protection of All 
                                                                                                                                                            
concern pre-trial detention). 
157  Eg Taipei High Administrative Court (ROC) Judgment, 99-Su-1677 (28 June 2012) 
(concerning housing rights and forced evictions); Taipei High Administrative Court (ROC) 
Judgment, 99-Su-1999 (7 April 2011) FRQFHUQLQJFKLOGUHQ¶VIUHHGRPRIH[SUHVVLRQ. 
158 Eg Supreme Court (ROC) Judgment, 97-Tai-Kang-707 (3 October 2008) (concerning pre-
trial detention); Supreme Court (ROC) Judgment, 97-Tai-Shang-3508 (24 July 2008) 
(concerning the rights of defendant in criminal proceedings). 
159 Eg Taipei High Administrative Court (ROC) Judgment, 101-Su-1318 (11 April 2013). 
160  7KH ³freedom of privacy of correspondence´ LV SURYLGHG LQ $UWLFOH  RI WKH 52&
Constitution.  According to Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 631, the purpose of this provision 
³is to protect the people¶s right to choose whether or not, with whom, when and how to 
communicate and the contents of their communication without arbitral invasion by the State 
DQG RWKHUV ´  -XGLFLDO <XDQ 52& -XGLFLDO <XDQ ,QWHUSUHWDWLRQ 1R   -XO\ 
<http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=631> accessed 20 
August 2014. 
161 µStandard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners¶ First United Nations Congress on 
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (22 August-3 September 1955) (30 
August 1955) UN Doc A/CONF/611, Annex I. 
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Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment162 adopted by the 
UN General Assembly in 1988.  These instruments in and of themselves 
might not carry binding force under international law, it has been argued 
that the principles derived from Standard Minimum Rules have obtained 
customary status,163 and many provisions of the Body of Principles for the 
Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment 
aim to ³set forth, and sometimes develop, principles already recognized 
XQGHU FXVWRPDU\ ODZ´164  Although it was not expressly indicated in the 
judgment of the Taipei High Administrative Court that these principles 
carried binding force as a matter of domestic law, the Court indeed used 
these principles to examine the proper treatment that the prison 
authorities were obligated to provide. 
Overall, the courts in Taiwan rarely apply general international human 
rights law in their judgments, and when rules other than human rights 
treaties are invoked, references are usually vague and do not point to the 
specific sources of rights.  However, the lack of judicial practice does not 
necessarily suggest that the courts consider general international human 
rights law inapplicable.  Although there is no constitutional or statutory 
provision authorising the application of general international law, past 
judicial decisions suggest that such rules do indeed form a part of the 
domestic legal system.  One of the earliest cases on this issue was decided 
by the Shanghai Provisional Court in 1927.  As the Court ruled on the issue 
RI MXULVGLFWLRQ WKH ³FXVWRP RI SXEOLF LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´ FRQFHUQLQJ
MXULVGLFWLRQZDVDSSOLHGWRGHWHUPLQHWKHLPPXQLW\HQMR\HGE\³WKHVWDWH-
                                                            
162  Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment, UNGA Res 43/173 (9 December 1988) UN Doc A/RES/43/173. 
163  Roger S Clark, The United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Program: 
Formulation of Standards and Efforts at Their Implementation (U Pennsylvania P 1994) 99. 
164 81&+5µReport of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention¶12 January 1993) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1993/24. 
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RZQHG QDYLJDWLRQ RUJDQ RI D IULHQGO\ FRXQWU\´165  In a number of other 
cases, courts have also applied principles of international law in their 
judgments concerning jurisdiction 166  and immunity. 167   In 1994, a 
questionnaire from the International Law Association was forwarded by its 
Chinese (Taiwan) Branch to the Judicial Yuan, and question 10 of the 
TXHVWLRQQDLUHDVNHGKRZFRXUWVLQ7DLZDQDVFHUWDLQWKH³YDOLGLW\FRQWHQW
VFRSH DQG PDQQHU RI DSSOLFDWLRQ´ RI D UXOH ³GHULYLQJ IURP FXVWRP RU
RWKHUZLVH IURP JHQHUDO LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´ 168   In response, the Judicial 
<XDQVWDWHGWKDW³SDUWLes involved have the burden to prove [the validity, 
content, scope and manner of application of the international custom] and 
WKH FRXUW LV DOVR FRPSHWHQW WR LQLWLDWH DQ LQYHVWLJDWLRQ WKHUHIRU´169  The 
Judicial Yuan further indicated that, to ascertain a rule of general 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ ³WKH FRXUW FDQ UHIHU WR WKH OHJDO RSLQLRQ RI WKH
International Court of Justice, other courts in the Republic of China, 
H[HFXWLYHEUDQFKHVDQGGRPHVWLFDQG IRUHLJQ VFKRODUV´170  This response 
suggests that courts in Taiwan in fact can apply general international law 
in their judgments, and thus general international human rights law should 
DOVREHFRQVLGHUHGDVDSSOLFDEOHODZLQ7DLZDQ¶VGRPHVWLFOHJDOV\VWHP 
V. Possible Concerns for Acknowledging the Applicability of  
International Human Rights Law to the ROC (Taiwan) 
                                                            
165  Shanghai Provisional Court (ROC) Judgment, 15-Min-Shi-4885 (30 September 1927), 
translated in 40 ILR 84. 
166 Eg Taipei District Court (ROC) Judgment, 54-Su-2107 (8 November 1965), translated in 40 
ILR 56 (invoking a ³principle generally recognized by international law´ concerning fictitious 
territory). 
167  Eg Taipei District Court (ROC) Judgment, 90-Su-387 (3 June 2003) (invoking rules of 
³customary LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ´ concerning immunity of a diplomatic mission of a foreign State); 
Taiwan High Court (ROC) Judgment, 92-Shang-Yi-875 (17 February 2004) (upholding the 
previous case on the basis of ³international practices and customs´). 
168 µResponses of the Chinese (Taiwan) Branch of the International Law Association and the 
Judicial Yuan of the Republic of China to the Questionnaire of the International Law 
Association Regarding the International Law Practice in the Municipal Courts of the Republic of 
China¶ (1994-95) 13 Chinese YB Intl L & Affairs 168, 192. 
169 ibid 202. 
170 ibid. 
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As discussed in previous chapters, the potential concerns for 
acknowledging the applicability of conventional and general international 
human rights law to unrecognised entities include the risks of improper 
legitimisation or implied recognition, lack of ability to protect and fulfil 
human rights, and the danger of downgrading standards of protection.  In 
relation to the latter two concerns, it is clear that such concerns are not 
valid for the case of Taiwan. As emphasised in this chapter, the degree of 
exclusive territorial control exercised by the Taiwanese government and its 
effective governance and State-like functions suggest that it is the entity 
that is best in place to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights in Taiwan.  
7KH JRYHUQPHQW¶V HIIRUWV LQ LQFRUSRUDWLQJ LQWHUQDWLRQDO KXPDQ ULJKWV
treaties into the domestic legal system further demonstrate that Taiwan 
has the required ability.  In terms of the danger of downgrading standards 
of protection, as explained in Chapter 3, this concern usually applies in 
situations where bilateral agreements incorporating human rights elements 
contain lower standards of human rights.  In the case of Taiwan, the 
attempts to participate in treaties have only been aimed at multilateral 
human rights treaties, thus eliminating the concern of downgrading 
standards. 
Turning to the risk of improper legitimisation and implied recognition: 
although there has been concern that conclusion of bilateral agreements 
with Taiwan may imply recognition, 171  similar concerns have not been 
voiced in relation to the participation in international human rights treaties 
or the applicability of general international human rights law.  With the 
H[FHSWLRQ RI WKH 81¶V UHMHFWLRQ RI 7DLZDQ¶V DWWHPSW WR SDUWLFLpate in the 
ICCPR, the ICESCR, and the CEDAW, the attitudes of other members of the 
international community towards the applicability of international human 
                                                            
171 Attix (n 18). 
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rights law to Taiwan remains unclear.  As mentioned earlier, 172  even 
though the EU occasionally comments on the human rights conditions in 
Taiwan and seems to support the incorporation of the two Covenants into 
7DLZDQ¶V GRPHVWLF ODZ 173  it has not explicitly commented on the 
applicability of these treaties to Taiwan.  Without knowing the positions of 
other States and international actors on this issue, it is difficult to 
unequivocally conclude whether the theoretical concerns of legitimisation 
and recognition are valid in relation to Taiwan.  Nevertheless, as argued in 
previous chapters, even if these concerns exist, they are often outweighed 
by the need to safeguard human rights by imposing human rights 
obligations on unrecognised entities.  The same rationale should equally 
apply to the case of Taiwan, and such concerns should not bar the 
application of international human rights law to Taiwan. 
VI. Conclusion 
The ROC (Taiwan) remains a peculiar case under international law.  While 
it displays State-like features and satisfies the criteria of statehood, it 
receives limited recognition from other States.  While the international 
legal status of Taiwan remains disputed, it is clear that Taiwan fits the 
definition of an unrecognised entity as adopted in this thesis.  This chapter 
has explored the applicability of international human rights law to Taiwan 
by examining the practice concerning Taiwan in terms of both conventional 
and general international human rights law and applying arguments put 
forward in previous chapters.  In terms of human rights treaties, although 
the ROC has signed and ratified more than twenty human rights treaties 
prior to 1970, after its de-recognition as a result of UN General Assembly 
Resolution 2758, the validity of the ROC government¶V VLJQDWXUHV DQG
                                                            
172 See text accompanying n 1. 
173 European Union - European External Action Service (n 1). 
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ratifications becaPH GLVSXWHG  :KLOH VRPH SUDFWLFH VXJJHVWV WKH 52&¶V
signatures and ratifications were no longer recognised, this thesis argues 
that those human rights treaties should continue to apply on the basis of 
the principle of continuity of international human rights obligations.  After 
1970, Taiwan was isolated from inter-governmental organisations and 
excluded from participation in international treaties, and it was only until 
recent years has Taiwan formally attempted to accede to or ratify 
international human rights treaties.  Although these attempts were 
unsuccessful, this thesis argues that it is necessary, from the point of view 
RI WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\ WR DFNQRZOHGJH 7DLZDQ¶V FDSDFLW\ WR
participate in these treaties since Taiwan is the entity that is best placed to 
implement the obligations provided in them.  In addition, Taiwan has 
expressed its consent to be bound by these treaties by submitting 
instruments of ratification/accession, issuing unilateral declarations, and 
incorporating these instruments into the domestic legal system.  In short, 
the treaties ratified by the ROC government prior to its de-recognition and 
the treaties that it attempts to adhere to in the recent decade should all be 
applicable to Taiwan. 
Turning to general international human rights law, although, compared to 
human rights treaties, less practice is found at both the international and 
domestic levels, this thesis argues that the lack of practice should not be 
interpreted as suggesting that general international human rights law does 
not apply to Taiwan.  On the contrary, the lack of practice and attention 
further demonstrates the need to examine the human rights situations in 
Taiwan in light of general international human rights law and to impose 
corresponding obligations on Taiwan.  This is necessary in order to ensure 
that the duty-bearer is in fact an entity that is capable of respecting, 
protecting, and fulfilling the rights of individuals living in Taiwan. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
As explained at the outset, the aim of this thesis is to explore whether and 
on what basis international human rights law applies to unrecognised 
entities, and especially to the ROC (Taiwan).  Chapter 1 set out the 
background of these research questions and considered the approach to be 
taken to answer those questions.  Issues regarding sources of international 
law in general, and international human rights law in particular, were 
discussed, and it was then established that this thesis would examine two 
groups of law: international human rights treaties and general international 
human rights law, separately.1  With the research questions identified and 
the framework of research determined, Chapter 1 presented the 
methodology and structure that would be adopted to answer the research 
questions. 
Chapter 2 explored the notion of statehood and theories concerning State 
recognition under international law.  In this connection, the traditional 
criteria of statehood (permanent population, defined territory, government, 
and the capacity to enter into relations with other States) and other 
proposed criteria (independence, permanence or stability, willingness and 
ability to observe international law, legality of establishment, self-
determination, and recognition) were examined. 2   While there is little 
doubt that the traditional criteria reflect customary international law and 
are considered as prerequisites for an entity to obtain statehood, the same 
cannot be said in relation to the additional criteria.  In many cases, the 
additional criteria are used as factors for the evaluation of whether the 
traditional criteria of statehood are fulfilled, rather than as standalone 
                                                            
1 See Chapter 1, Section II.A. 
2 See Chapter 2, Section II.A. 
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criteria that are required for the purpose of determining statehood. 3  
Among the proposed additional criteria is the notion of recognition.  
Considering that recognition, or rather the lack of recognition, is an 
important aspect of the concept of an ³XQUHFRJQLVHG HQWLW\´ &KDSWHU 
analysed the theories and effect of recognition.4   
Considerations of international human rights law contributed to the 
FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRI³XQUHFRJQLVHGHQWLWLHV´5  While the acts of many non-
6WDWH DFWRUV PLJKW LQIOXHQFH LQGLYLGXDOV¶ HQMR\PHQW RI KXPDQ ULJKWV WKH
thesis seeks to focus on those entities whose relationships vis-à-vis rights 
holders resemble those between States and individuals living in their 
territories.  Building on the discussions of the various statehood criteria, 
Chapter 2 defined ³XQUHFRJQLVHG HQWLWLHV´ as entities that fulfil the 
WUDGLWLRQDOFULWHULDRIVWDWHKRRGRU WKH³0RQWHYLGHRFULWHULD´DQGDFKLHYH
de facto independence but are not generally recognised as States by the 
international community.  Based on the definition provided in this chapter, 
the criteria of unrecognised entities can be broken down into three aspects: 
a) the Montevideo criteria of statehood; b) de facto independence; and c) 
a lack of general State recognition.  While the interpretation of the 
Montevideo criteria in this context is more or less similar to the context of 
statehood,6 the other two criteria deserved further elaboration.  Regarding 
the notion of de facto independence, this thesis requires that unrecognised 
HQWLWLHVPXVWQRWEHVXEMHFWHGWRWKH³HIIHFWLYHFRQWURO´RIRWKHU6WDWHVRU
entities.7  7KH³HIIHFWLYHFRQWURO´WHVWoriginally adopted by the ICJ in the 
Nicaragua Case, is used here to exclude entities whose acts, including 
those that may affect the enjoyment of human rights, can be attributed to 
                                                            
3 See Chapter 2, Section II.A.2. 
4 See Chapter 2, Section II.B. 
5 See Chapter 2, Section III.A. 
6 See Chapter 2, Section III.B.1. 
7 See Chapter 2, Section III.B.2. 
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another State.  In those cases, the third State may be held liable for the 
violations of human rights, and the study of the obligations of the entity 
subjected to its control is no longer necessary.  Regarding the final 
criterion, the lack of general recognition, the thesis provided a number of 
indicators as to whether an entity has received general recognition.  In the 
assessment of whether an entity fits the definition of unrecognised entities, 
the attitudes of other States and international organisations should be 
taken into consideration.  The Holy See, the Cook Islands, and Palestine 
were provided as examples as entities excluded from this thesis since 
according to existing practice, they would be allowed to participate in 
international human rights treaties if they express the intention to do so.8 
Chapters 3 and 4 respectively examined the application of international 
human rights treaties and general international human rights law to 
unrecognised entities.  Chapter 3 began by analysing the notion of treaties 
under international law and then defined a treaty as ³D FRQVHQVXDO
agreement concluded between two or more subjects of international law in 
written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a 
single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its 
SDUWLFXODUGHVLJQDWLRQ´.9  The examination of whether unrecognised entities 
may bear obligations under international human rights treaties was 
conducted in two stages: firstly regarding the capacity to conclude or 
participate in treaties (treaty-making capacity), secondly concerning 
possible means to express consent to be bound by human rights treaties.  
In the first stage, this chapter studied the treaty-making capacity of States, 
international organisations, insurgents, NLMs, and entities created to 
administer territories, and the rationale behind granting them such 
                                                            
8 See Chapter 2, Section III.B.3. 
9 See Chapter 3, Section I. 
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capacity.  The treaty-making capacity of States appears to stem from the 
increasing importance of treaties in the international legal order and the 
role of States as the principal actor at the international level.10  Regarding 
international organisations, different schools of thought were proposed as 
the basis for their treaty-making capacity.  Some argued that treaty-
making capacity of an international organisation derived from the 
delegation of authority of the member States of that organisation.  Others 
considered international legal personality as the basis of international 
RUJDQLVDWLRQV¶ WUHDWy-making capacity.  While both schools have met with 
criticisms, this thesis recalled the ICJ¶V YLHZ in the Reparation Advisory 
Opinion concerning the UN,11 that the nature and capacities of a subject of 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ ³GHSHQGV XSRQ WKH QHHGV RI WKH FRPPXQLW\´ DQG WKH
³UHTXLUHPHQWV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLIH´12  Among the other non-State actors 
whose treaty-making capacity were examined in this chapter, necessity, or 
the needs of the international community, also serves as the basis of 
treaty-making capacity of insurgents.13 
Of the rationales that justify the possession of treaty-making capacity of 
States and various categories of non-States actors, this thesis argued that 
necessity can also be used to explain why the capacity of unrecognised 
entities to conclude or participate in international human rights treaties 
should be acknowledged.  Three potential sources of necessity were 
presented and examined.  Firstly, it is necessary to allow unrecognised 
entities to conclude or participate in international human rights treaties 
since they are the only entities that are in place to respect, protect, and 
                                                            
10 See Chapter 3, Section II.A.2. 
11 See Chapter 3, Section II.B.2. 
12 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) 
[1949] ICJ Rep 174, 176. 
13 See Chapter 3, Section II.C.2. 
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fulfil the rights provided in those treaties. 14   This is especially true 
considering the effective and exclusive control of an unrecognised entity 
over its territory.  Secondly, the necessity for the continuity of 
international human rights treaty obligations may support acknowledging 
treaty-making capacity of unrecognised entities.  To examine whether 
there is a principle of continuity in terms of international human rights 
obligations, this chapter analysed rules concerning denunciation of 
international human rights treaties and State succession in respect of such 
treaties.15  While the first set of rules do not provide a satisfactory basis for 
the principle of continuity of obligations, the second set of rules suggest 
that an unrecognised entity should be allowed to have the capacity to 
assume the obligations under the human rights treaties undertaken by the 
State that formerly exercised effective control of the territory in question.  
Acknowledging WKH XQUHFRJQLVHG HQWLW\¶V FDSDFLW\ LQ WKLV UHJDUG LV
necessary in order to guarantee the enjoyment of rights already acquired 
by the people living in that territory.  The last potential source of necessity 
is the notion of international legal personality. 16   This approach is 
problematic for many reasons.  The determination of whether an entity 
possesses international legal personality is a difficult task as there is no 
agreed definition of international legal personality.  More importantly, the 
relationship between international legal personality and capacities to act at 
the international level remains disputed, and not all international legal 
persons possess the same capacities.  In other words, even if an entity is 
thought to possess international legal personality, it does not mean that 
the entity would thus possess treaty-making capacity.  Therefore, the 
notion of international legal personality alone does not justify the necessity 
                                                            
14 See Chapter 3, Section III.A.1. 
15 See Chapter 3, Section III.A.2. 
16 See Chapter 3, Section III.A.3. 
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to allow unrecognised entities to conclude or participate in international 
human rights treaties.  The chapter also examined four possible reasons 
EHKLQG RWKHU 6WDWHV¶ UHOXFWDQFH RI DFNQRZOHGJLQJ XQUHFRJQLVHG HQWLWLHV¶
capacity to conclude international human rights treaties.17  Overall, there 
are reasonable grounds to support the necessity of allowing unrecognised 
entities to conclude or participate in international human rights treaties.  
The potential concerns either only exist in theory or bear little relevance 
when examined in light of the actual practice involving unrecognised 
entities.   
After establishing that the treaty-making capacity of unrecognised entities 
in relation to international human rights treaties should be acknowledged, 
this chapter moved on to present three possible means for these entities to 
express consent to be bound: conclusion of bilateral human rights treaties, 
official participation in multilateral human rights treaties (through the 
submission of signatures, accession, and ratification, etc), and unilateral 
expression of consent to be bound by such treaties. 18   This chapter 
provided examples of the first means, explained the challenges of the 
second means, and presented the third means as an alternative to official 
participation since official participation of unrecognised entities is only 
possible if existing States parties agree to it.  In short, this chapter argued 
that not only should unrecognised entities be deemed as possessing the 
capacity to conclude or participate in international human rights treaties, 
there are ways available for these entities to express their consent to be 
bound.  If an unrecognised entity in fact expresses such consent, it should 
be considered bound by the treaty in question. 
                                                            
17 See Chapter 3, Section III.B. 
18 See Chapter 3, Section IV. 
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Chapter 4 explored the application of non-treaty rules of international 
KXPDQULJKWVODZRU³JHQHUDOLQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQULJKWVODZ´In order to 
answer the question whether unrecognised entities are bound by general 
international human rights law, this chapter looked at two aspects: a) the 
nature and authority of different types of general international law 
(international custom, general principles of law, and peremptory norms); 
and b) its applicability to certain categories of non-State actors.  With the 
first aspect, it was acknowledged that the theory of consent has long been 
invoked as the basis of authority of international custom.  However, as 
shown in this chapter, this theory does not provide a satisfactory 
MXVWLILFDWLRQ IRU WKH SURKLELWLRQ RI ³VXEVHTXHQW REMHFWRUV´ and for barring 
new States from opting out of existing customs.19  Thus, an alternative 
WKHRU\ RI ³VRFLDO QHFHVVLW\´ ZDV SURSRVHG20 arguing that there are rules 
that are necessary conditions of the international society.  According to this 
theory, these rules exist on the basis of justice and common interest and 
must be binding because members of the international community consider 
³RUGHUDQGQRWFKDRVLVWKHJRYHUQLQJSULQFLSOHRIWKHZRUld in which they 
KDYHWROLYH´21  The notion of necessity can also be observed in discussions 
concerning the basis of authority of general principles of law 22  and 
peremptory norms.23 
Turning to the second aspect, this chapter examined the applicability of 
general international human rights law to international organisations, 
armed groups, and entities created to administer territories. 24  
International jurisprudence, the work of international bodies, especially 
those within the UN, and scholarly writings were analysed to see whether 
                                                            
19 See Chapter 4, Section II.A.2. 
20 See Chapter 4, Section II.A.2.c. 
21 Andrew Clapham, %ULHUO\¶V/DZRI1DWLRQV (OUP 2012) 53. 
22 See Chapter 4, Section II.B.2. 
23 See Chapter 4, Section II.C.2. 
24 See Chapter 4, Section III. 
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these non-State actors were bound by general international human rights 
law and what bases were giving to justify its applicability.  Many of the 
bases in fact relate to the State-like characteristics of those actors (such as 
control over territory, structure and organisation of government, etc).  
Following the introduction of practice related to the applicability to 
unrecognised entities,25 this chapter illustrated how the notion of necessity 
can be invoked to support the application of general international human 
rights law to unrecognised entities.26 
Building on what was developed in Chapters 2 to 4, Chapter 5 explored the 
application of international human rights law to the ROC (Taiwan).  The 
chapter first tackled the issue of the international legal status of the ROC in 
light of the criteria of statehood and those of unrecognised entities 
introduced in Chapter 2.  Although Taiwan fulfils all of the traditional 
criteria of statehood and most of the additional criteria, its status remains 
controversial. 27   Still, since Taiwan fits the definition of unrecognised 
entities provided in this thesis,28  the remainder of the chapter examined 
the case of Taiwan in light of the arguments supporting the application of 
international human rights law in Chapters 3 and 4, as well as the potential 
concerns. 29   In terms of treaties, this chapter studied the ROC 
government¶V SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO KXPDQ ULJKWV WUHDWLHV SULRU WR
its de-recognition, the impact of the de-recognition on the signatures, 
accessions, and ratifications by the ROC, as well as its attempts to 
participate in international human rights treaties in recent years. 30  
Considering the status of Taiwan and the practice described in this chapter, 
it is necessary to acknowledge that Taiwan has the capacity to participate 
                                                            
25 See Chapter 4, Section IV.A. 
26 See Chapter 4, Section IV.B. 
27 See Chapter 5, Section II.B. 
28 See Chapter 5, Section II.C. 
29 See Chapter 5, Sections III-V. 
30 See Chapter 5, Section III.A. 
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in international human rights treaties.  Firstly, acknowledging such 
capacity echoes with the principle of continuity of obligations, in terms of 
the treaties in which the ROC government participated prior to its de-
recognition.  Secondly, Taiwan is the only entity that is able to implement 
the rights provided in international human rights treaties in its territory.  
Furthermore, Taiwan has expressed its consent to be bound by a number 
of international human rights treaties through the submission of 
instruments of ratification/accession, unilateral declaration, and 
incorporation of human rights treaties into the domestic legal system.  In 
sum, the international human rights treaties that the ROC government 
participated in prior to its de-recognition and those it attempted to 
participate in reason year should all be considered applicable to Taiwan.  
As for general international human rights law, there has been less practice 
at both international and domestic levels concerning its applicability to 
Taiwan.  However, this chapter argued that the lack of practice does not 
mean Taiwan is not bound by general international human rights law.  
Instead, it signals the need for more attention and monitoring for the 
implementation of general international human rights law in Taiwan, and 
only through holding Taiwan as the duty-bearer can the objective of 
respecting, protecting, and fulfilling the rights of individuals living in 
Taiwan be achieved. 
Although Taiwan is the case study of this thesis, it is envisaged that the 
arguments developed here apply to other unrecognised entities as well.  
While different backgrounds and circumstances contribute to the lack of 
recognition and disputed status of each unrecognised entity under 
international law, the rationale behind acknowledging the applicability of 
international human rights law to unrecognised entities ± necessity ± is 
firmly based on their common features.  While there is limited practice 
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actually explicitly admitting that unrecognised entities may possess 
obligations under international human rights law, this thesis argues that 
the theories and practice regarding international human rights law and 
non-State actors provide reasonable bases to justify the acknowledgment 
of its application to unrecognised entities.  It should be noted that such an 
acknowledgement does not imply that unrecognised entities have the 
capacity to enjoy rights and bear obligations under other fields of 
international law.  Most of the arguments supporting the application of 
international law to unrecognised entities are grounded upon the 
characteristics of international human rights law and are not easily 
transferrable to other areas. 
Looking beyond unrecognised entities, it might also be possible to use the 
test of necessity to assess the applicability of international human rights 
law to other non-State actors.  After all, the test was first invoked by the 
ICJ to determine the nature and capacities of subjects of international law, 
and in particular international organisations.  Discussions concerning the 
treaty-making capacity and the applicability of general international human 
rights law to non-State actors in this thesis also reveal that the rationale 
behind acknowledging such capacity and applicability echo the needs of the 
international community.  Furthermore, as not all actors in a legal system 
possess identical ranges of capacities and bear the same scope of 
obligations, the necessity test may also help to ascertain the extent of 
obligations of various categories of non-State actors under international 
human rights law.  Although the test was introduced 65 years ago, it 
remains a useful tool that demonstrates how rules of international law can 
be flexibly interpreted to accommodate emerging new actors and how the 
international legal order may evolve to meet the challenges brought about 
by such actors.   
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